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ABSTRACT 
Liquidity has always been part of finance theory but the importance of liquidity has been 
magnified due to the recent financial crisis. Although the number of studies on liquidity 
have increase over the years, some questions remains unanswered as past research tend 
to focus on US market. Therefore, the objective of this PhD is to answer some of the 
questions by investigating the potential of illiquid as an investment style, as well as the 
relationship of illiquidity with variables such as monetary conditions and oil. The PhD 
thesis also studies countries other than the US.    
Chapter one outlined the aims of this PhD thesis, while chapter two provides the literature 
review. Chapter three is the first empirical chapter and it finds evidence to support the 
claim that market liquidity and individual stock pricing due to illiquidity are both affected 
by monetary conditions, justifying the intervention of central banks when required. 
Chapter four is the second empirical chapter, which focuses on the ability of illiquidity 
as an investment style in the UK during the financial crisis. The results show that 
illiquidity can be a reliable style for the seven years pre-crisis period and it is found to be 
more stable after the crisis. Chapter five investigates the same issues but with longer 
periods and two additional analyses involving covariance versus characteristics and 
January effect. However, unlike Ibbotson et al. (2013) study on US, illiquidity is found 
to be strongly correlated to size for both chapters.  
Chapter six and seven are the last two empirical chapters and it investigates illiquidity 
and energy markets by comparing net oil exporters and importers. Chapter six studies the 
asymmetric effect of oil price and illiquidity shocks on economic growth and it finds 
evidence contradictory to past literature, as most countries response to negative oil price 
shocks. Moreover, illiquidity shocks appear to provide clearer results. Chapter seven 
investigates the relationship between economic growth and predictive variables such as 
national liquidity, global liquidity, oil and Baltic Dry. Results show that oil have the 
highest explanatory power in predicting economic growth while global liquidity has 
better explanatory power to national liquidity. Furthermore, it is discovered that oil is 
more important for the economies of net oil exporters relative to net oil importers. 
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Chapter eight summarises the overall findings and concludes on the significance of 
liquidity for finance theory, as central banks can use it to stabilise the market and 
investors can use it as an investment style. Even though liquidity provides less ability to 
predict economic growth compared to oil, liquidity still provides some explanatory 
power.  
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis of 2007/ 2008 is an important event for the global financial markets, 
as three top economists agree that this crisis is one of the worse crises since the great 
depressions (Roubini, Rogoff, & Behravesh, 2009). Brunnermeier (2009) highlights that 
the crisis might drag on over the next few years and threatens to have large repercussions 
on the real economy. Due to the severity of the crisis to the global economy, various 
studies have emerged trying to explain how the crisis happened in the first place. Crotty 
(2009) highlights that financial deregulation, complex financial products, liquidity dry-
outs and investors running for liquidity and safety as some of the reasons for the crisis. 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011) mention that liquidity dried up at banks 
due to the freezing of interbank markets and the collapse of asset-backed and mortgage-
backed securities markets. Nonetheless, liquidity (or illiquidity) appears to be one of the 
obvious reasons, as some researchers refer to the crisis as either liquidity crisis or liquidity 
crunch (Iyer, Peydró, da-Rocha-Lopes, & Schoar, 2014). 
The importance of liquidity is shown as Citigroup CEO Charles Prince made a comment 
in July 2007, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But 
as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” 
(Nakamoto & Wighton, 2007) 
Nevertheless his comments as highlighted by Crotty (2009) also reflect both the power 
of perverse incentives and the destructive dimensions of financial market competition due 
to liquidity, as companies would be able to take on major risks when there is enough 
liquidity available. Hence, resulting in the financial crisis.   
Due to the financial crisis and developments in the financial sector that have resulted in 
greater finance access (Rajan, 2006), the study of liquidity has become more prominent. 
An earlier liquidity research by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) study the relationship 
between expected returns and bid-ask spreads of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks and they discovered that market-observed average returns are an increasing 
function of the bid-ask spread. Moreover, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), using capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) on NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from July 
1962 to December 1999 show that their model provides evidence of the importance of 
liquidity on asset prices.  
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Furthermore, it is commonly known that Central Banks such as the Federal Reserve use 
monetary policy to stabilize the financial system (Cornett et al., 2011) and since liquidity 
is an issue during the crisis, there are studies done on the effect of monetary conditions 
on market liquidity. For instance, by studying the NYSE and AMEX for the period from 
1962 to 2003, Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) find strong evidence that monetary policy 
predicts illiquidity while Jensen and Moorman (2010) highlight that expansive shifts 
correspond with an increase in market liquidity while restrictive shifts bring about a drop 
in market liquidity. Therefore, chapter three which is our first empirical chapter, focuses 
on any possible relationship between monetary conditions and illiquidity by using the 
Jensen and Moorman (2010) framework. Jensen and Moorman (2010) focus on the 
United States (US) market, while we on the contrary focus on the United Kingdom (UK) 
market and also discuss the financial crisis.  
Past evidences on illiquidity appears to indicate that returns will increase with illiquidity 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). This signifies the potential of illiquidity portfolios as an 
investment style. The relationship between returns and illiquidity is quite obvious, 
Ibbotson, Chen, Kim, and Hu (2013) mention that investors clearly want more liquidity 
and hence, illiquidity should be compensated with additional returns. Thus, chapter four 
investigates the potential of illiquidity as a reliable and consistent investment style during 
the financial crisis, by using 14 years UK data divided equally into pre-crisis and post-
crisis sample periods.  
Nonetheless, Beneda (2002) highlights that the research time-period is important as it is 
shown that over a longer period (at least 14 years), average returns for growth stocks are 
found to be superior to value stocks. Although research during the financial crisis can 
provide valuable insights, we believe that research can be improved by using a longer 
sample period. Hence, chapter five is an extension of chapter four, whereby we will also 
study illiquidity as an investment style in the UK but using a longer data period of 23 
years. We have also included more analysis in chapter five such as an investigation into 
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the “covariance vs characteristics model1” and “January effect2”, in order to make the 
study on illiquidity more thorough.   
Similar to liquidity, oil has also some effect on the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
Taylor (2009) mentions that oil price increases have prolonged the financial crisis. 
Moreover, some researchers have also acknowledged the relationship between the two 
variables. For instance, Ratti and Vespignani (2013) find evidence that relative to 
developed economies, the cumulative impact of China's liquidity (measured by money 
supply) on the real price of crude oil is large and statistically significant. Due to this 
development, oil and liquidity research should be fascinating for academics and 
practitioners within the financial and energy sectors. 
Past literature such as Hamilton (1983)3 appears to show that crude oil does impact the 
economy of countries. Nonetheless, we believe researching asymmetric effects4 of oil on 
economic growth is also important, as earlier research such as Hamilton (1983) tends to 
focus only on oil price increases. However, Engemann, Owyang, and Wall (2014) study 
on US states discover that around 35 states are affected by positive oil price shocks only5. 
Similar to oil, we feel that there are potential asymmetric effects as far as illiquidity is 
concerned, as Said and Giouvris (2017) discover that the reaction of liquidity after 
restrictive monetary shifts appears to be less noticeable compared to expansive monetary 
shifts. This signifies potential asymmetric effects of positive and negative illiquidity 
shocks 6  on the economy. Although research on illiquidity asymmetries would be 
interesting and beneficial within the current environment, surprisingly, there is actually 
                                                 
1 “Characteristics model” use financial ratios such as B/M ratio to measure the expected return of stocks while “covariance model” 
considers returns sensitivity to factors such as value factors (or value premium) (Daniel and Titman 1997). Daniel and Titman (1997) 
mention that stock returns due to covariance model signifies riskiness of stocks while characteristics model means stocks are under-
priced. By comparing the two models, it will allow us to investigate which model construct the better performing portfolio. Ibbotson, 
Chen et al. (2013) who also test the theory using a different investment style factor namely the illiquidity factor, indicate that the 
“characteristics model” performs better than the “covariance model”. 
2 The January effect is a seasonal anomaly whereby prices or returns increases in the month of January in comparison to other months. 
Wachtel (1942) is one of the first to observe this in the US market (DJIA). Interestingly, January effect is commonly linked to the 
various investment styles. For example, Fama and French (1992) signify its appearance within value style while Keim (1983) mentions 
its existence within size effect. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) comment on it in his study of momentum style while Eleswarapu and 
Reinganum (1993) highlight of its presence within illiquidity premium. 
3 Hamilton (1983) who underlines that there is a significant increase in the price of crude petroleum prior to seven of the eight post 
World War II recessions in the US. 
4 Similar to Engemann, Owyang et al. (2014), we define an asymmetric effect when a country responds to either positive or negative 
oil price shocks while a symmetric effect occurs when a country responds to both shocks (positive and negative) or does not respond 
at all. 
5 Oil price shocks are calculated by comparing the current oil price with where it has been over the previous one (1) year or previous 
four (4) quarters as proposed by Hamilton (1996). For instance, positive oil price shocks are calculated as below (Engemann, Owyang 
et al., 2014): 
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ    (1.1) 
Where ݔ௧is crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the crude oil Brent price of the previous four (4) quarters. 
Please refer to chapter four (data and variables section) for more information. 
6 Hamilton (1996) equation for calculating oil price shocks appears to be simple enough and we feel that it can be applied to measure 
the shocks of other variables including illiquidity shocks.  
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limited research available. In order to close this gap, chapter six will research the 
asymmetric effects of oil price shocks and illiquidity shocks on the economy of multiple 
countries.  
As highlighted earlier, past literature such as Hamilton (1983) appears to show that crude 
oil does impact the economy of countries while Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) study 15 
European countries and find evidence of oil price shocks affecting macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation and industrial production indexes. Similarly, studies have 
emerged on the impact of liquidity on macroeconomic variables such as Næs, Skjeltorp, 
and Ødegaard (2011) who mention that at least since World-War II (WWII), market 
liquidity contains useful information for estimating the current and future state of the US 
and Norway economy. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) expand this line of research by 
studying G7 countries and they find evidence that market liquidity may contain some 
information for predicting the current and future state of the G7 economies. Even though 
both oil prices (Hamilton, 1983) and liquidity (Galariotis & Giouvris, 2015) are related 
to economic growth, there are no research available that investigates the combined effect 
of the two variables. Therefore, chapter seven studies the impact of oil and market 
liquidity on the future state of the economy. 
Chapter seven also includes national foreign exchange (NFX) and Baltic Dry index (BD) 
as part of the variables in order to make the study more comprehensive. National foreign 
exchange rate (NFX) is included because Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that the 
effect of oil on economic activity becomes more significant when oil is defined in local 
currencies. Baltic Dry index (BD) is included because it is commonly used as an indicator 
of economic activity reflecting global demand for raw materials (Bakshi, Panayotov, & 
Skoulakis, 2011).  
Since Engemann et al. (2014) highlight that most energy intensive US states appear to 
respond only to negative oil price shocks, it appears that the characteristics of the states 
or countries are also important in relation to oil research. Surprisingly, past studies seldom 
differentiate between oil exporting countries and oil importing countries, as highlighted 
by Wang, Wu, and Yang (2013). Due to this, chapter six and seven will also investigate 
the effect of oil on the economies of net oil exporting countries and net oil importing 
countries. 
To summarise, this thesis aims to investigate i) the relationship between illiquidity and 
monetary conditions in the UK, ii) the potential of using illiquidity as an investment style 
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during the financial crisis and over longer periods, iii) the covariance versus 
characteristics portfolio construction models as well as the January effect with regards to 
the investment styles, iv) responses of multiple countries to oil price shocks and illiquidity 
shocks and v) the relationship between macro-economy and various predictive variables 
such as oil, Baltic Dry index and market liquidity for net oil exporting countries and net 
oil importing countries.  
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways as follows: 
 It shows that the relationship between illiquidity and monetary conditions does not 
exist only in the US market but also in the UK markets. It also supports the claim 
that market liquidity and individual stock pricing due to illiquidity are both affected 
by monetary conditions, justifying the intervention of central banks when required. 
 It shows that illiquidity can be a reliable investment style for the seven years pre-
crisis period. Although it is profitable post-crisis, results are less convincing. 
Nonetheless, illiquidity portfolios are found to be more stable post-crisis, signifying 
investors’ preference for illiquidity based portfolios as well as profit opportunities 
with lower transaction costs.  
 It shows that over longer periods, illiquidity portfolios are able to outperform the 
market and enhance the performance of value and momentum styles. Data 
migration test revealed that illiquidity stocks are stable over time and it appears that 
the January effect of value and size is actually due to illiquid stocks. Moreover, 
compared to “covariance model”, “characteristics model” may be the best way to 
construct illiquidity portfolios as it provided consistent results. 
 It shows that the countries in our sample consisting of 5 net oil exporters and 6 net 
oil importers are mostly affected by negative oil price shocks. With regards to 
illiquidity shocks, most countries significantly respond to positive illiquidity shocks 
and remarkably, illiquidity shocks appear to be more consistent in comparison to 
oil price shocks.  
 It shows that that global illiquidity (GAM) provides greater overall explanatory 
power compared to national illiquidity (NAM). Baltic Dry index (BD) also provides 
some explanatory power while national foreign exchange (NFX) is the only 
variable that has no predictive ability when all countries are included. Nevertheless, 
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oil (OB) is the most important predictive variable for net oil exporters while Baltic 
Dry index (BD) appears to be more important for net oil importers. 
 It shows that there is a two-way causality between GDP and our predictive variables 
namely global illiquidity (GAM), Baltic Dry index (BD) and oil (OB). Oil (OB) 
continues to be important for net oil exporters, as the two-way causality disappears 
for net oil importers.    
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter two the established literature which is 
relevant to the economics of liquidity, investment styles, oil price shocks, asymmetric 
effect and Baltic Dry Index are reviewed. The purpose of the literature review is to 
provide the theoretical foundations for the empirical studies that has been conducted, in 
order to highlight related past studies and identify any potential research gaps. 
Nevertheless, the literature specific to each of the issues studied are also presented at the 
beginning of each empirical chapters to make it easier for the readers. 
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter and discusses the relationship between 
illiquidity and monetary conditions as well as the financial crisis by studying the UK 
market, as past research tend to be US focused. The study feels that UK market has strong 
research potential as its stock market is considered as one of the largest stock markets by 
capitalisation. The study uses the Jensen and Moorman (2010) framework. Two monetary 
condition measures are chosen namely the Bank of England (BOE) base rate and the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The chapter starts by investigating if there are 
any unconditional return differences for illiquid and liquid stocks, followed by a 
conditional monetary policy investigation involving market liquidity and zero-cost 
portfolio7 returns respectively. Overall, our research of the UK market shows that illiquid 
stocks generate higher returns compared to liquid stocks and when considering monetary 
conditions, expansive monetary conditions result in an increase in market liquidity and 
higher zero-cost portfolio returns. Moreover, the crisis has an effect on market liquidity 
and illiquidity premium but it is more noticeable for the former. Nevertheless, compared 
to Jensen and Moorman (2010), our overall results are weaker probably due to the lower 
volatility in the UK market relative to the US market (Bartram, Brown, & Stulz, 2012). 
                                                 
7 Zero-cost portfolio = long the Illiquid portfolio and short the Liquid portfolio. Therefore, it is similar to the illiquidity premium as 
described by other researchers such as Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993). 
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Chapter four and five are the next two empirical studies and both investigate the potential 
of illiquidity as an investment style in the UK, as it is believed that it should be given 
equal standing with other widely known investment styles such as value, growth and 
momentum. The two chapters are conducted using Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework and 
Sharpe (1992) four benchmark portfolio criteria8. Both chapters start by investigating 
whether the respective investment styles’ premium9 including illiquidity premium exist 
within the UK market. This is followed by investigations on double sorted quartile 
portfolios, which are the intersection between illiquidity and the other investment styles. 
Lastly, stock migration analysis is conducted to investigate the stability of the portfolios. 
As highlighted earlier, the difference between the two chapters is that chapter four uses 
financial crisis data while chapter five uses a longer data period. 
Chapter four divides 14 years of financial crisis data equally into pre-crisis and post-crisis 
sample periods which will allow us to assess the extent to which illiquidity is a good 
trading strategy pre and post-crisis. Our results show that illiquidity can be a reliable 
investment style for the seven years pre-crisis period. Although it is profitable post-crisis, 
results are less convincing. Nonetheless, illiquidity portfolios are found to be more stable 
post-crisis, signifying investors’ preference for illiquidity based portfolios as well as 
profit opportunities with lower transaction costs. Nevertheless, unlike Ibbotson, Chen et 
al. (2013) in their US study, illiquidity is found to be strongly correlated to size for both 
periods. 
Chapter five uses a longer data period of 23 years but we have also included an 
investigation into the covariance versus characteristics models and the January effect. 
Our findings show that illiquidity portfolios are able to outperform the market and 
enhanced the performance of value and momentum styles. Data migration tests revealed 
that illiquidity stocks are stable over time and it appears that the January effect of value 
and size is actually due to illiquid stocks. Overall, our results support that illiquidity is a 
reliable investment style that should have equal standing with the other styles. However, 
similar to chapter four, illiquidity is found to be strongly correlated to size.  
In comparison to Ibbotson, Chen et al. (2013), our results for chapter four and five are 
also weaker probably due to the different liquidity measure used and characteristic of the 
                                                 
8 Sharpe (1992) establishes that a benchmark portfolio should be 1) identifiable before the fact, 2) not easily beaten, 3) a viable 
alternative, and 4) low in cost. 
9 An Investment style premium happens when one specific style performs better than its relevant antagonist style. For example, value 
premium (value portfolio returns > growth portfolio returns) and growth premium (value portfolio returns < growth portfolio returns). 
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UK market such as the lower volatility in the UK market relative to US market (Bartram, 
Brown, & Stulz, 2012). 
Chapter six investigate the responses of multiple countries economy to oil price shocks 
and illiquidity shocks by focusing on asymmetric effects. The chapter uses Engemann et 
al. (2014) framework but instead of using US states, we will be using eleven (11) 
countries, categorised as net oil exporting and net oil importing countries. We have 
developed oil and illiquidity shocks using the Hamilton (1996) equation to investigate 
their link to the economy. Furthermore, instead of using payroll employment, we decide 
to use Gross Domestic Products (GDP) as a proxy for macroeconomic activity because 
it is readily available for the countries in our sample.   
Chapter six shows that similar to past research, our result shows some relationship 
between oil price shocks and the economy. However, although our results display an 
asymmetric effect for oil price shocks, unlike Engemann et al. (2014) the countries in our 
sample are mostly affected by negative oil price shocks. With regards to illiquidity, most 
countries respond significantly to positive illiquidity shocks and remarkably, illiquidity 
shocks appear to be more consistent in comparison to oil price shocks. Overall our study 
shows that illiquidity shocks appear to be at least an equally important determinant of the 
state of the economy compared to oil price shocks which are thought to be one of the 
most important factors for a number of years. Finally, nationalising oil price shocks does 
not appear to provide any obvious improvement in results when testing for asymmetric 
effects. 
Chapter seven is the last empirical study and it attempts to investigate the ability of five 
related predictive variables on economic growth. The five predictive variables are 
consisting of crude oil Brent (OB), national illiquidity (NAM), global illiquidity (GAM), 
national foreign exchange (NFX) and Baltic Dry index (BD). The study uses the 
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) framework and focuses on ten countries, segregated 
equally into net oil exporters and net oil importers, allowing us to investigate which 
predictive variables affect macroeconomic activity 10  of the two group of countries. 
Finally, the study also splits our net oil exporting countries into developed and emerging 
countries. Our findings show that global illiquidity (GAM) provides greater overall 
explanatory power compared to national illiquidity (NAM). Baltic Dry index (BD) also 
                                                 
10 The paper uses Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a proxy for macroeconomic indicator or variable.  
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provides some explanatory power while NFX is the only variable that has no predictive 
ability when all countries are included. Nevertheless, oil (OB) is the most important 
predictive variable for net oil exporters while Baltic Dry index (BD) appears to be more 
important for net oil importers. Finally, there is a two-way causality between GDP and 
our predictive variables namely global illiquidity (GAM), Baltic Dry index (BD) and oil 
(OB). Oil (OB) continues to be important for net oil exporters, as the two-way causality 
disappears for net oil importers.    
Lastly, Chapter eight summarised the main results of the PhD thesis and the concluding 
remarks are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two provides an overall review of the existing literature that is relevant to this 
PhD thesis. This chapter discusses various strands of literature such as liquidity, 
investment styles, oil price shocks, asymmetric effect and the Baltic Dry Index. The 
purpose of the chapter is to provide the theoretical foundations of past empirical studies 
in order to evaluate related past studies and identify any potential research gaps.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 and 2.3 introduce liquidity literature 
whereby section 2.2 discusses liquidity in general while section 2.3 compares accounting 
and market liquidity. Section 2.4 presents the overall literature review on the difference 
between illiquid and liquid assets as well as the role of liquidity in asset pricing. Since 
liquidity is the main theme of the PhD thesis, this section discusses the importance of 
liquidity in asset pricing and is relevant to all five empirical chapters. Section 2.5 presents 
the literature review that is relevant to our first empirical chapter which covers the 
relationship between illiquidity and monetary conditions.  
Section 2.6 contains a review of literature involving investment styles and the potential 
of using illiquidity as an investment style which are relevant to the second and third 
empirical chapters. This section also includes a discussion regarding covariance versus 
characteristics models and the January effect which are more relevant to the third 
empirical chapter.  
Section 2.7 presents literature covering the last two empirical chapters. The earlier part 
of the section includes literature regarding the relationship between the macro-economy 
and illiquidity as well as oil. Other than that, this section also provides a review regarding 
the importance of the countries characteristics of being either a net oil exporter or net oil 
importer.   
The latter part of the literature is more specific to the fourth and fifth empirical chapters. 
The literature review in section 2.8 is in relation to asymmetric effects and it is relevant 
to the fourth empirical chapter while section 2.9 is related to the fifth empirical chapter 
since it reviews the Baltic dry index (BD) and national foreign exchange (NFX) 
relationship with the macro-economy. Section 2.10 involves literature that is also mainly 
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applicable to the fifth empirical chapter and it is regarding causality between macro-
economy and various predictive variables. Finally, section 2.11 provides a summary of 
the overall PhD hypotheses or research questions that will be investigated in the 
subsequent chapters.  
However, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the literature specific to each of the 
issues researched are also presented at the beginning of each empirical chapters to make 
it easier for the readers to follow each chapters. 
 
2.2. WHAT IS LIQUIDITY? 
Liquidity in general term relates to the easiness of conversion of assets to cash. Moffatt 
(2017) defines liquidity as how quickly and cheaply an asset can be converted into cash 
while Mueller (2017) describes liquidity as the degree to which an asset can be quickly 
bought or sold in the market without affecting the asset's price. In this regard, the most 
liquid asset would be cash (or money), as cash is already cash and can be used 
immediately and easily (Mueller, 2017), while illiquid assets are generally assets that can 
only be sold (or converted to cash) after a long exhaustive search for a buyer and usually 
with some penalty (Moffatt, 2017). 
Cash (or money) is important for liquidity measurement, as other assets tend to be 
compared to cash in order to measure the liquidity of such assets. For instance, 
“certificates of deposit” are considered to be slightly less liquid relative to cash, because 
there is usually some penalty for converting “certificates of deposit” to cash before the 
maturity date. Similarly, other financial assets such as stocks and bonds are also 
considered fairly liquid, because such assets usually can be sold readily and an investor 
can receive their cash within a few days but sometimes with a minor penalty. Such 
financial assets can also be considered as “cash or cash equivalents” because the assets 
can be converted to cash with little effort or penalty (Mueller, 2017). 
As mentioned by Moffatt (2017), illiquid assets tend to be more difficult to sell and 
Mueller (2017) states that such assets take more effort or time before the assets can be 
converted to cash. For example, although preferred shares are also considered as financial 
assets, usually preferred shares tend to have covenants dictating how and when the assets 
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may be sold and hence preferred shares are considered less liquid compared to cash and 
ordinary shares.   
Relative to cash, real estate is another obvious example of less liquid asset because real 
estate can take weeks or months to sell or convert to cash. For example, if a homeowner 
plans to sell his/ her real estate to another homeowner, the homeowner may obtain full 
value with negotiations but it may take time, even with the current technological 
advancement. Nevertheless, if the homeowner goes to a realtor instead, the homeowner 
can get his/ her cash quicker but the homeowner may receive less of it due to fees and 
commissions payable to the realtor. Moreover, a homeowner may have to sell the real 
estate at a discount, if the homeowner needs immediate cash to meet his/ her financial 
obligations. Thus, real estate can be considered as an illiquid assets relative to cash and 
financial assets such as shares. Other examples of illiquid assets include items such as 
coins, stamps, art and other collectibles (Mueller, 2017) 
Liquidity is important for both individuals and companies as a rich individual or 
successful company may still be in trouble if the individual or company are unable to 
convert their assets into cash when required. Therefore, banks are important as it provides 
liquidity for individuals and companies when required but at a price. Nevertheless, 
individuals and companies should understand liquidity, as proper liquidity management 
helps individuals and companies from going into future financial troubles. (Mueller, 2017) 
 
2.3. ACCOUNTING LIQUIDITY AND MARKET LIQUIDITY 
There are two types of liquidity that should also be considered namely “accounting 
liquidity” and “market liquidity” (Liquidity, n.d,). Although slightly different, both 
accounting liquidity and market liquidity relate to cash and how easily the assets can be 
converted to cash. For instance, accounting liquidity looks into meeting financial 
obligations using liquid assets such as cash while market liquidity refers to the timing in 
which assets can be sold and the impact that the selling process has on the stock's price.  
There are several ratios and measurements available in order to express accounting 
liquidity and market liquidity. 
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2.3.1. ACCOUNTING LIQUIDITY  
Accounting liquidity refers to the ease in which individuals or companies can use their 
available liquid assets (such as cash) in order to meet their financial obligations. 
According to Mueller (2017), cash should be considered as a company's lifeblood 
signifying the importance of accounting liquidity. A company can sell lots of products 
and have good net earnings but if the company cannot collect the actual cash from its 
customers on a timely basis as well as not having liquid assets available to them, the 
company will be unable to pay its own financial obligations (such as debts), potentially 
resulting in bankruptcy (Mueller, 2017). Moreover, a company with illiquid assets (such 
as real estate) will need to sell its assets at a big discount if the company does not have 
cash or liquid assets to meet its financial obligations. During hard times for the business 
or the economy, a company with insufficient liquidity may be forced to make tough 
choices to meet their obligations. (Wohlner, 2017). 
There are a number of ratios that measure accounting liquidity and the measures tend to 
compare liquid assets to current liabilities based on different portions of the company’s 
current assets and current liabilities taken from the firm’s balance sheet. (Wohlner, 2017). 
 
Current Ratio = େ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲	୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ	େ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲	୐୧ୟୠ୧୪୧୲୧ୣୱ (2.1) 
Where current assets are assets that can reasonably be converted to cash within one year 
while current liabilities are financial obligations with duration of one year or less. 
 
Quick Ratio = ሺେୟୱ୦	ୟ୬ୢ	େୟୱ୦	୉୯୳୧୴ୟ୪ୣ୬୲ୱ	ା	ୗ୦୭୰୲	୘ୣ୰୫	୍୬୴ୣୱ୲୫ୣ୬୲ୱ	ା	୅ୡୡ୭୳୬୲ୱ	ୖୣୡୣ୧୴ୟୠ୪ୣሻ	େ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲	୐୧ୟୠ୧୪୧୲୧ୣୱ	  (2.2) 
Where the ratio excludes “inventories” and “other current assets” from the “current 
assets”. Current liabilities are still financial obligations with duration of one year or less. 
 
 14 
 
Cash Ratio = ሺେୟୱ୦	ୟ୬ୢ	େୟୱ୦	୉୯୳୧୴ୟ୪ୣ୬୲ୱ	ା	ୗ୦୭୰୲	୘ୣ୰୫	୍୬୴ୣୱ୲୫ୣ୬୲ୱሻ		େ୳୰୰ୣ୬୲	୐୧ୟୠ୧୪୧୲୧ୣୱ  (2.3) 
Where the ratio excludes “accounts receivable” as well as “inventories” and “other 
current assets” from the “current assets”. Current liabilities are still financial obligations 
with duration of one year or less. 
 
2.3.1.1. SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING LIQUIDITY RATIOS/MEASURES 
Among the three “accounting liquidity ratios”, the “current ratio” is considered as the 
simplest and least stringent ratio. The “quick ratio” (or acid-test ratio) is slightly stricter 
compared to current ratio because the ratio excludes “inventories” and “other current 
assets”, which are less liquid current assets relative to “cash and cash equivalents”, 
“accounts receivable” and “short-term investments”. Thus, relative to current ratio, the 
quick ratio is conceivably a better barometer of the assets’ coverage for the company’s 
current liabilities, should a company experience any financial difficulties (Wohler, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the “cash ratio” is the most demanding of the accounting liquidity ratios, 
as the ratio also excludes accounts receivable and hence the cash ratio shows the level of 
a company’s cash and near-cash investments relative to the company’s current liabilities. 
According to Wohler (2017), the cash ratio is almost like an indicator of a company’s 
value under the worst-case scenario where the company is about to go out of business. 
The cash ratio will inform investors the value of current assets that could quickly be 
turned into cash, and the percentage of the company’s current liabilities, such assets can 
covered. Thus, the cash ratio, also assesses a company's ability to stay solvent in a crisis, 
which is quite important as even highly profitable companies can run into trouble if they 
do not have the liquidity to react to unexpected events.  
A high accounting liquidity ratio appears to be better, as it signifies that a company is 
better positioned to cover its current liabilities. Nevertheless, companies with a seemingly 
high liquidity ratio may not be in a safer or better position than a company with a 
relatively low liquidity ratio. Therefore, an investor should also look at the composition 
and quality of the company’s current or liquidity assets. For instance, with regards to 
“current ratio” a company with good quality current assets such as inventory will allow 
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the company to liquidate its inventory quicker if required, relative to a company with bad 
quality current assets (Wohlner, 2017).  
Other issues should also be considered, as it is not realistic to assume that a company will 
liquidate all current assets that is part of a liquidity ratio in order to cover current liabilities 
because the company still needs a level of working capital to remain a going concern. 
Moreover, it is not realistic for a company to maintain excessive levels of cash and near-
cash assets to cover its short-term debts. In fact, it is often seen as poor asset utilization 
for a company to hold large amounts of cash on its balance sheet, as the funds can be 
returned to shareholders or used elsewhere to generate higher returns (Wohlner, 2017). 
Finally, Lancaster et al (1998) highlight that changes in company liquidity is sensitive to 
the sample period and liquidity ratios used. Therefore, while providing an interesting 
liquidity perspective, the usefulness of the liquidity ratios is still limited especially the 
cash ratio, as it is seldom used in financial reporting or by analysts in the fundamental 
analysis of a company (Wohlner, 2017).  
 
2.3.2. MARKET LIQUIDITY  
Even though “market liquidity” appears to have a slightly different meaning compared to 
“accounting liquidity”, market liquidity is still related to how assets (such as stocks) can 
be converted to cash. Market liquidity refers to the extent in which a market, such as a 
stock market in a country, allows assets to be bought and sold at stable prices. For 
example, the market for a stock is said to be liquid if the stocks can be sold rapidly and 
the act of selling has little impact on the stock's price (Mueller, 2017). Thus, cash would 
be considered as the most liquid asset, while real estates and collectibles are considered 
relatively illiquid. Please refer to section 2.2 for more information.  
Market liquidity also shows where the stocks are traded and the level of interest that 
investors have in a company. For instance, a company stock traded on a major stock 
exchange can usually be considered as liquid while a company stock traded “over the 
counter (OTC)” are often considered as non-liquid (Mueller, 2017). 
Mueller (2017) mentions that another way to judge liquidity in a company's stock is to 
look at the “bid-ask spread”, which is a common way to measure liquidity. It is expected 
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that liquid stocks, such as Microsoft, would have a narrow (small value) bid-ask spread 
while an illiquid stock would have a wider (large value) bid-ask spread.  
Other than the simple bid-ask spread, there are a number of ratios (measures) available, 
which are able to calculate market liquidity. In fact, Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka 
(2009) research more than twenty liquidity measures. Therefore, we are unable to discuss 
all the available ratios. Nonetheless, some of the common market liquidity ratios are as 
follows. 
 
Bid-ask spread = tt PBPA          (2.4) 
Where PA is the Ask Price and PB is the Bid price of a company in the current period. 
 
Relative bid-ask spread = 


 

2
tt
tt
PBPA
PBPA       (2.5) 
Where PA is the Ask Price and PB is the Bid price of a company in the current period. 
 
Roll Estimator = ),(2 1 tt PPCov       (2.6) 
Where ∆Pt is change in price of a company in the current period and ∆Pt-1 is the change 
in price of a company in the previous period. Cov is the serial covariance of the price 
changes.  
 
Amihud (ILLIQ) =  

t tt
t
volumeprice
return
t
000,000,11       (2.7) 
Where |ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊௧|, ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ and  ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁௧  is the absolute return, price and volume of a 
company in the current period.  
 
Amivest =  
t t
tt
return
volumeprice
t
000001.01       (2.8) 
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Where |ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊௧|, ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ and  ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁௧  is the absolute return, price and volume of a 
company in the current period.  
 
Traded Volume in GBP (TVt) =  


  tt pricevolln      (2.9) 
Where ݒ݋݈௧  and ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ is the volume and price of a company in the current period.  
 
2.3.2.1. SUMMARY OF MARKET LIQUIDITY RATIOS/MEASURES 
The “bid-ask spread” is a simple but well known liquidity measure while the “relative 
bid-ask spread” divides the bid-ask spread by the mid-point of the spread in order to 
measure liquidity. The “roll estimator”, developed by Roll (1984) provides the effective 
bid-ask spread, is based on the serial covariance of price changes and is indirectly related 
to trading costs.   
“Amihud illiquidity measure” (Amihud, 2002) is a well-known recognisable measure that 
has been extensively used in recent past literature. “Amivest ratio” is used by researchers 
such as Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterback (1997) and Hasbrouk (2006) to measure 
liquidity and is simply the inverse of the Amihud illiquidity measure while “traded 
volume” looks into volume and price in order to measure market liquidity.  
Among the above liquidity measures, bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask spread and roll 
estimator are used as a proxy for spreads11 while  Amihud, Amivest and traded volume 
are used as a proxy for price impact12.  
As highlighted earlier, a company stock with a narrow bid-ask spread (small value) 
signifies higher liquidity relative to a company with a wider bid-ask spread (large value). 
Such an interpretation applies to most liquidity measures such as relative bid-ask spread, 
roll estimator and Amihud illiquidity measure.  
                                                 
11 Spread is between the price at which you can buy an asset and the price at which you can sell the same asset at the same point in 
time (Damodaran, n.d.) 
12 Price impact is the impact that an investor can create by trading on an asset. Pushing the price up when buying the asset and pushing 
it down while selling (Damodaran, n.d.) 
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However, some measures such as traded volume are different, as a higher traded volume 
implies increased liquidity due higher trading activity (Fernández-Amador, Gächter, 
Larch, & Peter, 2011). Since Amivest is the inverse of Amhud illiquidity measure, it also 
indicates that a higher value shows higher liquidity. Therefore, interpreting the liquidity 
measures should be conducted carefully, as there are various liquidity measures available. 
Moreover, Amihud, Mendelson & Panderson (2005) mention that there is hardly a single 
liquidity measure that can capture all aspects of estimating the effect of liquidity on asset 
prices while Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) in their research of various liquidity 
measures mention that different illiquidity measures capture different aspects of liquidity. 
Thus, signifying that choosing an appropriate liquidity measure is not as straightforward.  
Nevertheless, Goyenko et al (2009) mention that a researcher should choose the liquidity 
measure based on what the researcher wants to measure. For instance, Goyenko et al 
(2009) suggest using Amihud illiquidity measure for measuring liquidity based on price 
impact as it does well in measuring it.   
 
2.3.3. PAST RESEARCH ON LIQUIDITY 
Due to the recent financial crisis (see Crotty (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009)) and 
developments in the financial sector that have resulted in greater finance access (Rajan, 
2006), the study of liquidity has become more prominent. 
Nevertheless, past accounting liquidity research seems to focus on the relationship 
between a company’s liquidity (such as liquidity ratios) and the company’s performance 
or financial statements. For instance, Largay and Stickney (1980) research focuses on the 
bankruptcy of W.T. Grant Company. They find that traditional ratios including liquidity 
ratios would not have revealed the company's many problems earlier than careful analysis 
of the company's cash flows, which would have revealed its impending doom around a 
decade earlier.  
Kirkham (2012) also conclude on the importance of cash flow, as a decision based solely 
on the traditional liquidity ratios could well have led to an incorrect decision regarding 
the liquidity of a number of companies. Others accounting liquidity researches such as 
Lancaster et al (1998) study the relationship of company liquidity (e.g. ratios) to company 
earnings as well as company cash flow in the US while Eljelly (2004) examines the 
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relationship between profitability and liquidity (e.g. current ratio) on a sample of joint 
stock companies in Saudi Arabia. 
Market liquidity research seems to focus on the overall market such as Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) study on the NYSE shows that market-observed average returns are 
an increasing function of the illiquidity (bid-ask spread). Similarly, using three different 
liquidity measures and studying the US market, Jensen and Moorman (2010) find 
evidence to suggest that returns increases with increase in illiquidity. Since past evidences 
on illiquidity appears to indicate that returns will increase with illiquidity, illiquidity can 
potentially be made into an investment style (Ibbotson et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, since liquidity is an issue during the crisis, there are studies done on the 
effect of monetary conditions on market liquidity. For instance, by studying the NYSE 
and AMEX for the period from 1962 to 2003, Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) find strong 
evidence that monetary policy predicts illiquidity.  
Studies have also emerged on the impact of liquidity on macroeconomic variables such 
as Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) research suggests that market liquidity may contain 
some information for predicting the current and future state of the G7 economies. 
Moreover, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) research on the NYSE and AMEX provides 
evidence of the importance of liquidity on asset prices by using CAPM.  
Overall, accounting liquidity research seems to be more company focus while in contrast, 
market liquidity research tends to be on the overall financial markets as well as macro-
economies. Therefore, since our research interest is in relation to market liquidity, the 
following sections will be exploring market liquidity literature.   
 
2.4. ILLIQUID VERSUS LIQUID ASSETS 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who study the relationship between expected returns and 
bid-ask spreads of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks discover that market-
observed average returns are an increasing function of the bid-ask spread. Other studies 
provide similar results such as Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). Moreover, Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005), using daily return and volume data for all common shares listed on 
NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from July 1962 to December 1999 and 
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using a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing model (CAPM), show that their model 
provides evidence signifying the importance of liquidity on asset prices. 
Similarly, using three different liquidity measures and studying the US market, based on 
a vast CRSP data period from September 1954 to December 2006, Jensen and Moorman 
(2010) find evidence that the zero-cost portfolio earns returns that are both economically 
and statistically significant, suggesting that returns increases with increase in illiquidity, 
which is similar to past researches such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Furthermore, 
by segregating their sample into illiquidity quintiles, their evidence even exhibits that 
returns are increasing monotonically with increase in stock illiquidity. 
Nevertheless, there are some contradictory results, which show that illiquid stocks do not 
necessarily provide consistently higher returns. Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl (2008) 
who study the NYSE, find evidence that the profitability of trading strategies based on 
liquidity premium13 has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies 
virtually unprofitable especially when using volume as a liquidity measure. Although 
liquidity measures not related to volume do show some evidence of liquidity premiums, 
they are considered weak (Ben-Rephael et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) who empirically investigate the 
seasonal behaviour of the liquidity premium in asset pricing during the 1961-1990 period, 
find evidence that the premium is reliably positive only during the month of January 
suggesting a strong seasonal component. Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) who 
analyse the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity and its role in asset pricing, state that 
in general, only the down-days element commands a return premium14. 
However, unlike Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) 
who investigate the liquidity-return relationship for all non-financial firms on the NYSE, 
using turnover as measure of liquidity, from 1962 through 1991 find a strong negative 
relationship between stock returns and liquidity. The liquidity effect is not restricted to 
the month of January alone and is prevalent throughout the year. The evidence supports 
                                                 
13 Illiquidity premium or liquidity premium is the premium that investors received for holding a more illiquid asset/ portfolio. Usually 
it is calculated as follows = illiquid asset/ portfolio minus liquid asset/ portfolio. 
14 Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) research, signifies that there is evidence of illiquidity asymmetry effect on expected 
returns during up and down-days while Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlight that capital constraints are more likely to happen 
during market downturns. Therefore, such asymmetry in expected returns is anticipated as during down-days, investors is expected to 
require more premiums for holding the riskier illiquid stocks due to issues such as capital constraints. Moreover, our research appears 
to also show a similar asymmetry effect for expansive and restrictive periods, as the two periods can be considered as down-days and 
up-days respectively (Said and Giouvris, 2017) 
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Amihud and Mendelson (1986) notion of liquidity premium and establishes its role in the 
overall cross section of stock returns. 
Due to conflicting evidence, conducting research on liquid and illiquid stocks still has its 
merits. Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) highlight the importance of the relationship 
between monthly returns and various factors such as size, cash flow-to-price ratio (C/P) 
and book-to-market ratio (B/M), using over 27,000 stocks from 49 countries including 
the UK over a three-decade period. Hou et al. (2011) highlight that the study of liquidity 
is likely to be particularly promising, as several new studies have documented strong 
cross-sectional and time-series relations between returns and various liquidity proxies. 
Although their research does not cover liquidity proxies, they do highlight the potential 
of conducting such research on liquidity. 
 
2.4.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO ILLIQUID VERSUS LIQUID 
ASSETS 
Due to the contradictory views from past researchers, conducting research on the 
relationship between liquid and illiquid stocks still has its merits.  
Therefore, our first two research questions are: 
1) What is the relationship between illiquid and liquid stocks?  
2) Do illiquid stocks produce higher returns relative to illiquid stocks? 
 
2.5. ILLIQUIDITY AND MONETARY CONDITIONS 
This section covers literature relevant to the first empirical chapter, which involves the 
relationship between illiquidity and monetary conditions. This section is divided into four 
sub-sections as follows: Section 2.5.1 discusses the relationship between market liquidity 
and monetary conditions while section 2.5.2 discusses the literature involving illiquidity 
premium across monetary conditions. Section 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 discuss relevant issues 
involving flight to liquidity as well as sensitivity of illiquid and liquid portfolios. The last 
sub-section provides potential research questions.   
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2.5.1. MARKET LIQUIDITY AND MONETARY CONDITIONS 
It appears like there are various factors that affect liquidity pricing such as Dimson and 
Hanke (2004) who show that the ex-ante illiquidity premium is related to proxies such as 
the small firm premium, closed-end fund discount, bond maturity premium, trading 
volume, credit spreads, and the futures basis. However, our objective for our first 
empirical chapter is to investigate whether liquidity pricing is systematically linked to 
macroeconomic changes or more specifically, changes in monetary conditions similar to 
Jensen and Moorman (2010). 
Unfortunately there is not much research available that focuses on the relationship 
between illiquidity premium and monetary conditions but there seems to be more research 
on the effect of monetary conditions on market liquidity such as Söderberg (2008) who 
studies the ability of fourteen macroeconomic variables’ such as interest rate and broad 
money growth to forecast changes in monthly market liquidity on Scandinavian order-
driven stock exchanges such as Copenhagen (Denmark), Oslo (Norway) and Stockholm 
(Sweden). 
Moreover, by studying the US market, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that the 
investor on a company’s stock should be concerned with market downturns and market 
liquidity, shedding light on the total and relative economic significance of liquidity not 
only at the company level but also at the market level, as both can affect individual asset 
prices. Thus, signifying that by understanding how monetary conditions affect market 
liquidity will allow us to explore how monetary conditions affect prices as well as 
illiquidity premium. 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) study the effects of several explanatory 
variables (inclusive of short-term interest rates and macroeconomic announcements15) on 
aggregate market spreads, depths and trading activity for US stocks (NYSE) from 1988 
to 1998, confirm that short-term interest rates significantly affect market liquidity as well 
as trading activity. Fujimoto (2004) who also studies the US market using NYSE and 
AMEX during the 1965-2001 period and Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis show that 
macroeconomic fundamentals are significant determinants of liquidity and their effects 
are stronger prior to the mid 1980’s when business cycle dynamics are more volatile.  
                                                 
15 Nevertheless, their study focuses on more macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment 
rate and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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Similarly, by studying the same stock exchanges for the period from 1962 to 2003, 
Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) find strong evidence that monetary policy predicts illiquidity. 
Jensen and Moorman (2010) highlight that expansive shifts correspond with an increase 
in market liquidity while restrictive shifts bring about a drop in market liquidity. A more 
recent research by Fernández-Amador, Gächter, Larch, and Peter (2013) shed light on the 
actual impact of monetary policy on stock liquidity and thereby addresses its role as a 
determinant of commonality in liquidity by considering the data of three major Euro 
markets namely Germany, France and Italy. Their results suggest that an expansionary 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) leads to an increase of aggregate 
stock market liquidity of the three European markets.  
Nevertheless, there are less confirmed results such as Chordia, Sarkar, and 
Subrahmanyam (2005) who research the cross-market liquidity dynamics by studying 
stock and bond market liquidity as well as volatility within the US market and obtain 
results indicating monetary expansions are associated with increased equity market 
liquidity but only during crisis periods. Even Söderberg (2008) in their study of the 
Scandinavian stock markets highlights that although some of the macroeconomic 
variables are able to predict the market liquidity of the respective stock markets but not 
one variable is able to predict the market liquidity of all three Scandinavian stock markets, 
signifying that not a single macroeconomic variable have the same effect on all three 
stock markets.   
 
2.5.2. ILLIQUIDITY PREMIUM ACROSS MONETARY CONDITIONS 
Although there is not much research on the relationship between illiquidity premium and 
monetary conditions, there is some research on the relationship between stock prices and 
business conditions including monetary conditions such as Fama and French (1989). 
Fama and French (1989) investigate the effect of business conditions on stock and bond 
markets within the US market, whereby they highlight that expected stock returns are 
found to be lower when economic conditions are strong and higher when conditions are 
weak but they also highlight that further research on monetary policy should be done. 
Therefore, by extending Fama and French (1989) research, Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson 
(1996) find evidence to suggest that the monetary environment actually influences 
investors’ required returns. They add that monetary conditions as well as business 
conditions in part causes the predictability of expected stock and bond returns variation 
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through time. Along the same lines, Patelis (1997) who studies the NYSE concludes that 
monetary policy variables are significant predictors of future returns, although they 
cannot fully account for the observed stock return predictability. Amihud (2002) does 
highlight that expected market illiquidity affects ex-ante stock excess return positively 
over time, signifying that if there is an expansionary shift (market liquidity increase), 
stock returns are expected to decrease. However, contrasting to Fama and French (1989) 
and Amihud (2002), Thorbecke (1997) who also study the US market find evidence to 
indicate that expansionary policy increases ex-post stock returns. Therefore, if the 
monetary conditions increases market liquidity (expansionary), stock returns are 
expected to also increase. 
Rigobon and Sack (2003) who study the US market using Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 
500) index find evidence of a significant policy response on the S&P 500 index, while 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) highlight the effects of unanticipated monetary policy 
actions (or shocks) on expected excess returns account for the largest part of the response 
of stock prices, which is acknowledged earlier by Amihud (2002). There are other 
researchers who investigate the response of asset prices to changes in monetary policy 
based on the increase in the variance of policy shocks such as Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
but most of the studies so far cover US markets. Nevertheless, Brogaard and Detzel (2012) 
do investigate economic policy including monetary policy for 21 countries including 
Great Britain and finds a relationship between stock portfolio returns and the uncertainty 
of economic policy. They also suggest that there are material and long-lasting real and 
financial implications due to the indecisiveness in government economic policymaking.  
Having discuss the relationship between market liquidity and monetary conditions, we 
can now investigate if there is any relationship between illiquidity premium and market 
liquidity to understand whether illiquidity premiums are affected by monetary conditions. 
We refer to the illiquidity premium as the required return premium for holding illiquid 
stocks. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) emphasize that changing monetary conditions 
are associated with changes in investor funding requirements and find evidence to suggest 
that the return premium required for holding illiquid stocks increases during periods 
associated with funding constraints (decreased market liquidity) because such periods 
decrease the ability of speculators to allocate capital to illiquid stocks. Therefore, the 
illiquidity premium expected from investors should increase (decrease) as monetary 
conditions become more restrictive (expansive) implying that during expansive monetary 
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periods, liquidity conditions improve and the price for illiquid stocks increases relative to 
liquid stocks. 
Similarly, Jensen and Moorman (2010) do highlight that an illiquidity premium arises 
because investors demand compensation for the costs and risks of holding illiquid assets. 
Based on the models of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
it is expected that, during periods of high market liquidity, liquidity becomes less valued 
by investor resulting in the reduction of the illiquidity premium. Therefore, during 
expansionary periods, when market liquidity increase, it is expected that illiquidity 
premium decreases when the price of illiquid stocks increases relative to liquid stocks, or 
when zero-cost portfolio return increases (Jensen & Moorman, 2010). 
 
2.5.3. FLIGHT TO LIQUIDITY 
Amihud (2002) also highlights the effects of both expected and unexpected market 
illiquidity are stronger on the returns of small-firms stock portfolios. Since small firms 
are usually known to be more illiquid compared to larger firms, their study also indicates 
that market liquidity affects illiquid stocks more compared to liquid stocks meaning that 
small stocks are subject to greater illiquidity risk. If priced, illiquidity risk should result 
in higher illiquidity risk premium. Such a relationship can also be linked to the ‘‘flight-
to-liquidity’’ or “flight-to-quality” phenomenon as in times of dire liquidity large stocks 
seem relatively more attractive compared to small stocks due to the illiquidity risk.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model to indicate that there are associations 
between an asset's market liquidity16 and investors' funding liquidity17. Their model 
actually establish various findings such as market liquidity has commonality across 
shares and is subject to flight-to-quality while Acharya and Pedersen (2005) provide 
evidence of investors flight-to-liquidity by using a liquidity adjusted CAPM. Likewise, 
by studying stock and bond markets, Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) also mention flight-to-
liquidity episodes due to the effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity. 
Nevertheless, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also show that under certain conditions, 
the relationship can also lead to liquidity spirals. Moreover, Rajan (2006) mentions that 
                                                 
16 Market liquidity means how easily an asset is traded. 
17 Funding liquidity relates to degree of difficulty/ easiness investors can obtain funding. 
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in times of ample liquidity supplied by the central banks (low interest rates), investors 
have a tendency to engage in riskier investments to earn higher returns. Therefore, during 
expansive monetary policy periods where market liquidity is expected to increase, it is 
likely that investors will increase their holdings of riskier illiquid stocks causing the price 
of illiquid stocks to increase18.  
Jensen and Moorman (2010) also find results consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009), whereby prior to an expansive monetary policy shift, liquidity concerns 
heightened and the funding constraints (decrease in market liquidity) causes investors to 
increase the premium they require for holding illiquid stocks and move to more liquid 
stocks signifying flight-to-liquidity, which continues for several days after the policy shift. 
Thus, the return of illiquid stocks is driven down relative to liquid stocks resulting in the 
reduction of the zero-cost portfolio returns.  
 
2.5.4. SENSITIVITY OF ILLIQUID QUINTILE AND LIQUID QUINTILE 
Another point that Amihud and Mendelson (1986) discover is that there is a clientele 
effect, whereby stocks with higher spreads are held by investors with longer holding 
periods resulting in the returns of higher-spread stocks (illiquid stocks) to be less spread-
sensitive giving rise to a concave return-spread relation that is caused by long horizon 
investors19 and small investors focusing on the illiquid stocks, who demand a small 
premium. Therefore, it indicates that illiquid stock investors would react slowly to 
changes in liquidity of the stocks as they tend to hold the stocks longer.  
                                                 
18 Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson (1996) suggest that investors’ required return are actually influenced by monetary environment while 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlight that the return premium required for holding illiquid stocks increases during periods 
associated with funding constraints, signifying the role of monetary conditions for investors’ stock returns and illiquidity. 
Nevertheless, Amihud (2002) mention flight-to-liquidity phenomenon, as in times of dire liquidity, large stocks appear to be relatively 
more attractive compared to small stocks due to the illiquidity risk. The link between illiquidity and size is quite common, as 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight that the illiquidity premium is a result of size effect while Elfakhani (2000) mentions 
that the returns of small-firms are larger due to the liquidity hypothesis, as small-firms are considered to be less liquid and hence 
should obtain higher return premiums. The reaction of investors towards illiquidity, size and monetary environment can potentially 
be explained by the investor sentiment, as the judgement of an uncertainty future event may be affected by the persons’ mood and 
hence happy (optimistic) investors may be more willing to invest in uncertain projects (Wright and Bower, 1992). Thus, a monetary 
environment can impact investors decision through sentiment, as due to an expansionary period, which is considered to be an 
optimistic event, investors are more willing to invest into the riskier (uncertain) illiquid or small stocks. Whilst during times of dire 
liquidity, investors will prefer the more stable liquid (or large stocks). Even though investor sentiment may play some role in our 
research, we have not covered it. However, we agree that including investor sentiment may be good for our future research. 
19 In order to avoid losses from selling an illiquid stock, some investors tend to hold such stocks longer, resulting in a less sensitive 
stock. Moreover, there are also investors who use a “buy and hold strategy” (passive strategy) and do not react if there are any 
movement in the market. Nevertheless, researchers such as Jensen and Moorman (2010) mention that less liquid assets are more 
sensitive to changes in monetary or funding condition. The studies by Amihud and Mandelson (1986) and Jensen and Moorman 
(2010) signify that due to the characteristics of illiquid stocks, an investor may decide to either hold or not hold illiquid stocks longer. 
Thus, causing the illiquid stocks to be more or less sensitive to a specific environment (e.g. monetary condition). There may be other 
reasons for holding a stock longer or shorter but stock illiquidity is expected to play some role in it. 
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However, Perez‐Quiros and Timmermann (2000) find evidence indicating that small 
firms can be adversely affected by lower liquidity (obtaining financing) and should be 
more affected across recession and expansion states. Therefore, it should result in a higher 
sensitivity of their expected stock returns with respect to variables that measure credit 
market conditions. Since small firms are usually associated with low liquidity, in a way 
Perez‐Quiros and Timmermann (2000) research signifies that illiquid stocks are more 
sensitive compared to liquid stocks during expansive or restrictive conditions.  
Moreover, using turnover as a measure of liquidity and up to 48 stock exchanges20, Dey 
(2005) supports a negative relationship between turnover and returns for the period from 
1995 until 2001. However, they find that turnover is significant for emerging market 
portfolios only, while it is insignificant for developed market portfolios. They highlight 
that due to the high liquidity of developed markets, liquidity is not a concern for investors. 
In emerging markets though where liquidity can be restricted, investors would be more 
concerned with liquidity risk. Therefore, since the UK market is a developed market, 
investors may not be as concerned with liquidity, resulting in asset prices to be less 
sensitive to changes in liquidity. 
Furthermore, Rajan (2006) mentions that when market liquidity increases, investors have 
a tendency to engage in riskier investments such as illiquid stocks. Bekaert, Hoerova, and 
Lo Duca (2013) highlight that lax monetary policy (increased market liquidity) decreases 
both risk aversion and uncertainty of expected market volatility by studying the VIX21.  
Therefore, it is expected that investors will prefer illiquid stocks making it to be more 
sensitive compared to liquid stocks during expansive monetary conditions. 
 
2.5.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO ILLIQUIDITY AND 
MONETARY CONDITIONS 
The literature review appears to highlight that monetary policy affects market liquidity 
(Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009 and Jensen and Moorman, 2010) and hence, justifying 
Central Banks such as the Federal Reserve using monetary policy to stabilize the financial 
system (Cornett et al., 2011). Monetary conditions are also associated with return 
                                                 
20 48 stock exchanges consist of 22 exchanges from Europe, 7 exchanges from North America, 13 exchanges from Asia/Pacific, 5 
exchanges from South America and 1 exchange from Africa. 
21 VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, which is the stock market option-based implied volatility of the 
US S&P500 index. 
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premiums due to illiquidity, as investors required more premiums for holding illiquid 
stocks during periods associated with funding constraints (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 
2009). Finally, past evidence shows that small companies (or illiquid stocks) are more 
sensitive compared to large companies (or liquid stocks) during either expansive or 
restrictive conditions (Perez Quiros and Timmermann, 2000 and Bekaert et al., 2013). 
Thus, our next research questions are: 
1) Are there any possible relationships between monetary conditions and market 
liquidity? 
2) How do monetary conditions affect return premiums due to illiquidity? 
3) Are illiquid stocks more sensitive than liquid stocks in relation to monetary 
conditions? 
4) How does the financial crisis affect market liquidity? 
 
2.6. ILLIQUIDITY, INVESTMENT STYLES, COVARIANCE VERSUS 
CHARACTERISTICS AND JANUARY EFFECT  
This section covers literature relevant to the second and third empirical chapters, which 
involves the potential of illiquidity as an investment style. The section is divided into the 
following sub-sections: Section 2.6.1 discusses different types of investment styles while 
section 2.6.2 covers past studies in relation to the potential of illiquidity. Section 2.6.3 
and 2.6.4 reviews literature regarding covariance versus characteristics models and the 
January effect respectively. Finally, section 2.6.5. discusses potential research questions.   
 
2.6.1. INVESTMENT STYLES  
Investment styles are strategies or theories used by investors and asset managers to set 
asset allocation and choose individual assets such as stocks for investment, while Chang, 
Wang, and Lu (2013) similarly define investment style as the combining of stocks with 
the same characteristics to construct style portfolios and make investments in the stock 
markets. The investment style of a portfolio (or fund) helps set expectations for the long-
term performance of the portfolio and publicizes it to potential investors looking for a 
specific type of investment or market exposure as well as aiding the investors in stock-
selection. Therefore, most mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) use a 
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consistent form of investment style of which they must comply to. The investment style 
can be broad such as “international stocks” as well as narrow such as “large size growth 
stocks” (Investment Styles, n.d.).  
Fontinelle (2010) mentions that the major investment styles can be broken down into 
three main dimensions namely 1) active vs. passive management, 2) growth vs. value 
investing and 3) small cap vs. large cap companies. Among the three, the most commonly 
known investment style is active vs passive management.  
In comparison to passive management, active management tend to have full-time staff of 
financial researchers and portfolio managers who carefully select their holdings and are 
constantly seeking to gain larger returns for investors. However, due to such service, 
active funds usually have higher fees (expenses) than passive funds (Fontinelle, 2010).  
Although the fees of active funds are higher, the $10 trillion invested in active-
management funds indicate that investors still trust their fund managers (Stein, 2017). 
Nevertheless, over the years, more investors tend to prefer passive funds as around a third 
of all assets in the US are in passive funds, up from about a fifth a decade ago. Moreover, 
flows into passive funds from active funds, have reached nearly $500 billion in the first 
half of the year 2017 (Stein, 2017), signifying the growth of passive funds.  
More importantly, a study by S&P Dow Jones Indices in 2016, shows that about 90 
percent of active stock managers failed to beat their index targets over various periods 
and that underperformance is significantly due to fees (Stein, 2017) 
In relation to growth and value stocks, value stocks tend to be relatively less expensive 
(e.g. lower price-to-earnings ratio), as opposed to growth stocks that are relatively more 
expensive (e.g. higher price-to-earnings ratio) because an investor believes that the 
growth stocks’ price might grow even higher (Israelsen, 2016). By looking at various 
indices, Israelsen (2016) reports that value outperform growth index in the long run while 
Pisani (2017) reports that for the first few months of the year 2017, growth stocks (e.g. 
technology and health care) appears to outperform value stocks (e.g. financials and 
energy). 
However, it should be acknowledged that no one investment style should inherently be 
considered better than another, as the key is to find a style that suits an investor's appetite 
for risk while maintaining a sufficient level of diversification (Investment Styles, n.d.). 
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In the end, investment styles are merely categorical investing and, as such, constitutes 
some sort of experimental research such as back-testing in order to aid investors in stock-
selection in the complex investment or market environments, where there can be complex 
financial products. 
Nonetheless, Chang et al. (2013) highlight that the common type of investment styles are 
“value versus growth” stocks, “small versus big” stocks and “momentum versus 
contrarian” stocks, whereby they can be further segregated into 6 styles. Therefore, we 
will firstly discuss the most common type of investments styles.    
 
2.6.1.1. VALUE VERSUS GROWTH 
Value and growth are two popular fundamental investment style whereby value style is 
where an investor must look for stocks that are undervalued according to companies’ 
financial statements while growth style involves identifying long-term potential and 
performance. Past literature seems to indicate that value style is an antagonist to growth 
style, as research tends to compare the two styles with each other, by using a suitable 
variable such as book-to-market ratio (B/M ratio), price-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) and 
price-to-cash-flow ratio (P/C ratio).  
There are various studies available that investigate the performance of the two styles. 
However most research appears to conclude that value style is considered superior to 
growth style in the US market resulting in the value premium (Basu, 1983; Rosenberg, 
Reid, & Lanstein, 1985) (Daniel & Titman, 1997; Fama & French, 1992). For markets 
other than the US market, Daniel, Titman, and Wei (2001) also find value premium within 
the Japanese market, while Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993) who study 6 international 
markets including UK obtained consistent results to US market studies.  
In contradiction, a mixed outcome is obtained by Ding, Chua, and Fetherston (2005) who 
look into various East Asia markets. Value premium is significant and positive in the 
Malaysian market, while in Thailand it appears to be significantly negative and in 
Indonesia it is insignificant. Fama and French (2012) also find mixed results for North 
America, Europe, Asia Pacific and Japan. In Japan, they do not find evidence of a value 
premium. However, Gonenc and Karan (2003) who focus only on Istanbul Stock 
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Exchange (ISE) obtain similar results to Ding’s study of Thailand market as there is no 
value premium within the ISE, indicating growth superiority.  
Nonetheless, Beneda (2002) who investigates Compustat Industrial Files’ data and the 
Standard & Poor (S&P) index highlights that the research time-period is important as it 
is discovered that over a short period of five years, value style is found to be more 
profitable but if a longer period (at least 14 years) is chosen, average returns for growth 
stocks is superior.  
    
2.6.1.2. SIZE EFFECT  
Banz (1981) highlights that average returns are negatively related with size. This widely 
recognized anomaly is known as either small-firm or size effect, which is further 
supported by Reinganum (1982) and Keim (1983). Such a relationship is expected as 
small firms are usually considered riskier than large firms and their returns are expected 
to be higher. Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985) confirm this as they state that within an 
efficient market, the higher average returns of smaller firms are justified by the additional 
risks borne by such firms. 
Nevertheless, the study on size effect is less optimistic after the early 1980s as Van Dijk 
(2011) highlights that past empirical studies declared the size effect to be dead since then. 
Gonenc and Karan (2003) actually obtain opposite findings whereby firms with larger 
capitalization are considered to be superior while Horowitz, Loughran, and Savin (2000) 
report no consistent relationship between size and realized returns and hence, their results 
show that the widespread use of size in asset pricing is unwarranted. Amihud (2002) 
highlights that the size effect is partially due to market illiquidity, as times of dire 
illiquidity will cause flight to liquidity, resulting in preference for larger stocks and hence 
small stocks are actually subjected to higher illiquidity risk premium.  
Nevertheless, Dissanaike (2002) finds evidence of a size effect within the UK based on 
FT50022 sample, while Hou and Van Dijk (2014) study of US market find that there are 
still a robust size effect in the cross-section of expected returns after adjusting for the 
price impact of profitability shocks. Furthermore, Van Dijk (2011) does point out that the 
                                                 
22 FT 500 Index comprises the largest 500 industrial companies in the UK and accounts for well over 70% of the market capitalization 
of the LSE (Dissanaike, 1997).  
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size premium in the US has been large in recent years and more empirical research needs 
to be conducted to examine the robustness of the size effect on the US and international 
stock markets.  
 
2.6.1.3. MOMENTUM VERSUS CONTRARIAN 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their behavioural finance research on stock market 
overreaction discover that loser stocks perform exceptionally well in comparison to 
winner stocks over extended time periods of 3 to 5 years horizons and this is particularly 
noticeable in the month of January. Nevertheless, in contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) document that investment styles that combined buying winner stocks and selling 
loser stocks generate significant positive returns of about 1% per month over 3 to 12 
months holding periods. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also find similar pattern of returns 
around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) revisit the subject and their evidence indicates that momentum profits have 
continued in the 1990s, suggesting that the original results are not a product of data 
snooping bias.  
However, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) highlight that part of the abnormal returns 
generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years 
while Conrad and Kaul (1998) highlight that contrarian style is profitable for long-term 
horizons, while the momentum style is usually profitable for medium-term holding 
periods of between 3 and 12 months.  
Shen, Szakmary, and Sharma (2005) findings agree with Conrad and Kaul (1998), who 
show that contrarian profits in the US market are very dependent on the period examined 
whereas Schiereck, De Bondt, and Weber (1999) mention that the apparent success of 
contrarian and momentum styles may be due to institutional factors and risk mis-
measurement or it may simply be the result of data mining. 
In the UK, Dissanaike (2002) shows results that contrarian style outperformed 
momentum style and their loser-winner effect (or contrarian effect) results are significant. 
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Nonetheless, Galariotis, Holmes, and Ma (2007) demonstrate that both momentum and 
contrarian profits are available for the LSE23.  
 
2.6.1.4. ILLIQUIDITY VERSUS LIQUIDITY 
As highlighted in chapter 2.2, the general evidence of the relationship seems to indicate 
that returns will increase with illiquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1989) (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996). Furthermore, Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005), using a liquidity adjusted CAPM, find evidence signifying the 
importance of liquidity on asset prices.  
Using  three different liquidity measures and studying the US market, Jensen and 
Moorman (2010) find evidence that the zero-cost investment portfolio24 earns returns that 
are both economically and statistically significant, signifying that returns increase with 
illiquidity.  
Nevertheless, there are some contradictory results, which show that illiquid stocks do not 
necessarily provide consistent higher returns. Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) find 
evidence to suggest that the January effect and size effect are significant, indicating the 
return for spreads may be a result of seasonal and size effect. Brennan et al. (2013) who 
analyses the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity and its role in asset pricing, state that 
in general, only the down-days element commands a return premium.  
Furthermore Ben-Rephael et al. (2008) who study the NYSE find evidence that the 
profitability of trading strategies based on illiquidity premium has declined over the past 
four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable. Even Lischewski and 
Voronkova (2012) who investigate various investment styles by focusing on the Polish 
market, find evidence to support  size and value factors but not liquidity factors.  
                                                 
23 Conrad and Kaul (1998) analyse two strategies diametrically opposed in philosophy and execution whereby contrarian strategy 
relies on price reversals while momentum strategy is based on price continuations. Schiereck et al (1999) define it slightly differently 
whereby contrarian strategy buys stocks that performed poorly over the past two to five years (prior losers) and sells short stocks that 
performed well over the same period (prior winners), while momentum strategy is the opposite of the contrarian strategy. Nevertheless, 
Harvey (n.d.) highlights that contrarian trading is an investment style that goes against prevailing market trends by buying poorly 
performing assets and then selling when the assets perform well while momentum trading transacts assets that are moving significantly 
in one direction. Thus, there are various ways to describe contrarian and momentum styles but for our research, we considered 
momentum style as simply focusing on winner (price continuation) stocks while contrarian style is the opposite that is trading on loser 
(price reversal) stocks. For example, momentum style will buy a winner stock whereas contrarian style will buy a loser stock.    
24 Zero-cost portfolio = long the illiquid portfolio and short the liquid portfolio 
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However, unlike Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Datar et al. (1998) investigate the 
liquidity-return relationship for all non-financial firms on the NYSE, find a strong 
positive relationship between stock returns and illiquidity, and the illiquidity premium is 
not restricted to the month of January alone and is prevalent throughout the year.  
Moreover, using three liquidity measures in the UK, Said and Giouvris (2015) reveal that 
illiquid portfolios consistently earn higher returns compared to liquid portfolios and the 
zero-cost portfolio returns are statistically significant for at least two of the illiquidity 
measures used.  
Due to the conflicting evidence, conducting research on illiquidity as an investment style 
still has its merits.  
 
2.6.1.5. RELATIONSHIP AND RETURNS BETWEEN INVESTMENT STYLES 
We also notice that past literature appears to try to find links between different types of 
investment styles. Shen et al. (2005) who study the connections between value versus 
growth investment styles and momentum styles within international markets, show that 
momentum profits are much stronger in the growth indices, while adding value indices 
into the mix reduces the profitability of the momentum styles. This is consistent with 
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) who highlight that value and momentum are 
inversely correlated to each other within and across asset classes.  
Size effect seems to be linked to other styles. Bauman, Conover, and Miller (1998) 
initially believed that the value premium is attributed to small-firm effects but then 
discover that the large-firm value premium is greater than small-firm value premium, 
indicating that the superiority of value style is genuine.   
Nevertheless, some researchers find less direct evidence of the relationship between 
styles such as Dissanaike (2002) who finds evidence that within UK, the size effect and 
“winner vs loser effect” (or “momentum vs contrarian effect”) are not completely 
independent of each other but he adds that there is no concrete evidence to suggest that 
the size effect subsumes the “winner vs loser effect”. 
At the moment, there are studies that connect other investment styles with illiquidity such 
as  Asness et al. (2013) who find significant evidence that funding liquidity risk is 
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inversely related to value but positively related to momentum globally across asset classes. 
Similarly, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)  measures of liquidity risk are positively related 
to momentum in US individual stocks. In addition Sadka (2006) finds evidence that 
momentum is positively related to liquidity risk or liquidity shock. 
One of the most common style connections is between illiquidity and size effect as 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight that the illiquidity premium is as a result of 
size effect. On the other hand, Elfakhani (2000) discovers that the returns of small-firms 
are substantially larger due to the liquidity hypothesis as small-firms are considered to be 
less liquid and thus should obtain higher return premiums. This is contradictory to the 
research conducted by Ibbotson et al. (2013) on US market, who highlight that the returns 
obtained of illiquidity based portfolios are sufficiently different from those of the other 
styles. Considering the research above, one can see that the relationship between 
illiquidity and size is not clearly defined.  
Nevertheless, Fama and French (1992) highlight that risks may be the reason that 
investment styles, based on size and simple ratios, performed better. Similarly Ryan and 
Hajiyev (2004) investigate the Irish stock exchange and find that returns of value stocks 
are superior but conclude that the differences in returns may simply be compensation for 
risks (ex-ante risk premium). Arshanapalli, Coggin, and Doukas (1998) indicate that 
value stocks manage to outperform growth stocks while also have a lower level of risk. 
Therefore, investigating the risks of the investment styles is equally important to 
researching the different style returns themselves.  
Other reasons for the higher returns of investment styles may be due to investor sentiment 
as mentioned by Baker and Wurgler (2006) in relation to various styles such as small 
stocks and growth stocks, while Black (1993) highlights the possibility of data mining 
bias on value and size. Nevertheless, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) highlight that the 
positive profitability of momentum strategies are not due to data mining, by addressing 
the issue in the context of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  
 
2.6.2. POTENTIAL OF ILLIQUIDITY AS AN INVESTMENT STYLE 
Due to the recent financial crisis, the study of liquidity has become more prominent, as 
studies such as Crotty (2009) highlights that the financial crisis happened when investors 
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run for liquidity and safety. Therefore, since our literature highlights that stock returns 
are an increasing function of illiquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986), liquidity has 
started becoming a common part of finance literature and researchers have noticed the 
potential and importance of illiquidity as a finance or investment tool.  
Yan (2008) in their research of US mutual funds finds evidence to suggest that liquidity 
is an important reason why size erodes fund performance signifying the importance of 
liquidity in investment management. Moreover, Idzorek, Xiong, and Ibbotson (2012) 
highlight that on average mutual funds that hold illiquid stocks significantly perform 
better than mutual funds that hold more liquid stocks. Therefore, signifying the potential 
of liquidity as investment strategy or style. 
Nowadays, more studies have been conducted to prove illiquidity as a reliable investment 
style such as Ibbotson et al. (2013) who find evidence to suggest that liquidity should be 
given equal standing to other investment styles.  
 
2.6.3. COVARIANCE VERSUS CHARACTERISTICS MODELS 
In order to measure the performance of various investment style portfolios, we will be 
using various relevant financial ratios to rank and construct the portfolios. For instance, 
as highlighted earlier in the literature, we can use P/E ratio to distinguish between value 
and growth portfolios whereby a low P/E stock portfolio will be considered as value 
stocks and high P/E stocks as growth stocks (Beneda, 2002).    
Nevertheless, it is not that simple, as according to the CAPM a stock return actually 
depends on its sensitivity towards market risk (or systematic risk) captured by beta and 
time value of money (represented by the risk free rate). Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) further expanded on univariate CAPM which is known as Fama-French 3 
factor model and Carhart 4 factor model25 respectively. Therefore, constructing portfolios 
simply by using relevant financial ratios may not be sufficient.        
Daniel and Titman (1997) is one of the first few to recognise and explore the issue. They 
consider two models namely the “characteristics model” and “covariance model”. They 
label “characteristics model”, the model using only financial ratios such as B/M ratio to 
                                                 
25 A study by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) support the momentum factor. 
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measure the expected return of stocks. Meanwhile, the “covariance model” is a financial 
model and considers returns sensitivity to factors such as value factors (or value premium). 
Daniel and Titman (1998) highlight that the persistent better performance of value stocks 
over growth stocks may be due to either mispricing or riskiness of stocks. They clarify 
that mispricing of stocks is due to the “characteristic model” and means that the market 
systematically under-prices value stocks. On the other hand, riskiness as measured by the 
“covariance model” indicates that value stocks are considered riskier resulting in higher 
returns.  
Daniel and Titman (1997) underline that the “characteristics model” seems to explain 
the cross-sectional variation in stock returns better than the “covariance model”. Daniel 
and Titman (1998) find further evidence to support the “characteristics model” 
signifying that investors should be able to construct better portfolios using 
“characteristics model“ relative to “covariance model” such as Fama-French 3 factor 
model (Fama & French, 1992, 1993).  
Furthermore, Daniel et al. (2001) replicate the Daniel and Titman (1997) study on a 
Japanese sample from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) between 1971 and 1997 and their 
test failed to reject the “characteristic model” but rejected the Fama-French 3 factor model. 
Ibbotson et al. (2013) who also test the theory using a different investment style factor 
namely the illiquidity factor, indicated that the “characteristics model” perform better 
than the “covariance model”.  
 
2.6.4. THE JANUARY EFFECT 
Another common issue that can be linked to the various investment styles is the January 
effect. Fama and French (1992) signify its appearance within value style, which is also 
confirmed by Loughran (1997). Keim (1983) mentions its existence within size effect 
whereas De Bondt and Thaler (1985) comment on it in his study of momentum style. 
Even Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight of its presence within illiquidity 
premium.  
The January effect is a seasonal anomaly whereby prices or returns increases in the month 
of January in comparison to other months. Wachtel (1942) is one of the first to observe 
this in the US market (DJIA) while Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) mention its existence 
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in most major industrialized countries including the UK. Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) 
and Clare, Psaradakis, and Thomas (1995) also find evidence of the January effect in UK 
stock market.  
The market is expected to be at least weakly efficient and the January effect is quite a 
simple anomaly that can be exploited by any investor inexpensively. Therefore, since it 
is discovered more than 70 years ago, it is expected that such a simple anomaly would 
disappear by now but Haugen and Jorion (1996) highlight that the January effect is still 
going strong in their research and Haug and Hirschey (2006) confirm that the January 
effect continue to contradict the EMH.  
Ritter and Chopra (1989) mention that the January effect may be due to window dressing, 
as following December tax loss selling, investors rebalance their portfolios in early 
January. Nevertheless, Haug and Hirschey (2006) highlight that the continuing presence 
of a January effect since 1987 appears to weaken that argument of tax loss selling. 
It may simply be compensation for risks. Chan et al. (1985) mention risk is higher in 
January or during the turn of the year by looking at bonds. Moreover, Gu (2003) 
emphasizes that the January effect is positively related to volatility. 
Gu (2003) also indicates the pronounced declining trend of January effect in the US for 
both large and small firm stock indices since 1988, which may be due to macroeconomic 
variables such as stronger real GDP growth and higher inflation. They also mention that 
the decline represents a trend towards market efficiency due to knowledgeable investors 
and technology advancement.  
On the other hand, Ahsan and Sarkar (2013) find significant positive return in June 
instead of January in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh. 
 
2.6.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REGARDING ILLIQUIDITY, INVESTMENT 
STYLES, COVARIANCE VS CHARACTERISTICS AND JANUARY RETURNS.  
In general, past evidence seems to signify that returns will increase with illiquidity 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) while Idzorek, Xiong, and Ibbotson (2012) highlight that 
on average mutual funds that held illiquid stocks performed better than mutual funds with 
more liquid stocks, signifying the potential of liquidity as investment strategy or style.  
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With regards to covariance vs characteristics models, “characteristics model” appears to 
explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns better than the “covariance model” 
for value factor (Daniel and Titman, 1998) and liquidity factor (Ibbotson et al., 2013).  
Past research also shows that January effect is a common issue that can be linked to the 
various investment styles namely size effect (Keim, 1983), value style (Fama and French, 
1992) momentum style (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) and illiquidity premium 
(Eleswarapu and Reinganum, 1993).  
Thus, our next research questions are: 
1) Can illiquidity be made into a reliable investment style or strategy? 
2) How does the financial crisis affect investment styles? 
3) Is covariance model better than characteristics model when constructing 
portfolios? 
4) Does January effect persist within the various investment styles? 
 
2.7. MACRO-ECONOMY, ILLIQUIDITY AND OIL  
This section covers literature reviews relevant to the final two empirical chapters. The 
section is divided into three sub-sections as follows: Section 2.7.1 discusses the 
relationship between macro-economy and oil while section 2.7.2 involves literature 
regarding macro-economy and market liquidity. Section 2.7.3 discusses the importance 
of characterising countries as net oil exporting and net oil importing countries. The last 
sub-section offers potential research questions.   
 
2.7.1. OIL AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
In relation to oil and macroeconomic research, one of the earliest key studies is conducted 
by Hamilton (1983) who highlights that there is a significant increase in the price of crude 
petroleum prior to seven of the eight post world-war II recessions in the US. Nonetheless, 
although this does not automatically signify that oil price shocks cause the recessions, oil 
price shocks are found to be at least a contributing factor, as evidence indicates that over 
the period between 1948 and 1972, this correlation is statistically significant and non-
spurious. (see also Hamilton (1996), Hamilton (2003) and Hamilton (2009)). 
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Hamilton (2011) updates the count to 10 out of 11 US recessions being preceded by 
significant rises in oil prices, with the additional three rises occurring in the fall of 1990, 
1999-2000 period and 2007–2008 period. As also highlighted in Hamilton (1983), the 
only exceptional recession is between 1960 and 1961, as there is no preceding rise in oil 
prices.   
As observed, Hamilton’s studies are more focused on the US economy and hence, it is 
important to explore other countries as well such as Cunado and De Gracia (2005) who  
research six Asian countries namely Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines between 1975(Q1) and 2002(Q2). Their research suggests that oil 
prices have a significant effect on both economic activity and price indexes, especially 
when oil price shocks are in national currencies. Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) also 
show the expected vulnerability of the Iranian economy to oil price fluctuations. 
Nevertheless, Chang and Wong (2003) highlight that the impact of oil price shocks on 
the Singapore economy is marginal but should not be considered negligible even though 
it is small.  
Overall, past literature appears to show that crude oil does impact the economy of 
countries. However, the degree of development of each country seems to show that there 
are some differences how countries react towards crude oil. Even the classification of a 
country as an oil importer/exporter appears to be important.  For instance Singapore is 
only marginally impacted (Chang & Wong, 2003) while Iran is highly vulnerable to oil 
price fluctuations (Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009). 
 
2.7.2. MARKET LIQUIDITY AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
As highlighted earlier, our research in chapter six also looks into the effect of illiquidity 
shocks on the macro-economy. There are various studies that investigate the relationship 
between market liquidity and the macro-economy of countries. However, the initial 
common theme is how macroeconomic variables affect market liquidity. Chordia et al. 
(2001) discover that market liquidity increases prior to major macroeconomic 
announcements by studying the effects of several explanatory variables (including 
macroeconomic announcements 26 ) on aggregate market spreads, depths and trading 
                                                 
26 Their study focuses on macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment rate and the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  
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activity for US stocks from 1988 to 1998. (See also Fujimoto (2004), Söderberg (2008) 
and Said and Giouvris (2017)) 
Nevertheless, recently, more studies have emerged on the reverse relationship that is the 
impact of liquidity on macroeconomic variables. Næs et al. (2011) highlight that market 
liquidity contains useful information for estimating the current and future state of the US 
and Norway economy. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) expand this line of research by 
studying G7 countries and they show that liquidity may contain some information for 
predicting the current and future state of the economies but it is found to be more country 
specific and liquidity-variable dependent.  
 
2.7.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTRY’S OIL INDUSTRY AND THE 
MACRO ECONOMY.  
Although there appears to be some differences in the relationship between net oil 
exporting countries and net oil importing countries, such studies are still limited. For 
instance, Mork, Olsen, and Mysen (1994) obtain results which show that Norway, an oil-
exporting country, behaves differently relative to oil-importing countries, as its economy 
benefits significantly from oil price increases and seems to be hurt by price declines but 
somewhat less significantly. The different behaviour for Norway27 suggests that the 
domestic oil sector is large enough relative to the size of the economy. Furthermore, 
Engemann et al. (2014) highlight that apparently the US states that only respond to 
negative oil-price shocks are generally energy-intensive US states.  
However, Cunado and De Gracia (2005) mention that further research is needed to obtain 
a more reliable conclusion, even though their results seem to suggest that there are 
different responses between oil exporters and oil importers.  
Overall, it seems that the classification of whether a country is an oil exporter or importer 
is important when undertaking research on oil. However, past studies seldom differentiate 
between oil exporting and importing countries, which is also highlighted by Wang et al. 
(2013). Although they differentiate between oil exporting and importing countries, their 
focus is on the relationship between oil price shocks and stock markets instead of macro-
                                                 
27 Furthermore, the reason that Norway is affected less when the oil price declines even though it is an oil exporter is because the 
government uses all wealth accumulated in previous years to boost the macro economy of the country when revenue from selling oil 
diminishes. 
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economic activity. This is clearly a gap in the literature, highlighting the importance and 
potential of conducting research on the macro-economy, by investigating the effect of oil 
prices on the economic activity between oil exporting and importing countries. 
 
2.7.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REGARDING MACRO-ECONOMY, ILLIQUIDITY 
AND OIL.  
The literature appears to show that crude oil does impact the economy of countries 
(Hamilton, 1983). Although countries’ classification as either an oil exporter or importer 
appears to be important, past studies seldom differentiate between oil exporting countries 
and oil importing countries (Wang et al., 2013) 
There are various studies that investigate the relationship between market liquidity and 
the macro-economy of countries but the initial common theme is how macroeconomic 
variables affect market liquidity (Chordia et al., 2001). Nevertheless, recently, more 
studies have emerged on the reverse relationship that is the impact of liquidity on 
macroeconomic variables (Næs et al., 2011). 
Therefore, our next research questions are: 
1. Does oil price impact macro-economies? 
2. How does oil affect the economic activity of oil exporting and importing 
countries? 
3. Does liquidity influence macro-economies? 
 
2.8. ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF OIL AND ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS  
This section covers literature on asymmetric effects that is more relevant to the fourth 
empirical chapter. This section is divided into two sub-sections: Section 2.8.1 discusses 
asymmetric effects due to oil price shocks while section 2.8.2 reviews the potential 
asymmetric effects of illiquidity shocks on the macro-economy. Lastly, section 2.8.3 
provides potential research questions.   
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2.8.1. ASYMMETRY EFFECT DUE TO OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
Nowadays, a number of research are focusing on the asymmetric effects of oil price 
shocks on the economy and the financial markets. One of the prominent earlier studies is 
conducted by Mork (1989), as an extension of Hamilton (1983) study on the US economy. 
Mork (1989) highlights that positive oil price changes have a significant negative effect 
on the US macro-economy measured using GNP, while oil price declines tend to have a 
small positive but statistically insignificant effect, indicating an asymmetric effect.  
Mork et al. (1994) expand their research by covering seven Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries namely US, Canada, Japan, Germany 
(West), France, UK and Norway. Mork et al. (1994) mention that asymmetry is not 
confined to the US, as most countries show evidence of asymmetric effects, with the 
exception of Norway. This is not surprising as the oil producing sector of Norway is large 
relative to the economy as a whole. Their results also confirm that oil-price fluctuations 
are important for the shaping of business cycles of the leading market economies. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) study Iran, one of the largest oil producers and a net 
oil exporting country, whose economy depends significantly on oil exports. Farzanegan 
and Markwardt (2009) find asymmetric effects of oil price shocks by investigating the 
dynamic relationship between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic variables. 
Interestingly, one of their findings indicates that both positive and negative oil price 
shocks significantly increase inflation. 
Nevertheless, using US data between 1973 (Q2) and 2007 (Q4), Kilian and Vigfusson 
(2011) show empirically that there is no statistically significant evidence of asymmetry 
in the response functions of real GDP towards unanticipated changes in the real oil price. 
Moreover, Engemann et al. (2014) show some contradictory results to asymmetric effects. 
Their study of fifty US states (plus DC) discover that although most states are affected 
by positive oil shocks only, ten states experience symmetric responses, five states respond 
to both shocks and another five states respond to neither shocks. They also find evidence 
that five states show an asymmetric effect of responding only to negative oil shocks. 
Overall, the literature above shows that there are instances where symmetric responses 
do actually exist. Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) show a symmetric effect in their study of 
the US economy while Engemann et al. (2014) find symmetric effect evidence on some 
of the US states. Furthermore, Mork et al. (1994) highlight that only Norway shows 
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evidence of symmetric effects, which is probably due to Norway’s large oil-producing 
sector. Therefore, the classification of a country as oil exporter/importer may have some 
impact on the asymmetric effect results. 
 
2.8.2. POTENTIAL ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS DUE TO MARKET ILLIQUIDITY 
So far the literature in chapter 2.7.2 does confirm that there is a relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and liquidity, indicating that there should also be a relationship 
between business cycles and liquidity. However, unlike oil price shocks, there is not much 
research available in relation to the asymmetric effects of illiquidity shocks on the 
economy. Thus, we feel that there is potential in researching the asymmetric effects of 
illiquidity shocks.  
Chordia et al. (2001) have conducted some asymmetric effect research but it is in relation 
to bid-ask spreads (liquidity) response to market movements. They find that both quoted 
and effective spreads increase dramatically in down markets, but decrease only 
marginally in up markets.   
Jensen and Moorman (2010) study on the US market finds that liquidity price adjusts 
substantially around expansive monetary policy shifts but maintains consistency around 
shifts to a restrictive monetary policy. Similarly, Said and Giouvris (2017) research on 
UK appears to show that market liquidity increases after expansive monetary shifts but it 
is less noticeable during restrictive periods, indicating that investors are less concerned 
with liquidity. Thus, providing more evidence of potential asymmetry effect of liquidity 
in the US and UK. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) mention flight-to-quality, whereby when funding 
becomes scarce speculators cut back on the market liquidity provision especially for 
capital intensive assets. This indicates that when market liquidity decreases, the state of 
the economy may potentially worsen due to fewer investment projects. Rajan (2006) 
mentions that in times of ample liquidity supplied by the central banks, investors tend to 
engage in riskier investments to earn higher returns. Thus, during expansive monetary 
condition periods where market liquidity is expected to increase, it is likely that investors 
will increase their investments in riskier projects, potentially increasing economic growth. 
The two events of constrained and ample liquidity potentially show a symmetric effect. 
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2.8.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF 
OIL AND ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS.  
Past literature shows that crude oil does impact macro-economies but earlier research 
tends to focus on oil price increases (Hamilton, 1983). However, when oil price decreases 
are also included, the evidence shows asymmetric effect due to oil price increases only 
(Mork, 1989). Nevertheless, there are studies that indicates the existence symmetric effect 
(Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011). Thus, the effect of oil on economic growth can either be 
symmetric or asymmetric (Engemann, Owyang, and Wall, 2014).  
Engemann et al. (2014) also highlight that the most energy intensive US states appear to 
respond only to negative oil price shocks and hence the characteristics of the countries 
may also be important in relation to oil price shocks research. 
Similar to oil, the literature seems to show potential asymmetric effects for illiquidity on 
the economy, as the reaction of liquidity after restrictive monetary shifts appears to be 
less noticeable compared to expansive monetary shifts. Although research on illiquidity 
asymmetries would be interesting and beneficial within the current environment, 
surprisingly, there is actually limited research available.  
Therefore, our next research questions are: 
1) Are there symmetric or asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the economy of 
multiple countries? 
2) Are there symmetric or asymmetric effects of illiquidity shocks on the economy 
of multiple countries? 
3) Does classifying the countries into oil exporters and importers influence 
symmetric and asymmetric effects results? 
   
2.9. BALTIC DRY INDEX, NATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND MACRO-
ECONOMY 
This section reviews literature relevant to the fifth and final empirical chapter. The section 
is divided into two sections as follows: Section 2.9.1 discusses the relationship between 
macro-economy and Baltic Dry index while section 2.9.2 discusses literature regarding 
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the potential links between macro-economy and national foreign exchange. Finally, 
section 2.9.3 provides potential research questions.   
 
2.9.1. BALTIC DRY INDEX AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
The Baltic Dry Index (BD) is a shipping and trade proxy created by the Baltic Exchange 
and it reflects the rates that freight carriers charge to haul solid raw materials such as iron 
ore, coal, cement, and grain (Rothfeder, 2016). Lin and Sim (2013) highlight that BD has 
become one of the most important indicators of the cost of shipping and an important 
barometer of the volume of worldwide trade and manufacturing activity.  
Bakshi et al. (2011) find evidence of positive association between a BD increase and 
growth on stock/commodity returns as well as in global economic activity by studying 
the industrial production of 20 countries. Thus, revealing the role of the BD in predicting 
the future course of the real economy.  
Another reason that we consider BD as part of our research is due to its apparently close 
relationship with oil. Tett (2016) mentions that recently, the behaviour of the BD is almost 
as dramatic as oil prices due to the current sluggish trade environment. Moreover, Wang 
et al. (2013) used the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, constructed 
by Kilian (2009), to estimate the scale of global economic activity as a proxy for global 
oil demand. Although the dry cargo single voyage freight rates is not actually BD, its 
concept is the same as the dry cargos consist of grain, oilseeds, coal, iron ore, fertilizer, 
and scrap metal. 
 
2.9.2. NATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
We have included national foreign exchange (NFX) rate as part of our predictive 
variables because oil is usually priced in United States Dollars (USD). Moreover, there 
appears to be a relationship between oil and NFX as Basher, Haug, and Sadorsky (2012) 
mention that lower USD coincides with higher oil prices and vice versa.  
The mechanism behind the relationship between NFX and the economy of countries 
appears simple. It is expected that as NFX rate change, the prices of goods and services 
will affect exports and imports. This is a simple policy that is commonly reported in the 
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mainstream media. For instance in 2015, China’s central bank has purposely devalued 
the Yuan relative to the USD because a cheaper Yuan will make Chinese exports less 
expensive, potentially boosting overseas sales (exports) that have been among the main 
drivers of economic growth for China’s remarkable rise over the past 30 years (Inman, 
2015). Thus, it would be expected that the NFX rate has at least an indirect effect on the 
growth or decline of macro-economies. 
 
2.9.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REGARDING MACRO-ECONOMY, BALTIC DRY 
INDEX AND NATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE. 
The literature shows that Baltic Dry index (BD) has a potential role in predicting a 
country’s economy, as it is an important barometer of worldwide trade and manufacturing 
activity (Lin and Sim, 2013). Moreover, the BD behaviour is almost as dramatic as oil 
(Tett, 2016) and BD is also used as a proxy for global oil demand (Wang et al., 2013). 
Therefore, BD apparently has a close relationship to oil, which is an important variable 
for our research. 
National foreign exchange (NFX) appears to influence economic growth as a cheaper 
NFX will make a country’s export cheaper boosting the country’s economy, as shown by 
China’s growth (Inman, 2015). Moreover, it is known that global oil is usually priced in 
United States Dollars (USD) and since we have various countries in our research it is 
logical to include NFX of the countries in our research. Basher, Haug, and Sadorsky 
(2012) also mention that lower USD coincides with higher oil prices and vice versa, 
indicating that there is a potential relationship between oil and NFX.  
Thus, our next research questions are: 
1) Does Baltic Dry index (BD) impact macro-economies? 
2) Does national foreign exchange (NFX) influence macro-economies? 
 
2.10. CAUSALITY 
The final section covers literature relevant to the final empirical chapter, which involves 
causalities between the macro-economy and our predictive variables. This section is 
divided into four sub-sections which discuss causality between the macro-economy and 
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our predictive variables: oil, liquidity, Baltic dry index and national foreign exchange. As 
before, the last sub-section discusses potential research questions.   
 
2.10.1. CAUSALITY POTENTIAL OF OIL AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
So far past literature in chapter 2.7.1 appears to show that crude oil does impact the 
economy of countries as well as financial markets. Moreover, there is a comparable 
unidirectional effect when looking at the relationship between energy consumption and 
GDP. Lee (2005) finds evidence that long-run and short-run causalities run from energy 
consumption to GDP, but not vice versa using as their sample eighteen developing 
countries. (See also Wolde-Rufael (2004) and Narayan and Smyth (2008))  
Nevertheless, we believe that there may also be an inverse relationship between energy 
and economic growth whereby economic growth can influence oil price. The logic behind 
this is as follows. As economies improve, it is expected that the energy consumption of 
those economies will also increase resulting in an increasing demand for oil causing the 
oil price to also increase. For instance, Kraft and Kraft (1978) find evidence in the US 
that causality is unidirectional, running only from GNP to energy28 for the post-war 
period between 1947 and 1974. (See also Al-Iriani (2006)) 
However, there are also studies that find a bidirectional causality such as Oh and Lee 
(2004). They find a long run bidirectional relationship between energy and GDP by 
studying Korea for the 1970–1999 period. (See also Soytas and Sari (2003)) 
There are also studies that find contradictory results of no causality between economic 
growth and energy consumption such as Eden and Hwang (1984) research on US, using 
data between 1947 and 1979. A more important point is highlighted by Al-Iriani (2006) 
who mentions in their research of GCC countries that energy consumption is based on 
aggregate data, so oil consumption may only be a portion of other more relevant energy 
variables 29 . Wolde-Rufael (2004) actually dis-aggregated the energy series, finding 
evidence to suggest that there is no Granger causality running in any direction between 
oil consumption and real GDP but there is only a unidirectional Granger causality running 
                                                 
28 Energy is represented by Gross energy inputs which include the total of inputs into the economy of primary fuels plus the generation 
of hydro and nuclear power converted to equivalent energy inputs (BTU’s). The primary fuels include both domestic and imports of 
coal, natural gas and petroleum (Kraft & Kraft, 1978) 
29Energy consumption for the World Bank (Global Consumption Database) consists of Electricity, Gas and other fuels. 
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from coal, electricity and total energy consumption to real GDP. This indicates that other 
energy variables have a stronger effect on economic growth and hence energy 
consumption may not be appropriately captured by oil.  
Basher et al. (2012) investigate the dynamic relationship between oil prices, exchange 
rates and emerging market stock prices and show that positive shocks to oil prices tend 
to depress emerging market stock prices. However, a positive oil production shock lowers 
oil prices while a positive shock to real economic activity increases oil prices. They also 
show that increases in oil prices are due to increases in emerging market stock prices30. 
Clements and Fry (2008) highlight that commodity exporting countries through their 
exchange rate can have an impact on commodity prices. This situation can arise if a 
country is a large producer of a commodity or if a group of commodity exporting 
countries have the combined market power to influence the world prices of commodities. 
In fact, Clements and Fry (2008) give example of Saudi Arabia having the ability to 
influence oil prices. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is part of OPEC (Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries), a group of oil exporting countries, which should have 
the combined market power to influence oil prices. In fact, Kaufmann, Dees, 
Karadeloglou, and Sanchez (2004) find evidence that OPEC31 Granger cause real oil 
prices but there is no inverse relationship (or causality), implying that OPEC is able to 
influence real oil price.  
Overall, the literature appears to suggest the possibility of bidirectional relationship 
between oil and economic growth. 
 
                                                 
30 Currently, it is not surprising for oil price to be effected by emerging market stock prices due to the impact that emerging markets 
have on global economies. For instance, Basher and Sadorsky (2006) highlight that emerging economies are expected to consume an 
increasing share of the world's oil and become larger players in the global financial markets, which is shown by the rising economic 
importance of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies. Therefore, indicating that emerging economies will use up a 
significant amount of fossil fuels. Moreover, Basher et al. (2012) in their updated research highlights that over the past ten years, 
emerging economies have been accounting for a larger proportion of global GDP and such trend is expected to continue in the future. 
The study also mentions that emerging economies are among the fastest growing economies with GDP growth rates much higher than 
the growth rates observed in developed economies (Basher et al., 2012). Thus, as oil consumption in most developed economies is 
either flat or in decline, emerging market economic growth (as proxied by emerging market stock prices) is likely to be an important 
source of demand side pricing pressure in the oil market (Basher et al., 2012). Due to the influence that emerging economies appears 
to have on global economies including the oil market, it is expected that emerging market stock prices can somehow affect oil prices. 
31 The variables of the study include OPEC capacity utilization, OPEC production quotas, the degree to which OPEC exceeds these 
production quotas and crude oil stocks in OECD nations. 
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2.10.2. CAUSALITY POTENTIAL OF LIQUIDITY AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
The literature in chapter 2.7.2 appears to show that there is a potential two-way 
relationship between illiquidity and macroeconomic variables, as Fujimoto (2004) 
mentions that macroeconomic fundamentals seem to be significant determinants of 
liquidity while Næs et al. (2011) highlight the inverse relationship. Pereira and Zhang 
(2010) do find a bidirectional relationship but their study involves stock market and 
liquidity while Chordia et al. (2001) find indirectly that there is a potential two-way 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and liquidity.  
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) have found evidence that there is a two-way causality 
between macroeconomic indicators and liquidity variables for the six countries in their 
sample but it is more consistent for global liquidity. When considering both developed 
and developing markets, Sung and Giouvris (2016) also find that there is a two-way 
causality between macroeconomic variables and national liquidity but not for global 
liquidity.  
Overall, the literature shows that there is potentially a two-way causality between 
liquidity and macroeconomic variables but the causality depends on the liquidity measure 
used. For instance, Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) find a two-way causality for global 
liquidity whereas Sung and Giouvris (2016) obtain similar results for national liquidity.   
 
2.10.3. CAUSALITY POTENTIAL OF BALTIC DRY INDEX AND THE MACRO-
ECONOMY 
The literature in chapter 2.9.1 shows that Baltic Dry Index (BD) appears to have some 
relationship with economic growth as it has the ability to predict economic growth 
(Bakshi et al., 2011). However, there also seem to be an inverse relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and BD as well. Klovland (2002) shows that cycles in 
economic activity are major determinants of the short-run behaviour of shipping freight 
rates in the years between 1850 and World-War I. Moreover, since Apergis and Payne 
(2013) indicate that there is a relationship between commodities and BD, a change in 
demand for commodities should have an effect on BD as well. For example, due to 
economic growth, an increased demand for commodities will eventually affect BD. Bloch, 
Rafiq, and Salim (2012) mention that China's demand for coal is surging because of 
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China’s strong economic growth. Hence, there is potentially a two-way relationship 
between BD and economic growth. In fact, Bloch et al. (2012) find that there is a 
bidirectional causality between coal consumption and GDP using demand-side analysis. 
Thus, since coal is part of BD, it should be expected that economic growth may also affect 
BD.   
On a separate note, Lin and Sim (2013) investigate 48 Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
designated by the United Nations using BD as an instrument for trade and they find that 
a 1% expansion in trade raises GDP per capita by approximately 0.5% on average, 
emphasizing the importance of trade towards the economic development of LDCs or low 
income countries. Since we have two emerging countries in our sample, it may be 
interesting to investigate whether developed and emerging countries would react 
differently to the predictive variables including Baltic Dry Index (BD). However, Mexico 
and Brazil are not part of the Lin and Sim (2013) LDCs. 
Overall, there is a potential two-way causality between Baltic Dry index and the macro-
economy. 
 
2.10.4. CAUSALITY POTENTIAL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE MACRO-
ECONOMY 
The literature appears to show that national foreign exchange (NFX) can influence 
economic activity because Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that the impact of oil 
price shocks on economic activity becomes more significant when shocks are defined in 
national currencies. However, we believe that economic growth can also affect NFX rate, 
as Inman (2015) highlights that the main reason that China devalue the Yuan is due to its 
flagging economy. This is also reported by Ryan and Farrer (2015) indicating that the 
state of the economy of a country can also impact NFX rate. Therefore, the possibility of 
a two-way relationship between the NFX rate and economic growth.  
 
2.10.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REGARDING CAUSALITY 
The literature appears to suggest the possibility of bidirectional relationship between oil 
and economic growth as Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that oil affects economic 
 52 
 
activity while Kaufmann et al. (2004) shows that OPEC can influence real oil prices to 
benefit their economies if required 
Potentially, there is also a two-way causality between liquidity and macroeconomic 
variables as Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) find a two-way causality for global liquidity 
while Sung and Giouvris (2016) obtain similar results for national liquidity. There is also 
a probable two-way causality between BD and macro-economy (Bloch et al., 2012).  
National foreign exchange (NFX) also seems to show bidirectional relationship with 
economic growth, as NFX appears to influence economic activity (Cunado and De Gracia, 
2005) while Inman (2015) reports that the main reason that China devalue the Yuan is 
due to its flagging economy. 
Therefore, our next research questions are: 
1) Is there a bi-directional causality between oil and macro-economies? 
2) Is there a bi-directional causality between liquidity and macro-economies? 
3) Is there a bi-directional causality between Baltic Dry Index and macro-
economies? 
4) Is there a bi-directional causality between national foreign exchange and macro-
economies? 
 
2.11. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The literature shows the importance of illiquidity for financial markets and macro-
economies, and how research on illiquidity becomes more prominent due to financial 
sector developments (Rajan, 2006) and the financial crisis (Crotty, 2009). Various 
questions, especially regarding illiquidity, have emerged from the literature review and 
in order to answer the questions, we have five empirical chapters.   
Our first empirical chapter is our overall third PhD chapter and it initially explores the 
relationship between illiquid and liquid stocks. This will be followed by investigating the 
impact of monetary conditions on market liquidity and illiquidity premium as well as on 
the sensitivity of various illiquidity portfolios. Since past research on illiquidity and 
monetary conditions tends to focus on US market (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2001) and Jensen and Moorman (2013)), we decide to conduct a research on UK market.  
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Our second and third empirical chapter hopes to answer the question on whether 
illiquidity can be made into a reliable investment style, as it is believed that it should be 
given equal standing with other widely known investment styles such as value, growth 
and momentum (Ibbotson et al., 2013). The two empirical chapters also use UK data 
because we agree with Galariotis and Giouvris (2007) that the results on the UK market 
will be of great interest to the international scientific, corporate and investment 
community. 
Since the financial crisis appears to impact financial markets and instruments, our second 
empirical chapter investigates the crisis period by dividing 14 years of crisis data equally 
into pre-crisis and post-crisis sample periods while the third empirical chapter uses a 
longer data period of 23 years. However, the third empirical chapter also includes an 
investigation into portfolio construction comparing “characteristics model” and 
“covariance model”, followed by a study on whether January effect persists within the 
various investment styles.  
Our final two empirical chapters research the impact of oil and illiquidity on macro-
economies. The two empirical chapters also investigate on whether categorising the 
countries in our sample into net oil exporters and importers, will provide any valuable 
insights. The fourth empirical chapter focuses on whether there are either symmetric or 
asymmetric effects of oil price shocks as well as illiquidity shocks on eleven macro-
economies consisting of net oil exporting countries (Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico 
and Brazil) and net oil importing countries (Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan, France and 
US). 
The last and fifth empirical chapter investigates the ability of five related predictive 
variables namely crude oil Brent (OB), national illiquidity (NAM), global illiquidity 
(GAM), national foreign exchange (NFX) and Baltic Dry index (BD) on ten macro-
economies segregated equally into net oil exporters and net oil importers. The sample 
countries are similar to the fourth empirical chapter with the exception of US. The 
empirical chapter further splits our net oil exporting countries into developed and 
emerging countries. Finally, two-way causality tests are also conducted between GDP 
and our predictive variables.  
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CHAPTER 3 : ILLIQUIDITY, MONETARY CONDITIONS AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Amihud and Mendelson (1986) highlight that stock returns is an increasing 
function of illiquidity, illiquidity (or liquidity) has become a common part of finance 
literature. Nevertheless, the study of illiquidity has become more prominent due to the 
developments in the financial sector that have resulted in greater funding access (Rajan, 
2006) and more importantly the recent financial crisis (see Crotty (2009) and 
Brunnermeier (2009)).  
Furthermore, Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) mention that due to the crisis, safe products 
such as commercial paper32, which is considered to be a safe asset due to its short maturity 
and high credit rating before the crisis, has nearly dried up and ceased being perceived as 
a safe haven. Obviously, the flight-to-safety from other kinds of debt as well as stocks, 
can cause damage to an economy by making it more expensive for businesses to finance 
their daily operations (Bajaj, 2008). Thus, the effect of the liquidity crisis is not only 
confined to financial companies33. Obviously, the seriousness of the crisis can also be 
seen at country level34.  
Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) show that there is a relationship between liquidity and 
monetary conditions, specifically an expansionary monetary policy coincides with 
increasing market liquidity. (see also Chordia et al. (2001) and Söderberg (2008)).  
Due to the importance of liquidity and monetary policy in combating the financial crisis, 
we feel that it is time that we update current United States (US) focused research by 
studying the United Kingdom (UK) market. Our research hopes to investigate any 
                                                 
32 Commercial paper is an unsecured short-term debt instrument issued by companies. 
33 For example, during the crisis, Keogh (2008) highlights that the credit ratings of United Parcel Service Inc and Toyota are 
downgraded while General Electric Co., which has held the Standard & Poor (S&P)’s top rating since 1956 (longer than any other 
company) is in danger of being downgraded which would have cost $233 million more in annual payments on the $23.3 billion GE 
Capital Corp. raise in the US bond market in the first half of 2008, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Eventually, General 
Electric Co. does lose its perfect credit rating when Standard & Poor's downgrades the company to "AA+" from "AAA". S&P expects 
the worsening economy to cause GE's holdings to deteriorate in value (Goldman, 2009). After 5 years, General Electric Co. have not 
recovered their perfect ratings but at least their 'AA+' long-term corporate credit rating outlook remains stable (StreetInsider.com, 
2014). 
34 As expected, there is a domino effect following the liquidity crisis, which is due to the nation’s political process and budget issues. 
Detrixhe (2011) reports it even results in S&P downgrading US’ AAA credit rating for the first time, causing stock markets to fall 
including the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which endure its sharpest one-day decline since the financial crisis in 2008 
(Browning, 2011). Three years after the downgrade, S&P maintains US’ credit ratings as AA+ but the outlook on ratings is stable 
(Detrixhe & Katz, 2014). 
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possible relationship between monetary conditions and illiquidity by using Jensen and 
Moorman (2010) framework. Jensen and Moorman (2010) focus on the US market, while 
we on the contrary focus on the UK market and also discuss the financial crisis.   
We feel that the UK market has strong research potential as its stock market is considered 
as one of the largest stock markets by capitalisation and turnover ratio indicating that the 
market is quite liquid and therefore the results will be as immune as possible from biases 
such as infrequent trading (Galariotis & Giouvris, 2007). In relation to the two monetary 
condition measures chosen here, namely the Bank of England (BOE) base rate and the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the former is essentially similar to the Federal 
Reserve System in the US35, while LIBOR is widely used by institutions globally and it’s 
link to financial instruments are quite significant, whereby about USD 300 trillion 
financial contracts are pegged to it (Zibel, 2008).  
We start our research by investigating if there are any unconditional return differences 
for illiquid and liquid stocks as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) indicate in their study. 
This is followed by a conditional monetary policy investigation, which is further 
separated into two related exercises starting with the relationship between market 
liquidity and monetary conditions. The next step is to look into zero-cost portfolio36 
returns and monetary conditions. It should be noted that similar to Jensen and Moorman 
(2010), our study focuses mainly on changes of all monetary conditions over the sample 
periods but we will also discuss the financial crisis when we conduct our monthly event 
study.  
Overall, our research of the UK market shows that illiquid stocks generate higher returns 
compared to liquid stocks and when considering monetary conditions, expansive 
monetary conditions result in an increase in market liquidity and higher zero-cost 
portfolio returns. However, prior to expansive shifts investors’ liquidity concerns 
heighten resulting in funding constraints and higher risks, making investors to reduce 
their holdings of illiquid stocks and moving to the less risky liquid stocks, signifying a 
flight-to-liquidity. Moreover, the crisis has an effect on market liquidity and illiquidity 
premium but it is more noticeable for the former.  
                                                 
35 Decisions of BOE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) are also being tracked by global markets. 
36 Zero-cost portfolio = long the illiquid portfolio and short the liquid portfolio. Therefore, it is similar to the illiquidity premium as 
described by other researchers such as Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993). 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature 
review while section 3.3 describes the data and variables. In section 3.4, the methodology 
and empirical results are discussed followed by our conclusion in section 3.5.   
 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.2.1. UNCONDITIONAL RETURNS FOR ILLIQUID AND LIQUID STOCKS 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who study the relationship between expected returns and 
bid-ask spreads in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) discover that average returns 
are an increasing function of the bid-ask spread. Similarly, using three different liquidity 
measures, Jensen and Moorman (2010) find evidence that the zero-cost portfolio earns 
returns that are both economically and statistically significant, suggesting that returns 
increase with increase in illiquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1989) Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) provide similar results. Moreover, 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), using liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), provide evidence signifying the importance of liquidity on asset prices. 
However, there are some contradictory results, which show that illiquid stocks do not 
necessarily provide consistently higher returns. Ben-Rephael et al. (2008) study of NYSE 
find evidence that the profitability of trading strategies based on liquidity premium37 has 
declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable 
especially when using volume as a liquidity measure38. Furthermore, Eleswarapu and 
Reinganum (1993) find evidence that the premium is reliably positive only during the 
month of January suggesting a strong seasonal component while Brennan et al. (2013) 
who use the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity and its role in asset pricing, state that 
in general, only the down-days element commands a return premium. Nevertheless, Datar 
et al. (1998) who investigate the liquidity-return relationship for all non-financial firms 
on the NYSE highlight that the liquidity effect is prevalent throughout the year and is not 
restricted to the month of January alone.  
                                                 
37 Illiquidity premium or liquidity premium is the premium that investors received for holding a more illiquid asset/ portfolio. Usually 
it is calculated as follows = illiquid asset/ portfolio minus liquid asset/ portfolio. 
38 Although liquidity measures not related to volume do show some evidence of liquidity premiums, they are considered weak (Ben-
Rephael et al., 2008). 
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We believe that due to conflicting evidence, conducting research on liquid and illiquid 
stocks still has its merits.  
 
3.2.2. MARKET LIQUIDITY (AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY INNOVATION, ΕT) 
AND MONETARY CONDITIONS 
There is more research on the effect of monetary conditions on market liquidity than the 
relationship between illiquidity premium and monetary conditions. Specifically 
Söderberg (2008) studies the ability of 14 macroeconomic variables such as interest rate 
to forecast changes in monthly market liquidity on 3 Scandinavian order-driven stock 
exchanges39. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) highlight that an investor should also be 
concerned with market liquidity, as the combined effect of both market and individual 
asset liquidity can affect asset prices. Thus, suggesting that by understanding how 
monetary conditions affect market liquidity will allow us to explore how monetary 
conditions affect prices as well as the illiquidity premium. 
Chordia et al. (2001) study the effects of several explanatory variables (inclusive of short-
term interest rates40) confirm that short-term interest rates significantly affect market 
liquidity as well as trading activity (See also Fujimoto (2004), Goyenko and Ukhov 
(2009), Jensen and Moorman (2010) and Fernández-Amador et al. (2013)). Nevertheless, 
Chordia et al. (2005) obtain results indicating monetary expansions are associated with 
increased equity market liquidity but only during crisis periods. Even Söderberg (2008) 
highlights that although some of the macroeconomic variables are able to predict the 
market liquidity of the specific stock markets, not a single variable is able to predict the 
market liquidity of all three Scandinavian stock markets. Therefore, implying that not a 
single macroeconomic variable has the same effect on all three stock markets.   
 
3.2.3. ILLIQUIDITY PREMIUM ACROSS MONETARY CONDITIONS 
Even though there is limited research on the relationship between illiquidity premium and 
monetary conditions, there is some research on the relationship between stock prices and 
                                                 
39 Copenhagen (Denmark), Oslo (Norway) and Stockholm (Sweden). 
40 Nevertheless, their study focuses on more macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment 
rate and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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business conditions. In particular, Fama and French (1989) highlight that further research 
on monetary policy should be done. Hence, by extending Fama and French (1989) 
research, Jensen, Mercer, and Johnson (1996) find evidence to suggest that the monetary 
environment actually influences investors’ required returns. Amihud (2002) even 
highlights that expected market illiquidity affects ex-ante stock excess return positively 
over time, signifying that if there is an expansionary shift (market liquidity increase), 
stock returns are expected to decrease.  
However, in contrast to Fama and French (1989) and Amihud (2002), Thorbecke (1997) 
who also studies the US market finds evidence to indicate that expansionary policy 
increases ex-post stock returns. Thus, if market liquidity (expansionary) increases, stock 
returns are expected to also increase. 
 
3.2.4. FLIGHT TO LIQUIDITY 
Amihud (2002) also highlights the effects of both expected and unexpected market 
illiquidity are stronger on the returns of small firms stock portfolios. Since small firms 
are usually known to be more illiquid compared to larger firms, their study also indicates 
that market liquidity affects illiquid stocks more compared to liquid stocks meaning that 
small stocks are subject to greater illiquidity risk. Such a relationship can also be linked 
to the ‘‘flight-to-liquidity’’ or “flight-to-quality” phenomenon as in times of dire liquidity 
large stocks seem relatively more attractive compared to small stocks due to the illiquidity 
risk.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model to indicate that there are associations 
between an asset's market liquidity41 and investors' funding liquidity42. Their model 
actually establishes various findings such as market liquidity has commonality across 
shares and is subject to flight-to-quality. See also Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Goyenko 
and Ukhov (2009) and Jensen and Moorman (2010) 
Nevertheless, Rajan (2006) mentions that in times of ample liquidity supplied by the 
central banks (low interest rates), investors have a tendency to engage in riskier 
investments to earn higher returns. Therefore, during expansive monetary policy periods 
                                                 
41 Market liquidity means how easily an asset is traded. 
42 Funding liquidity relates to degree of difficulty/ easiness investors can obtain funding. 
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where market liquidity is expected to increase, it is likely that investors will increase their 
holdings of riskier illiquid stocks causing the price of illiquid stocks to increase.  
 
3.2.5. SENSITIVITY OF ILLIQUID QUINTILE AND LIQUID QUINTILE 
Another point that Amihud and Mendelson (1986) discover is that there is a clientele 
effect, whereby stocks with higher spreads are held by investors with longer holding 
periods resulting in the returns of higher-spread stocks (illiquid stocks) to be less spread-
sensitive. Therefore, such illiquid stock investors will react slowly to changes in liquidity 
of the stocks as they tend to hold the stocks for longer.  
However, using turnover as a measure of liquidity and a sample of 48 stock exchanges43, 
Dey (2005) supports a negative relationship between turnover and returns but they find 
that turnover is significant for the emerging market portfolios only. They highlight that 
due to the high liquidity of developed markets, liquidity is not a concern for investors. 
Therefore, since the UK market is a developed market, investors may not be as concerned 
with liquidity, resulting in asset prices to be less sensitive to changes in liquidity. 
Furthermore, Bekaert et al. (2013) mention that lax monetary policy (increased market 
liquidity) decreases both risk aversion and uncertainty of expected market volatility by 
studying the VIX44. Therefore, it is expected that investors will prefer illiquid stocks 
making it to be more sensitive compared to liquid stocks during expansive monetary 
conditions. 
 
3.3. DATA AND VARIABLES  
3.3.1. DATA 
We use stocks listed under the FTSE All-Share index to capture the UK stock market. Our 
sample starts in January 1987 and ends in December 2013. All data is obtained from 
                                                 
43 48 stock exchanges consist of 22 exchanges from Europe, 7 exchanges from North America, 13 exchanges from Asia/Pacific, 5 
exchanges from South America and 1 exchange from Africa. 
44 VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, which is the stock market option-based implied volatility of the 
US S&P500 index. 
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DataStream. Outliers are eliminated and the final data set contains 621 stocks by the year 
2013.  
 
3.3.2. LIQUIDITY MEASURES   
Choosing the right liquidity measure may be complicated. As Amihud, Mendelson, and 
Pedersen (2005) highlight there is hardly a single liquidity measure that can capture all 
aspects of estimating the effect of liquidity on asset prices45. Therefore, similar to Jensen 
and Moorman (2010) and in order to address the issues highlighted by Amihud et al. 
(2005), we decided to use three liquidity measures namely i) Amihud illiquidity measure 
(Amihud, 2002), ii) High-Low Spread (Adjusted46) (Corwin & Schultz, 2012) and iii) Roll 
Estimator (Roll, 1984). Please refer to table 3.1 for more information.  
Since all three measures are mainly used to measure illiquidity, it is expected that there 
will be strong correlations between the measures but as Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka 
(2009) mention, different measures capture different aspects of liquidity. Table 3.1 
provides results that are consistent with expectations as the three liquidity measures are 
positively correlated to each other and the results are statistically significant at least at 1% 
level. Nevertheless, since the correlations are not perfect (ρ < 1), it shows the uniqueness 
of each of the three liquidity measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Moreover, Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) in their research of various liquidity measures mention that different liquidity 
measures capture different aspects of liquidity, signifying that choosing an appropriate liquidity measure is not as straightforward. 
Goyenko et al (2009) suggest using Amihud illiquidity measure, as it does well for measuring liquidity based on price impact but their 
research focuses on US market while our study focuses on UK market. Hence, their results may not be relevant for our research. 
Therefore, in order to address the issue of not choosing an appropriate measure, initially we use three liquidity measures, allowing us 
to investigate its effectiveness in measuring liquidity within UK. Jensen and Moorman (2010) also use three liquidity measures but 
two of the measures are different from our research.  
46 Corwin and Schultz (2012) makes a few assumptions for calculating the High-Low spread, where one measure is adjusted for 
overnight price changes whereas the second is not. We decide to use the one that is adjusted for overnight price changes. Nonetheless, 
the difference in spreads for the two techniques are quite minimum.   
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of liquidity measures: January 1987 to December 2013. 
This table shows descriptive statistics including the correlation of the three liquidity measures used throughout the 
paper. The measures are derived from daily data but are averaged to produce monthly measures. However, for the 
correlations, the monthly measures are further averaged to yield annual measures.  The sample uses companies listed 
on FTSE All Share Index between January 1987 and December 2013 (324 months). All data are obtained from 
DataStream.    
1. The Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) or AMH is calculated for each company, c, every month as follows: 
ܣܯܪ௖௠ ൌ 1ݐ෍
1,000,000 ൈ |ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊௧|
݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ ൈ ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁௧௧
												ሺ3.1ሻ 
Where t is a trading day within the year the measure is calculated.   
2. The High-Low Spread (Adjusted) or HLA is calculated for each company, c, every month as follows: 
ܪܮܣ௖௠ ൌ 2
ሺ݁ఈ െ 1ሻ
1 ൅	݁ఈ 																																																ሺ3.2ሻ Where negative values are converted to zero (0) and the following equations are used to calculate α which is inserted 
in the above HLA equation    
ߙ ൌ ඥ2ߚ െ ඥߚ3 െ 2√2 െ ඨ
ߛ
3 െ 2√2																																	ሺ3.3ሻ 
 
ߚ ൌ෍ቈ݈݊ ቆܪ௧ା௝
଴
ܮ௧ା௝଴ ቇ቉
ଶଵ
௝ୀ଴
																																															ሺ3.4ሻ 
 
ߛ ൌ ቈ݈݊ ቆܪ௧,௧ାଵ
଴
ܮ௧,௧ାଵ଴ ቇ቉
ଶ
																																																				ሺ3.5ሻ 
Where t is a trading day within the year the measure is calculated.   
 
3. The Roll Estimator or RE is calculated for each company, c, every month as follows: 
ܴܧ௖௠ ൌ 2ඥെܥ݋ݒሺ∆ ௧ܲ, ∆ ௧ܲିଵሻ																																ሺ3.6ሻ Where t is a trading day within the year the measure is calculated. 
   
 Correlation    
  AMH HLA RE  Mean Std Dev 
AMH  1.00000    2.42280 1.36766 
  -----      
        
HLA  0.67312 1.00000   0.00477 0.00226 
  (0.0001) -----     
        
RE  0.64433 0.56259 1.00000  0.00522 0.00123 
  (0.0003) (0.0023) -----    
 
 
3.3.3. MONETARY POLICY MEASURES 
In order to identify shifts in Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, Jensen and Moorman 
(2010) use two alternative measures namely the Federal funds rate and Fed47 discount 
rate. Federal funds rate is used to represent monetary policy stringency and to identify 
adjustments in federal stringency while the second measure, Fed discount rate is used to 
                                                 
47 Fed is the short and informal name of the Federal Reserve System. 
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represent monetary policy stance in order to identify fundamental shifts in the overall Fed 
monetary policy.  
Stance can be defined as the contribution made by monetary policy to the economic, 
financial and monetary developments (ECB, 2010). Fed uses it to identify fundamental 
shifts in the overall Fed monetary policy (Jensen & Moorman, 2010). The Bank of 
England (BOE) base rate is the best alternative measure for stance in the UK as it is the 
key interest rate used by BOE to manage monetary policy, which will be a good indicator 
of economic and financial development in the UK. The BOE base rate is also the rate that 
the BOE charges banks for secured overnight lending. Changes to the UK BOE base rate 
(if any), is decided and made by the Monetary Policy Committee of the BOE on a monthly 
basis (Bank-of-England, 2014a). This is similar to the Fed discount rate, which is decided 
by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) but they meet only around eight times 
per year (Board-of-Governors-of-the-Federal-Reserve-System, 2014). 
Jensen and Moorman (2010) mention that stringency can be defined as the degree of 
monetary strictness whilst Maddaloni and Peydró (2013) define it as how stringent the 
capital requirements of the banking sector are within a country. Hence, the UK 3 months 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) may be the best alternative measure for 
stringency in UK as it is the 3 months average interest rates estimated by leading banks 
in London and it has been known to serve as the benchmark reference for debt instruments 
such as government bonds and even retail financing. Moreover, LIBOR is the interbank 
rate in the UK, which is similar to Federal fund rate, the rate used to represent stringency 
in the US. However, the FOMC also decides the Federal funds rate (Board-of-Governors-
of-the-Federal-Reserve-System, 2014), unlike the LIBOR which is decided by leading 
banks in UK. Thus, the two alternative monetary policy measures that we will be using 
are UK BOE base rate and UK 3 months LIBOR rate as an indicator of stance and 
stringency respectively.  
Similar to Jensen and Moorman (2010), the variables are measured as binary variables 
since we are identifying shifts in monetary conditions. The variables are considered as 
expansive for a given month (t) whenever the rate (either BOE base rate or LIBOR) 
decreases from month (t-1) to month (t) while restrictive for a given month (t) is whenever 
the rate (either BOE base rate or LIBOR) increases from month (t-1) to month (t). If there 
are no changes from month (t-1) to month (t), the previous month (t-1) classification will 
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be maintained for month (t). In order to avoid look-ahead bias, stock returns are measured 
subsequent to the identified shifts in monetary policy. 
Although the two measures are used to represent different aspects of monetary conditions, 
panel A in table 3.2 indicates that the two monetary policy measures are highly positively 
correlated to each other. Furthermore, table 3.2 shows that the mean is higher for LIBOR 
but BOE base rate has a slightly higher standard deviation indicating higher volatility and 
risk.  
Panel B and C of table 3.2 reports changes (expansive or restrictive) of the two monetary 
conditions proxies over the 324 months period. Panel B considers the two measures 
independently showing that there are more months with expansive monetary conditions 
than restrictive monetary conditions for either stance or stringency, which is in contrast 
with Jensen and Moorman (2010) whom have more restrictive than expansive months. 
This could be due to the current financial crisis which has resulted in prolonged expansive 
periods, which is part of the data sample.  
Panel C identifies the intersection of the two measures. Again contrasting to Jensen and 
Moorman (2010), panel C shows that there are also more months when both stance and 
stringency are expansive (128 months) compared to when both are restrictive (72 months). 
Panel C also shows the uniqueness of the two monetary policy measures, as out of the 
324 months, the two monetary policy measures have not intersected for 124 months 
indicating that the leading banks in London, which determine the LIBOR, do not 
necessarily follow the BOE whenever the BOE change their base rate. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for measures of monetary conditions: January 1987 to December 2013. 
This table shows descriptive statistics for measures of monetary conditions used throughout the paper. Stance is derived 
from the monthly United Kingdom (UK) Bank of England (BOE) Base Rate, which is the key interest rates used by 
BOE to manage monetary policy. Stringency is determined based on UK 3 months London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), which is the average interest rates estimated by leading banks in London that the banks would offer to other 
banks if they borrowed from them. An increase in the rate from the prior month is labelled “Restrictive” and a decrease 
is labelled “Expansive”. For each rate, whenever there is no change from one month to the next, the prior label is 
maintained. Statistics are derived from the period between January 1987 and December 2013. All data are obtained 
from DataStream.    
Panel A: Correlation of measures of monetary conditions  
 Correlation    
  BOE LIBOR  Mean Std Dev 
BOE  1.00000   5.80216 3.78182 
  -----     
       
LIBOR  0.99734 1.00000  6.01542 3.76820 
  (0.0000) -----    
 
 Panel B: Months across monetary conditions: Measures separated  
 Number of months in alternative monetary conditions 
Monetary State Measure Expansive Restrictive  All 
UK BOE Base Rate (Stance) 199 125 324 
UK 3M LIBOR (Stringency) 181 143 324 
 
Panel C: Months across monetary conditions: Measures intersected 
 Number of months in alternative monetary conditions 
UK Stance (BOE)  
UK Stringency (3M LIBOR) Expansive Restrictive  
Expansive 128 53  
Restrictive 71 72  
   All = 324 
 
 
3.4. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
3.4.1. UNCONDITIONAL RETURNS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ILLIQUID AND 
LIQUID STOCKS 
Our research starts with an investigation of portfolio returns across illiquidity quintiles 
without regard to monetary conditions that is the unconditional returns of the quintiles. 
This will allow us to assess the pricing of illiquidity before any external variables are 
considered.  
Using data obtained from DataStream, the monthly stock prices are initially converted 
into monthly returns by using the formula below: 
ܴ݁ݐ௧ ൌ 	 ௧ܲ௧ܲିଵ െ 1.00000																																								ሺ3.7ሻ 
Where Pt is the share price at time (t) and Pt-1 is the share price one month before at time 
(t-1).  
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Table 3.3 shows the equally weighted average monthly returns of the quintiles over the 
sample period. The prior year (t-1) average of the illiquidity measure is used to construct 
the quintiles for the returns calculation for a given year (t). Therefore, the illiquidity 
measure for the year 1987 is used to construct the quintiles and then calculate the quintile 
returns for the year 1988. Using one of the illiquidity measures at a time, the stocks are 
ranked and the two portfolios that are ranked top 20% and bottom 20% are classified as 
either liquid or illiquid quintiles. The quintiles are rebalanced annually.  
The final column in table 3.3 shows the zero-cost portfolio returns, which takes a long 
position on the illiquid portfolio and a short position on the liquid portfolio (illiquid minus 
liquid stocks portfolio [IML]). Table 3.3 shows, similar to past research such as Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986), that the zero-cost portfolio of the first two liquidity measures 
earns returns that are both positive and statistically significant. However, although the 
zero-cost portfolio returns for the roll estimator shows the highest positive returns, results 
are not statistically significant. Therefore, there are positive significant zero-cost portfolio 
returns observed in our data sample based on Amihud and HLA indicating that illiquid 
portfolios earn higher returns compared to liquid portfolios.  
Jensen and Moorman (2010) also discover that returns are increasing monotonically with 
stock illiquidity for all three liquidity measures meaning they observe a decrease in 
returns when moving away from the low liquidity quintile (Illiquid) to the high liquidity 
quintile (Liquid). However as shown in table 3.3, our research indicates that out of the 3 
liquidity measures, only Amihud shows returns that increase monotonically with decrease 
in liquidity.  
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Table 3.3: Monthly returns on liquidity ranked portfolios (Unconditional portfolio returns): January 1988 to 
December 2013. 
This table shows equally-weighted, average monthly returns (in percentage format) for quintile portfolios based on the 
three liquidity measures described in Table 3.1. Quintile portfolio ranks are determined by the value of the liquidity 
measure in the year prior to the year in which returns are measured and are rebalanced annually. Thus, the returns 
sample period is from January 1988 to December 2013. The “Illiquid – Liquid” portfolio is a portfolio that takes a long 
position in the quintile of stocks with the lowest level of liquidity and a short position in the quintile of stocks with the 
highest liquidity. Newey-West p-values for long-short portfolios are reported in brackets and underneath the monthly 
average returns, whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth 
parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are 
obtained from DataStream.    
 Mean monthly portfolio return (%) 
 Liquidity Portfolio  
Liquidity 
Measure Liquid 2 3 4 Illiquid 
Illiquid - 
Liquid 
Amihud 0.79068% 0.84669% 0.99227% 1.00362% 1.37744% 0.58675% (0.0348) 
       
High Low Spread 
(Adjusted) 0.87038% 0.90009% 1.06716% 1.04422% 1.31145% 
0.44106% 
(0.0498) 
       
Roll Estimator 1.10231% 0.81193% 0.66244% 1.48521% 1.71233% 0.61003% (0.1271) 
 
 
3.4.2. AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY INNOVATIONS, ΕT, 
We will now proceed with our main research objective of investigating how different 
monetary conditions affect illiquidity premium but as highlighted before, other than 
Jensen and Moorman (2010), there is not much research available that investigates such 
a relationship.  
Nevertheless, there are some research on the relationship between market liquidity and 
monetary conditions such as Chordia et al. (2005) who discover that during the crisis 
periods, monetary expansions are associated with increased equity market liquidity (or 
decrease in aggregate illiquidity). Thus, it will be beneficial if we study aggregate 
illiquidity (market liquidity) in order to understand the effects of monetary conditions on 
illiquidity premium. As Acharya and Pedersen (2005) state each stock’s required return 
depends not only on its own expected liquidity but also on the market liquidity (aggregate 
illiquidity).  
In this section, we investigate the relationship between aggregate illiquidity and monetary 
conditions exploring whether aggregate illiquidity changes with different monetary 
conditions.  
Similar to the regression technique adopted by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and 
described by Jensen and Moorman (2010), we use the aggregate Illiquidity Innovation, 
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εt, as an aggregate measure of illiquidity which is obtained using a market-wide version 
of Amihud (ILLIQ). Please refer to table 3.4 for more details.  
The residuals, εt, from the regression, are considered to be the aggregate illiquidity 
innovations, εt, which provide a dynamic measure of market liquidity conditions (Jensen 
& Moorman, 2010). Using the aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, three analyses are 
conducted in order to investigate the relationship between aggregate illiquidity and 
monetary conditions. The first analysis investigates the relationship between aggregate 
illiquidity innovation, εt and monetary conditions followed by the monthly event study, 
which is achieved by examining cumulative aggregate illiquidity innovation, εt around a 
directional change in the BOE base rate. The last analysis involves aggregate illiquidity 
innovations, εt, within the most illiquid and most liquid quintile.  
 
3.4.2.1. AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY INNOVATION, ΕT AND MONETARY 
CONDITIONS 
Table 3.4 is constructed by assigning monetary conditions in month (t-1) to an aggregate 
illiquidity innovation εt in month (t). Since we are using aggregate illiquidity innovation 
εt, a negative aggregate illiquidity innovation εt, value is considered as a decrease in 
aggregate illiquidity (or increase in market liquidity) whereas a positive aggregate 
illiquidity innovation εt value is considered as an increase in aggregate illiquidity (or 
decrease in market liquidity).  
Although the values (positive or negative) are similar to past research as table 3.4 shows 
the values are negative following expansive monetary conditions and vice-versa, the p-
value indicates that the results are generally not significant especially for restrictive 
periods. Table 3.4 also highlights that market liquidity is highest and significant when 
both stance and stringency are expansive, which is also observed by Jensen and Moorman 
(2010). Interestingly, the results seem to show that stringency (LIBOR) matters more than 
stance (BOE base rate), as it produces significant results for expansive periods.    
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Table 3.4: Aggregate Illiquidity Innovations and Monetary Conditions. 
This table shows average monthly innovations in aggregate illiquidity across monetary conditions and the method used 
is described by Jensen and Moorman (2010) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
 
The measure is derived from the monthly market wide version of ILLIQ (AMH) that is reported in Table 3.1 as in 
equation (3.1). The aggregate value of illiquidity (AILLIQ) is calculated as follows: 
ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ ൌ 1௧ܰ෍ܫܮܮܫܳ௜,௧
ே
௜ୀଵ
																																																																	ሺ3.8ሻ 
Where Nt includes all firms with an observation for ILLIQ in month t except for the highest and the lowest 1% of 
ILLIQi,t. 
 
Monthly changes in aggregate illiquidity are calculated for each month t as follows: 
∆ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ ൌ ݉௧ିଵ݉ଵ ሺܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ െ ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ିଵሻ																																						ሺ3.9ሻ Where mt-1 is the total market value at the beginning of month t-1 for all firms with an observation for ILLIQi,t in month 
t. m1 is the total market value at the beginning of January 1987 for all firms with an observation for ILLIQi,t in January 
1987. We regress the monthly change in aggregate illiquidity on its lag and the scaled lagged value of aggregate 
illiquidity as follows: 
∆ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ∆ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ିଵ ൅ ߣ ൬݉௧ିଵ݉ଵ ൰ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧										ሺ3.10ሻ	 Aggregate illiquidity innovations are the fitted values of the regression residual, εt. 
 
Monetary conditions, as labelled in month t-1, are assigned to a value of εt in month t. Measures of monetary conditions 
are detailed in Table 3.2. Newey-West p-values are reported in brackets and underneath the monthly average, whereby 
bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-
West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. Values are calculated over the period from 
January 1987 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 Aggregate illiquidity innovation 
Monetary policy Stance (UK BOE) 
Stringency (LIBOR) Expansive Restrictive All 
Expansive -0.71828 0.14693 -0.46694 
 (0.0502) (0.6284)   (0.0757) 
       
Restrictive 0.70925 0.46145 0.58449 
 (0.3273) (0.2504)  (0.1576) 
       
All -0.20639 0.32956 0.00000 
 (0.3185)  (0.2938)  (1.0000)  
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3.4.2.2. AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
A Vector autoregression (VAR) is also run to further investigate the response of the 
aggregate Illiquidity Innovation, εt to a shock in monetary conditions. Dummy variables 
to represent monetary conditions are used and the following VAR model is used to obtain 
figure 3.1.  
௧ܻ ൌ ߜ ൅෍߶௝ ௧ܻି௝ ൅ ݑ௧
௄
௝ୀଵ
																		ሺ3.11ሻ 
Where Y is a vector that includes the aggregate illiquidity innovation εt, and a dummy 
variable that measures monetary conditions. δ is a vector of constants. 
In order to examine response to an expansive shock for either BOE base rate or LIBOR, 
the dummy variable takes the value of one (1) in month (t) when the monetary conditions 
are expansive and zero (0) when the conditions are restrictive. With regards to examining 
response to a restrictive shock (either BOE base rate or LIBOR), it is the opposite 
whereby monetary condition is a dummy variable that takes the value of one (1) in month 
(t) when the monetary conditions are restrictive and zero (0) when the conditions are 
expansive.    
In relation to examining response to an expansive combination of BOE base rate and 
LIBOR monetary condition (combined), the dummy variable takes the value of one (1) 
in month (t) when both monetary conditions namely BOE base rate and LIBOR are 
expansive and zero (0) for other periods. For combined restrictive, it will follow the 
opposite process.  
The lag length K for the above equation are determine by 5 tests48 and if there are any 
conflicts, the lag length with the highest number of significant tests is chosen. However, 
if there are still conflicts, the shortest lag length is chosen.   
It should be noted that following an expansive monetary condition, a negative value (drop) 
indicates a decrease in aggregate illiquidity innovation εt (or market liquidity increase) is 
expected, whereas a positive value indicates an increase in aggregate illiquidity 
innovation εt (market liquidity decrease) is expected after restrictive monetary conditions. 
                                                 
48 The 5 lag length tests conducted are Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC) and Hannan‐Quinn information criterion (HQ). 
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Finally, we consider the variable to be responsive to the respective shocks if the variables 
respond is statistically different from zero for at least one month.  
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate Illiquidity Impulse Response Function. 
This figure shows the impulse response functions for aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, as defined in Table 3.4, to a Cholesky one standard deviation shock in monetary conditions. The first row of 
graphs shows the response of aggregate illiquidity to an expansive shock. The second row shows the response of aggregate illiquidity to a restrictive shock. The VAR lag length is chosen according to 5 
tests namely Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) & Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). The sample 
period is from January 1987 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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The top row in figure 3.1 relates to expansive monetary conditions and it shows that 
aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, decreases (or market liquidity increases) when either 
stance or stringency are in expansive shock, peaking after 2 months. Similar results are 
also obtained when both are expansive. The bottom row shows opposite results as 
expected indicating that aggregate illiquidity innovation εt increases (or market liquidity 
decreases) after monetary condition signifies restrictive shock, also peaking after 2 
months. However, only LIBOR produce significant results for both expansive and 
restrictive monetary conditions.  
Overall, the impulse response function in figure 3.1 shows some association between 
monetary conditions and aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, but in contrast to table 3.4, 
figure 3.1 indicates that this is not statistically significant for combined expansive 
monetary conditions associations. However, the figure apparently shows that LIBOR are 
significant for both monetary conditions and it appears to occur regularly at the 2nd lag 
(2nd month), signifying again that stringency (LIBOR) appears to matter more than stance 
(BOE base rate) when considering aggregate illiquidity. 
 
3.4.2.3. MONTHLY EVENT STUDY: CUMULATIVE AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY 
INNOVATION, ΕT AROUND A DIRECTIONAL CHANGE IN THE BANK OF 
ENGLAND BASE RATE (SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY) 
So far table 3.4 and figure 3.1 shows some relationship between aggregate illiquidity 
innovation εt and monetary conditions but it does not investigate the timing of 
adjustments in aggregate illiquidity innovation εt. Therefore, Figure 3.2, shows the timing 
of adjustments in aggregate illiquidity innovation εt, which involves examining the 
changes in aggregate illiquidity innovation εt around shifts in monetary policy by 
conducting a “Monthly Event Study”. It is assumed that an “event” is an incident when 
there is a shift in monetary policy through a statement or decision issued by the BOE. A 
change in interest rate (expansive to restrictive or vice-versa) is considered as a shift in 
monetary policy. Moreover, we also assumed that “broad shift” means “long-term shift”. 
Hence, we are investigating long-term shifts in monetary policy. 
Data of shifts in monetary policy is obtained from the BOE website (Bank-of-England, 
2014b), which publishes changes in interest rates since 1694.  Between January 1987 and 
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December 2013 there are 94 changes in interest rates but only 18 are actual changes from 
expansive to restrictive or vice-versa (shifts in monetary policy). The remaining 76 
changes are further (continued) increase or decrease in interest rates in the direction of 
the prior shifts. 
The “monthly event study” investigates the behaviour of the markets, 1 year (12 months) 
before and after an event (directional change in BOE base rate or stance) has occurred 
whereby month “0” is considered as when the event occurred.  If there is a shift within 
the 12 months period before and after an event, this is considered only as a temporary 
shift and is not included in our research, as our main intention is to investigate only a 
long-term shift in monetary policy. Nevertheless, we have also included the financial 
crisis period even though there is a minor temporary shift. Thus, including the financial 
crisis period which obviously results in monetary policy shifts, there are only eight 
monetary policy shifts between January 1987 and December 2013, namely four expansive 
and four restrictive shifts. 
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Event Study: aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt. 
This figure shows the event time average of cumulative aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, around a directional change in the UK BOE Base Rate (shift in Stance). The monthly version of aggregate 
illiquidity innovations detailed in Table 3.4 is used. A monetary condition is labelled as “Expansive” if the prior interest rate change is a decrease or “Restrictive” if the prior change is an increase. 
Numbers on the horizontal axis are event months. The sample period is from January 1988 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 Monetary condition: 
Expansive 
Monetary condition: 
Restrictive 
Cumulative 
aggregate 
illiquidity 
innovation 
 
  
 Event months Event months 
 
 
Note: 
Based on our analysis, the unexpected significant increase of the event-time average of cumulative aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt are caused by three major happenings of which two are from the 
recent financial crisis, which occurred 7 months after the directional change in the UK BOE Base Rate (event), as below: 
1. September 11 attacks in the US (7 months after event - September 2001) 
2. The fall of one of US leading mortgage lenders IndyMac Bank. (7 months after event – July 2008) 
3. Due to investors’ concerns after the fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shares, resulting in the US government plan of saving them (7 months after event – July 2008)  
 
Please refer to note below.   
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The left side of figure 3.2 shows that six months before the expansive events, cumulative 
aggregate illiquidity innovation starts increasing prior to an expansive shift, indicating 
that aggregate illiquidity increases (or market liquidity decreases). However, cumulative 
aggregate illiquidity innovation starts decreasing after the expansive event, signifying 
that market liquidity has improved but there are some interruptions seven months after 
the event. These are due to i) the September 11 attacks on the US (McAndrews & Potter, 
2002), ii) the fall of one of US leading mortgage lenders, IndyMac Bank (Clifford & 
Chris, 2008)  and iii) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shares plummeting due to investors’ 
concerns (Luhby, 2008). Therefore, with the exception of the interruptions, our findings 
are somehow consistent to our previous findings as market liquidity improves following 
an expansive monetary condition.  
The right side of figure 3.2 shows that the reaction after restrictive monetary shifts are 
less noticeable compared to expansive monetary conditions indicating that during 
restrictive monetary policy periods, changes in aggregate illiquidity will have limited 
implications for pricing of liquidity as investors are less concerned with liquidity, which 
is similar to the findings of Jensen and Moorman (2010). 
 
3.4.2.4. AGGREGATE ILLIQUIDITY INNOVATIONS: MOST ILLIQUID QUINTILE 
AND MOST LIQUID QUINTILE 
Panel A and B in table 3.5 shows the average monthly innovations in aggregate illiquidity 
innovation εt across monetary conditions for the most liquid and illiquid quintiles 
respectively.  
Similar to table 3.4, although the values (either positive or negative) are consistent with 
past research, the results in table 3.5 are generally not significant. The only significant 
results are when stringency is expansive as well as when both stance and stringency are 
expansive for the most liquid quintile.  
By looking only at significant results under stringency, panel A and B of table 3.5 shows 
that the most illiquid quintile experiences greater change in aggregate illiquidity 
innovation εt values compared to the most liquid quintile, which exhibits minimum 
changes. Panel C in table 3.5 presents the difference in aggregate illiquidity innovation 
εt between the most illiquid and most liquid quintiles. It shows that the values are not 
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affected by the most liquid quintile confirming that the most liquid quintile experiences 
only a minimum change in aggregate illiquidity innovation εt due to monetary conditions.  
As before, table 3.5 seems to indicate again that stringency seems to be more important 
for the UK market as it generates significant results.  
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Table 3.5: Aggregate illiquidity innovations, εt, and Monetary Conditions: Most illiquid quintile and most liquid quintile. 
This table shows average monthly innovations in aggregate illiquidity across monetary conditions separately for the quintile of the most illiquid stocks and the quintile of the most liquid stocks. The 
aggregate illiquidity innovation measure is detailed in Table 3.4. Panel C shows the difference in aggregate illiquidity innovations for the most illiquid and the most liquid quintile. Newey-West p-values 
are reported in brackets and underneath the monthly average, whereby bold figures denote statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value 
is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. Values are calculated over the period from January 1987 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Panel: A: Most Liquid Quintile  B: Most Illiquid Quintile  C: Illiquid minus Liquid 
 Mean monthly illiquidity innovation  Mean monthly illiquidity innovation  Mean monthly illiquidity innovation 
            
Monetary policy Stance (BOE)  Stance (BOE)  Stance (BOE) 
Stringency (LIBOR) Expansive Restrictive All  Expansive Restrictive All  Expansive Restrictive All 
Expansive -0.00655 -0.00438 -0.00592  -2.15471 -0.95894 -1.84612  -1.94456 -0.73326 -1.59268 
  (0.0978)  (0.5425) (0.0866)   (0.1425)  (0.1553) (0.0848)   (0.1456)  (0.1854) (0.0858) 
                     
Restrictive 0.00783 0.00700 0.00741  2.83524 1.52680 2.20115  2.66768 1.32894 1.99363 
 (0.3419)  (0.1014) (0.1203)  (0.3195)  (0.3034)   (0.1927)  (0.3218) (0.3006) (0.1965)  
                     
All -0.00140 0.00223 0.00000  -0.31775 0.56146 0.00000  -0.29068 0.46415 0.00000 
 (0.5870) (0.6306)  (1.0000)  (0.8112) (0.6318)   (1.0000)  (0.8106)  (0.6385)  (1.0000)  
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3.4.3. MONETARY CONDITIONS AND RETURNS TO ILLIQUID, RELATIVE TO 
LIQUID STOCKS 
Up to this point our UK findings do not fully support Jensen and Moorman (2010) but 
there are some significant results indicating that expansive monetary conditions are 
associated with eased funding constraints (increase in market liquidity). To investigate 
the relationship between illiquidity premium and monetary conditions, we undertake four 
different exercises focusing on the zero-cost portfolio or illiquid minus liquid portfolio 
(IML). 
The first exercise investigates the average return of the IML portfolio across monetary 
conditions, which is achieved by examining the IML portfolio equally-weighted average 
monthly returns across different monetary conditions based on the three different 
liquidity measures. The second exercise examines the terminal wealth in different 
monetary conditions, which is done by assessing the terminal growth of £100 invested in 
the IML portfolio within different monetary conditions over 26 years. The third exercise 
is a monthly event study involving the cumulative IML portfolio returns around a 
directional change in the BOE base rate (shifts in stance monetary policy). The last 
exercise looks into illiquidity and monetary conditions beta, β to determine whether 
stocks with the highest or lowest illiquidity levels drive the relationship between returns 
and monetary conditions.  
 
3.4.3.1. AVERAGE RETURN TO THE ZERO-COST PORTFOLIO ACROSS 
MONETARY CONDITIONS 
Table 3.6 shows the IML portfolio equally-weighted average monthly returns across 
different monetary conditions based on the three liquidity measures. As before, returns 
are measured in a given month (t) based on monetary conditions determined in the 
previous month (t-1).  
Table 3.6 demonstrates that a relationship exists between IML portfolio returns and 
monetary conditions for all three liquidity measures but it is considerably less noticeable 
for the Roll estimator. Table 3.6 also shows that the IML portfolio return is different 
across the two monetary conditions. It shows that expansive monetary conditions 
consistently results in higher IML portfolio returns compared to restrictive monetary 
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conditions (see Amihud (panel A)). Following periods of expansive shifts for stance 
(stringency), the IML portfolio returns is 1.0964% (0.9075%) whereas after restrictive 
periods, the IML portfolio returns is -0.1745% (0.2287%). Our results also show that the 
average IML portfolio returns are generally statistically insignificant when either of the 
monetary conditions are restrictive. Moreover, the IML portfolio returns are the highest 
when both monetary conditions are expansive and the results are significant for both 
Amihud and HLA measures. In fact, the returns (conditional returns) for the two liquidity 
measures are more than twice the return of their respective unconditional returns which 
WAS discussed before, in table 3.3. Also unlike aggregate illiquidity in table 3.4, table 
3.6 shows that stance (BOE base rate) has a stronger effect on IML than stringency 
(LIBOR).  
Overall, there is some relationship between the zero-cost portfolio returns and monetary 
conditions even though the three liquidity measures do not capture the same aspects of 
illiquidity. Nevertheless, table 3.6 at least shows that there is a relationship between 
monetary conditions and the price of liquidity.  
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Table 3.6: Illiquid minus liquid portfolio returns across monetary conditions: January 1988 to December 2013. 
This table shows illiquid minus liquid (zero-cost) portfolio, equally-weighted average monthly returns (in percentage format) across different monetary conditions. Each return is for a portfolio long in 
the quintile of stocks with the lowest liquidity and short in the quintile of stocks with the highest liquidity. Returns are measured in month (t) based on monetary conditions determined in month (t-1) and 
the portfolios are rebalanced on an annual basis based on the three respective liquidity measures. Liquidity and monetary conditions measures are detailed in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, respectively. Newey-
West p-values are reported in brackets and underneath the monthly average returns, whereby bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for 
the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Panel: A: Amihud  B: High Low Spread (Adjusted)  C: Roll Estimator 
 Mean monthly return (%)  Mean monthly return (%)  Mean monthly return (%) 
            
Monetary policy Stance (BOE)  Stance (BOE)  Stance (BOE) 
Stringency (LIBOR) Expansive Restrictive All  Expansive Restrictive All  Expansive Restrictive All 
Expansive 1.5292% -0.5968% 0.9075%  0.9002% 0.0881% 0.6628%  1.0928% 1.0353% 1.0760% 
 (0.0000) (0.0889) (0.0053)   (0.0345)  (0.7361) (0.0397)    (0.1693)  (0.1189)  (0.0660) 
                  
Restrictive 0.3376% 0.1229% 0.2287%  0.2184% 0.1796% 0.1987%  0.3662% -0.3248% 0.0158% 
 (0.4529) (0.8332) (0.5952)  (0.5189)   (0.6531)  (0.4611)  (0.1878)   (0.7624)  (0.9751) 
                  
All 1.0964% -0.1745% 0.5868%  0.6526% 0.1418% 0.4411%  0.8289% 0.2373% 0.6100% 
 (0.0001) (0.6227) (0.0348)  (0.0337)   (0.5538) (0.0498)   (0.1139)  (0.7287)  (0.1271)  
            
Unconditional 0.5868%  0.4411%  0.6100% (0.0348)  (0.0498)  (0.1271) 
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3.4.3.2. TERMINAL WEALTH IN DIFFERENT MONETARY CONDITIONS 
Figure 3.3 shows the growth of £100 after 26 years period (January 1988 to December 
2013) by investing on the IML (zero-cost portfolio) using the three liquidity measures, 
under different monetary conditions. It is assumed that £100 is invested in the beginning 
(January 1988) growing cumulatively across the respective monetary conditions. In table 
3.7, we provide the final results of figure 3.3 and we also include the returns growth for 
unconditional zero-cost portfolio (in the last row of table 3.7). 
Table 3.7 shows that the highest return is actually based on Amihud during stance (BOE) 
expansive monetary condition whereby after 26 years, £100 grew to £308.23. As expected, 
figure 3.3 and table 3.7 highlights that during restrictive monetary conditions, the 
portfolios experience less growth and can even result in losses. The lowest growth is 
shown by Roll estimator across combined restrictive monetary conditions and the initial 
£100 investment has fell in value to £76.94.  
Interestingly, table 3.7 also shows that the unconditional zero-cost portfolios can actually 
produce returns higher than when investing only during expansive conditions. 
Considering HLA, the unconditional return of £237.61 is slightly higher compared to 
combined expansive conditions that results in returns of £208.93 only. This signifies that 
it may even be better for investors to invest using the traditional buy-and-hold strategy, 
without regards to monetary conditions within the UK market. 
Nevertheless, as a summary, although for a short period of time, portfolio growth during 
restrictive conditions can actually be higher than during expansive conditions (noticeably 
for the Roll estimator), the figure shows that in the long run, the IML portfolio for all 
three liquidity measures consistently results in higher growth during expansive monetary 
conditions relative to restrictive monetary conditions. This is also important as table 3.2 
indicates that there are more expansive periods compared to restrictive periods. 
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Figure 3.3: Illiquid minus liquid portfolio growth of £100 across different monetary conditions (stringency): January 1988 to December 2013. 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in the following strategy: long illiquid stocks and short liquid stocks in different monetary conditions over the 26 years study period. The black line shows 
the dollar growth for investing in the long-short strategy for either stance or stringency during expansive conditions and not investing during restrictive periods. The grey line shows the dollar growth for 
investing in the long-short strategy for either stance or stringency during restrictive conditions and not investing during expansive policy periods. If monetary conditions are expansive for both Stringency 
and Stance, then “Combined” is labelled expansive and it involves investing when both monetary conditions are expansive and not investing during other periods. If monetary conditions are restrictive 
for both Stringency and Stance, then “Combined” is labelled restrictive and it involves investing when both monetary conditions are restrictive and not investing during other periods. All data are obtained 
from DataStream.    
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Table 3.7: Illiquid minus liquid portfolio growth of £100 across different monetary conditions: January 1988 to December 2013. 
This table shows the growth of £100 invested in the strategy long illiquid stocks and short liquid stocks in different monetary conditions over the 26 years study period. This table provides the end results 
of figure 3.3 as well as the zero-cost portfolio growth of unconditional monetary condition. The expansive dollar growth long-short strategy for either stringency or stance involves investing during 
expansive periods and not investing (zero returns) during restrictive periods. The restrictive dollar growth long-short strategy for either stringency or stance involves investing during restrictive periods 
and not investing (zero returns) during expansive periods. The expansive dollar growth long-short strategy for both stringency and stance (Combined) involves investing following both are expansive 
periods and not investing (zero returns) during other periods. The restrictive dollar growth long-short strategy for both stringency and stance (Combined) involves investing following both are restrictive 
periods and not investing (zero returns) during other periods. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 
Panel: A: Amihud  B: High Low Spread (Adjusted)  C: Roll Estimator 
 £100 portfolio value after 26 years  £100 portfolio value after 26 years  £100 portfolio value after 26 years 
            
Monetary policy Stance Stringency Combined  Stance Stringency Combined  Stance Stringency Combined 
Expansive £308.23 £255.19 £285.03  £224.00 £213.33 £208.93  £257.49 £283.99 £232.23 
            
Restrictive £78.88 £132.02 £108.72  £117.16 £127.82 £112.75  £128.71 £102.21 £76.94 
            
Unconditional £283.07  £237.61  £290.33 
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3.4.3.3. ILLIQUID MINUS LIQUID (IML) PORTFOLIO RETURN IMPULSE 
RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
As before, to explore further the relationship between the price of liquidity and monetary 
conditions, we estimate a VAR model and report the resulting impulse responses. Amihud 
(2002) mentions that the largest effect on stock returns comes from the unexpected 
component of market liquidity (or shocks) but, unfortunately, they do not examine the 
relationship further. A VAR allows us to assess the ramifications that a shift in monetary 
policy has on the return of the zero-cost portfolio by considering an alternative lag 
structure and by showing the timing of the responses (Jensen and Moorman, 2010). 
ܺ௧ ൌ ߜ ൅෍߶௝ܺ௧ି௝ ൅ ݑ௧
௄
௝ୀଵ
																																					ሺ3.12ሻ 
Where X is a vector that includes the zero-cost portfolio returns and a dummy variable 
that measures monetary conditions. δ is a vector of constants.  
Monetary condition determinations for figure 3.4 and figure 3.5 are similar to figure 3.1. 
As before, dummy variables that measure monetary conditions are used and the lag length 
K for the above equation are determined by 5 tests49. If there are any conflicts, the lag 
length with the most number of positive tests is chosen. However, if there are still 
conflicts, the shortest lag length is chosen. It should be noted that following a specific 
monetary condition, a positive value (rise) indicates zero-cost portfolio returns increase, 
whereas negative value (drop) indicates a decrease in zero-cost portfolio returns. As 
before, we consider a variable to experience a shock if its response is statistically 
significant (different from zero) for at least one month.  
                                                 
49 The 5 lag length tests conducted are Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC) and Hannan‐Quinn information criterion (HQ). 
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Figure 3.4: Illiquid minus liquid Portfolio Return Impulse Response Function: Expansive Shocks. 
This figure shows the impulse response function of the illiquid minus liquid portfolio return to a Cholesky one standard deviation expansive shock in monetary conditions. The VAR lag length is chosen 
according to 5 tests namely Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) & Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). 
Dotted lines represent two-standard error bands. The sample period is from January 1988 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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Figure 3.5: Illiquid minus liquid Portfolio Return Impulse Response Function: Restrictive Shocks. 
This figure shows the orthogonalized impulse response function of the illiquid minus liquid portfolio return to a Cholesky one standard deviation restrictive shock in monetary conditions. The VAR lag 
length is chosen according to 5 tests namely Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) & Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ). The sample period is from September 1988 through December 2013. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows the impulse response function of the zero-cost portfolio returns 
to Cholesky one standard deviation expansion shock across different monetary conditions 
whereby figure 3.4 is based on the three liquidity measures across expansive monetary 
conditions. As expected, figure 3.4 shows that returns of all zero-cost portfolios have 
actually increase (positive value) as expected following expansive shock and peaking at 
either the 2nd lag (2nd month) or 3rd lag (3rd month). Figure 3.5 is based on the three 
liquidity measures across restrictive monetary conditions and it shows that returns of all 
zero-cost portfolios have actually decrease (negative value) after a restrictive shock event, 
where it reach its lowest point after either 2nd lag (2nd month) or 3rd lag (3rd month).  
The impulse response function from figure 3.4 and figure 3.5 confirms some association 
between monetary conditions and changes in zero-cost portfolio returns as reported in 
table 3.6 before. However, Roll estimator does not show any significant results for all 
monetary conditions and only Amihud produce significant results for both expansive and 
restrictive monetary conditions according to BOE base rate. In relation to combined 
expansive shock, only Amihud and HLA produces significant results and the zero-cost 
portfolio returns are the highest when both conditions are expansive. The significant 
results for Amihud and HLA can also be observed when both monetary conditions are 
restrictive but in the opposite direction.  Interestingly, similar to table 3.6, the two figures 
seem to show that stringency (LIBOR) has a weaker effect on IML than stance (BOE 
base rate). 
 
3.4.3.4. MONTHLY EVENT STUDY: CUMULATIVE ILLIQUID MINUS LIQUID 
(IML) PORTFOLIO RETURNS AROUND A DIRECTIONAL CHANGE IN THE 
BANK OF ENGLAND BASE RATE (SHIFTS IN MONETARY POLICY) 
So far table 3.6 and figure 3.3 as well as figure 3.4 and 3.5 establish the existence of a 
relationship between zero-cost portfolio returns and monetary conditions to a certain 
extent. However, the behaviour of the temporal relationship between zero-cost portfolio 
returns and monetary policy shifts remains uncertain. Therefore, to investigate the 
temporal relationship around a directional change in the BOE base rate (shifts in stance 
monetary policy), we conduct a monthly event study for the three liquidity measures 
similar to before.  
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Figure 3.6: Monthly Event Study: Cumulative changes in interest rates. 
This figure shows the event time average of cumulative changes in the BOE and LIBOR around a directional change in the UK BOE base rate (shift in Stringency). A monetary state is labelled as 
“Expansive” if the prior discount rate change is a decrease or “Restrictive” if the prior change is an increase. Numbers on the horizontal axis are event months. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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We have also included an investigation on the event-time average of cumulative change 
in interest rate for both BOE base rate and LIBOR across a shift in expansive and 
restrictive monetary policy in figure 3.6. Under expansive, figure 3.6 shows that the 
cumulative change in interest rates has actually started falling around one month before 
the shift of the monetary policy event from restrictive to expansion (expansive shifts) 
whilst restrictive shifts show similar results but in the opposite directions also shown in 
figure 3.6. It can also be observed in figure 3.6 that BOE base rate and LIBOR move very 
closely to each other, confirming the high correlation between the two variables, as 
indicated in table 3.2.  
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Figure 3.7: Monthly Event Study: Cumulative excess illiquid minus liquid portfolio returns. 
This figure shows cumulative excess illiquid minus liquid portfolio returns around a directional change in the UK BOE Base Rate (shift in Stance). The illiquid minus liquid portfolio is a strategy that is 
long the quintile portfolio of illiquid stocks and short the quintile portfolio of liquid stocks. The line shows the event time average of cumulative monthly returns in excess of the sample period mean for 
the long-short strategy. A monetary condition is labelled as “Expansive” if the prior interest rate change is a decrease or “Restrictive” if the prior change is an increase. Numbers on the vertical axis are 
percentages. Numbers on the horizontal axis are event months. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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The top row of figure 3.7 shows the event-time average of “cumulative excess zero-cost 
portfolio returns” around an expansive directional change in BOE base rate (shifts in 
stance) whilst the bottom row shows the event-time average of “cumulative excess zero-
costs portfolio returns” around a restrictive directional change in BOE base rate (shifts 
in stance).  
Unlike Jensen and Moorman (2010), the return patterns of the zero-cost portfolio for the 
three liquidity measures are different proving that the three liquidity measures are able to 
capture different aspects of illiquidity. Nevertheless, among the three liquidity measures, 
Amihud seems to provide results that are more consistent to our previous findings as the 
IML portfolio returns increase following an expansive monetary condition.  
Based on Amihud, our findings are consistent with Jensen and Moorman (2010) when 
there is an expansive shift. Figure 3.7 shows that 5 months prior to the event, cumulative 
IML portfolio returns start decreasing reaching their lowest point. This signifies that prior 
to an expansive shift, investors’ liquidity concerns heighten resulting in funding 
constraints and higher risks. Due to this, investors reduce their holdings of illiquid stocks 
moving to the less risky liquid stocks (flight-to-liquidity), resulting in the reduction of 
price and returns of illiquid stocks in comparison to liquid stocks. Nevertheless, after the 
event, cumulative IML portfolio returns start to stabilize and increase. The pattern after 
the event indicates that liquidity concerns have improved, resulting in better funding and 
less risk. Thus, as explained by Rajan (2006), due to the market liquidity increase, 
investors are less concerned with illiquidity risks and started moving from liquid to the 
riskier illiquid stocks causing the price of illiquid stocks to increase. Similar to figure 3.2, 
there is slight interruption seven months after the event due to September 11 attacks and 
the financial crisis involving IndyMac Bank but it is less noticeable.  
Using Amihud, when there is a restrictive shift, figure 3.7 shows results that are in the 
opposite direction of expansive shifts. Five months before the event, IML portfolio 
returns start increasing, reaching peak 5 months after the event before decreasing. 
However, similar to figure 3.2, the reaction is less noticeable compared to expansive 
monetary conditions signifying that during restrictive monetary policy periods, investors 
are less concerned with liquidity. 
As highlighted earlier, HLA and the Roll estimator do not seem to demonstrate results 
similar to Jensen and Moorman (2010). For HLA, figure 3.7 shows that the price of 
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liquidity adjusts relatively little around a monetary policy shift whereas the Roll estimator, 
after a restrictive shift, seems to demonstrate a contradictory pattern that would normally 
be seen following an expansive shift.  
Overall, the patterns observed show that the price of liquidity adjusts considerably in the 
months around an expansive monetary policy shift.  
 
3.4.3.5. ILLIQUIDITY AND MONETARY CONDITIONS BETA, Β 
In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between portfolio returns and 
monetary conditions is driven by strong returns for stocks with either the highest or lowest 
illiquidity levels. The regression framework (as explained in table 3.8) is used for the 
three liquidity measures, in order to obtain the beta, β, which is used to explore the 
hypothesis that sensitivities to monetary conditions vary with the level of stock illiquidity. 
Similar to Jensen and Moorman (2010), our findings in table 3.8 reveal that illiquid 
portfolios have higher betas, β than the liquid portfolios indicating that monetary 
conditions have the largest effect on the returns of illiquid stocks. This is consistent with 
table 3.5, which also shows that monetary conditions have the largest effect on the 
aggregate illiquidity of illiquid stocks. Overall, the results provide further support on the 
relationship between illiquidity premium and monetary conditions.  
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Table 3.8: Liquidity and Sensitivity to Monetary Conditions: January 1988 to December 2013. 
This table reports the coefficient, β from the following regression: 
 
ݎ݁ݐ௧ ൌ ߛ ൅ ߚ ൈܯ݋݊݁ݐܽݎݕ	ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݊ݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧																																ሺ3.13ሻ  
Where rett is the equally-weighted return in month t either from a liquidity ranked quintile portfolio or from a portfolio long in the quintile of stocks with the lowest liquidity and short in the quintile of stocks with the highest 
liquidity (Illiquid-Liquid). For the monetary condition measures Stance and Stringency, Monetary Conditionst-1 is a dummy variable that is one in month t-1 when the monetary condition measure is “Expansive” and is zero when 
the measure is “Restrictive”. For the monetary condition measure Combined, Monetary Conditionst-1 is a dummy variable that is one in month t-1 if the monetary condition is “Expansive” for both Stance and Stringency and is 
zero in other months. Newey-West p-values are reported in brackets for the low liquidity minus high liquidity portfolio, whereby bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth 
parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
  Monetary conditions beta, β  
Panel A: Amihud  Liquidity Portfolio  
Monetary conditions measure  Liquid 2 3 4 Illiquid Illiquid – Liquid 
BOE 
 
 -0.00498 -0.00026 0.00346 0.00415 0.00773 0.01271  (0.0068) 
LIBOR  0.00735 0.01131 0.01419 0.01268 0.01414 0.00679  (0.1037) 
Combined 
 
 0.00293 0.00935 0.01320 0.01338 0.01811 0.01518  (0.0007) 
   
Panel B: High Low Spread  Liquidity Portfolio  
Monetary conditions measure  Liquid 2 3 4 Illiquid Illiquid - Liquid 
BOE 
 
 0.00043 0.00153 0.00291 0.00224 0.00553 0.00511  (0.1912) 
LIBOR  0.01164 0.01270 0.01254 0.01322 0.01628 0.00464  (0.2137) 
Combined 
 
 0.01022 0.01177 0.01182 0.01276 0.01753 0.007306  (0.0977) 
   
Panel C: Roll Estimator  Liquidity Portfolio  
Monetary conditions measure  Liquid 2 3 4 Illiquid Illiquid - Liquid 
BOE 
 
 0.00049 0.00112 0.00033 0.00159 0.00641 0.00592  (0.4749) 
LIBOR  0.00966 0.00847 0.00869 0.00790 0.02026 0.01060  (0.1508) 
Combined 
 
 0.01279 0.00664 0.00593 0.00979 0.02088 0.00809  (0.3370) 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
This study looks into monetary conditions and how they affect market liquidity and the 
illiquidity premium for different liquidity portfolios in the UK including the financial 
crisis period. We start our research by considering unconditional returns, where we find 
evidence similar to past research such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) to suggest that 
in general illiquid portfolios generate higher returns relative to liquid portfolios for all 
three liquidity measures. However, our research indicates that out of the three liquidity 
measures, only Amihud provides a monotonically increase in portfolio returns with 
decrease in liquidity, which is similar to Jensen and Moorman (2010). 
Since our research is on the financial crisis, we feel that it is important to conduct a 
research on how monetary conditions affect aggregate illiquidity (market liquidity). 
Generally speaking, our findings indicate that aggregate illiquidity decreases (market 
liquidity increases) when monetary conditions are expansive. Nevertheless, the results 
are generally not always significant50 particularly for restrictive conditions51. This can be 
a result of the high liquidity of the UK market, as Dey (2005) states that investors of 
developed markets may be less concerned with liquidity.  
We also consider how monetary conditions affect the illiquidity premium and on most 
occasions, our findings reveal that illiquid portfolio returns are higher relative to liquid 
portfolio when monetary conditions are expansive compared to restrictive and the highest 
returns occurs when both stance and stringency are expansive. Our research also explores 
the uniformity of the changes in liquidity across liquidity quintiles and it generally shows 
that monetary condition changes have more effect on illiquid stocks relative to liquid 
stocks. 
Our monthly event study finds evidence to indicate that market liquidity increases after 
expansive shifts, but with some interruptions due to major events such as the September 
11 attacks in the US and the financial crisis. However, it is less noticeable during 
restrictive periods, signifying investors are less concerned with liquidity. The monthly 
                                                 
50 We have also conducted a stock migration investigation using Amihud as measure of liquidity but using quartiles instead of quintiles 
between January 1991 and December 2014. Basically, our investigation looks into stock migration from each quartile in year (t) 
(sorting year) to other quartiles in year (t+1) (performance year). The quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that stocks are 
held for at least one year. Our overall results show (not presented here to keep the number of tables as low as possible) that over the 
period, on average 78.45% of stocks remain in the same quartiles. This could be one of the reasons why our results are not always 
significant. 
51 Table 3.2 shows that there are more expansive periods compared to restrictive periods, which may be another reason for results that 
are not significant during restrictive periods.  
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event study on IML portfolio returns indicates that out of the three liquidity measures, 
only Amihud presents patterns that are consistent to past studies. The IML portfolio 
returns increase following expansive monetary shifts, signifying that illiquid stocks 
become more popular during expansive monetary conditions. As Rajan (2006) highlights 
investors are willing to take more risks during high market liquidity, causing illiquid stock 
prices to increase52. However, prior to the expansive monetary policy shifts, illiquid 
stocks become less popular signifying ‘flight-to-liquidity’.  
Using three different liquidity measures, we also obtain evidence to suggest that the three 
measures capture different aspects of liquidity since there can be some divergence on the 
results obtained. Our research shows that out of the three measures, Amihud seems to 
produce the most consistent results. Interestingly, we also discovered that the aggregate 
illiquidity and IML portfolio have different reaction towards BOE base rate and LIBOR. 
It shows that investors who are concerned with IML portfolio and aggregate illiquidity 
should focus on BOE decisions and LIBOR respectively. Nevertheless, it can be deducted 
that when there is an intersection between the two monetary conditions, the reaction is 
stronger.  
In conclusion, our evidence generally shows that illiquid portfolios are found to supersede 
liquid stocks returns. Market liquidity, stock prices and illiquidity premium are affected 
by changes in monetary conditions but interestingly enough, it seems that stringency 
(LIBOR) is more effective than stance (BOE base rate) especially in relation to market 
liquidity. However, in the long run, the monthly event study does show the usefulness of 
stance. This justifies the intervention of central banks or monetary authority when 
required during the financial crisis.  
Nevertheless, in comparison to Jensen and Moorman (2010), we obtain weaker evidence 
probably due to the shorter data sample as well as the different characteristics of the UK 
                                                 
52 Our findings tend to show that expansionary monetary policy results in higher IML returns, which can be due to investors’ 
willingness to take more risk (Rajan, 2006) by investing into the riskier illiquid stocks relative to liquid stocks. Whilst prior to 
expansive monetary policy, there is flight-to-liquidity due to dire in liquidity (liquidity concerns) signifying popularity of liquid stocks 
(large stocks) relative to illiquid (small stock) (Amihud, 2002). One explanation for such a behaviour is investor sentiment, as Wright 
& Bower (1992) highlights that the judgement of an uncertainty future event may be affected by persons’ mood and hence an 
optimistic investor may be more willing to invest in riskier projects while the opposite may be observed for pessimistic investors. For 
instance, Al-Hajieh et al (2011) finds that the celebrated holy of month of Ramadan (of the Muslim calendar) appears to have a 
generally positive impact on stock prices of Islamic Middle Eastern countries. Gavriilidis et al (2016) also conduct a comparable 
research by focusing on the stock markets of seven majority Muslim countries, where they document the presence of significant 
herding during Ramadan in most of their sample markets. Moreover, Galariotis et al (2014) highlight the role of sentiment indicators 
in explaining the differences in momentum profits in the UK but it is not evident when the post-subprime crisis period is excluded. 
Nevertheless, the research shows the importance of investor sentiment for financial markets and the correlation between monetary 
expansion and illiquidity in our research may be due to it. Thus, although we did not study investor sentiment, this may potentially be 
a good research topic for the future. 
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market relative to US market. According to Bartram et al. (2012) the UK market is less 
volatile compared to the US market considering companies with similar characteristics. 
A higher level of volatility will definitively affect prices and consequently market 
liquidity (See Stoll (1978), Vayanos (2004) and Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan 
(2010))53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53   Stoll (1978) shows that bid-ask spreads (illiquidity) are positively affected by return volatility. Vayanos (2004) discovers that 
during volatile times, investors reduce their willingness to hold illiquid assets, illiquidity premia increase followed by market betas of 
illiquid assets. Hameed et al. (2010) mention that negative market returns decrease stock liquidity, with the effect being strongest for 
high volatility firms and during times of market funding tightness. Hameed et al. (2010) also document that market volatility affect 
liquidity commonality positively. Overall, it shows that there is a relationship between volatility and illiquidity and due to the 
difference in market volatility between the UK and the US, it would result in different findings for us compared to Jensen & Moorman 
(2010).  
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CHAPTER 4 : ILLIQUIDITY AS AN INVESTMENT STYLE DURING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
Market efficiency signifies that obtaining abnormal returns is not possible but over the 
years, researchers find evidence to contradict the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and 
various investment styles (or strategies) have been developed in order to beat the market. 
Style investments are recommended by Sharpe (1978) who looks at general styles such 
as passive and active management. This is further extended to include more specific and 
generally accepted investment styles of size, value/growth and momentum/contrarian. 
For instance Banz (1981) mentions that average returns are found to be inversely related 
to size while Fama and French (1992) highlight that value is considered superior than 
growth investing. However, there are contradictory findings as well, which will be 
discussed in the literature review.  
The financial crisis of 2007 has resulted in the emergence of studies of its impact on 
financial markets and instruments. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) study bank lending54 
while Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) study hedge fund stock trading55. 
Moreover, the study of illiquidity has gained importance, probably due to the financial 
crisis56 (Brunnermeier, 2009) and financial sector development (Rajan, 2006). General 
evidence seems to indicate that asset returns will increase with illiquidity such as bid-ask 
spread (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). The relationship between returns and illiquidity is 
quite obvious as Ibbotson et al. (2013) mention that investors clearly want more liquidity. 
Hence, illiquidity should be compensated with additional returns. Surprisingly, even 
though it is so apparent, for some reason illiquidity is rarely used as a control variable 
and is not a common investment style, as most studies, generally use the other three styles 
(Subrahmanyam, 2010). Only lately, research on illiquidity as an investment style has 
been undertaken (See K. Chang et al. (2013) on the Taiwanese stock market (TSM) and 
                                                 
54 Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) shows that during the peak period of the financial crisis, new loans to large borrowers fell.   
55 Ben-David et al. (2012) highlight that hedge fund investors are more sensitive to losses compared to mutual fund investors during 
the financial crisis. 
56 Brunnermeier (2009) mentions that the financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008, due to liquidity and the credit crunch, has led to 
the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
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Ibbotson et al. (2013) on the United States (US) market, who both find evidence to support 
illiquidity as an investment style).  
Given the lack of more recent evidence for other well-known markets, we decide to 
investigate the potential of illiquidity as a reliable and consistent investment style during 
the financial crisis. We believe that the United Kingdom (UK) market provides a good 
opportunity because the London Stock Exchange (LSE) is considered as one of the largest 
stock markets by capitalisation, signifying that the market is quite liquid and hence the 
results will be as immune as possible from biases such as infrequent trading (Galariotis 
& Giouvris, 2007). We also agree with Galariotis and Giouvris (2007) that the results on 
the UK market will be of great interest to the international scientific, corporate and 
investment community. This is further strengthen by our usage of pre-crisis and post-
crisis data that will allow us to assess the extent to which illiquidity is a good trading 
strategy pre and post-crisis.   
Using Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework and Sharpe (1992) four benchmark portfolio 
criteria57, our research starts by investigating whether the respective investment styles’ 
premium 58  including illiquidity premium exist within the UK market. This will be 
followed by investigations on double sorted quartile portfolios, which are the intersection 
between illiquidity and the other investment styles. Lastly, stock migration analysis is 
conducted to investigate the stability of the portfolios. 
Overall, our research for the UK market shows that with the exception of momentum 
premiums, the other investment styles do generate positive and significant premiums. The 
illiquid portfolios also consistently outperform the benchmarks and are quite stable 
during both periods. Nonetheless, illiquidity appears to meet Sharpe (1992) four 
benchmark criteria pre-crisis only and not post-crisis. This signifies that illiquidity can be 
classified as a reliable investment style pre-crisis but it is highly correlated to size.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the literature 
review while section 4.3 describes the data and variables. In section 4.4, the methodology, 
                                                 
57 Sharpe (1992) establishes that a benchmark portfolio should be 1) identifiable before the fact, 2) not easily beaten, 3) a viable 
alternative, and 4) low in cost. 
58 An Investment style premium happens when one specific style performs better than its relevant antagonist style. For example, value 
premium (value portfolio returns > growth portfolio returns) and growth premium (value portfolio returns < growth portfolio returns). 
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empirical results and analysis of the research are discussed followed by our conclusion in 
section 4.5. 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1. INVESTMENT STYLES  
Chang et al. (2013) define investment style as the combining of stocks with the same 
characteristics to construct style portfolios and make investments in the stock markets. 
They also highlight that the most common types of investment styles are “value versus 
growth” stocks, “small versus big” stocks and “momentum versus contrarian” stocks. 
Therefore, we will firstly discuss the most common type of investment styles.    
 
4.2.1.1. VALUE VERSUS GROWTH 
Value and growth are two popular fundamental investment styles whereby value style 
looks for stocks that are undervalued according to companies’ financial statements while 
growth style involves identifying long-term potential and performance. Past literature 
seems to indicate that value style is an antagonist to growth style, as researchers tend to 
compare the two styles with each other, by using suitable variables such as book to market 
ratio (B/M ratio) and price earnings ratio (P/E ratio). 
Most research appears to conclude that value style is considered superior to growth style 
in the US market resulting in value premium (Basu, 1983; Fama & French, 1992). Daniel 
et al. (2001) also find value premium within the Japanese market, while Capaul et al. 
(1993) who study six international markets including UK, obtained consistent results to 
US market studies.  
In contrast, a mixed outcome is obtained by Ding et al. (2005) who look into East Asia 
markets. Value premium appears to be significantly negative in Thailand and in Indonesia 
it is insignificant. Gonenc and Karan (2003) discover that there is no value premium 
within the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), signifying growth superiority. However, 
Beneda (2002) highlights that the research period is important, as it is shown that over a 
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short period of five years, value style is found to be more profitable but for a longer period 
(at least 14 years), average returns for growth stocks are superior. 
 
4.2.1.2. SIZE EFFECT  
Banz (1981) highlights that average returns are negatively related with size. This widely 
recognized anomaly is known as either small-firm or size effect and is also supported by 
researchers such as Keim (1983). Such a relationship is expected as small firms are 
usually considered riskier than large firms and their returns are expected to be higher. 
Chan et al. (1985) confirm this as they state that within an efficient market, the higher 
average returns of smaller firms are justified by the additional risks borne by such firms. 
Nevertheless, studies on size effect are less optimistic after the early 1980s as Van Dijk 
(2011) highlights that past empirical studies declare the size effect to be dead since then. 
Gonenc and Karan (2003) actually obtain opposite findings whereby firms with larger 
capitalization are considered superior while Horowitz et al. (2000) report no consistent 
relationship between size and realized returns, and their results show that the widespread 
use of size in asset pricing is unwarranted. Amihud (2002) highlights that the size effect 
is partially due to market illiquidity, as times of dire illiquidity will cause flight-to-
liquidity, resulting in preference for larger stocks and hence small stocks are actually 
subjected to higher illiquidity risk premium. Nonetheless, there are still recent evidence 
of a size effect within the UK (Dissanaike, 2002) and the US (Van Dijk, 2011) but Van 
Dijk (2011) also mentions that more empirical research needs to be conducted to examine 
the robustness of size effect on the US and international stock markets.  
 
4.2.1.3. MOMENTUM VERSUS CONTRARIAN 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their behavioural finance research on stock market 
overreaction discover that loser stocks (or contrarian style) perform exceptionally well in 
comparison to winner stocks (or momentum style) over extended time periods of 3 to 5 
years horizons. Nonetheless, in contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that 
investment styles that combined buying winner stocks and selling loser stocks generate 
significant positive returns of about 1% per month over 3 to 12 months holding periods. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) revisit the subject and their evidence indicates that 
 103 
 
momentum profits have continued in the 1990s, suggesting that the original results are 
not a product of data snooping bias.  
However, Conrad and Kaul (1998) emphasise that contrarian style is profitable for long-
term horizons, while the momentum style is usually profitable for medium-term holding 
periods of between 3 and 12 months. Shen et al. (2005) findings agree with Conrad and 
Kaul (1998), who show that contrarian profits in the US market are very dependent on 
the period examined. In the UK, Dissanaike (2002) shows results that contrarian style 
outperformed momentum style and their loser-winner effect (or contrarian premium) 
results are significant. Nonetheless, Galariotis et al. (2007) demonstrate that both 
momentum and contrarian profits are available for the LSE.  
 
4.2.1.4. ILLIQUID VERSUS LIQUID 
General evidence seems to indicate that returns will increase with illiquidity  (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
also highlight the importance of liquidity on asset prices. Nevertheless, there are some 
contradictory results, which show that illiquid stocks do not necessarily provide 
consistently higher returns. Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) find evidence to suggest 
that ‘the January effect’ and ‘size effect’ are significant, indicating that the return for 
illiquidity may be a result of seasonal and size effect. Brennan et al. (2013) who analyse 
the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity and its role in asset pricing, state that in general, 
only the down-days element commands a return premium. Furthermore, Ben-Rephael et 
al. (2008) who study the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) find evidence that the 
profitability of trading strategies based on illiquidity premium has declined over the past 
four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable.  
However, unlike Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Datar et al. (1998) find a strong 
positive relationship between stock returns and illiquidity. The illiquidity premium is not 
restricted to the month of January alone and is prevalent throughout the year. Additionally, 
using three liquidity measures in the UK, Said and Giouvris (2015) reveal that illiquid 
portfolios consistently earn higher returns compared to liquid portfolios and the zero-cost 
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portfolio returns59 are statistically significant for at least two of the illiquidity measures 
used.  
 
4.2.1.5. RETURNS BETWEEN DIFFERENT INVESTMENT STYLES 
Past literature shows that there are links between different investment styles. Asness et 
al. (2013) highlight that value and momentum are inversely correlated to each other, 
within and across asset classes. However, Bauman et al. (1998) who initially believe that 
the value premium is attributed to small-firm effects, discover that the superiority of value 
style is actually genuine.   
There are also studies that connect illiquidity with other styles such as Asness et al. (2013) 
who find significant evidence that funding liquidity risk is inversely related to value but 
positively related to momentum globally across asset classes. Similarly, Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003)  measures of liquidity risk are positively related to momentum in US 
stocks. One of the most common style connections is between illiquidity and size, as 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight that the illiquidity premium is a result of 
size effect. In contrast, Elfakhani (2000) mentions that the returns of small-firms are 
larger due to the liquidity hypothesis, as small-firms are considered to be less liquid and 
thus should obtain higher return premiums. This is contradictory to Ibbotson et al. (2013) 
study on US market, who highlight that the returns obtained of illiquidity based portfolios 
are sufficiently different from those of the other styles. Considering the research above, 
one can see that the relationship between illiquidity and size is not clearly defined.  
 
4.2.2. POTENTIAL OF ILLIQUIDITY 
Due to the recent crisis 60 , the study of liquidity has become more prominent and 
researchers have noticed the potential and importance of illiquidity as an investment tool. 
Yan (2008) in their research of US mutual funds finds evidence to suggest that liquidity 
is an important reason why size erodes fund performance indicating the importance of 
liquidity in investment management. Moreover, Idzorek et al. (2012) mention that on 
                                                 
59 Zero-cost portfolio = long the illiquid portfolio and short the liquid portfolio. 
60 Crotty (2009) highlights that the financial crisis happens when investors run for liquidity and safety. 
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average, mutual funds that hold illiquid stocks perform significantly better than funds that 
hold more liquid stocks. Thus, signifying the potential of liquidity as investment strategy 
or style particularly during the financial crisis. Even Ibbotson et al. (2013) suggest that 
liquidity should be given equal standing to the other investment styles.  
 
4.2.2.1. ILLIQUIDITY AS AN INVESTMENT STYLE 
Nowadays, it is normal for different investment styles to be made a benchmark 
portfolio61such as S&P/BARRA Growth stock index and S&P/BARRA Value Stock index 
(Capaul et al., 1993). Therefore, similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), we feel that the best 
way to explore whether illiquidity can be chosen as a reliable investment style during the 
crisis, is to investigate if a dependable benchmark portfolio can be created based on 
illiquidity. According to Sharpe (1992), a benchmark portfolio should meet four criteria 
namely 1) “identifiable before the fact”, 2) “not easily beaten”, 3) “a viable alternative”, 
and 4) “low in cost”.  
 
4.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.3.1. DATA 
In order to capture the UK stock market, the sample that we use consists of stocks listed 
under the FTSE All-Share index for the 14 years period from January 2001 through 
December 2014. Although the financial crisis happens around August 2007, we decide to 
divide equally the 14 years sample period into half, namely pre-crisis (January 2001 to 
December 2007) and post-crisis period (January 2008 to December 2014). The final data 
set contains 640 companies (as of the year 2014) after filtering of outliers. All data used 
in this paper is obtained from DataStream. 
 
                                                 
61 A benchmark portfolio is a portfolio consisting of a list of securities that has been constructed based on specific criteria, which can 
be compared to an actual portfolio’s performance. So if the investment style of “illiquidity” appears to be attractive in the UK then 
we will be seeing benchmark portfolios such as “S&P illiquidity index” in the future. 
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4.3.2. INVESTMENT STYLES’ MEASURES 
To determine “value versus growth” investment style, Gonenc and Karan (2003) use 
B/M ratio while Beneda (2002) suggests using P/E ratio and Bauman et al. (1998) use 
dividend yield. We use Price to book ratio (P/B ratio), which is just the inverse of B/M 
ratio, because it is one of the most widely recognisable variables and allows us to obtain 
data for more companies compared to P/E ratio. Determining the “small versus big” 
investment style is simpler, as we feel that using the market value (MV) of each firm is 
the most appropriate measure as in Dissanaike (2002). Similarly, choosing the most 
appropriate variable for “momentum versus contrarian” investment style is also 
straightforward as we will be using monthly returns as in De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
For illiquidity, we have decided to choose the Amihud illiquidity measure62 (Amihud, 
2002) as it is a well-known measure and has been extensively used in past literature. 
Moreover, we also thoroughly considered two other liquidity measures namely the Roll 
estimator (Roll, 1984) and High Low spread by Corwin and Schultz (2012) and we find 
that Amihud illiquidity measure provides results that are more consistent to past studies. 
We have chosen FTSE All-Share index and UK 3 months London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) as benchmarks for market returns and risk-free rate respectively. 
 
4.4. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.4.1. ILLIQUIDITY AS AN INVESTMENT STYLE BASED ON ITS ABILITY AS A 
BENCHMARK  
As highlighted earlier, exploring whether illiquidity can be made into a dependable 
portfolio benchmark seems to be the best way to investigate illiquidity’s potential as a 
reliable investment style and how the financial crisis affects it. Thus, we feel that we 
should follow Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework, whereby they based it on Sharpe’s (1992) 
specification of a portfolio benchmark, which should be 1) “identifiable before the fact”, 
2) “not easily beaten”, 3) “a viable alternative” and 4) “low in cost”. 
                                                 
62 It is calculated for each stock, s, every month as follows: 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀௦௠ ൌ ଵ௧ ∑
ଵ,଴଴଴,଴଴଴ൈ|௥௘௧௨௥௡೟|
௣௥௜௖௘೟ൈ௩௢௟௨௠௘೟௧   (4.1) Where t is each trading day  
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To meet the “identifiable before the fact” criterion, we will be constructing quartiles (or 
portfolios) based on the prior year (t-1) measure of the relevant investment style, which 
is then used to calculate the results of the portfolios for a given year (t). Therefore, the 
portfolios are “identifiable before the fact”. The next criterion for us to fulfil is the “not 
easily beaten”. This will be achieved by investigating if the returns of the illiquidity 
portfolios can provide positive returns (if any) and then compare it with the chosen 
benchmarks and other investment styles. This will be followed by “a viable alternative” 
criterion, which will be achieved by applying the method used by Ibbotson et al. (2013), 
who distinguish illiquidity from the other styles by constructing double-sorted portfolios. 
The double-sorted portfolios will allow us to study whether illiquidity is able to enhance 
the performance of the more recognized styles. Lastly, similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), 
we investigate the “low in cost” criterion by exploring stock migration, which will allow 
us to consider whether illiquidity can be managed passively and at low cost.  
 
4.4.2. COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT STYLES’ RETURNS AND RISKS.  
Our research starts with the investigation of portfolio performance across different 
investment style quartiles. This section will also allow us to determine whether illiquidity 
will be able to meet the first two benchmark criteria of “identifiable before the fact” and 
“not easily beaten”. More importantly, this section will also confirm whether an 
illiquidity premium63 exists in the first place.   
Table 4.1 shows the equally weighted average annualised monthly returns and risks of 
the investment styles based on quartiles. Over the 14 years period, the selection period is 
between 2000 and 2013 (inclusive), while the performance period is between 2001 and 
2014 (inclusive). The two portfolios that are ranked top 25% and bottom 25% are 
classified as either Q1 or Q4 quartiles and the stocks are rebalanced annually. 
The final column in table 4.1 shows the zero-cost portfolio returns (or applicable 
investment style premium), which takes a long position on Q1 portfolio and short position 
on Q4 portfolio. Thus, for “value versus growth” investment style, it would be the value 
premium if “High value portfolio (Q1)” outperforms “High growth portfolio (Q4)” and 
                                                 
63 Illiquid quintile provides higher returns compared to liquid quintile.  
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growth premium if “High growth portfolio (Q4)” is found to perform better than “High 
value portfolio (Q1)”. 
The zero-cost portfolio64 in table 4.1 shows the existence of value premium, small-firm 
premium and illiquidity premium65, consistent with Capaul et al. (1993), Dissanaike (2002) 
and Amihud and Mendelson (1986) respectively for both periods. As expected, all three 
premiums dropped in value post-crisis. The best results are achieved by value premium 
and small-firm premium pre-crisis and post-crisis respectively. Momentum premium is 
not statistically significant for both periods, which is not akin to past research such as 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Dissanaike (2002) who studies the UK market discovers 
that contrarian performed better while Galariotis et al. (2007) mention that both 
momentum and contrarian profits are available within UK, which may explain the 
insignificant results for both periods. In fact, figure 1, shows the growth of value premium, 
small-firm premium and illiquidity premium consistently over the 14 years period while 
momentum premium noticeably drop in value after the financial crisis of 2007, performing 
worse in comparison to the other premiums and even the two benchmarks (FTSE All 
Share Index and 3 months LIBOR).  
Similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) study on US, table 4.1 shows that the best performing 
top66 investment style is achieved by “High value portfolio (Q1)” for both periods. The 
worst performing portfolio is the bottom investment style of “High growth portfolio (Q4)” 
for the pre-crisis period but post-crisis, it is the “Mid value portfolio (Q2)”.  One 
interesting finding is that regardless of periods, all the top and bottom investment styles 
show higher returns relative to the benchmarks of FTSE All-Share index and 3 months 
LIBOR, indicating that any of the simple investment styles, allow investors to outperform 
the market.   
In terms of risk, the highest standard deviation and beta is reported by the “High 
contrarian portfolio”, which is not consistent with the traditional theory of “higher 
returns come with higher risk”, as it does not produce the highest returns. Nevertheless, 
the crisis obviously results in higher risks, as observed in the post-crisis results.  
                                                 
64 Q1-Q4 (for example value – growth quartile) 
65 Q1 is greater than Q4 
66 Top investment style means the top 25% ranked based on the relevant investment style or Q1 and it is expected to be Value, Micro, 
Momentum and Illiquid portfolios. Bottom investment style means the bottom 25% ranked based on the relevant investment style or 
Q4. It is expected to be Growth, Big, Contrarian and Liquid portfolios.   
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Table 4.1: Cross-Sectional annualized returns and risks of the investment styles pre and post-crisis. 
This table shows equally-weighted, annualised returns (in percentage format) for quartile portfolios based on the investment styles briefly describe below. Although the financial crisis happens around 
August 2007, we decide to equally divide the 14 years return sample periods into half namely Pre-Crisis (January 2001 to December 2007) and Post-Crisis periods (January 2008 to December 2014). 
Quartile portfolio ranks are determined by the value of the investment style measure in the year (t-1) prior to the year (t) in which returns are calculated and are rebalanced annually. Therefore, the style 
measure for the year 2000 is used to construct the quartiles and then calculate the returns for the year 2001, where the stocks will be held for at least one year. The “Q1 – Q4” portfolio is a portfolio that 
takes a long position in the quartile of stocks (Q1) and a short position in the quartile of stocks (Q4). For example, in relation to illiquid vs liquid investment style, “Q1 – Q4” takes a long position in the 
quartile of illiquid stocks (Q1) and a short position in the quartile of liquid stocks (Q4). The table also shows 2 benchmarks namely 3 months LIBOR and FTSE All-Share index. It also shows the total and 
systematic risks of the portfolios measured based on standard deviation and beta respectively. Beta is calculated based on FTSE All-Share index. Newey-West p-values are reported in brackets for the 
arithmetic mean of the “Q1 – Q4” portfolio, whereby bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated 
using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 
1. Value effect (value versus growth investment style) uses the end of year price-to-book value (P/B) ratio.   
 
2. Size effect (micro versus big investment style) uses the end of year market value (MV).  
 
3. Momentum effect (momentum vs contrarian investment style) used the annualised monthly returns. It is also commonly known as winners versus losers’ investment style. 
 
4. Illiquidity effect (illiquid versus liquid investment style) uses the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud). 
 
 
 
  Cross Section Result Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007) 
 Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q4 
Value effect Arithmetic mean  19.66% 7.22% 13.34% 6.05% 13.61%  16.80% 4.07% 10.46% 9.58% 7.22% 
Value vs growth      (0.0352)      (0.0119) 
 Standard deviation 17.13% 22.21% 21.15% 22.83% 11.16%  40.77% 28.81% 29.28% 27.56% 15.67% 
(Q1 = Value, Q4 = Growth) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 0.86 1.16 1.12 1.33 -0.47  2.07 1.51 1.53 1.44 0.63 
 Average no. of stocks 113 113 113 112   140 140 140 139  
Size effect Arithmetic mean  18.34% 11.78% 9.21% 6.32% 12.02%  16.20% 10.31% 8.36% 5.30% 10.91% 
Micro vs big      (0.0280)      (0.0005) 
 Standard deviation 21.53% 21.62% 21.81% 17.41% 9.77%  35.07% 35.40% 29.80% 26.34% 10.58% 
(Q1 = Micro, Q4 = Big) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.04 1.17 1.21 1.01 0.03  1.81 1.85 1.56 1.37 0.44 
 Average no. of stocks 115 115 115 115   142 142 142 141  
Momentum effect Arithmetic mean  12.42% 12.75% 10.35% 10.07% 2.35%  10.75% 10.98% 8.36% 10.36% 0.39% 
Momentum vs contrarian      0.3412      (0.9463) 
(Q1 = Momentum, Q4 = 
Contrarian) 
Standard deviation 19.36% 16.07% 19.15% 29.80% 17.60%  28.45% 28.01% 28.38% 46.31% 29.57% 
Beta (FTSE All-Share) 0.97 0.92 1.08 1.48 -0.51  1.44 1.45 1.47 2.25 -0.81 
Average no. of stocks 115 115 114 114   142 141 141 141  
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Illiquidity effect Arithmetic mean  17.12% 11.32% 9.52% 6.56% 10.55%  14.13% 10.97% 9.91% 5.17% 8.96% 
Illiquid vs liquid      (0.0135)      (0.0002) 
 Standard deviation 21.36% 21.21% 22.53% 17.43% 7.56%  33.30% 33.07% 32.94% 27.37% 7.68% 
(Q1 = Illiquid, Q4 = Liquid) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.11 1.16 1.23 1.01 0.10  1.75 1.71 1.71 1.42 0.33 Average no. of stocks 113 113 113 112   142 142 142 141  
FTSE All-Share index Arithmetic mean  2.67%  2.75% 
 Standard deviation 16.71%  18.97% 
3 Months LIBOR Arithmetic mean  4.66%  0.98% 
 Standard deviation 0.76%  0.84% 
  
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the growth of the respective investment style premiums pre and post-crisis. 
This figure shows the growth of the respective investment style premiums over the 14 years study period (7 years pre and 7 years post-crisis). The investment premiums included are value premium, small-
firm premium, momentum premium and illiquidity premium. The percentage growth for investing in the benchmark of FTSE All-Share index and 3 months LIBOR are also included in the figure. All data 
are obtained from DataStream. 
 
 
 111 
 
Overall, portfolios constructed based on illiquidity can generate positive returns. 
Moreover, with the exception of “High value portfolio” and “Micro portfolio”, the 
“High illiquid portfolio” performs better in comparison to the other styles and the two 
benchmarks for both periods. Hence, it can safely be concluded that illiquidity has met 
the second benchmark criterion of “not easily beaten”. Since the portfolios are 
constructed based on the prior year (t-1) measure, this automatically also satisfies the first 
criterion of “identifiable before the fact”. Also as expected, the investment styles seem 
to be superior pre-crisis.  
 
4.4.2.1. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY PORTFOLIOS WITH OTHER 
INVESTMENT STYLES 
Although our results in the last section appear to indicate that illiquidity is “not easily 
beaten” for both periods, some researchers highlight that the positive performance of 
illiquidity is actually due to other styles. Asness et al. (2013) find significant evidence 
that funding liquidity risk is inversely related to value but positively related to momentum 
globally, whereas Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight that the illiquidity 
premium is a result of size effect. Therefore, we will implement the double sorting 
technique used by Ibbotson et al. (2013), as this technique will allow us to test whether 
illiquidity is able to enhanced the other styles and hence meeting the third benchmark 
criterion of “a viable alternative”. 
 
4.4.2.2. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY AND VALUE/GROWTH INVESTMENT 
STYLES (PORTFOLIOS) 
The first double sorted portfolios are constructed by independent sorting, based on 
Amihud illiquidity measure and P/B ratio, to produce 16 intersection portfolios as can be 
seen in table 4.2. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct 
and calculate the portfolio performance for a given year (t). The stocks are also rebalanced 
annually.  
Unfortunately, due to the limited number of stocks available for the UK market, the 
number of stocks significantly reduce after segregation into 16 intersection portfolios. 
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Therefore, we have to ensure that each portfolio is diversified. Past studies have different 
opinions on the number of stocks required to properly diversify a portfolio such as Evans 
and Archer (1968) who highlight that 10 to 15 stocks are required. Nevertheless, Reilly 
and Brown (2012, p. 201) highlight that based on past studies such as Evans and Archer 
(1968) and Tole (1982) “…major benefits of diversification were achieved rather quickly, 
with about 90 percent of the maximum benefit of diversification derived from portfolios 
of 12 to 18 stocks”. Thus, we consider portfolios that have at least 12 stocks as 
“acceptable portfolios” because achieving 90 percent of the maximum benefit of 
diversification is more than satisfactory for us.  
Panel A of table 4.2 shows only one portfolio has less than twelve stocks pre-crisis while 
for post-crisis, all portfolios are considered acceptable. Both pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods show results that are less consistent, as across value portfolios (rows), illiquid 
stocks do not consistently generate higher returns relative to more liquid stocks. Similarly, 
across illiquidity (columns), value portfolios also do not perform consistently better 
compared to growth portfolios.  
However, although the highest return is not generated by the intersection of “High value 
& High illiquid portfolio”, its return of 20.93% is higher than the return of 19.66% of the 
“High value portfolio (Q1)” in table 4.1 for pre-crisis period. This can also be seen post-
crisis, signifying that illiquidity does enhance the value investment style.  
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Table 4.2: Annualized returns and risks of value/growth and illiquidity intersection portfolios pre and post-crisis. 
The table shows the results of intersection quartiles between value/growth and illiquidity investment styles. The portfolios are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles based on 
the two investment styles and then by taking the intersection sets of portfolios to produce 16 intersection groups as below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct the 
portfolios, which are then used to calculate the portfolio returns and risk for a given year (t). The portfolios are rebalanced annually. Thus, the sorting period is from January 2000 to December 2013 whilst 
performance period is from January 2001 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. The 14 years performance sample periods are divided into half namely Pre-Crisis (2001 to 2007) 
and Post-Crisis periods (2008 to 2014). Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 
12 stocks on average. Thus, acceptable portfolios with 12 or more stocks on average are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid  High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Value          
Arithmetic mean  20.93% 21.66% 15.51% 11.81%  17.60% 18.90% 13.84% 10.51% 
Standard deviation 19.00% 16.72% 18.59% 12.78%  34.21% 43.58% 46.79% 41.11% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.01 0.72 0.97 0.58  1.78 2.11 2.33 2.06 
Average no. of stocks 43 32 25 10  56 44 28 15 
Mid Value          
Arithmetic mean  8.78% 7.81% 3.47% 7.03%  4.65% 5.25% 3.47% 0.47% 
Standard deviation 22.72% 21.32% 22.88% 25.02%  28.40% 24.08% 34.06% 36.09% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.18 1.14 1.08 1.21  1.48 1.25 1.77 1.86 
Average no. of stocks 29 30 31 18  33 49 31 22 
Mid Growth          
Arithmetic mean  20.38% 12.63% 15.40% 7.29%  18.35% 12.42% 8.74% 5.27% 
Standard deviation 26.27% 21.17% 27.17% 16.63%  33.26% 32.47% 28.54% 25.15% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.21 1.09 1.34 0.98  1.73 1.66 1.48 1.31 
Average no. of stocks 22 26 25 37  32 27 37 43 
High Growth          
Arithmetic mean  17.28% 3.86% 4.05% 5.21%  18.45% 8.77% 12.86% 5.09% 
Standard deviation 25.99% 31.21% 28.12% 16.74%  38.21% 35.78% 28.40% 22.48% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.18 1.73 1.53 0.98  1.98 1.84 1.46 1.16 
Average no. of stocks 17 21 29 45  18 19 42 59 
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4.4.2.3. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY AND SIZE INVESTMENT STYLES 
(PORTFOLIOS) 
Unlike Ibbotson et al. (2013), table 4.3 seems to show that within the UK investing in 
illiquid stocks is almost similar to investing into small firms because the intersection of 
the portfolios result in a limited number of stocks for some portfolios. This is particularly 
noticeable for the “Micro & High Liquid portfolio”, where the average number of stocks 
is only 1 for both periods. This is not surprising since it is expected that micro stocks are 
less liquid compared to other size related portfolios. 
Among the “acceptable portfolios”, table 4.3 shows conflicting results as both illiquidity 
and size do not show clear enhancing ability, indicating that illiquidity does not provide 
additional benefits when combined with portfolios based on size for both periods. 
Therefore, signifying that size does appear to capture illiquidity, as suggested by 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993). 
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Table 4.3: Annualized returns and risks of size and illiquidity intersection quartiles pre and post-crisis. 
This table shows the results of intersection quartiles between size and illiquidity investment styles. The portfolios are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles based on the two 
investment styles and then by taking the intersection sets of portfolios to produce 16 intersection groups as below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct the portfolios, 
which are then used to calculate the portfolio returns and risk for a given year (t). The portfolios are rebalanced annually. Thus, the sorting sample period is from January 2000 to December 2013 whilst 
performance sample period is from January 2001 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. The 14 years performance sample periods are divided into half namely Pre-Crisis (2001 
to 2007) and Post-Crisis periods (2008 to 2014). Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of 
at least 12 stocks on average. Thus, portfolios with 12 or more stocks on average are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid  High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
Micro          
Arithmetic mean  18.26% 17.40% 19.63% 11.66%  16.02% 14.75% 37.26% -46.99% 
Standard deviation 20.60% 28.06% 23.42% N/A  33.76% 38.31% 80.87% N/A 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.04 1.29 2.69 N/A  1.77 1.84 2.92 N/A 
Average no. of stocks 80 29 2 1  103 38 2 1 
Small          
Arithmetic mean  15.69% 9.53% 12.89% 19.31%  9.82% 9.59% 10.95% -25.94% 
Standard deviation 23.68% 20.73% 25.92% 15.04%  33.33% 32.23% 54.09% N/A 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.26 1.17 1.15 1.22  1.73 1.69 2.66 N/A 
Average no. of stocks 27 66 19 1  36 82 24 1 
Medium          
Arithmetic mean  13.77% 8.21% 8.79% 9.87%  8.19% 8.95% 8.36% 6.62% 
Standard deviation 19.09% 22.15% 22.20% 23.83%  28.56% 28.86% 28.86% 39.75% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.02 1.09 1.23 1.36  1.35 1.51 1.51 1.94 
Average no. of stocks 6 17 82 9  4 22 100 16 
Big          
Arithmetic mean  -3.17% 16.44% 7.30% 6.26%  64.09% 16.66% 10.53% 4.74% 
Standard deviation 25.79% 42.05% 24.48% 16.73%  N/A 68.39% 27.55% 26.26% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.21 2.70 1.37 0.97  N/A 6.90 1.41 1.37 
Average no. of stocks 1 1 11 103  1 1 16 126 
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4.4.2.4. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUIDITY AND MOMENTUM/CONTRARIAN 
INVESTMENT STYLES (PORTFOLIOS) 
Table 4.4 which combines illiquidity and momentum/contrarian style is more evenly 
segregated for both periods, suggesting that the two styles are quite independent of each 
other. Across momentum portfolios (rows), illiquid portfolios generally produce higher 
returns in comparison to more liquid portfolios and the highest return is generated by the 
enhanced portfolio of “High contrarian & High illiquid portfolio” and “High momentum 
& High illiquid portfolio” pre-crisis and post-crisis respectively.  
Nonetheless, across illiquidity portfolios (columns), highly momentum portfolios 
sometimes generate better returns than contrarian styles but it is less consistent for both 
periods. In fact, “High contrarian & High illiquid portfolio” produces higher returns than 
the “High momentum & High illiquid portfolio” pre-crisis. Furthermore, compared to the 
“High momentum portfolio (Q1)” and “High contrarian portfolio (Q4)” in table 4.1, 
table 4.4 also shows that illiquidity does manage to enhance the returns of the two 
portfolios for both crisis periods.  
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Table 4.4: Annualized returns and risks of momentum/contrarian and illiquidity intersection portfolios pre and post-crisis. 
This table shows the results of intersection quartiles between momentum/contrarian and illiquidity investment styles. The portfolios are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles 
based on the two investment styles and then by taking the intersection sets of portfolios to produce 16 intersection groups as below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct 
the portfolios, which are then used to calculate the portfolio returns and risk for a given year (t). The portfolios are rebalanced annually. Thus, the sorting period is from January 2000 to December 2013 
whilst performance period is from January 2001 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. The 14 years’ performance sample periods are divided into half namely Pre-Crisis (2001 
to 2007) and Post-Crisis periods (2008 to 2014).  Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements 
of at least 12 stocks on average. Thus, portfolios with 12 or more stocks on average are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream. 
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid  High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Momentum              
Arithmetic mean  16.37% 11.19% 8.34% 12.44%  17.64% 7.17% 11.29% 9.05% 
Standard deviation 23.25% 22.19% 19.78% 16.54%  29.91% 32.11% 27.68% 25.00% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 0.91 1.11 1.00 0.92  1.47 1.62 1.43 1.24 
Average no. of stocks 28 31 31 22  35 32 39 37 
Mid Momentum          
Arithmetic mean  17.63% 17.08% 12.57% 5.36%  13.69% 11.34% 10.07% 8.69% 
Standard deviation 17.07% 11.84% 21.23% 15.65%  32.34% 28.91% 26.51% 23.36% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 0.91 0.65 1.21 0.88  1.69 1.51 1.36 1.15 
Average no. of stocks 28 27 28 30  36 41 32 32 
Mid Contrarian          
Arithmetic mean  15.17% 7.44% 9.51% 6.77%  10.50% 9.85% 9.41% 2.53% 
Standard deviation 19.14% 24.07% 21.70% 16.58%  30.44% 27.65% 27.78% 29.40% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.03 1.37 1.20 0.97  1.60 1.42 1.42 1.46 
Average no. of stocks 27 25 29 30  38 38 33 32 
High Contrarian          
Arithmetic mean  17.77% 8.77% 7.06% 4.10%  15.04% 13.07% 8.78% 5.29% 
Standard deviation 29.49% 29.55% 34.53% 27.15%  42.12% 48.75% 50.06% 43.34% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.44 1.51 1.71 1.43  2.15 2.24 2.44 2.08 
Average no. of stocks 30 28 23 31  33 31 37 41 
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Overall, tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that risks have consistently increased after the crisis 
but returns can be higher, probably as a compensation for the higher risks. Nevertheless, 
the essential finding is that with the exception of size, so far our results appear to meet 
the third benchmark criterion of “a viable alternative” as illiquidity managed to enhance 
both value and momentum investment styles for both periods. 
 
4.4.3. ILLIQUIDITY AS A FACTOR IN COMPARISON TO OTHER INVESTMENT 
FACTORS 
Since illiquidity seems to be able to enhance value and momentum styles, similar to 
Ibbotson et al. (2013), we conduct further investigation on the ability of illiquidity as an 
investment style by looking at the risk factors (zero cost or dollar neutral) of the styles. 
Nevertheless, instead of using annual data, we will be using monthly data for the 
correlation and regression analysis to ensure more meaningful results. 
 
4.4.3.1. CORRELATION OF THE INVESTMENT STYLES (FACTORS) WITH EACH 
OTHER AND THE MARKET 
The correlation analysis is conducted to see the relationship of the respective factors with 
each other and the market. Results in table 4.5 are almost similar for the two periods. The 
illiquidity factor is positively related with size and value factor. It is worth noticing that 
the illiquidity factor is not significantly correlated with the market pre-crisis but it is 
negatively correlated post-crisis. We also obtain contradictory results for value, size and 
momentum factors in relation to the market for the two periods. 
The strongest positive correlation is observed between the illiquidity factor and size 
factor, which comes into contrast with Ibbotson et al. (2013) who find a negative 
correlation between the two factors. The positive correlation obtained here between the 
two factors is not surprising as our earlier results in table 4.3, show that there is a close 
relationship between illiquidity and size. This provides further evidence to indicate that 
size captures illiquidity in the UK. However, post-crisis, the illiquidity factor is slightly 
less correlated to size.   
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Table 4.5: Correlation and descriptive statistics of the monthly returns of the respective factors with each other and the market pre and post-crisis. 
This table shows the correlation of the monthly returns of the respective factors with each other as well as the market. The p-values of the correlations are reported in brackets under each respective 
correlation coefficient, whereby bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10%. The sample uses stocks that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 2001 and 
December 2014 (168 months), which are divided further into pre (84 months) and post-crisis periods (84 months). All data are obtained from DataStream.    
  Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
 Correlation  Correlation 
 Illiquidity Factor Market 
Value 
Factor Size Factor 
Momentum 
Factor 
 Illiquidity 
Factor Market 
Value 
Factor Size Factor 
Momentum 
Factor 
            
Illiquidity 
Factor 
1.0000 -0.1346 0.3763 0.9418 0.0461  1.0000 -0.2381 0.1995 0.8416 -0.0939 
----- (0.2221) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.6771)  ----- (0.0195) (0.0514) (0.0000) (0.3628) 
             
Market 
  
-0.1346 1.0000 -0.2259 -0.1885 -0.2528  -0.2381 1.0000 0.3074 -0.0837 -0.1619 
(0.2221) ----- (0.0388) (0.0860) (0.0203)  (0.0195) ----- (0.0023) (0.4177) (0.1151) 
             
Value 
Factor 
0.3763 -0.2259 1.0000 0.4911 -0.0516  0.1995 0.3074 1.0000 0.6004 -0.8653 
(0.0004) (0.0388) ----- (0.0000) (0.6408)  (0.0514) (0.0023) ----- (0.0000) (0.0000) 
             
Size Factor 
  
0.9418 -0.1885 0.4911 1.0000 -0.0217  0.8416 -0.0837 0.6004 1.0000 -0.5366 
(0.0000) (0.0860) (0.0000) ----- (0.8445)  (0.0000) (0.4177) (0.0000) ----- (0.0000) 
             
Momentum 
Factor  
0.0461 -0.2528 -0.0516 -0.0217 1.0000  -0.0939 -0.1619 -0.8653 -0.5366 1.0000 
(0.6771) (0.0203) (0.6408) (0.8445) -----  (0.3628) (0.1151) (0.0000) (0.0000) ----- 
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4.4.3.2. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VARIOUS ILLIQUIDITY PORTFOLIOS 
Similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) we will use three asset pricing models (univariate CAPM, 
Fama-French 3 Factor model and Carhart 4 Factor model) to further explain the average 
returns of various relevant illiquidity portfolios that is discussed earlier.  
Table 4.6 shows the regression results for two portfolios namely the zero-dollar 
“illiquidity factor portfolio” (Panel A) and long only “High illiquid portfolio” (Panel B). 
The table shows that based on CAPM, both portfolios (panel A and panel B) report 
positive and statistically significant monthly alpha for both periods. The Fama-French 3 
factor model shows that after including the value factor and size factor, the monthly alpha 
disappears for the “illiquidity factor portfolio”. However, the long only “High illiquid 
portfolio” monthly alpha remains pre-crisis but it disappears post-crisis. Surprisingly, 
although slightly reduce, the monthly alpha of the long only “High illiquid portfolio” 
remains even after the introduction of the momentum factor signifying that investing into 
illiquid portfolios can generate positive returns and thus poses a challenge to the EMH, 
as it should have resulted in no significant monthly alpha. Nevertheless, this can only be 
observed for the pre-crisis period, as the financial crisis seems to have cause the monthly 
alpha to disappear post-crisis.  
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Table 4.6: Regression analyses of monthly returns of the zero-cost illiquid factor and High Illiquidity portfolio pre and post-crisis. 
This table shows results from the following three regression models on zero-cost (or dollar neutral) Illiquidity factor portfolio (Panel A) and long only High Illiquid portfolio (Panel B). Illiquidity factor 
portfolio (or illiquidity effect) takes a long position in the portfolio of high illiquid stocks and a short position in the portfolio of high liquid stocks. The p-values are reported in brackets under each 
respective coefficient, whereby bold figures denote a statistically significant coefficient at least at 10%. The sample uses stocks that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 2001 and December 
2014 (168 months), which are divided further into pre (84 months) and post-crisis (84 months). All data are obtained from DataStream. 
 
1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ௣ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ߝ௣         (4.2) 
 
2. Fama-French three factor model 
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ௣ܸ൫ܴ௩ െ ܴ௚൯ ൅ ܵ௣ሺܴ௦ െ ܴ௕ሻ ൅ ߝ௣     (4.3)  
 
3. Carhart four factor model  
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ௣ܸ൫ܴ௩ െ ܴ௚൯ ൅ ܵ௣ሺܴ௦ െ ܴ௕ሻ ൅ ܯ௣ሺܴ௠௢௠ െ ܴ௖ሻ ൅ ߝ௣         (4.4) 
 
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
Panel A                
Illiquidity factor portfolio (Illiquidity effect)             
                
CAPM 0.86% -0.0863    0.52% 84  0.76% -0.1373    5.41% 84 
 (0.0020) (0.2340)       (0.0048) (0.0188)      
                
Fama-French 
3 factor 
0.01% 0.0195 -0.1251 1.0123  89.38% 84  0.06% -0.0032 -0.3252 0.9726  84.17% 84 
(0.9125) (0.4233) (0.0110) (0.0000)     (0.6027) (0.9048) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
                
Carhart 4 
factor 
-0.01% 0.0333 -0.1161 1.0140 0.0656 89.80% 84  -0.10% -0.0357 -0.0490 0.9599 0.1935 88.68% 84 
(0.9144) (0.1810) (0.0162) (0.0000) (0.0420)    (0.3146) (0.1286) (0.4129) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
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 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
Panel B                
Long only High illiquid portfolio              
                
CAPM 1.25% 1.0378    61.99% 84  0.99% 0.9502    68.90% 84 
 (0.0003) (0.0000)       (0.0025) (0.0000)      
                
Fama-French 
3 factor 
0.46% 1.1376 -0.3147 1.1643  88.80% 84  0.19% 1.0122 -0.0625 0.9140  91.04% 84 
(0.0307) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0000)     (0.2821) (0.0000) (0.3484) (0.0000)    
                
Carhart 4 
factor 
0.41% 1.1685 -0.2945 1.1682 0.1467 89.35% 84  0.15% 1.0029 0.0164 0.9103 0.0553 91.01% 84 
(0.0487) (0.0000) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.0261)    (0.4285) (0.0000) (0.8847) (0.0000) (0.3899)   
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4.4.3.3. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VARIOUS 
ENHANCED ILLIQUIDITY PORTFOLIOS 
Using the 3 asset pricing models, table 4.7 shows the regression results of 3 enhanced 
intersected illiquidity portfolios (net of risk free rate). The 3 enhanced portfolios are 1) 
“High Value & High Illiquid portfolio”, 2) “Micro & High Illiquid portfolio” and 3) 
“High Momentum & High Illiquid portfolio”. Although the 3 portfolios do not produce 
the highest returns, we decide to use those to provide consistent comparison between pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods. Besides, with the exception of size, illiquidity does manage 
to enhance the other two investment style returns. Furthermore, Ibbotson et al. (2013) use 
similar portfolios.  
Based on CAPM, all three portfolios generate significant positive monthly alpha whereby 
the “High value & High illiquid portfolio” produces the highest alpha for both periods. 
All portfolios are found to be positively related to the market but interestingly, the 
relationship seems weaker post-crisis signifying that the respective portfolios have lower 
systematic risk. Using the Fama-French 3 factor model, the monthly alpha remains for 
“High value & High illiquid portfolio” and “Micro & High illiquid portfolio” for pre-
crisis periods but it disappears for post-crisis periods. The alpha of the “High momentum 
& High illiquid portfolio” remains only post-crisis.  
Fascinatingly, panel A of table 4.7 shows that the monthly alpha of the High value & 
High illiquid portfolio” remains positive and significant pre-crisis, even after the 
inclusion of all 3 factors confirming that illiquidity has improved the value portfolio as 
reported earlier. The table also shows that the portfolio is positively related to value, size 
and momentum factor pre-crisis. The monthly alpha of the “Micro & High illiquid 
portfolio” and “High momentum & High illiquid portfolio” disappears pre-crisis and 
post-crisis respectively.  
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Table 4.7: Regression analyses of monthly returns of the enhanced illiquidity portfolio pre and post-crisis. 
This table reports results from the 3 regression models of enhanced illiquidity portfolios. There are three enhanced illiquidity portfolios based on its intersection with other investment styles namely “Micro 
& High illiquid”, “High value & High illiquid” and “High momentum & High illiquid” portfolios. The p-values are reported in brackets under each respective coefficient, whereby bold figures denote a 
statistically significant coefficient at least at 10%. The sample uses stocks that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 2001 and December 2014 (168 months), which are divided further into 
pre (84 months) and post-crisis periods (84 months). All data are obtained from DataStream. 
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
Panel A                
High value & High illiquid              
                
CAPM 1.57% 1.0422    61.49% 84  1.28% 1.0108    61.21% 84 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)       (0.0020) (0.0000)      
                
Fama-French 
3 factor 
0.43% 1.1810 0.1489 0.9946  87.72% 84  0.32% 1.0100 0.1801 0.9343  89.21% 84 
(0.0544) (0.0000) (0.1560) (0.0000)     (0.1540) (0.0000) (0.0311) (0.0000)    
                
Carhart 4 
factor 
0.35% 1.2316 0.1819 1.0009 0.2403 89.40% 84  0.21% 0.9882 0.3649 0.9258 0.1295 89.44% 84 
(0.0938) (0.0000) (0.0647) (0.0000) (0.0004)    (0.3537) (0.0000) (0.0099) (0.0000) (0.1016)   
 
Panel B                
Micro & High illiquid              
                
CAPM 1.34% 1.0512    59.53% 84  1.15% 0.9428    65.88% 84 
 (0.0003) (0.0000)       (0.0010) (0.0000)      
                
Fama-French 
3 factor 
0.38% 1.1721 -0.2255 1.2447  89.75% 84  0.27% 1.0011 -0.0351 0.9841  92.28% 84 
(0.0696) (0.0000) (0.0231) (0.0000)     (0.1107) (0.0000) (0.5757) (0.0000)    
                
Carhart 4 
factor 
0.33% 1.2048 -0.2042 1.2488 0.1555 90.35% 84  0.23% 0.9923 0.0396 0.9806 0.0523 92.26% 84 
(0.1081) (0.0000) (0.0345) (0.0000) (0.0168)    (0.1964) (0.0000) (0.7104) (0.0000) (0.3876)   
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 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
 Monthly 
α (%) 
Market 
Beta  Value Size 
Moment-
um 
Adjusted 
R2 (%) N 
Panel C                
High momentum & High illiquid              
                
CAPM 1.18% 1.0005    44.42% 84  1.29% 0.9278    62.04% 84 
 (0.0121) (0.0000)       (0.0006) (0.0000)      
                
Fama-French 
3 factor 
0.57% 1.0809 -0.6528 1.3624  70.72% 84  0.65% 1.0783 -0.3927 0.9460  76.05% 84 
(0.1401) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000)     (0.0337) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000)    
                
Carhart 4 
factor 
0.38% 1.1985 -0.5762 1.3771 0.5591 78.17% 84  0.34% 1.0150 0.1454 0.9213 0.3770 79.48% 84 
(0.2533) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)    (0.2419) (0.0000) (0.4096) (0.0000) (0.0003)   
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Overall, although our results are not similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) in relation to the 
illiquidity factor, the significant positive results for the long only “High illiquid portfolio” 
in panel B of table 4.6 for the pre-crisis period does confirm that illiquidity is “not easily 
beaten” and can even be considered as “a viable alternative”. Furthermore, the ability 
of illiquidity to enhance the value portfolio in panel A of table 4.7 with a positive and 
significant monthly alpha does confirm illiquidity as meeting the third portfolio 
benchmark criterion of “a viable alternative”. Our results also show the substantial effect 
of the crisis on the portfolios as the monthly alpha disappears post-crisis after the 
inclusion of all three factors. 
 
4.4.4. ILLIQUIDITY STABILITY AND MIGRATION  
The fourth and last benchmark criterion of Sharpe (1992) is whether the illiquidity 
investment style can be managed at “a low cost”, which will be assessed by using the 
technique developed by Ibbotson et al. (2013). It is important to consider costs as Carhart 
(1997) highlights that investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees 
all have a direct, negative impact on funds’ performance. Furthermore, Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) highlight that although private equity partnerships earn returns (gross of 
fees) exceeding the S&P 500 over the entire sample period (1980–1997), average fund 
returns net of fees are roughly equal to those of the S&P 500, signifying the negative 
impact of fees.  
Ibbotson et al. (2013) highlight that illiquidity has a cost as the stocks may take longer to 
trade and even have higher transaction costs but trading costs can be mitigated through 
longer horizons and less trading, which translates into higher returns for the less liquid 
stocks. Nevertheless, less liquid portfolios are riskier to liquidate in a crisis compared to 
more passively held portfolios which can largely mitigate this risk. Therefore, studying 
migration of the stocks in a portfolio will allow us to understand if any of the portfolios 
can be managed at a low cost or passively. 
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4.4.4.1. MIGRATION OF STOCKS OF VARIOUS INVESTMENT STYLES 
Table 4.8 shows the migration of stocks from each quartile in year (t) (sorting year) to 
other quartiles in year (t+1) (performance year) for all investment styles. As before, the 
quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that the stocks are held for at least one 
year while diagonal results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remain in their 
respective quartiles after one year.  
Panel A of table 4.8 shows that overall 77.66% of the illiquid stocks remain in the same 
quartile, pre-crisis. For the “High illiquid portfolio” (Quartile 1), 75.54% remain in their 
quartile while the rest migrated to other quartiles, with the next quartile (Q2) receiving 
the most stocks (22.21%). However, the most stable quartile is the “High liquid portfolio” 
(Quartile 4) as 93.83% of stocks remain within their quartile.  
Pre-crisis, size is considered the most stable as overall 84.20% of stocks remain within 
their quartile while momentum results in the lowest stability of only 30.87%. Value 
portfolios are also relatively stable, whereby overall 67.29% remained in the same 
quartile. Similar results are obtained post-crisis. Table 4.8 signifies that generally the 
transaction costs in maintaining illiquidity based portfolios are relatively low. Therefore, 
along with the stable returns and risks reported earlier, illiquidity styles can be regarded 
as a stable strategy. Moreover, table 4.8 shows that the “High liquid portfolio” (Quartile 
4) is the most stable (low transaction costs) although the portfolio still generates positive 
returns with lower risks (table 4.1). However, a fascinating finding is that post-crisis, 
overall illiquidity portfolios increase in stability while other investment styles decrease 
in stability, suggesting the preference of illiquidity based portfolios post-crisis.  
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Table 4.8: Migration of stocks one year after portfolio construction for all investment styles pre and post-crisis. 
The table shows the migration of stocks from each quartile in year (t) (sorting year) to other quartiles in year (t+1) (performance year) for all investment styles. The sample uses companies that are listed 
on FTSE All-Share index between January 2000 and December 2014, which are divided into pre (84 months) and post-crisis periods (84 months). As before, the quartiles are only rebalanced annually 
meaning that the stocks are held for at least one year. Diagonal results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remain in their respective quartiles after one year. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 Pre-Crisis periods (2001 –2007)  Post-Crisis periods (2008 – 2014) 
Year t  
(Illiquidity) 
Panel A-Illiquidity migration (Overall 77.66% remains in the same quartile)  Illiquidity migration (Overall 82.16% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t+1 (Illiquidity)  Year t+1 (Illiquidity) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quartile 1 75.54% 22.21% 2.13% 0.13%  83.56% 15.93% 0.50% 0.00% 
Quartile 2 19.71% 64.08% 16.21% 0.00%  16.49% 71.28% 12.03% 0.20% 
Quartile 3 0.85% 12.32% 77.17% 9.67%  0.50% 11.00% 80.52% 7.98% 
Quartile 4 0.11% 0.00% 6.06% 93.83%  0.11% 0.00% 6.62% 93.27% 
          
Year t  
(Value) 
Panel B-Value migration (Overall 67.29% remains in the same quartile)  Value migration (Overall 66.14% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t+1 (Value)  Year t+1 (Value) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quartile 1 67.07% 27.10% 2.70% 3.12%  64.49% 27.35% 5.55% 2.61% 
Quartile 2 29.36% 56.88% 13.11% 0.65%  28.85% 56.72% 13.90% 0.53% 
Quartile 3 2.53% 13.67% 67.42% 16.38%  5.29% 13.71% 63.68% 17.32% 
Quartile 4 2.26% 1.94% 18.03% 77.78%  2.53% 0.64% 17.15% 79.68% 
          
Year t  
(Size) 
Panel C-Size migration (Overall 84.20% remains in the same quartile)  Size migration (Overall 82.95% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t+1 (Size)  Year t+1 (Size) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quartile 1 86.31% 13.45% 0.24% 0.00%  86.83% 12.86% 0.21% 0.10% 
Quartile 2 12.34% 76.20% 11.46% 0.00%  12.17% 74.60% 12.83% 0.40% 
Quartile 3 0.51% 9.95% 81.27% 8.27%  0.62% 11.74% 78.54% 9.09% 
Quartile 4 0.00% 0.13% 6.84% 93.03%  0.20% 0.32% 7.66% 91.82% 
          
Year t 
(Momentum) 
Panel D- Momentum migration (Overall 30.87% remains in the same quartile)  Momentum migration (Overall 29.39% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t+1 (Momentum)  Year t+1 (Momentum) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quartile 1 31.21% 25.33% 19.93% 23.53%  29.89% 22.44% 21.03% 26.64% 
Quartile 2 25.32% 29.34% 26.34% 19.00%  25.08% 28.87% 26.25% 19.81% 
Quartile 3 21.34% 25.60% 31.22% 21.85%  19.96% 27.99% 29.79% 22.26% 
Quartile 4 24.74% 21.19% 22.36% 31.71%  26.14% 21.33% 23.53% 29.00% 
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To summarize, the results in table 4.8 indicate that portfolios based on illiquidity can be 
managed at “a low cost”, meeting the fourth and final benchmark criterion. The improved 
stability of illiquid portfolios post-crisis, signifies that investors can even reduce 
transaction costs by using illiquid portfolios. This means that at least pre-crisis, illiquidity 
has met all 4 of Sharpe (1992) benchmark criteria signifying that it can be made into a 
benchmark portfolio and can be categorised as a viable investment style in line with the 
other more traditional styles such as value style.  
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
Investors have always wanted to find ways to beat the market and thus various investment 
styles have been established such as value (Fama & French, 1992) and momentum styles 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). Recently, illiquidity has gained importance due to the 
financial crisis. Although researchers such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find 
evidence to suggest that returns are an increasing function of illiquidity, it is never 
classified as a separate investment style. Ibbotson et al. (2013) even state that illiquidity 
has the most obvious connection to valuation, as investors will pay more for liquid and 
less for illiquid stocks. Thus, we feel that it is time to conduct such a study on the UK 
market as well as on the style’s response towards the crisis, using Ibbotson et al. (2013) 
framework which is based on Sharpe (1992) benchmark criteria of 1) “identifiable before 
the fact”, 2) “not easily beaten”, 3) “a viable alternative”, and 4) “low in cost”. 
The first criterion of “identifiable before the fact” is met by using the prior year (t-1) 
related style measure to obtain the results of the quartiles (or portfolio) for a given year 
(t). For the traditional style measures, we have decided to use P/B ratio (value), MV (size) 
and annualised returns (momentum). For measuring illiquidity, we use the Amihud 
illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002).  
The second criterion is “not easily beaten” and our results show that value premium, size 
premium and even illiquidity premium exists but momentum premiums are insignificant 
for both periods. The “High illiquid portfolio” also performs better than the two 
benchmarks and other styles, with the exception of “High value portfolio” and “Micro 
portfolio”. Similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), we use CAPM, Fama-French 3 factor model 
and Carhart 4 factor model for estimating alpha. The results show that the long only “High 
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illiquid portfolio” is able to generate significantly positive monthly alpha on all three 
models pre-crisis only. Thus, we consider the “High illiquidity portfolio” as “not easily 
beaten” but not for post-crisis. 
Since illiquidity is able to outperform the benchmarks, it can be considered as satisfying 
the third criterion of “a viable alternative” but the illiquidity premium may also be due 
to the other styles. To shed light on this, we construct double sorted illiquidity portfolios 
with the other styles. Illiquidity is able to enhance the returns of both value and 
momentum styles. Moreover, using CAPM, all enhanced portfolios are able to generate 
positive and significant alpha for both periods. The “High value & High illiquid 
portfolio” is even able to generate positive and significant alpha for all three models pre-
crisis only. Thus, meeting the third benchmark criterion of “a viable alternative” but 
again not for the post-crisis period. 
Illiquid stocks are also found to be overall more stable than value and momentum 
portfolios for both periods, signifying that illiquid portfolios can be managed at low cost, 
meeting the fourth criterion of “low in cost”. Furthermore, illiquid stocks stability 
actually improves post-crisis, indicating the preference for illiquid stocks after the 
financial crisis.  
To summarize, our results show that pre-crisis, illiquidity as captured by Amihud 
illiquidity measure, is able to meet the four criteria of Sharpe (1992) benchmark 
requirements or at least show its profitability as an investment style. Thus, we agree with 
Ibbotson et al. (2013) that illiquidity can be considered as an alternative investment style 
in equal standing with the other styles and our“High value & High illiquid portfolio” is 
the best strategy for fund managers to utilize in UK, pre-crisis.  
As expected, there is a detrimental effect on the illiquidity portfolios due to the crisis, as 
the portfolios performance post-crisis is almost consistently worse relative to pre-crisis. 
Interestingly, although illiquidity is not as successful after the crisis, it does provide 
steady profits as it is able to perform better than the benchmarks. Furthermore, it is more 
stable, signifying potential of profit opportunities.  
Nevertheless, even though our results appear to confirm illiquidity as a profitable style, 
one must keep in mind that there is a strong relationship between size and illiquidity. This 
comes into contrast with Ibbotson et al. (2013), signifying that the favourable 
performance of illiquidity may actually be due to size. Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) 
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also highlight similar results but Elfakhani (2000) believes that the size premium may 
actually be due to illiquidity. Moreover, our results are weaker in comparison to Ibbotson 
et al. (2013), probably due to the shorter periods and different liquidity measure used. 
Another reason may be the different characteristics of UK and US markets such as the 
lower volatility in the UK market relative to the US market (Bartram et al., 2012), since 
the lower level of volatility will definitely affect asset prices and liquidity. Stoll (1978) 
shows that liquidity is positively affected by return volatility while Vayanos (2004)  
mentions that investors reduce their willingness to hold illiquid assets during volatile 
times. 
Further studies need to be conducted in different geographical areas and over longer 
periods. However, we feel that illiquidity still has its merits as an investment management 
tool and choosing an investment style actually depends on investors’ preference. In fact, 
it is shown that the migration stability of illiquid stocks has improved after the crisis, 
signifying lower transaction costs. Besides since the crisis is partly attributed on the 
illiquidity of financial markets, it is expected that investors will expect more 
compensation for the illiquidity risk of holding stocks longer, indicating profit 
opportunities with lower transaction costs67.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 It is important to consider costs of investment styles or strategies, as Keim and Madhavan (1996) mention that trading costs are 
economically significant and even increases with trade difficulty. Moreover, Carhart (1997) highlights that investment costs of 
expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on funds’ performance while Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) mention that average fund returns of private equity partnerships (net of fees) are roughly equal to those of the S&P 500. Thus, 
signifying the negative impact of fees and trading costs on investment styles or strategies. Nevertheless, trading costs can be mitigated 
through longer horizons and less trading (Ibbotson et al., 2013). Therefore, the stability of our illiquidity portfolios indicates that the 
negative impact from transaction (trading) costs can be reduced and hence increases the profitability of our portfolios for investors. 
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CHAPTER 5 : INVESTMENT STYLES, ILLIQUIDITY AND JANUARY RETURNS 
IN UNITED KINGDOM 
  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we discuss the potential of using illiquidity as an investment style 
during the financial crisis in the United Kingdom (UK) where we apply Ibbotson et al. 
(2013) framework on 14 years data, equally divided into pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Our results show that illiquidity can be a reliable investment style for the seven years pre-
crisis period but as expected, performance is less convincing post-crisis. However, 
illiquidity portfolios are found to be more stable post-crisis, indicating investors’ 
preference for illiquidity based portfolios. Although we find some valuable insights, we 
believe that the research can be improved by using a longer period68.  Therefore, in this 
chapter, we will also study illiquidity as an investment style in the UK but using a longer 
data period of 23 years. Furthermore, we have also included more analysis such as an 
investigation into the January effect, in order to make the study on illiquidity more 
concise.   
As highlighted before, market efficiency signifies that obtaining abnormal returns is not 
possible. However, over the years, researchers find evidence to contradict the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) known as anomalies. The January-effect (Keim, 1983) is one 
of the most common type of anomalies.  
Due to such anomalies, various investment styles (or strategies) have been developed in 
order to beat the market. Farrell (1974) is one the first few to raise the issue by looking 
at homogenous stock groupings. Style investments are later recommended by Sharpe 
(1978) who looks at general styles such as passive and active management. This is further 
extended to include more specific and generally accepted investment styles of size, value/ 
growth and momentum/contrarian. For instance, Banz (1981) mentions that average 
returns are found to be inversely related to size while Fama and French (1992) highlight 
that value investing is considered superior in either developed or emerging markets. 
Lastly, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that styles that combine buying winner 
                                                 
68 For example, past research tends to conclude that value style is considered superior to growth style (Basu 1983, Rosenberg, Reid et 
al. 1985) but Beneda (2002) highlights that over a longer period (at least 14 years), average returns for growth stocks are found to be 
superior to value stocks, signifying the importance of using different time-periods. 
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stocks (momentum) and selling loser stocks (contrarian) generate significant positive 
returns. However, there are contradictory findings as well, which will be discussed briefly 
in the literature review.  
Recently, the study of illiquidity has gained importance, probably due to financial sector 
development (Rajan, 2006) and the financial crisis69  (Brunnermeier, 2009). General 
evidence seems to indicate that asset returns will increase with illiquidity. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) discover that market-observed average returns are an increasing 
function of the bid-ask spread. A more recent paper by Jensen and Moorman (2010) find 
evidence that the zero-cost portfolio 70  earn returns that are both economically and 
statistically significant for the US market while Said and Giouvris (2015) obtain similar 
results for the UK market. Furthermore, the relationship between returns and illiquidity 
is quite obvious as Ibbotson et al. (2013) mention that investors clearly want more 
liquidity and avoid illiquidity. Therefore, illiquidity should be compensated with 
additional returns.  
Surprisingly, even though it is so apparent, for some reason illiquidity is rarely used as a 
control variable and most studies, generally use the other three styles (Subrahmanyam, 
2010). Hence, it is not a common investment style even in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Only lately, research on illiquidity as an investment style has been undertaken (see Chang 
et al. (2013) on the Taiwanese stock market (TSM), Theart and Krige (2014) on the 
Johannesburg Stock market (JSE) and Ibbotson et al. (2013) on the US market). Ibbotson 
et al. (2013) find evidence to support illiquidity as an investment style.  
Similarly, we feel that it is time that illiquidity be categorised as a reliable and consistent 
investment style on equal level with the more establish investment styles. Therefore, we 
have decided to conduct research based on Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework but focusing 
on the UK market, as the number of such studies conducted are still limited. 
We believe that the UK market is a good research opportunity because the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), is considered as one of the largest stock market by capitalisation and 
turnover ratio signifying that the market is quite liquid and therefore the results will be as 
immune as possible from biases such as infrequent trading (Galariotis & Giouvris, 2007). 
                                                 
69 Brunnermeier (2009) mentions that the financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008, due to liquidity and the credit crunch, has led to 
the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
70 Zero-cost portfolio = long the illiquid portfolio and short the liquid portfolio 
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Hence, due to the attractiveness of the UK market, we agree with Galariotis and Giouvris 
(2007) that the results on the UK market will be of great interest to the international 
scientific, academics, corporate and investment community.   
Using Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework and Sharpe (1992) four benchmark portfolio 
criteria71, we start our research by investigating whether the respective investment styles’ 
premium 72  including illiquidity premium exist within the UK market and how the 
different styles perform against benchmarks. This will be followed by investigations on 
double sorted quartile portfolios, which are the intersection between illiquidity and the 
other investment styles.  
Since we are constructing portfolios as well as using financial models in our study, we 
have also conducted a covariance versus characteristics analysis73 . Finally, we also 
investigate the January effect because past research shows that it is quite persistent within 
the 3 styles and illiquidity.    
Overall, our research for the UK market report that all 4 investment styles do generate 
positive premiums similar to past literature but the momentum/contrarian does not show 
significant results while the illiquid portfolios consistently outperform the benchmarks. 
Illiquidity satisfactorily meet Sharpe (1992) 4 benchmark criteria signifying that 
illiquidity can be classified as a reliable investment style but it is highly correlated to size.  
We have also find evidence to suggest that the January effect remains for value, size and 
illiquidity styles but not for the market and momentum/contrarian investment style. 
However, when independent double sorting is conducted, it appears that the January 
effect of value and size is due to illiquid stocks.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the literature 
review while section 5.3 describes the data and variables. In section 5.4, the methodology, 
empirical results and analysis of the research are discussed followed by our conclusion in 
section 5.5. 
                                                 
71 Sharpe (1992) establishes that a benchmark portfolio should be 1) identifiable before the fact, 2) not easily beaten, 3) a viable 
alternative, and 4) low in cost. 
72 Investment style premium happens when one specific style performs better to its relevant antagonist style. For example, value 
premium (value returns > growth returns) and growth premium (value returns < growth returns). 
73 Covariance model considers returns sensitivity to variables such as market returns and a popular model is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). Characteristics model uses only financial ratios such as book-to-market ratios to construct portfolios. Daniel and 
Titman (1997) mention that stock returns due to covariance model signifies riskiness of stocks while characteristics model means 
stocks are under-priced. By comparing the two models, it will allow us to investigate which model construct the better performing 
portfolio.   
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5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1. INVESTMENT STYLES, ILLIQUIDITY AND ITS POTENTIAL 
The literature review on investment style is similar to the one presented in the previous 
chapter as well as the broad literature and hence it will not be repeated extensively. 
Nevertheless, we will briefly discuss some of the key literature on investment styles.  
We start off with value and growth investment styles which are two popular fundamental 
styles that appears to be antagonist to each other. Past research tends to conclude that 
value style is considered superior to growth style in the US market (Basu, 1983; 
Rosenberg et al., 1985). Nonetheless, Beneda (2002) highlights that the research time-
period is important as it is discovered that over a longer period (at least 14 years), average 
returns for growth stocks is found to be superior. In relation to size effect, Banz (1981) 
highlights that average returns are negatively related with size but after the early 1980s, 
it is less optimistic as Van Dijk (2011) mentions that past empirical studies declare the 
size effect to be dead since then. 
Momentum and contrarian are the other popular investment styles as De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) discover that loser stocks (or contrarian style) perform exceptionally well in 
comparison to winner stocks (or momentum style) over extended time periods of 3 to 5 
years horizons. However, in contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that 
investment styles that combine buying winner stocks and selling loser stocks generate 
significant positive returns of about 1% per month over 3 to 12 months holding periods. 
Finally, the general evidence on illiquidity appears to indicate that returns will increase 
with illiquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). However, Ben-Rephael et al. (2008) who 
study the NYSE finds evidence that the profitability of trading strategies based on 
illiquidity premium has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies 
virtually unprofitable. 
The conflicting evidence of the various investment styles indicates that conducting 
research on illiquidity as an investment style still has its merits especially since Yan (2008) 
in their research of US mutual funds finds evidence to suggest that liquidity is an 
important reason why size erodes fund performance signifying the importance of liquidity 
in investment management. Moreover, Ibbotson et al. (2013) find evidence to suggest 
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that liquidity should be given equal standing to other investment styles by studying the 
US market.  
 
5.2.2. COVARIANCE VERSUS CHARACTERISTICS 
In order to measure the performance of various investment style portfolios, we will be 
using various relevant financial ratios to rank and construct the portfolios. For instance, 
as highlighted earlier in the literature, we can use P/E ratio to distinguish between value 
and growth portfolios whereby a low P/E stock portfolio will be considered as value 
stocks and high P/E stocks as growth stocks (Beneda, 2002).    
Nevertheless, it is not that simple, according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
a stock return actually depends on its sensitivity towards market risk (or systematic risk) 
captured by beta and time value of money (represented by the risk free rate). Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) further expanded on univariate CAPM which is known 
as Fama-French 3 factor model and Carhart 4 factor model74 respectively. Therefore, 
constructing portfolios simply by using relevant financial ratios may not be sufficient.        
Daniel and Titman (1997) is one of the first few to recognise and explore the issue. They 
consider two models namely the “characteristics model” and “covariance model”. They 
label “characteristics model”, a model using only financial ratios such as B/M ratio to 
measure the expected return of stocks. Meanwhile, the “covariance model” is a financial 
model and considers returns sensitivity to factors such as value factors (or value premium). 
Daniel and Titman (1998) highlight that the persistent better performance of value stocks 
over growth stocks may be due to either mispricing or riskiness of stocks. They clarify 
that mispricing of stocks is due to the “characteristic model” and means that the market 
systematically under-prices value stocks. On the other hand, riskiness as measured by the 
“covariance model” indicates that value stocks are considered riskier resulting in higher 
returns.  
Daniel and Titman (1997) underline that the “characteristics model” seems to explain 
the cross-sectional variation in stock returns better than the “covariance model”. Daniel 
and Titman (1998) find further evidence to support the “characteristics model” 
                                                 
74 A study by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) support the momentum factor. 
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signifying that investors should be able to construct better portfolios using 
“characteristics model“ relative to “covariance model” such as Fama-French 3 factor 
model (Fama & French, 1992, 1993).  
Furthermore, Daniel et al. (2001) replicate the Daniel and Titman (1997) study on a 
Japanese sample from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) between 1971 and 1997 and their 
test fail to reject the “characteristic model” but reject the Fama-French 3 factor model. 
Ibbotson et al. (2013) who also test the theory using a different investment style factor 
namely the illiquidity factor, indicate that the “characteristics model” performs better 
than the “covariance model”.  
 
5.2.3. THE JANUARY EFFECT 
Another common issue that can be linked to the various investment styles is the January 
effect. Fama and French (1992) signify its appearance within value style, which is also 
confirmed by Loughran (1997). Keim (1983) mentions its existence within size effect 
whereas De Bondt and Thaler (1985) comment on it in his study of momentum style. 
Even Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight of its presence within illiquidity 
premium.  
The January effect is a seasonal anomaly whereby prices or returns increases in the month 
of January in comparison to other months. Wachtel (1942) is one of the first to observe 
this in the US market (DJIA) while Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) mention its existence 
in most major industrialized countries including the UK. Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) 
and Clare et al. (1995) also find evidence of the January effect in UK stock market.  
As highlighted earlier, the market is expected to be at least weakly efficient and the 
January effect is quite a simple anomaly that can be exploited by any investor 
inexpensively. Therefore, since it is discovered more than 70 years ago, it is expected that 
such a simple anomaly will disappear by now but Haugen and Jorion (1996) highlight 
that the January effect is still going strong in their research and Haug and Hirschey (2006) 
confirm that the January effect continue to contradict the EMH.  
Ritter and Chopra (1989) mention that the January effect may be due to window dressing, 
as following December tax loss selling, investors rebalance their portfolios in early 
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January. Nevertheless, Haug and Hirschey (2006) highlight that the continuing presence 
of a January effect since 1987 appears to weaken that argument of tax loss selling. 
It may simply be compensation for risks. Chan et al. (1985) mention risk is higher in 
January or during the turn of the year by looking at bonds. Moreover, Gu (2003) 
emphasizes that the January effect is positively related to volatility. 
Gu (2003) also indicates the pronounce declining trend of the January effect in the US 
for both large and small firm stock indices since 1988, which may be due to 
macroeconomic variables such as stronger real GDP growth and higher inflation. They 
also mention that the decline represents a trend towards market efficiency due to 
knowledgeable investors and technology advancement.  
On the other hand, Ahsan and Sarkar (2013) find significant positive return in June 
instead of January in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh. 
  
5.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
5.3.1. DATA 
In order to capture the UK stock market, the sample that we decide to use consists of all 
the stocks listed under the FTSE All-Share index for the 24 years period from January 
1991 through December 2014. However, after portfolio construction, 23 years data is 
available for the analysis. Unfortunately, at the time of data collection, 23 years is the 
longest period that we are able to collect data, for which sufficiently meets our analysis 
requirements. We mainly use daily data to calculate the monthly and yearly variables. All 
the data use in this paper is obtained from DataStream.  
Before the calculation of the illiquidity measures and construction of the portfolios, the 
sample is initially analysed for any unsuitable data to avoid the emergence of bias results. 
After filtering the data set, the final data set contains 640 companies as of the year 2014 
and averages around 456 companies over the 23 years period. Summary statistics of the 
stock universe can be found in table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the stock universe by year: January 1991 to December 2014 
This table shows the summary statistics for our stock universe including number of stocks as well as mean, 
standard deviation, median, maximum and minimum market value (in £ millions) for each year. The table 
consists of stocks with complete relevant data that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between the year 
1991 and 2013, which is the sorting year (t-1) data and are used to calculate the performance year (t) results 
from the year 1992 to 2014. Since the data for the year 2014 is also used for relevant calculation such as 
data migration, we have also included the year 2014 data in Table 5.1. The last row provides the summary 
statistics of the whole sample used. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
  Market Value (£ Millions)  
Sorting year No. of stocks Mean Standard deviation  Median  Maximum Minimum 
1991 280 881.31 2765.45 119.55 25620.57 0.99 
1992 289 1009.20 2997.46 141.78 24932.26 0.58 
1993 303 1287.74 3486.58 196.13 29328.07 1.49 
1994 330 1129.17 3101.71 162.75 23514.47 1.08 
1995 347 1362.39 3805.16 191.11 32024.99 1.24 
1996 372 1500.47 4278.21 215.79 39571.24 2.44 
1997 387 1853.89 5771.80 236.54 51451.20 2.12 
1998 396 2152.41 7849.12 208.29 86904.94 1.91 
1999 407 2954.38 11322.88 269.84 121287.90 5.65 
2000 420 3260.89 13516.38 293.93 158542.90 4.86 
2001 428 2814.94 11684.75 259.63 122427.40 6.12 
2002 438 2133.28 8568.69 211.72 95556.69 6.16 
2003 448 2473.30 9847.60 279.65 100215.30 15.56 
2004 468 2565.36 9889.55 333.79 109351.80 14.50 
2005 497 3011.96 11004.31 413.24 127867.00 24.47 
2006 524 3166.36 10555.88 497.86 111714.90 9.00 
2007 543 3149.46 10913.21 440.09 116372.20 30.49 
2008 547 2225.71 8627.21 241.00 98545.13 8.18 
2009 549 2961.36 10629.31 388.08 123389.20 18.02 
2010 566 3262.21 10810.98 499.36 115152.70 7.54 
2011 575 3042.79 10211.20 448.01 89757.75 8.56 
2012 583 3288.43 10402.84 543.77 119519.90 32.98 
2013 609 3765.18 11679.16 732.91 124728.70 52.01 
2014 640 3493.60 10296.94 720.06 116950.40 46.08 
Whole Sample  2619.53 9561.04 331.49 158542.90 0.58 
 
5.3.2. INVESTMENT STYLES’ MEASURES 
One of the key parts of our research is to investigate the ability of illiquidity as an 
investment style and we hope to compare its performance with other investment styles as 
well as the chosen benchmarks.  
Nonetheless, initially we need to choose variables that will determine each respective 
investment style. For example, for “value versus growth” investment style, past 
researchers such as Gonenc and Karan (2003) and Fama and French (1998) use B/M ratio 
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to rank their portfolio whereby high B/M ratio is categorised as value stocks while low 
B/M ratio as growth stocks. Beneda (2002) suggests using P/E ratio, Yen, Sun, and Yan 
(2004) use P/C ratio and Bauman et al. (1998) use dividend yield. However, among the 
different variables, we have decided to use P/B ratio, which is just the inverse of B/M 
ratio because it is one of the most widely recognisable variables and provides more 
number of companies compared to P/E ratio. 
Determining the variable for size effect (“small versus big” investment style) is simpler, 
as we feel that using the market value of each firm is the most appropriate measure as it 
is used by past researchers such as Dissanaike (2002). Similarly, choosing the most 
appropriate variable for “momentum versus contrarian” investment style (or winners 
versus losers) is also straightforward as we will be using monthly returns akin to De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) but we annualise it.  
For illiquidity, we have decided to choose the Amihud Illiquidity measure (Amihud)75 as 
it is a well-known measure but still simple to calculate and has been extensively use in 
past literature. Moreover, we also thoroughly consider two other liquidity measures 
namely the roll estimator (Roll, 1984) and High Low spread by Corwin and Schultz 
(2012) and we find that Amihud provides results that are more consistent to past studies76. 
We have chosen FTSE All-Share index and UK 3 months London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) as benchmarks for market returns and risk-free rate respectively. 
 
5.4. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.4.1. ILLIQUIDITY AS AN INVESTMENT STYLE BASED ON ITS ABILITY AS A 
BENCHMARK  
Similar to our previous chapter and as highlighted earlier, the best way to investigate 
whether illiquidity is a reliable investment style, is to scrutinise if illiquidity can be made 
                                                 
75 It is calculated for each stock, s, every month as follows: 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀௦௠ ൌ ଵ௧ ∑
ଵ,଴଴଴,଴଴଴ൈ|௥௘௧௨௥௡೟|
௣௥௜௖௘೟ൈ௩௢௟௨௠௘೟௧   (5.1) Where t is each trading day  
76 Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) highlight that there is hardly a single liquidity measure which can capture all aspects of 
estimating the effect of liquidity on asset prices. Therefore, choosing an appropriate liquidity measure is not straightforward. However, 
our third chapter shows that among three liquidity measures namely i) Amihud illiquidity measure, ii) High-Low Spread (Adjusted) 
and iii) Roll Estimator, Amihud illiquidity measure produces results that are consistent to past studies in the UK. Since our fifth 
chapter also uses UK data, we decide to use Amihud as proxy for illiquidity. Moreover, among the three liquidity measures, Amihud 
have the advantage of being simple to calculate. 
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a dependable portfolio benchmark. Therefore, we feel that we should follow Ibbotson et 
al. (2013) framework, whereby they based it on Sharpe’s (1992) specification of a 
portfolio benchmark, which should be 1) “identifiable before the fact”, 2) “not easily 
beaten”, 3) “a viable alternative” and 4) “low in cost”. 
To meet the “identifiable before the fact” criterion, we will be constructing the quartiles 
(or portfolio) based on the prior year (t-1) measure of the relevant investment style, which 
is then used to calculate the results of the portfolios for a given year (t). For example, the 
investment style measure for the year 1991 (selection year) is used to construct the 
quartiles and calculate the returns and risks for the year 1992 (performance year). 
Therefore, the portfolios are “identifiable before the fact”. 
The next criterion for us to fulfil is the “not easily beaten”. This will be achieved by 
investigating if the returns of the illiquidity portfolios can provide significant and positive 
returns (if any) and then compare it with the chosen benchmark. Moreover, the portfolio 
across different investment quartiles will also be investigated, allowing us to examine the 
performance of illiquidity in comparison to the other styles.  
This will be followed by  “a viable alternative” criterion, which will be investigated by 
applying the method use by Ibbotson et al. (2013), who distinguish illiquidity from the 
other styles by constructing double sorted quartile portfolios. The double sorted portfolios 
will allow us to study whether illiquidity is able to enhance the performance of the more 
recognized styles.  
Lastly, similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), we investigate the “low in cost” criterion by 
exploring stock migration. Studying stock migration will allow us to consider whether 
illiquidity can be managed passively and at low cost.  
 
5.4.2 COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT STYLES’ RETURNS AND RISKS.  
Our research starts with an investigation of portfolio performance across “different 
investment style quartiles”. This section will also allow us to determine whether 
illiquidity will be able to meet the first two benchmark criteria of “identifiable before the 
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fact” and “not easily beaten”. More importantly, this section will also confirm whether 
an illiquidity premium77 exists in the first place.   
Table 5.2 shows the equally weighted average annualised monthly returns and risks of 
the investment styles based on quartiles over the sample period. Construction of the 
quartiles starts by calculating each measure on an annual basis whereby the prior year (t-
1) average of the styles measure is used to construct the quartiles for a given year (t). 
Therefore, over the 24 years’ period, the selection period is between 1991 and 2013 
(inclusive), while the performance period is between 1992 and 2014 (inclusive) and hence 
23 years data is available for the analysis.  
Using one of the investment style measures, the stocks are ranked and the two portfolios 
that are ranked top 25% and bottom 25% are classified as either Q1 or Q4 quartiles. For 
example, after using Amihud to rank the sample on a descending basis, the top 25% with 
the highest (or widest) spreads are considered as the “high illiquid portfolio (Q1)” 
whereas the bottom 25% stocks are classified as “high liquid portfolio (Q4)”. After the 
quartiles are constructed the portfolio performance of each quartile is calculated and the 
stocks are rebalanced annually, meaning that the stocks are held within each respective 
portfolio for one year before the portfolios are rebalanced.  
It should be noted that the final column in table 5.2 shows the zero-cost portfolio returns 
or applicable investment style premium, which takes a long position on Q1 portfolio and 
short position on Q4 portfolio. Therefore, for value versus growth investment style, it will 
be the value premium if “high value portfolio (Q1)” outperforms “high growth portfolio 
(Q4)” and growth premium if “high growth portfolio (Q4)” is found to perform better. 
The annualised returns of the portfolios in table 5.2 are calculated based on arithmetic 
mean (AM)78. The risks of the portfolios are measured based on arithmetic standard 
deviation (ASD)79 and Beta, β80 whereby the former is a measure for total risk while the 
latter represents systematic risk that is the sensitivity of the portfolios to the market 
benchmark of FTSE All-Share index. 
                                                 
77 Illiquid quintile provides higher returns compared to liquid quintile.  
78 ܣܯ௦ ൌ ଵ௡ ∑ ݎ௜௡௜ୀଵ    (5.2) 
79 ܣܵܦ௦ ൌ 	 ቂ ଵሺ௡ିଵሻ	∑ ሺݎ௜ െ ܣܯሻଶ௡௜ୀଵ ቃ
భ
మ (5.3) 
80 ߚ௦ ൌ ஼ை௏ሺ௥ೞ,௥೘ሻ௩௔௥ሺ௥೘ሻ     (5.4) 
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Table 5.2 reports that the “high illiquid portfolio (Q1)” does perform better in 
comparison to “high liquid portfolio (Q4)”, similar to Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
In fact, the zero-cost portfolio81 also shows value premiums and small size premiums82, 
consistent with Capaul et al. (1993) and Dissanaike (2002) respectively. Momentum 
produces the smallest premium but momentum does not show statistically significant 
results which is not akin to past research on other markets (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
Dissanaike (2002) who studies the UK market discovers that contrarian performs better 
while Galariotis et al. (2007) mention that both momentum and contrarian profits are 
available within the UK, which may explain the insignificant results.    
The highest top83 investment style return of 20.17% is achieved by “high value portfolio” 
while the lowest return of 8.69% is achieved by the bottom investment style of “high 
liquid portfolio”. Nevertheless, the highest zero-cost portfolio (premium) is attained by 
the size effect (or small-firm premium). Although Ibbotson et al. (2013) study on US find 
evidence to signify that their top style is also the “high value portfolio”, their worst 
performing style is the “high contrarian portfolio”.  
Figure 5.1 shows the growth of £100 invested in the strategy of long the portfolio of the 
top investment style over the 23 years study period. The figure demonstrates that “high 
value portfolio” provides the highest growth of £100 after 23 years while “high 
momentum portfolio” provides the lowest growth. However, all top investment styles 
achieve higher cumulative returns compared to the benchmarks of FTSE All-Share index 
and 3 months LIBOR in the long run signifying that by using any of the simple investment 
style, it allows investors to outperform the market.   
In terms of risk, the highest standard deviation and beta is reported by the “high 
contrarian portfolio”, which is not consistent with the traditional theory of “higher 
returns come with higher risk”, as it does not produce the highest returns. Nevertheless, 
the other styles show consistent results of higher returns achieved by taking higher risks, 
as “high value”, “micro”84 & “high illiquid” portfolios have higher risks compared to 
                                                 
81 Q1-Q4 (for example value – growth quartile) 
82 Q1 is greater than Q4 
83 Top investment style means the top 25% ranked based on the relevant investment style or Q1 and it is expected to be Value, Micro, 
Momentum and Illiquid portfolios. Bottom investment style means the bottom 25% ranked based on the relevant investment style or 
Q4. It is expected to be Growth, Big, Contrarian and Liquid portfolios.   
84 “Micro” is the portfolio that consists of the smallest stocks based on size and ranked using market value. Past research such as 
Dissanaike (2002) simply calls it “small portfolio”.  Therefore, our quartiles are labelled as Micro (Q1), Small (Q2), Medium (Q3) 
and Big (Q4). 
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their opposite styles namely “high growth”, “big” & “high liquid” portfolios 
respectively.  
This is contrary to Ibbotson et al. (2013), who find evidence that only size has a clear risk 
dimension by achieving higher returns with higher risks.  
 
Table 5.2: Cross-Sectional annualized returns and risks of the investment styles: January 1992 to 
December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, annualised returns (in percentage format) for quartile portfolios based on the 
investment styles briefly describe below. The return sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014. Quartile 
portfolio ranks are determined by the value of the investment style measure in the year (t-1) prior to the year (t) in 
which returns are calculated and are rebalanced annually. Therefore, the style measure for the year 1991 is used to 
construct the quartiles and then calculate the returns for the year 1992, where the stocks will be held for at least one 
year. The “Q1 – Q4” portfolio is a portfolio that takes a long position in the quartile of stocks (Q1) and a short position 
in the quartile of stocks (Q4). For example, in relation to illiquid vs liquid investment style, “Q1 – Q4” takes a long 
position in the quartile of illiquid stocks (Q1) and a short position in the quartile of liquid stocks (Q4). The table have 
2 benchmarks namely 3 months LIBOR and FTSE All-Share. It also shows the unsystematic and systematic risks of the 
portfolios measured based on standard deviation and beta respectively. Beta is calculated based on FTSE All-Share 
index. Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets for the arithmetic mean of the “Q1 – Q4” portfolio, whereby bold 
figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West 
p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 
1. Value effect (value versus growth investment style) uses the end of year price-to-book value (P/B) ratio.   
 
2. Size effect (micro versus big investment style) uses the end of year market value (MV).  
 
3. Momentum effect (momentum vs contrarian investment style) used the annualised monthly returns. It is also 
commonly known as winners versus losers’ investment style. 
 
4. Illiquidity effect (illiquid versus liquid investment style) uses the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud). Amihud 
is calculated for each stock, s, daily as follows: 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀௦௧ ൌ ଵ௧ ∑
ଵ,଴଴଴,଴଴଴ൈ|௥௘௧௨௥௡೟|
௣௥௜௖௘೟ൈ௩௢௟௨௠௘೟௧           (5.1) Where t was a trading day within the year the measure is calculated.   
Cross Section Result Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q4 
Value effect Arithmetic mean  20.17% 6.77% 12.99% 11.74% 8.42% 
Value vs growth      (0.0044) 
 Standard deviation 28.06% 21.49% 20.75% 21.48% 15.18% 
(Q1 = Value, Q4 = Growth) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.39 1.16 1.13 1.25 0.15 
 Average no. of stocks 110 109 109 109   
Size effect Arithmetic mean  19.64% 12.48% 10.46% 8.96% 10.68% 
Micro vs big      (0.0000) 
 Standard deviation 27.75% 23.92% 20.91% 18.06% 15.79% 
(Q1 = Micro, Q4 = Big) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.34 1.33 1.17 1.09 0.25 
 Average no. of stocks 112 112 112 112   
Momentum effect Arithmetic mean  14.52% 13.17% 11.26% 12.67% 1.86% 
Momentum vs contrarian      (0.3791) 
(Q1 = Momentum, Q4 = Contrarian) 
Standard deviation 20.38% 18.79% 20.53% 32.34% 19.72% 
Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.13 1.05 1.13 1.62 -0.49 
Average no. of stocks 112 112 111 111   
Illiquidity effect Arithmetic mean  18.17% 13.11% 10.84% 8.69% 9.48% 
Illiquid vs liquid      (0.0000) 
 Standard deviation 25.96% 24.11% 22.40% 18.18% 13.92% 
(Q1 = Illiquid, Q4 = Liquid) Beta (FTSE All-Share) 1.32 1.32 1.25 1.08 0.24 
 Average no. of stocks 104 103 103 103   
FTSE All-Share index Arithmetic mean  6.11% 
 Standard deviation 15.72% 
3 Months LIBOR Arithmetic mean  4.21% 
 Standard deviation 2.41% 
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of the growth of £100 across the top investment style portfolios: January 
1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in the strategy of long the quartile portfolio of the top 
investment styles over the 23 years study period. The investment styles include value, micro, momentum 
and illiquid style. The dollar growth for investing in the benchmark of FTSE All-Share index and 3 months 
LIBOR are also included in figure 5.1. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 
 
5.4.2.1. SIMPLE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT OF THE INVESTMENT 
STYLE PORTFOLIOS 
To investigate further, we have also conducted simple performance measurements (risk 
adjusted returns) namely 1) Sharpe ratio (SR) 85 , 2) Treynor ratio (TR) 86  and 3) 
Information ratio (IR)87. A comparison of each portfolio’s ratios is then conducted where 
the portfolio with the highest ratio indicates superior returns.  
Consistent to the previous table, table 5.3 shows that “high value portfolio” produces the 
highest Sharpe ratio, but the highest Treynor ratio is indicated by micro portfolio (size) 
whilst “high momentum portfolio” produces the highest information ratio. The weakest 
performance is shown by the “high liquid portfolio” based on Sharpe ratio and Treynor 
ratio whereas under information ratio, “high contrarian portfolio” produces the weakest 
performance. 
                                                 
85 ܴܵ௣ ൌ 	 ൫ோ೛ି	ோ೑൯ఙ೛  (5.5) 
86 ܴܶ௣ ൌ 	 ൫ோ೛ିோ೑	൯ఉ೛  (5.6) 
87 ܫܴ௣ ൌ 	 ൫ோ೛ିோ೘൯ఙ൫ோ೛ିோ೘൯ (5.7) 
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Table 5.3: Simple performance measurements (risk-adjusted returns) of the investment styles: 
January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the simple performance measurements of the quartile portfolios based on the investment 
styles briefly describe in table 5.2. The measurement allows for further analysis of the portfolios 
performance by scaling the returns. Three performance measurements are used namely Sharpe ratio (SR), 
Treynor’s ratio (TR) and information ratios (IR). Description of the performance measurements is found 
below. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
 
1. Sharpe ratio (SR)   
ܴܵ ൌ 	 ൫ோ೛ି	ோ೑൯ఙ೛    (5.5)	
 
2. Treynor’s ratio (TR) 
ܴܶ ൌ	 ൫ோ೛ିோ೑	൯ఉ೛    (5.6) 
 
3. Information ratio (IR) 
ܫܴ ൌ 	 ൫ோ೛ିோ೘൯ఙ൫ோ೛ିோ೘൯   (5.7) 
 
Cross Section Result Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Value effect Sharpe Ratio  56.86% 11.90% 42.35% 35.07% 
Value vs growth Treynor Ratio  11.46% 2.20% 7.78% 6.05% 
(Q1 = Value, Q4 = Growth) Information Ratio  75.47% 5.63% 62.91% 58.43% 
Average number of stocks 110 109 109 109 
Size effect Sharpe Ratio  55.61% 34.60% 29.92% 26.31% 
Micro vs big Treynor Ratio  11.52% 6.23% 5.33% 4.37% 
(Q1 = Micro, Q4 = Big) Information Ratio  71.78% 49.91% 42.67% 47.50% 
Average number of stocks 112 112 112 112 
Momentum effect Sharpe Ratio  50.60% 47.72% 34.33% 26.15% 
Momentum vs contrarian Treynor Ratio  9.13% 8.51% 6.25% 5.21% 
(Q1 = Momentum, Q4 = Contrarian) Information Ratio  82.34% 79.08% 48.82% 29.56% 
Average number of stocks 112 112 111 111 
Illiquidity effect Sharpe Ratio  53.77% 36.92% 29.62% 24.67% 
Illiquid vs liquid Treynor Ratio  10.58% 6.75% 5.29% 4.14% 
(Q1 = Illiquid, Q4 = Liquid) Information Ratio 73.46% 52.65% 41.62% 39.64% 
Average number of stocks 104 103 103 103 
 
Overall, portfolios that are constructed based on illiquidity can generate positive and 
significant returns as shown in table 5.2. Moreover, with the exception of “micro 
portfolio”, the “high illiquid portfolio” performs better in comparison to the other styles 
and the benchmarks. Although table 5.3 does not show superior performance for the 
“high illiquid portfolio” based on the 3 risk-adjusted returns, it still shows favourable 
positive performances. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that illiquidity has met the 
second benchmark criterion of “not easily beaten” and since the portfolios are 
constructed based on the prior year (t-1) measure, this automatically also satisfies the first 
criterion of “identifiable before the fact”. 
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5.4.3. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUID PORTFOLIOS WITH OTHER INVESTMENT 
STYLES 
Although our results in the previous section seem to indicate that illiquidity is “not easily 
beaten”, some researchers highlight that the positive performance of illiquidity is actually 
due to other investment styles. Asness et al. (2013) find significant evidence that funding 
liquidity risk is inversely related to value but positively related to momentum globally, 
whereas Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) highlight that the illiquidity premium is a 
result of size effect. Therefore, in order to investigate whether illiquidity actually deserves 
to be categorized as an investment style and distinguish it from the other investment 
styles, we will implement the technique use by Ibbotson et al. (2013) that is to construct 
double sorted quartile portfolios.  
This technique will allow us to test whether illiquidity is able to enhance the other styles 
and thus whether it meets the third benchmark criterion of “a viable alternative”. In fact, 
Ibbotson et al. (2013) discover that illiquidity mixes well with all three top investment 
styles of value, micro and momentum by adding an incremental return to it. 
 
5.4.3.1. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUID AND VALUE/GROWTH INVESTMENT 
STYLES (PORTFOLIOS) 
The double sorted portfolios are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into 
quartiles based on Amihud and year-end P/B ratio, to produce 16 intersection groups as 
can be seen in table 5.4. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to 
construct and calculate the portfolio returns and risks for a given year (t). Similar to before, 
the stocks are rebalanced annually.  
Unfortunately, due to the limited number of stocks available for the UK market, the 
number of stocks significantly reduce after segregation into 16 intersection portfolios. 
Therefore, we have to ensure that each portfolio is diversified. Past studies have different 
opinions on the number of stocks required to properly diversify a portfolio such as Evans 
and Archer (1968) who highlight that 10 to 15 stocks are required. 
Nevertheless, Reilly and Brown (2012, p. 201) highlight that based on past studies such 
as Evans and Archer (1968) and Tole (1982), “…major benefits of diversification were 
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achieved rather quickly, with about 90 percent of the maximum benefit of diversification 
derived from portfolios of 12 to 18 stocks…”. 
Therefore, as before, we consider portfolios that have at least 12 stocks as “acceptable 
portfolios” because achieving 90 percent of the maximum benefit of diversification is 
more than satisfactory for us.  
Table 5.4 shows only one portfolio that has less than 12 stocks. It also shows that across 
value portfolios (rows), illiquid stocks consistently generate higher returns relative to 
more liquid stocks while across illiquidity (columns), value portfolios sometimes perform 
better compared to growth portfolios but it is less consistent.  
 
Table 5.4: Annualized returns and risks of value/growth and illiquidity intersection portfolios: 
January 1992 to December 2014 
The table shows the results of intersection quartiles between value/growth and illiquidity investment styles. 
The quartiles are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles based on the two 
investment styles and then by taking the intersection sets of quartiles to produce 16 intersection groups as 
below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct the quartiles, which are then 
used to calculate the quartile returns and risk for a given year (t) and the quartiles are rebalanced annually. 
Therefore, the sorting sample period is from January 1991 to December 2013 whilst performance sample 
period is from January 1992 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. Due to the 
limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet 
our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable portfolios with 12 or more 
average stocks are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Value         
Arithmetic mean  21.71% 20.04% 16.43% 14.28% 
Standard deviation 29.90% 26.87% 30.04% 24.66% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.38 1.28 1.50 1.20 
Average no. of stocks 40 28 22 11 
Mid Value      
Arithmetic mean  7.96% 7.62% 5.33% 7.13% 
Standard deviation 22.77% 21.63% 22.95% 25.01% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.17 1.13 1.26 1.36 
Average no. of stocks 25 30 26 15 
Mid Growth      
Arithmetic mean  19.63% 13.04% 11.00% 8.77% 
Standard deviation 24.87% 23.26% 22.89% 17.36% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.24 1.22 1.07 1.02 
Average no. of stocks 22 23 23 33 
High Growth         
Arithmetic mean  18.19% 12.51% 11.17% 8.57% 
Standard deviation 26.39% 30.47% 24.77% 16.50% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.31 1.65 1.31 1.00 
Average no. of stocks 14 19 28 42 
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Furthermore, the highest return is generated by the intersection of “high value & high 
illiquid portfolio” and figure 5.2 also shows that the enhanced portfolio of “high value & 
high illiquid portfolio” generates the highest cumulative returns against the “high value 
only portfolio” signifying that illiquidity does enhanced the value investment style, which 
is similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) results.  
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison of the growth of £100 across the value/growth and illiquidity intersection 
portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in selected value/growth and illiquidity intersection 
portfolios over the 23 years study period. The intersection portfolios used are High Value & High Illiquid 
and High Growth & High Liquid. For comparison purpose, the dollar growth for investing in the High 
Value only quartile, High Growth only quartile and benchmark of FTSE All-share index and 3 months 
LIBOR are also included in figure 5.2. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
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Table 5.5 shows that the enhance portfolio only results in the highest risk-adjusted returns 
based on Treynor ratio but illiquidity still plays a role as the best risk-adjusted 
performance is shown by “mid growth & high illiquid portfolio”. 
 
Table 5.5: Simple performance measurements (risk-adjusted returns) of the value/growth and 
illiquidity intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the simple performance measurements of the value/growth and illiquidity intersection 
quartiles describe in table 5.4. The measurement allows for further analysis of the portfolios performance 
by scaling the returns. Three performance measurement are used namely Sharpe ratio (SR), Treynor’s ratio 
(TR) and information ratios (IR). Description of the simple performance measurements are found in table 
5.3. Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider 
portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable 
portfolios with 12 or more average stocks are in bold. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 
2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Value     
Sharpe Ratio 58.53% 58.91% 40.68% 40.86% 
Treynor Ratio 12.67% 12.38% 8.17% 8.43% 
Information Ratio 72.86% 75.82% 50.91% 50.24% 
Average number of stocks 40 28 22 11 
Mid Value     
Sharpe Ratio 16.47% 15.79% 4.88% 11.69% 
Treynor Ratio 3.22% 3.02% 0.89% 2.15% 
Information Ratio 13.41% 12.09% -6.34% 7.17% 
Average number of stocks 25 30 26 15 
Mid Growth     
Sharpe Ratio 62.02% 37.95% 29.65% 26.29% 
Treynor Ratio 12.39% 7.24% 6.33% 4.47% 
Information Ratio 85.41% 50.77% 31.46% 40.17% 
Average number of stocks 22 23 23 33 
High Growth     
Sharpe Ratio 52.96% 27.26% 28.11% 26.43% 
Treynor Ratio 10.65% 5.02% 5.31% 4.37% 
Information Ratio 70.25% 33.84% 34.63% 48.31% 
Average number of stocks 14 19 28 42 
 
 
5.4.3.2. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUID AND SIZE INVESTMENT STYLES 
(PORTFOLIOS) 
Unfortunately, unlike Ibbotson et al. (2013), table 5.6 seems to show that within UK 
investing in illiquid stocks is almost similar to investing into small firms because the 
intersection of the portfolios result in a limited number of stocks for some portfolios. This 
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is particularly noticeable for the “Micro & High Liquid portfolio”, where the average 
number of stocks is only one over the sample period. This is not surprising since it is 
expected that micro stocks are less liquid compared to other size related portfolios. 
Among the “acceptable portfolios”, table 5.6 shows conflicting results as both illiquidity 
and size do not show clear enhancing ability. However, figure 5.3 shows that the 
enhanced portfolio of “micro & high illiquidity portfolio” moves alongside “micro only 
portfolio” indicating that illiquidity does not provide additional benefits when combine 
with portfolios based on size.  
 
Table 5.6: Annualized returns and risks of size and illiquidity intersection portfolios: January 1992 
to December 2014 
This table shows the results of intersection quartiles between size and illiquidity investment styles. The 
quartiles are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles based on the two investment 
styles and then by taking the intersection sets of quartiles to produce 16 intersection groups as below. As 
before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct the quartiles, which are then used to 
calculate the quartile returns and risk for a given year (t) and the quartiles are rebalanced annually. 
Therefore, the sorting sample period is from January 1991 to December 2013 whilst performance sample 
period is from January 1992 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. Due to the 
limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet 
our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, portfolios with 12 or more average 
stocks are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
Micro     
Arithmetic mean  19.60% 20.24% 29.58% -11.78% 
Standard deviation 28.78% 34.60% 57.35% 31.05% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.35 1.61 2.56 1.04 
Average no. of stocks 70 23 2 1 
Small      
Arithmetic mean  14.63% 11.26% 16.03% 12.41% 
Standard deviation 23.87% 24.31% 35.10% 21.12% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.27 1.33 1.82 0.90 
Average no. of stocks 28 56 16 1 
Medium      
Arithmetic mean  18.53% 11.43% 9.35% 2.11% 
Standard deviation 25.00% 21.21% 21.09% 31.28% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.13 1.16 1.17 1.20 
Average no. of stocks 5 23 71 10 
Big      
Arithmetic mean  25.24% 13.27% 11.01% 8.58% 
Standard deviation 53.33% 33.87% 20.73% 17.63% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 2.24 1.88 1.19 1.06 
Average no. of stocks 1 1 15 95 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the growth of £100 across the size and illiquidity intersection portfolios: 
January 1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in selected illiquidity and size intersection portfolios over 
the 23 years study period. The intersection portfolios used are Micro High Illiquid and Big High Liquid. 
For comparison purpose, the dollar growth for investing in the micro only quartile, big only quartile and 
benchmark of FTSE All-share index and 3 months LIBOR are also included in figure 5.3. All data are 
obtained from DataStream.    
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Furthermore, after taking account of risk, table 5.7 does show that “micro & high illiquid 
portfolio” generates the highest risk-adjusted returns among the portfolios but the risk-
adjusted returns of “micro only portfolio” (table 5.3) performs better. Therefore, 
signifying that size does seem to capture illiquidity, as suggested by Eleswarapu and 
Reinganum (1993). 
 
Table 5.7: Simple performance measurements (risk-adjusted returns) of the size and illiquidity 
intersection quartiles: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the simple performance measurements of the size and illiquidity intersection quartiles 
describe in table 5.6. The measurement allows for further analysis of the portfolios performance by scaling 
the returns. Three performance measurements are used namely Sharpe ratio (SR), Treynor’s ratio (TR) and 
information ratios (IR). Description of the simple performance measurements is found in table 5.3. Due to 
the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that 
meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable portfolios with 12 or 
more average stocks are in bold. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014. All data are 
obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
Micro     
Sharpe Ratio 53.49% 46.34% 44.24% -51.48% 
Treynor Ratio 11.42% 9.95% 9.92% -15.34% 
Information Ratio 66.65% 55.51% 48.72% -257.39% 
Average number of stocks 70 23 2 1 
Small     
Sharpe Ratio 43.66% 28.99% 33.69% 38.85% 
Treynor Ratio 8.23% 5.29% 6.51% 9.13% 
Information Ratio 61.54% 38.35% 41.94% 51.87% 
Average number of stocks 28 56 16 1 
Medium     
Sharpe Ratio 57.27% 34.07% 24.37% -6.72% 
Treynor Ratio 12.71% 6.26% 4.41% -1.75% 
Information Ratio 69.91% 47.40% 30.01% -16.10% 
Average number of stocks 5 23 71 10 
Big     
Sharpe Ratio 39.44% 26.75% 32.84% 24.81% 
Treynor Ratio 9.40% 4.82% 5.73% 4.13% 
Information Ratio 44.96% 26.95% 51.64% 42.23% 
Average number of stocks 1 1 15 95 
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5.4.3.3. INTERSECTION OF ILLIQUID AND MOMENTUM/CONTRARIAN 
INVESTMENT STYLES (PORTFOLIOS) 
Table 5.8 which combines illiquidity and momentum/contrarian investment style is more 
evenly segregated signifying that the two styles are quite independent of each other. 
Across momentum quartiles (rows), illiquid portfolios generally produce higher returns 
compared to more liquid portfolios and the highest return is generated by the enhanced 
portfolio of “high momentum & high illiquid portfolio”. Nonetheless, across illiquidity 
portfolios (columns), highly momentum portfolios sometime generate better returns 
compared to contrarian styles but it is less consistent.  
 
Table 5.8: Annualized returns and risks of momentum/contrarian and illiquidity intersection 
portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the results of intersection quartiles between momentum/contrarian and illiquidity 
investment styles. The quartiles are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios into quartiles based 
on the two investment styles and then by taking the intersection sets of quartiles to produce 16 intersection 
groups as below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection measure is used to construct the quartiles, which 
are then used to calculate the quartile returns and risk for a given year (t) and the quartiles are rebalanced 
annually. Therefore, the sorting sample period is from January 1991 to December 2013 whilst performance 
sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. Due to 
the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that 
meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, portfolios with 12 or more average 
stocks are in bold. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Momentum         
Arithmetic mean  22.29% 14.86% 11.76% 12.48% 
Standard deviation 27.74% 30.46% 20.00% 17.78% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.23 1.49 1.14 1.03 
Average no. of stocks 25 25 28 25 
Mid Momentum      
Arithmetic mean  15.79% 15.39% 12.13% 10.43% 
Standard deviation 25.41% 19.90% 19.75% 16.74% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.21 1.03 1.06 0.97 
Average no. of stocks 25 27 25 25 
Mid Contrarian      
Arithmetic mean  16.51% 10.37% 10.43% 6.40% 
Standard deviation 23.79% 21.45% 19.98% 18.82% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.18 1.17 1.11 1.05 
Average no. of stocks 26 26 26 24 
High Contrarian         
Arithmetic mean  18.32% 11.33% 9.32% 7.84% 
Standard deviation 32.17% 31.55% 35.46% 29.87% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.58 1.56 1.72 1.50 
Average no. of stocks 27 24 24 28 
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Figure 5.4 shows that illiquidity does enhance the returns significantly compared to the 
other portfolios including “momentum only portfolio”. In fact, the return of the enhanced 
portfolio of “high momentum & high illiquid portfolio” is the highest compared to 
previously discuss double quartile portfolios in table 5.4 and table 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.4: Comparison of the growth of £100 across the momentum/contrarian and illiquidity 
intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in selected momentum/contrarian and illiquidity intersection 
portfolios over the 23 years’ study period. The intersection portfolios used are High Momentum High 
Illiquid and High Contrarian High Liquid. For comparison purpose, the dollar growth for investing in the 
High Momentum only quartile, High Contrarian only quartile and benchmark of FTSE All-share index and 
3 months LIBOR are also included in figure 5.4. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
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Table 5.9 confirms the strength of the enhanced portfolio as the “high momentum & high 
illiquid portfolio” outperform the other portfolios based on all three risk-adjusted returns.    
 
Table 5.9: Simple performance measurements (risk-adjusted returns) of the momentum/contrarian 
and illiquidity intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the simple performance measurements of the momentum/contrarian and illiquidity 
intersection quartiles describe in table 5.8. The measurement allows for further analysis of the portfolios 
performance by scaling the returns. Three performance measurements are used namely Sharpe ratio (SR), 
Treynor’s ratio (TR) and information ratios (IR). Description of the simple performance measurements is 
found in table 5.3. Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we 
only consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, 
acceptable portfolios with 12 or more average stocks are in bold. The sample period is from January 1992 
to December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Momentum     
Sharpe Ratio 65.20% 34.97% 37.77% 46.53% 
Treynor Ratio 14.67% 7.14% 6.64% 8.07% 
Information Ratio 80.19% 41.82% 61.27% 84.82% 
Average number of stocks 25 25 28 25 
Mid Momentum     
Sharpe Ratio 45.58% 56.19% 40.12% 37.17% 
Treynor Ratio 9.56% 10.83% 7.45% 6.45% 
Information Ratio 56.41% 80.48% 57.00% 60.74% 
Average number of stocks 25 27 25 25 
Mid Contrarian     
Sharpe Ratio 51.72% 28.75% 31.13% 11.63% 
Treynor Ratio 10.43% 5.26% 5.63% 2.08% 
Information Ratio 68.57% 37.77% 43.14% 3.15% 
Average number of stocks 26 26 26 24 
High Contrarian     
Sharpe Ratio 43.87% 22.56% 14.41% 12.16% 
Treynor Ratio 8.91% 4.56% 2.98% 2.42% 
Information Ratio 54.62% 24.01% 12.51% 8.65% 
Average number of stocks 27 24 24 28 
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5.4.4. ILLIQUIDITY AS A FACTOR IN COMPARISON TO OTHER INVESTMENT 
FACTORS 
With the exception of size, so far our results appear to meet the third benchmark criterion 
of “a viable alternative” as it manages to enhance both value and momentum investment 
styles. Nonetheless, similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), we decide to conduct further 
investigation on the ability of illiquidity as an investment style by looking at the risk 
factors (zero cost or dollar neutral) of the styles as well as how illiquidity reacts when 
financial models are utilised. Nevertheless, instead of using annual data, we will be using 
monthly data for the correlation and regression analysis in order to ensure more effective 
results. 
The risk factors (or investment style premiums) are basically the difference of the 
monthly returns of the top quartile (Q1) and the bottom quartile (Q4).  
 
5.4.4.1. CORRELATION OF THE INVESTMENT STYLES (FACTORS) WITH EACH 
OTHER AND THE MARKET 
The Pearson correlation analysis is conducted to see the relationship of the respective 
factors with each other and the market. Table 5.10 shows that the illiquidity factor is 
significantly negatively correlated with the market whilst positively correlated with size 
factor and value factor.  
Other factors are also negatively correlated to the market with the exception of value 
factor. Momentum factor is also negatively correlated with both value and size factor 
whilst value factor is positively correlated with size factor.  
Nevertheless, the strongest positive correlation is observed between the illiquidity factor 
and size factor, which is unlike Ibbotson et al. (2013) who find evidence of negative 
correlations between the two factors. The positive correlation between the two factors is 
not surprising as our earlier results especially in table 5.6, appear to show the close 
relationship between illiquidity and size. Therefore, providing further evidence to 
indicate that size captures illiquidity within the UK. 
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Table 5.10: Correlation and descriptive statistics of the monthly returns of the respective factors with 
each other and the market: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows the correlation of the monthly returns of respective factors with each other as well as the 
market. The table also shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. The p-value of the correlations are 
reported in brackets under each respective correlation coefficient, whereby bold figures denote statistically 
significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The sample uses stocks with complete relevant data that are 
listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 1992 and December 2014 (276 months). All data are 
obtained from DataStream.    
   Correlation   
  Illiquidity Factor Market Value Factor Size Factor 
Momentum 
Factor 
Illiquidity 
Factor1 1.0000 -0.1187 0.3015 0.8839 0.0376 
  ----- (0.0488) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5336) 
       
Market2 -0.1187 1.0000 0.1555 -0.1325 -0.1669 
  (0.0488) ----- (0.0097) (0.0278) (0.0054) 
       
Value Factor3 0.3015 0.1555 1.0000 0.4947 -0.6120 
  (0.0000) (0.0097) ----- (0.0000) (0.0000) 
       
Size Factor4 0.8839 -0.1325 0.4947 1.0000 -0.1944 
  (0.0000) (0.0278) (0.0000) ----- (0.0012) 
       
Momentum 
Factor5  0.0376 -0.1669 -0.6120 -0.1944 1.0000 
  (0.5336) (0.0054) (0.0000) (0.0012) ----- 
 
Notes: 
1 Illiquidity factor = illiquidity effect (Illiquid vs Liquid investment style) 
2 Market = FTSE All-Share Index 
3 Value factor = Value effect (Value vs Growth investment style) 
4 Size factor = Size effect (Micro vs Big investment style) 
5 Momentum factor = Momentum effect (Momentum vs Contrarian style) 
 
 
 
5.4.4.2. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VARIOUS ILLIQUID PORTFOLIOS 
Nowadays, it is common for asset pricing models to be used in order to investigate and 
explain the performance of portfolios. Therefore similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) we will 
use 3 asset pricing models (univariate CAPM, Fama-French 3 Factor model and Carhart 
4 Factor model) to further explain the average returns of various relevant illiquidity 
portfolios that is discussed earlier.  
Although CAPM is considered modest in comparison to the other two models, it is still 
widely used probably due to its simplicity and attractiveness. Therefore, for our research, 
we utilise all 3 models to explain the portfolio returns of the illiquidity portfolios.  
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Table 5.11 shows the regression results using the 3 asset pricing models for two portfolios 
namely the zero-dollar “illiquidity factor portfolio” (Panel A) and long only “high illiquid 
portfolio” (Panel B). The table reports that based on CAPM, the “illiquidity factor 
portfolio” is negatively related to the market whilst the “high illiquid portfolio” is 
positively related. Similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) both portfolios report positive and 
statistically significant monthly alpha.  
The Fama-French 3 factor model shows that after including the value factor and size 
factor, the monthly alpha disappears for “illiquidity factor portfolio”. However, the long 
only “high illiquid portfolio” monthly alpha remains even after the introduction of the 2 
additional factors but it does reduce. 
Obviously, after adding the momentum factor, the monthly alpha remains insignificant 
for the “illiquidity factor portfolio”, whereby the “illiquidity factor portfolio” is found 
to be positively related to momentum factor. Surprisingly, although slightly reduce, the 
monthly alpha of the long only “high illiquid portfolio” remains even after the 
introduction of the momentum factor signifying that investing into illiquid portfolios can 
generate positive returns and thus poses a challenge to the EMH, as it should have resulted 
in no significant monthly alpha.  
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Table 5.11: Regression analyses of monthly returns of the zero-cost illiquidity factor and High Illiquid portfolio: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows results from the following three regression models on zero-cost (or dollar neutral) Illiquidity factor (Panel A) and long High Illiquid portfolio (Panel B). Illiquidity 
factor (or illiquidity effect) takes a long position in the quartile of high illiquid stocks and a short position in the quartile of high liquid stocks. The p-value of the t-statistics are reported 
in brackets under each respective coefficient, whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The sample uses stocks with complete relevant 
data that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 1992 and December 2014 (276 months). All data are obtained from DataStream. 
 
1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ௣ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ߝ௣          (5.8) 
Where Rp is the average rates of returns of the portfolio and while the Rf is the risk-free rate and βp is the systematic risk of the portfolio while Rm is the market return. Together, (Rm – 
Rf) is the excess returns of the market returns over risk-free rate and ε is the residual error or unexplained variable. The overall dependent variable, Rp, can also be the excess return on 
the specific portfolio (Rp - Rf) but that depends on whether we are measuring either long liquidity portfolio or the illiquidity factor (zero-cost portfolio) because it is unnecessary to 
deduct the risk-free rate from the zero-cost portfolio. 
 
2. Fama-French three factor model 
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ௣ܸ൫ܴ௩ െ ܴ௚൯ ൅ ܵ௣ሺܴ௦ െ ܴ௕ሻ ൅ ߝ௣      (5.9)  
Where Vp is the sensitivity variable to the value versus growth investment style while Sp is the coefficient for size effect. Rv is returns for value portfolio and Rg is returns for growth 
portfolio whilst Rs is the returns for micro-firm (because micro-firm is smaller compared to small-firm) and Rb is returns for big-firm. The other variables are as explained earlier under 
CAPM (5.8).   
 
3. Carhart four factor model  
ܴ௣ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠ െ ௙ܴ൯ ൅ ௣ܸ൫ܴ௩ െ ܴ௚൯ ൅ ܵ௣ሺܴ௦ െ ܴ௕ሻ ൅ ܯ௣ሺܴ௠௢௠ െ ܴ௖ሻ ൅ ߝ௣         (5.10) 
Where Mp is the coefficient for momentum versus contrarian investment style. Rmom is the return for momentum portfolio and Rc represents contrarian portfolio returns. The other 
variables are as explained earlier under CAPM (5.8) and Fama-French three factor model (5.9).   
 
 Monthly alpha (%) Market Beta  Value Size Momentum Adjusted R2 (%) N 
Panel A        
Illiquidity Factor (Illiquidity effect)       
        
CAPM 0.80% -0.0823    0.93% 276 
 (0.0000) (0.0593)      
        
Fama-French three factor 0.05% 0.0297 -0.1969 0.9831  80.52% 276 
 (0.5456) (0.1402) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
        
Carhart four factor -0.04% 0.0362 -0.0632 0.9576 0.1373 82.78% 276 
 (0.5814) (0.0573) (0.0949) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
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 Monthly alpha (%) Market Beta  Value Size Momentum Adjusted R2 (%) N 
Panel B        
Long illiquid portfolio        
        
CAPM 1.04% 0.9818    60.49% 276 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)      
        
Fama-French three factor 0.24% 1.0806 -0.0960 0.9631  87.88% 276 
 (0.0363) (0.0000) (0.0325) (0.0000)    
        
Carhart four factor 0.23% 1.0811 -0.0847 0.9610 0.0116 87.84% 276 
 (0.0474) (0.0000) (0.1258) (0.0000) (0.7254)   
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5.4.4.3. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VARIOUS 
ENHANCED ILLIQUID PORTFOLIOS 
Table 5.12 shows the regression results for the 3 enhanced intersected illiquidity 
portfolios (net of risk free rate) using the 3 asset pricing models. The 3 enhanced 
portfolios are 1) “High Value & High Illiquid portfolio”, 2) “Micro & High Illiquid 
portfolio” and 3) “High Momentum & High Illiquid portfolio”. 
Based on CAPM, all three portfolios generate significant positive monthly alpha whereby 
the “High Momentum & High Illiquid portfolio” produces the highest alpha. Moreover, 
all portfolios are found to be positively related to the market but “High Momentum & 
High Illiquid portfolio “relationship is found to be weaker signifying that the portfolio 
has the lowest systematic risk. 
Using the Fama-French 3 factor model, the monthly alpha for “High Value & High 
Illiquid portfolio” and “Micro & High Illiquid portfolio” disappears but it remains for 
“High Momentum & High Illiquidity portfolio”. “Micro & High Illiquid portfolio” is also 
found to be not related to both momentum and value but “High Value & High Illiquid 
portfolio” is found to be positively related to all 3 additional variables.  
Panel C of table 5.12 shows that “High Momentum & High Illiquid portfolio” is positively 
related to size and momentum factor but negatively related to value factor. Nonetheless, 
the important and interesting finding is that the monthly alpha of the portfolio remains 
positive and significant even after the inclusion of all 3 additional factors confirming that 
illiquidity has improved the momentum portfolio as reported earlier.  
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Table 5.12: Regression analyses of monthly returns of the enhanced illiquidity portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table reports results from the 3 regression models (as described in table 5.11) on enhanced illiquidity portfolios. There are three considered enhanced illiquidity portfolios based 
on its intersection with other investment styles namely High Value & High Illiquid portfolio, Micro & High Illiquid portfolio and High Momentum & High Illiquid portfolio, which 
are described in table 5.4, table 5.6 and table 5.8 respectively (north-west of the respective tables). The p-value of the t-statistics are reported in brackets under each respective 
coefficient, whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The sample uses stocks with complete relevant data that are listed on FTSE All-
Share index between January 1992 and December 2014 (276 months). All data are obtained from DataStream. 
 Monthly alpha (%) Market Beta  Value Size Momentum Adjusted R2 (%) N 
Panel A        
High value, High illiquid        
        
CAPM 1.32% 1.0781    52.57% 276 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)      
        
Fama-French three factor 0.23% 1.1528 0.1979 1.0642  85.04% 276 
 (0.1226) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0000)    
        
Carhart four factor 0.15% 1.1585 0.3163 1.0416 0.1216 85.42% 276 
 (0.3264) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0047)   
 
 Monthly alpha (%) Market Beta  Value Size Momentum Adjusted R2 (%) N 
Panel B        
Microcap, High illiquid        
        
CAPM 1.15% 1.0079    53.80% 276 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)      
        
Fama-French three factor 0.17% 1.1089 -0.0061 1.0980  86.74% 276 
 (0.1850) (0.0000) (0.9052) (0.0000)    
        
Carhart four factor 0.16% 1.1098 0.0137 1.0943 0.0203 86.71% 276 
 (0.2325) (0.0000) (0.8277) (0.0000) (0.5912)   
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 Monthly alpha (%) Market Beta  Value  Size Momentum Adjusted R2 (%) N 
Panel C        
High momentum, High 
illiquid        
        
CAPM 1.38% 0.9702    41.75% 276 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)      
        
Fama-French three factor 0.68% 1.1431 -0.5539 1.2071  66.11% 276 
 (0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
        
Carhart four factor 0.41% 1.1613 -0.1731 1.1345 0.3910 70.41% 276 
 (0.0537) (0.0000) (0.0914) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
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Overall, although our results are not similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013) in relation to 
illiquidity factor, the significant positive results for the long only “high illiquid portfolio” 
in panel B of table 5.11 does confirm that illiquidity is “not easily beaten” and can even 
be considered as “a viable alternative”. Nevertheless, the ability of illiquidity to enhance 
the momentum portfolio in panel C of table 5.12 from the weakest performing top 
investment style to one of the best performing portfolio with a positive and significant 
monthly alpha does confirm illiquidity as meeting the third portfolio benchmark criterion 
of “a viable alternative”.  
 
5.4.5. LIQUIDITY STABILITY AND MIGRATION  
The fourth and last benchmark criterion of Sharpe (1992) is whether the illiquidity 
investment style can be managed at “low in cost”, for which we will be using the 
technique developed by Ibbotson et al. (2013). 
Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2009) believe that fees differ from fund to fund, as the 
characteristics of the funds can result in lower costs. It is important to study costs as 
Carhart (1997) highlights that the investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, 
and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on funds’ performance.  
Furthermore, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) highlight that although private equity 
partnerships earn returns (gross of fees) exceeding the S&P 500 over the entire sample 
period (1980–1997), average fund returns net of fees are roughly equal to those of the 
S&P 500, signifying the negative impact of fees.  
Malkiel (2005) finds evidence to indicate that professional investment managers, both in 
the US and abroad, do not outperform their index benchmarks while French (2008) 
mentions that under reasonable assumptions, the typical investor would have increased 
his average annual return by 67 basis points over the 1980–2006 period if he had switched 
to a passive market portfolio signifying that investors are better off investing into passive 
funds.  
Ibbotson et al. (2013) highlight that illiquidity has a cost as the stocks may take longer to 
trade and even have higher transaction costs but trading costs can be mitigated through 
longer horizons and less trading, which translates into higher returns for the less liquid 
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stocks. Nevertheless, less liquid portfolios may involve the risk of needing to quickly 
liquidate positions in a crisis, for which more passively held portfolios can largely 
mitigate this risk. Therefore, studying migration of the portfolio will also allow us to 
understand if any of the portfolios can be managed at a low cost or passively. 
 
5.4.5.1. MIGRATION OF STOCKS OF VARIOUS INVESTMENT STYLES 
Table 5.13 shows the migration of stocks from each quartile in year (t) (sorting year) to 
other quartiles in year (t+1) (performance year) for all investment styles. As before, the 
quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that the stocks are held for at least one 
year while diagonal results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remain in their 
respective quartiles after one year.  
Panel A of table 5.13 shows that overall 78.45% of the illiquid stocks remain in the same 
quartile. For the “high illiquid quartile” (Quartile 1), 76.99% remain in their quartile 
while the rest migrate to other quartiles, with the next quartile (Q2) receiving the most 
stocks (21.32%). However, the most stable quartile is the “high liquid quartile” (Quartile 
4) as 93.60% of stocks remain within their quartile.  
In comparison to other investment styles, size is considered the most stable as overall 
84.16% of stocks remain within their quartile while momentum results in the lowest 
stability of only 30.35%. Value quartiles are also relatively stable, whereby overall 67.62% 
remain in the same quartile.  
Generally, table 5.13 signifies that the transaction costs in maintaining illiquidity based 
portfolios are relatively low. Therefore, along with the stable returns and risks reported 
earlier, illiquidity styles can be regarded as a stable strategy. Moreover, table 5.13 shows 
that the “high liquid portfolio” (Quartile 4) is the most stable (lower transaction costs) 
although the portfolio still generates positive returns with lower risks (table 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 167 
 
Table 5.13: Migration of stocks one year after portfolio construction for all investment styles: 
January 1991 to December 2014 
The table shows the migration of stocks from each quartile in year (t) (sorting year) to other quartiles in 
year (t+1) (performance year) for all investment styles. The sample uses companies with complete relevant 
data that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 1991 and December 2014. As before, the 
quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that the stocks are held for at least one year. Diagonal 
results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remains in its respective quartiles after one year. The last 
column shows that all rows sum to 100%. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Panel A  
Illiquidity migration (Overall 78.45% remains in the same quartile)  
Year t  
(Illiquidity) 
Year t+1 (Illiquidity)  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
Quartile 1 76.99% 21.32% 1.60% 0.10% 100.00% 
Quartile 2 18.09% 65.01% 16.62% 0.29% 100.00% 
Quartile 3 0.69% 12.03% 78.20% 9.07% 100.00% 
Quartile 4 0.12% 0.40% 5.89% 93.60% 100.00% 
      
Panel B  
Value migration (Overall 67.62% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t  
(Value) 
Year t+1 (Value)  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
Quartile 1 65.21% 28.68% 3.37% 2.74% 100.00% 
Quartile 2 30.91% 56.82% 11.69% 0.57% 100.00% 
Quartile 3 3.46% 12.24% 68.72% 15.59% 100.00% 
Quartile 4 2.12% 1.20% 16.97% 79.71% 100.00% 
      
Panel C  
Size migration (Overall 84.16% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t  
(Size) 
Year t+1 (Size)  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
Quartile 1 86.41% 13.34% 0.18% 0.07% 100.00% 
Quartile 2 11.64% 75.40% 12.67% 0.29% 100.00% 
Quartile 3 0.34% 10.57% 81.35% 7.73% 100.00% 
Quartile 4 0.06% 0.23% 6.24% 93.48% 100.00% 
      
Panel D  
Momentum migration (Overall 30.35% remains in the same quartile)  
Year t 
(Momentum) 
Year t+1 (Momentum)  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
Quartile 1 32.41% 22.40% 21.02% 24.17% 100.00% 
Quartile 2 24.01% 29.34% 26.24% 20.41% 100.00% 
Quartile 3 19.81% 28.66% 29.28% 22.26% 100.00% 
Quartile 4 25.74% 21.33% 22.55% 30.37% 100.00% 
 
 
5.4.5.2. RETURNS AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MIGRATION IN 
ILLIQUIDITY PORTFOLIOS 
Table 5.14 shows equally-weighted, annualised return and risks for quartile portfolios 
based on illiquidity migration as highlighted in Panel A of Table 5.13. As before, the 
prior year (t-1) is used to construct the quartiles and are then used to calculate the stock 
performance for a given year (t). Quartiles are rebalanced annually.  
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Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are robust, we only 
consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 stocks in 
average. Diagonal results (underlined & italics) in table 5.14 represent stocks that remain 
in their respective quartiles after one year.  
Table 5.14 shows that in quartile 3 (row 3), the returns of stocks migrating from more 
liquid (Q3) quartiles to less liquid (Q2) actually increase, while illiquid stocks (Q1) 
migrating to more liquid quartile (Q2) in quartile 1 (row 1) returns actually reduce.  
However, this is not always the case, as in quartile 2 (row 2), stocks which migrated from 
Q2 to the more liquid quartile (Q3), actually shown increased returns, which is similar to 
the findings of Ibbotson et al. (2013). Similarly, risk profiling is also less consistent as 
moving from less liquid quartiles to the more liquid quartiles do not necessary decrease 
the quartiles’ riskiness.  
The findings are different to Ibbotson et al. (2013) since their results show that as less 
liquid migrate to more liquid, returns increase dramatically while migrating the other way 
results in the opposite, which is consistent to Fama and French (2007) evidence on value 
and size. Thus, Ibbotson et al. (2013) show that changes in liquidity are associated with 
changes in valuation.   
Nevertheless, an interesting finding of table 5.14 is that the average returns of the 
remaining stocks in “high illiquid quartile” (quartile 1 in Q1) and “high liquid quartile” 
(quartile 4 in Q4) have actually increased in comparison to the original portfolio as 
reported earlier in table 5.2. It is particularly noticeable for the “high liquid quartile” (Q4) 
whose returns increase from 8.69% (table 5.2) to 10.11% (table 5.14), signifying that the 
stocks which migrated have a negative impact on the initial portfolio. Therefore, if there 
is a method in which we can just keep the stable stocks, we can construct a passive 
portfolio that can generate higher returns with lower transaction costs. Even if this is not 
possible, table 5.13 highlights that 93.60% of stocks will not have moved anyway, 
indicating the savings that investors can make on transaction costs.  
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Table 5.14: Annualized returns and risks associated with migration in illiquidity portfolios: January 
1992 to December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, annualised returns (in percentage format) for quartile portfolios based 
on illiquidity migration as highlighted in Panel A of Table 5.13. As before, the prior year (t-1) is used to 
construct the quartiles and are then used to calculate the quartile returns and risks for a given year (t). The 
quartiles are also rebalanced annually. Therefore, the sorting sample period is from January 1991 to 
December 2013 whilst table 5.14 sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014 and the stocks are 
held for at least one year. The table also shows the unsystematic and systematic risks of the portfolio based 
on standard deviation and beta respectively. Beta is calculated based on FTSE All-share index. Due to the 
limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet 
our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable portfolios with 12 or more 
average stocks are in bold. Diagonal results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remains in its 
respective quartiles after one year. All data are obtained from DataStream.  
    
Year t (Illiquidity) 
Year t+1 (Illiquidity) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quartile 1     
Arithmetic mean  19.00% 12.07% 13.98% -3.96% 
Standard deviation 26.64% 29.76% 15.89% 42.82% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.30 1.52 0.54 3.01 
Average no. of stocks 74 19 2 1 
Quartile 2     
Arithmetic mean  15.99% 11.49% 13.34% -2.94% 
Standard deviation 26.43% 21.76% 26.20% 38.39% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.32 1.18 1.41 1.49 
Average no. of stocks 18 66 15 2 
Quartile 3     
Arithmetic mean 7.98% 15.72% 10.02% 11.88% 
Standard deviation 28.91% 37.12% 22.24% 20.46% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.48 1.69 1.23 1.02 
Average no. of stocks 2 12 79 9 
Quartile 4     
Arithmetic mean  -12.99% 29.28% 15.65% 10.11% 
Standard deviation 27.69% 30.79% 37.38% 22.63% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 0.93 0.23 1.69 1.22 
Average no. of stocks 1 1 6 90 
 
 
Overall the results in table 5.13 indicates that the portfolio based on illiquidity can be 
managed at “low in cost”, meeting the fourth and final benchmark criterion. This means 
that illiquidity has met all 4 of Sharpe (1992) benchmark criteria signifying that it can be 
made into a benchmark portfolio and can be categorised as a viable investment style in 
line with the other more tradition styles such as value style.  
 
5.4.6. COVARIANCE VERSUS CHARACTERISTICS 
Since we have now established that illiquidity can be regarded as a viable investment 
style, we will now look at different ways of constructing portfolios. Interestingly, most 
finance research seems to focus on using stock sensitivity such as Fama-French 3 factor 
model to explain results. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) follow a similar approach with 
 170 
 
illiquidity. Therefore, it will be fascinating to investigate whether a stock sensitivity 
measure based on “covariance” can construct portfolios that generate results that are 
comparable to portfolios constructed based on the “characteristics” of the stocks such as 
P/B ratio (value) and Amihud (illiquidity).  
 
5.4.6.1. COVARIANCE PORTFOLIO RETURNS AND RISKS 
Similar to before, construction of table 5.15, uses the prior year (t-1) illiquidity measure 
to build the quartiles and calculate the returns and risks for a given year (t). However, 
instead of using Amihud, we will be using covariance which is the sensitivity of the stocks 
to the illiquidity factor. Following Ibbotson et al. (2013), the covariance of each stock is 
obtained by regressing88 the 12-months excess returns of each stock over the market 
returns (stock returns minus market returns) on the illiquidity factor, whereby market 
return is represented by FTSE All-Share index while the illiquidity factor89, which is 
calculated earlier, is based on Amihud.  
The quartile (or portfolio) ranks in table 5.15 are determined by the value of the 
covariance or illiquidity beta (β), whereby stocks with high covariance values (β) are 
considered to be correlated to “high illiquid portfolio” whereas low covariance value (β) 
companies are related to “high liquid portfolio”. The prior year (t-1) value (β) is used to 
sort (construct) the quartiles, which are then used to calculate the quartile results for a 
given year (t). The quartiles are also rebalanced annually. 
Table 5.15 shows that constructing portfolio based on “covariance model” generates 
results consistent to “characteristic model”, as “high covariance portfolio” (Q1) 
produced higher returns compared to “low covariance portfolio” (Q4) and the covariance 
(illiquidity) premium is found to be positive and significant at least at 10% level. 
Moreover, it is established that the “high covariance portfolio” has both the highest 
systematic and unsystematic risk, justifying the portfolio’s higher returns. Nevertheless, 
the portfolio returns do not increase monotonically with increase in stock illiquidity 
(covariance).  
                                                 
88 Please bear in mind that the 12 months period may not be ideal for the regression period but to be consistent with our current 
research of using monthly data as well as our comparison to characteristics later that also uses monthly data, we decide to continue 
using the shorter than ideal regression. The method is used by Ibbotson et al (2013).   
89 Illiquidity factor = illiquid portfolio minus liquid portfolio 
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Table 5.15: Annualized returns and risks of the covariance portfolio: January 1992 to December 
2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, annualised returns (in percentage format) for quartile portfolios based 
on the covariance of the stocks. The covariance of each stock is obtained by regressing the 12-months 
excess returns of each stock over the market returns (Stock returns minus market returns) on the illiquidity 
factor. As before, market return is represented by FTSE All-Share index while the illiquidity factor is 
calculated using Amihud. Quartile portfolio ranks are determined by the value of the covariance or 
illiquidity beta (β), whereby stocks with high values (β) are considered to be correlated to high illiquid 
portfolio whereas low value (β) companies are related to high liquid portfolio. The prior year (t-1) value 
(β) is used to sort (construct) the quartiles, which are then used to calculate the quartile returns and risk for 
a given year (t) and the quartiles are also rebalanced annually. Therefore, the sorting sample period is from 
January 1991 to December 2013 whilst table 5.15 (performance) sample period is from January 1992 to 
December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. The “Q1 – Q4” takes a long position in the 
quartile of high covariance (β) stocks (Q1) and a short position in the quartile of low covariance (β) 
companies. The table also shows the unsystematic and systematic risks of the portfolio based on standard 
deviation and beta respectively. Beta is calculated based on FTSE All-share index. Newey-West p-value 
are reported in brackets for the arithmetic mean of the “Q1 – Q4” portfolio, whereby bold figures denote 
statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-
value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section Result Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 - Q4 
*High covariance vs Low 
covariance  
 
(Q1 = High Covariance, Q4 
= Low Covariance) 
Arithmetic mean  16.32% 11.62% 11.24% 12.38% 3.94% 
     (0.0865) 
Standard deviation 28.09% 20.86% 19.58% 21.92% 11.93% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.45 1.14 1.14 1.22 0.23 
Average no. of stocks 112 112 112 112  
 
Note: 
*High covariance for a stock means the stock correlates more with High illiquid portfolio, whilst low 
covariance means the stock correlates more with High liquidity portfolio.  
 
 
 
5.4.6.2. INTERSECTION OF COVARIANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS  
To investigate the effectiveness of either “covariance model” or “characteristics model” 
as an illiquidity measure to construct portfolios, we will be using independent double 
sorting as before, whereby 16 portfolios of the intersection between characteristics 
(Amihud) and covariance90 (illiquidity beta) will be generated.   
Table 5.16 reports that across rows the portfolio returns of “characteristic model”, 
increases with illiquidity consistently. Some of the returns across columns (“covariance 
model”) also increases with illiquidity but it is less consistent and weaker. In fact, under 
“mid-illiquidity portfolio” column, the “low covariance portfolio” is seen to generate 
higher returns relative to “high covariance portfolio”.  
                                                 
90 High covariance for a stock means the stock correlates more with High illiquidity, whilst low covariance means the stock correlates 
more with High liquidity. 
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Nevertheless as Ibbotson et al. (2013) and Daniel and Titman (1998) mention that the off-
diagonal portfolios demonstrate the relative importance of “covariance model” versus 
“characteristics model”. The off-diagonal (underlined & italics in table 5.16) reveals that 
“Low Covariance & High Illiquid portfolio” performs better than the “High Covariance 
& High Liquid portfolio” which is most likely due to the characteristics of the stocks. 
Figure 5.6 confirms this by comparing the two off-diagonal cumulative returns, whereby 
the growth of the “Low Covariance & High Illiquid portfolio” is higher compared to 
“High Covariance & High Liquidity portfolio”.  
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Table 5.16: Annualized returns and risks of covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) and illiquidity 
(characteristics - Amihud) intersection portfolios: January 1991 to December 2014 
This table shows the results of intersection quartiles between covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) and illiquidity 
(characteristics) investment styles. The quartiles are constructed by independently sorting the portfolios 
into quartiles based on the illiquidity as well as covariance of the stocks and then by taking the intersection 
sets of quartiles to produce 16 intersection groups as below. As before, the prior year (t-1) intersection 
measure is used to construct the quartiles, which are then used to calculate the quartile returns and risk for 
a given year (t) and the quartiles are also rebalanced annually. Therefore, the sorting sample period is from 
January 1991 to December 2013 whilst the sample period of the returns & risks, as in table 5.16 below, are 
from January 1992 to December 2014 and the stocks are held for at least one year. The table also shows 
the unsystematic and systematic risks of the portfolio based on standard deviation and beta respectively. 
Beta is calculated based on FTSE All-share index. Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that 
the results are significant, we only consider portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 
12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable portfolios with 12 or more average stocks are in bold. All data are 
obtained from DataStream 
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Covariance (Beta)         
Arithmetic mean  19.84% 14.63% 14.12% 12.99% 
Standard deviation 28.27% 29.72% 30.61% 28.24% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.36 1.58 1.51 1.35 
Average no. of stocks 41 29 19 12 
Mid-High Covariance (Beta)      
Arithmetic mean  15.28% 11.65% 10.59% 6.85% 
Standard deviation 24.11% 22.37% 22.07% 16.97% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.18 1.19 1.24 0.99 
Average no. of stocks 27 29 25 21 
Mid-Low Covariance (Beta)      
Arithmetic mean  18.92% 11.99% 9.27% 7.84% 
Standard deviation 33.08% 19.75% 19.69% 17.16% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.60 1.06 1.14 0.98 
Average no. of stocks 20 25 29 28 
Low Covariance (Beta)         
Arithmetic mean  18.36% 15.26% 11.28% 8.92% 
Standard deviation 24.21% 27.08% 25.10% 18.68% 
Beta (FTSE All Share) 1.13 1.42 1.30 1.06 
Average no. of stocks 15 19 29 42 
 
Note: 
*High covariance for a stock means the stock correlates more with High illiquidity, whilst low covariance 
means the stock correlates more with High liquidity.  
**The off-diagonal (underlined & italics) shows the relative importance of covariance vs characteristic, as 
it reveals High Illiquid Low Covariance minus High Liquidity High Covariance produce positive returns 
regardless of the intervention of covariance, whereas High Covariance High Liquidity minus Low 
Covariance High Illiquid produces negative returns, which is most likely due to the characteristics of the 
stocks. Moreover, the returns across columns (characteristics) is consistent to past results whereby returns 
increase with illiquidity, but is not consistent across rows (covariance) signifying that that the returns are 
not significantly dependent on covariance.     
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of the growth of £100 across the covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) and 
illiquidity (characteristics - Amihud) intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in selected covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) and illiquidity 
intersection portfolios over the 23 years study period. The intersection portfolios used are High Covariance 
High Illiquid and Low Covariance High Liquid. For comparison purpose, the dollar growth for investing 
in the High Covariance quartile, Low Covariance quartile and benchmark of FTSE All-share and 3 months 
LIBOR are also included in figure 5.5. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
  
 
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the growth of £100 in relation to Covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) versus 
Characteristics (Amihud): January 1992 to December 2014 
This figure shows the growth of £100 invested in selected covariance (illiquidity beta (β)) and illiquidity 
intersection portfolios over the 23 years study period. In order to investigate the historical performance of 
Covariance versus Characteristic, the intersection portfolios used are Low Covariance High Illiquid and 
High Covariance High Liquid, which are the southwest and northeast portfolios respectively in table 5.16 
(the two portfolios are underlined and in italics in table 5.16). All data are obtained from DataStream. 
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The simple performance measurement in table 5.17 reports that the best portfolio is 
shown by the “Low Covariance & High illiquid portfolio”, further confirming the 
strength and significance of the “characteristics model” over “covariance model”. 
Therefore, along with the consistent results of “characteristics model” across its row in 
table 5.16, this indicates that returns are not significantly dependent on “covariance 
model” but more on “characteristics model”. Our results coincide with Ibbotson et al. 
(2013) as well as Daniel and Titman (1998), who investigate “value versus growth styles” 
instead of illiquidity. 
 
Table 5.17: Simple performance measurements (risk-adjusted returns) of the covariance (illiquidity 
beta (β)) and illiquidity (characteristics - Amihud) intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 
2014 
This table shows the simple performance measurements of the covariance and illiquidity intersection 
quartiles describe in table 5.16. The measurement allows for further analysis of the portfolios performance 
by scaling the returns. Three performance measurements are used namely Sharpe ratio (SR), Treynor’s 
ratio (TR) and information ratios (IR). Description of the simple performance measurements is found in 
table 5.3. Due to the limited number of stocks and to ensure that the results are significant, we only consider 
portfolios that meet our diversification requirements of at least 12 average stocks. Thus, acceptable 
portfolios with 12 or more average stocks are in bold. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 
2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Covariance (Beta)         
Sharpe Ratio 55.30% 35.08% 32.39% 31.09% 
Treynor Ratio 11.51% 6.59% 6.56% 6.49% 
Information Ratio 70.90% 45.60% 38.30% 35.47% 
Average number of stocks 41 29 19 12 
Mid-High Covariance (Beta)         
Sharpe Ratio 45.92% 33.25% 28.92% 15.59% 
Treynor Ratio 9.37% 6.27% 5.13% 2.66% 
Information Ratio 58.61% 43.59% 40.93% 11.11% 
Average number of stocks 27 29 25 21 
Mid-Low Covariance (Beta)         
Sharpe Ratio 44.46% 39.42% 25.73% 21.16% 
Treynor Ratio 9.21% 7.33% 4.44% 3.72% 
Information Ratio 54.48% 55.60% 37.69% 22.45% 
Average number of stocks 20 25 29 28 
Low Covariance (Beta)         
Sharpe Ratio 58.47% 40.84% 28.18% 25.24% 
Treynor Ratio 12.56% 7.76% 5.44% 4.43% 
Information Ratio 73.71% 55.06% 33.70% 33.60% 
Average number of stocks 15 19 29 42 
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Table 5.18 also shows that overall only 33.95% of stocks remained in the same quartile 
for covariance model, which is quite low in comparison to “characteristic model” 
stability of 78.45% (panel A of table 5.13). Thus, we show that “characteristics model” 
is the best way to construct illiquidity or passive portfolios as it provides consistent results.  
 
Table 5.18: Migration of stocks one year after portfolio construction for covariance: January 1991 
to December 2014 
The table shows the migration of stocks from each quartile in year (t) (sorting year) to other quartiles in 
year (t+1) (performance year) for portfolios based on covariance (illiquidity beta (β)). The sample uses 
companies with complete relevant data that are listed on FTSE All-Share index between January 1991 and 
December 2014. As before, the quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that the stocks are held for 
at least one year. Diagonal results (underlined & italics) represent stocks that remains in its respective 
quartiles after one year. The last column shows that all rows sum to 100%. All data are obtained from 
DataStream.    
Covariance migration (Overall 33.95% remains in the same quartile) 
Year t 
(Covariance) 
Year t+1 (Covariance)  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
Quartile 1 39.00% 24.73% 17.09% 19.18% 100.00% 
Quartile 2 24.04% 30.50% 24.23% 21.23% 100.00% 
Quartile 3 16.32% 25.25% 33.26% 25.17% 100.00% 
Quartile 4 19.20% 20.72% 27.02% 33.06% 100.00% 
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5.4.7. THE JANUARY EFFECT 
5.4.7.1. JANUARY PREMIUMS OF FTSE ALL-SHARE INDEX AND VARIOUS 
INVESTMENT FACTORS 
Another consistent findings of past literature are the appearance of a seasonal effect in 
the month of January. It appears that it relates to all investment styles such as Fama and 
French (1992) on value style, Keim (1983) on size effects,  De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
on momentum style and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) on illiquidity premium. 
Thus, we believe that we should briefly cover the topic.  
To investigate the January effect we will be applying Haug and Hirschey (2006) 
framework. Table 5.19 shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in % format) 
for the month of January, other months and the January premiums91, which are based on 
the investment style factors (premiums) as well as the market. Wilcoxon signed rank test 
is used to test the significance of the results at least at 10% level.  
Contrary to Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), table 5.19 shows that January premiums do 
not exist within the market, which is measured using FTSE All Share index. This is similar 
for momentum factor. Although January premiums seem to exist, they are not significant. 
Nevertheless, it does exist within the other three investment styles namely value, size and 
illiquidity signifying that the earlier positive and significant investment style premiums 
may be due to the January returns or vice versa, which is similar to Haug and Hirschey 
(2006) study of US market even though they do not consider illiquidity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 January premiums is the paired difference between the month of January and other months.  
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Table 5.19: Monthly returns and risks for the month of January, other months and January 
Premiums of the FTSE All-Share index and respective investment factors: January 1992 to 
December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in percentage format) for the month of 
January, other months and the January premiums. The table is based on the investment factors (effects), 
which is described in table 5.2 as well as the FTSE All-Share market index. To test the significance of the 
results, a Wilcoxon signed rank test is used whereby the p-value of the tests are reported in brackets and 
bold figures denote statistically significance results at least at 10% level. The sample period is from January 
1992 to December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.  
  Investment Factors  January  Other 11 months  January Premiums (Paired Difference) 
FTSE All-Share      
N 23  253  23 
Mean -0.46%  0.56%  -1.03% 
Standard deviation 4.36%  4.02%  4.56% 
Median 0.04%  0.94%  -0.17% 
Percent positive 52.17%  61.26%  43.48% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.9636)  (0.0020)  (0.5531) 
      
Size factor (Size effect)      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 3.82%  0.62%  3.19% 
Standard deviation 3.44%  2.75%  3.44% 
Median 2.97%  0.65%  2.80% 
Percent positive 91.30%  59.29%  82.61% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0002)  (0.0010)  (0.0008) 
      
Value factor (Value effect)      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 1.99%  0.58%  1.41% 
Standard deviation 2.67%  2.86%  2.88% 
Median 2.26%  0.33%  2.51% 
Percent positive 86.96%  55.73%  69.57% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0030)  (0.0061)  (0.0254) 
      
Momentum factor (Momentum effect)     
N 23  253  23 
Mean 1.24%  0.06%  1.19% 
Standard deviation 4.35%  4.14%  4.95% 
Median 0.05%  0.45%  -0.37% 
Percent positive 52.17%  56.52%  47.83% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.2669)  (0.0678)  (0.3536) 
      
Illiquidity factor (Illiquidity effect)      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 4.07%  0.49%  3.58% 
Standard deviation 3.07%  2.74%  3.24% 
Median 3.90%  0.67%  3.80% 
Percent positive 95.65%  59.68%  91.30% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0001)  (0.0055)  (0.0002) 
 
 
5.4.7.2. JANUARY PREMIUMS OF ENHANCED PORTFOLIOS 
To further investigate January return premiums, table 5.20 shows the January premiums 
of the enhanced portfolios that are described earlier in tables 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, and 5.15. As 
expected, January premiums are found to be positive and significant for all enhanced 
portfolios.  
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Nevertheless, interestingly, January premiums are also discovered within the “momentum 
enhanced portfolio”, which earlier is not significant for momentum factor in table 5.19. 
This discovery may be due to the introduction of illiquidity to momentum style.  
Earlier research such as Ritter (1988) does highlight that low-capitalization stocks have 
unusually high average returns in early January compared to large-capitalization stocks, 
a phenomenon Ritter (1988) calls  the turn-of-the-year effect. Also Haug and Hirschey 
(2006) highlight in their study that January premiums remain mainly a small-cap 
phenomenon although value factor also plays some role. This is expected as our earlier 
findings show that size and illiquidity factors are strongly correlated to each other. 
 
Table 5.20: Monthly returns and risks for the month of January, other months and January 
Premiums of the enhanced portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in percentage format) for the month of 
January, other months and the January premiums of the enhanced portfolios, which are briefly described in 
table 5.4, 5.6, 5.8 and 5.16. To test the significance of the results, a Wilcoxon signed rank test is used 
whereby the p-value of the tests are reported in brackets and bold figures denote statistically significance 
results at least at 10% level. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2014. All data are 
obtained from DataStream.    
Enhanced portfolios January  Other 11 months  January Premiums (Paired Difference) 
Microcap, High illiquid      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 4.30%  1.39%  2.91% 
Standard deviation 4.67%  5.56%  5.00% 
Median 3.33%  1.45%  3.63% 
Percent positive 82.61%  67.19%  78.26% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0007)  (0.0000)  (0.0184) 
      
High value, High illiquid      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 5.23%  1.50%  3.73% 
Standard deviation 5.08%  5.99%  5.53% 
Median 5.32%  1.34%  3.57% 
Percent positive 91.30%  65.61%  78.26% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0037) 
      
High momentum, High illiquid      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 5.75%  1.50%  4.25% 
Standard deviation 6.15%  5.94%  5.71% 
Median 4.68%  1.64%  3.92% 
Percent positive 86.96%  63.24%  82.61% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0004)  (0.0000)  (0.0013) 
      
High covariance, High illiquid      
N 23  253  23 
Mean 4.75%  1.37%  3.37% 
Standard deviation 5.04%  5.85%  5.31% 
Median 5.12%  1.75%  4.04% 
Percent positive 86.96%  64.43%  78.26% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0007)  (0.0000)  (0.0102) 
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5.4.7.3. JANUARY PREMIUMS OF THE ILLIQUIDITY AND VALUE/GROWTH 
INTERSECTIONS 
Since illiquidity is the focus of the research, we will be concentrating on whether 
illiquidity plays any role on January premiums of the other styles.  
Table 5.21 shows equally-weighted returns and risks for the January premiums of the 
Value/Growth and illiquidity intersection portfolios. The table shows that January 
premiums are present in the “high illiquid” portfolios (first column) while across “high 
value” portfolios (first row), there is no consistent pattern of significant January return 
premiums. Moreover, it can be observed that there are no January premiums for the “high 
liquidity” portfolios (last column). Thus, signifying that January premiums is more 
related to illiquidity than value style.  
Table 5.21: Monthly returns and risks for the January return premiums of the value/growth and 
illiquidity intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in percentage format) for the January return 
premiums of the Value/Growth and illiquidity intersection portfolios. To test the significance of the results, 
a Wilcoxon signed rank test is used whereby the p-value of the tests are reported in brackets and bold 
figures denote statistically significance results at least at 10% level. The sample period is from January 
1992 to December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Value Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 3.73% 0.93% 0.83% 0.65% 
Standard deviation 5.53% 5.28% 5.87% 7.61% 
Median 3.57% 2.08% 1.37% 1.34% 
Percent positive 78.26% 60.87% 56.52% 60.87% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0037) (0.1103) (0.3229) (0.4748) 
     
Mid Value Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 1.75% -0.11% -0.22% -1.28% 
Standard deviation 4.61% 5.58% 4.58% 5.42% 
Median 3.42% 0.98% -0.33% -0.40% 
Percent positive 73.91% 56.52% 47.83% 43.48% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0914) (0.8671) (0.8911) (0.3860) 
     
Mid Growth Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 2.40% 1.42% 0.90% -0.98% 
Standard deviation 5.54% 5.51% 4.62% 5.33% 
Median 3.88% 2.80% 1.49% -0.12% 
Percent positive 69.57% 65.22% 65.22% 43.48% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0658) (0.2541) (0.3536) (0.6373) 
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High Growth Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 0.61% 1.49% 0.84% -1.07% 
Standard deviation 5.18% 4.89% 4.36% 4.38% 
Median 3.21% 2.41% 1.78% 0.29% 
Percent positive 60.87% 69.57% 69.57% 56.52% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.3229) (0.0752) (0.2416) (0.4562) 
 
 
 
5.4.7.4. JANUARY PREMIUMS OF THE ILLIQUIDITY AND SIZE 
INTERSECTIONS 
To confirm the results in table 5.21, we will investigate the intersection between the size 
and illiquidity portfolios in table 5.22, which is also the equally-weighted returns and 
risks for the January premiums of the intersection.  
Interestingly, although size and illiquidity are earlier found to be highly correlated to each 
other, table 5.22 shows that January premiums are present in the “high illiquid” portfolios 
(first column) while across “micro only” portfolios (first row), there is no significant 
January premiums other than the first column, which is probably due to the high 
illiquidity. Moreover, it can be observed that there are also no January premiums for the 
“high liquid” portfolios (last column). Therefore, demonstrating that January premiums 
is also more associated to illiquidity than size.  
 
Table 5.22: Monthly returns and risks for the January return premiums of the size and illiquidity 
intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in percentage format) for the January return 
premiums of the size and illiquidity intersection portfolios. To test the significance of the results, a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test is used whereby the p-value of the tests are reported in brackets and bold figures 
denote statistically significance results at least at 10% level. The sample period is from January 1992 to 
December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
Micro Portfolio     
n 23 23 13 3 
Mean 2.91% 0.01% 2.49% -1.86% 
Standard deviation 5.00% 5.90% 10.89% 6.57% 
Median 3.63% 0.46% 1.13% -1.06% 
Percent positive 78.26% 56.52% 69.23% 33.33% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0184)  (0.6373)  (0.4420)  (0.7893)  
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Small Portfolio     
n 23 23 22 7 
Mean 2.08% 0.94% 1.32% -1.00% 
Standard deviation 5.08% 4.71% 5.87% 9.63% 
Median 2.56% 0.95% 1.78% 1.16% 
Percent positive 78.26% 69.57% 63.64% 71.43% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0534)  (0.3229)  (0.1832)  (0.3525)  
     
Medium Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 19 
Mean 1.84% 1.40% 0.46% -0.47% 
Standard deviation 4.89% 4.88% 4.61% 7.12% 
Median 0.98% 2.68% 0.96% -0.49% 
Percent positive 69.57% 73.91% 65.22% 47.37% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0974)  (0.1759)  (0.4380)  (0.8248)  
     
Big Portfolio     
n 9 15 23 23 
Mean 6.56% -0.52% -0.45% -1.07% 
Standard deviation 11.60% 9.70% 4.82% 4.80% 
Median 1.25% -2.47% -0.44% 0.10% 
Percent positive 66.67% 33.33% 47.83% 56.52% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.2863)  (0.5509)  (0.9394)  (0.7495)  
 
 
 
5.4.7.5. JANUARY PREMIUMS OF THE ILLIQUIDITY AND 
MOMENTUM/CONTRARIAN INTERSECTIONS 
Table 5.23 shows the equally-weighted returns and risks for the January premiums of the 
intersections of momentum/ contrarian and illiquidity portfolios. As expected and similar 
to before, table 5.23 shows that January premiums is more related to illiquidity, as 
positive and significant results can be found under “high illiquid” portfolios (first column) 
while the “high liquid” portfolios (last column) does not show any January return 
premiums. 
Obviously, since the momentum factor is the only investment factor that does not show 
any January premiums in table 5.19, we do not expect for it to show any significant 
patterns across the high momentum portfolios (row) in table 5.23. Nevertheless, it does 
report positive and significant results under “mid-illiquidity portfolio” as well but 
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compared to illiquidity, the January premiums for momentum is less consistent, further 
confirming that January premium is an illiquidity phenomenon.  
 
Table 5.23: Monthly returns and risks for the January return premiums of the 
momentum/contrarian and illiquidity intersection portfolios: January 1992 to December 2014 
This table shows equally-weighted, monthly returns and risks (in percentage format) for the January return 
premiums of the momentum/contrarian and illiquidity intersection portfolios. To test the significance of 
the results, a Wilcoxon signed rank test (or sign test) is used whereby the p-value of the tests are reported 
in brackets and bold figures denote statistically significance results at least at 10% level. The sample period 
is from January 1992 to December 2014. All data are obtained from DataStream.    
Cross Section High Illiquid Mid Illiquid Mid Liquid High Liquid 
High Momentum Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 4.25% 1.76% 1.68% -0.11% 
Standard deviation 5.71% 4.57% 5.13% 5.36% 
Median 3.92% 2.33% 1.34% 0.27% 
Percent positive 82.61% 73.91% 60.87% 52.17% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0013) (0.0703) (0.1664) (0.8671) 
     
Mid Momentum Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 1.95% 0.35% 0.48% -1.25% 
Standard deviation 4.33% 4.83% 4.29% 4.71% 
Median 2.66% 1.53% 1.14% -0.29% 
Percent positive 73.91% 65.22% 60.87% 43.48% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0372) (0.5132) (0.5132) (0.3536) 
     
Mid Contrarian Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 1.35% 0.63% -0.12% -2.14% 
Standard deviation 4.75% 5.58% 4.69% 5.68% 
Median 2.44% 0.95% 0.67% -0.74% 
Percent positive 65.22% 60.87% 52.17% 39.13% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.1858) (0.6373) (0.6158) (0.2180) 
     
High Contrarian Portfolio     
n 23 23 23 23 
Mean 3.08% 0.68% 0.05% -0.11% 
Standard deviation 5.50% 6.90% 5.81% 7.14% 
Median 3.41% 2.47% 0.15% 1.41% 
Percent positive 78.26% 52.17% 60.87% 52.17% 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (P-Value) (0.0156) (0.3536) (0.7038) (0.8196) 
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
Investors have always wanted to find ways to beat the market and thus various investment 
styles have been established and some of the popular ones are value (Fama & French, 
1992) and momentum (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). Recently, illiquidity has gained 
importance probably due to the financial crisis but its classification as an investment style  
has not been recognised even though researchers such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
find evidence to suggest that returns are an increasing function of illiquidity. Moreover, 
Ibbotson et al. (2013) state that illiquidity has the most obvious connection to valuation, 
as investors will pay more for more liquid stocks and less for less liquid stocks and thus 
there should be an illiquidity premium. Therefore, we feel that it is time to conduct such 
a research on the UK market using Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework which is based on 
Sharpe (1992) benchmark criteria of 1) identifiable before the fact, 2) not easily beaten, 
3) a viable alternative, and 4) low in cost. 
The first criterion of “identifiable before the fact” is met by using the prior year (t-1) 
related style measure to construct and calculate the results of the quartiles (or portfolio) 
for a given year (t). For the traditional style measures, we have decided to use P/B ratio 
(value), MV (size) and annualised returns (momentum). For measuring illiquidity, we 
have decided to use Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002) because it is simple and 
provides the most consistent results when we compare against other liquidity measures.  
The second criterion is “not easily beaten” and we compare the results of the 3 
investment styles with illiquidity. The investigation also provides us with the opportunity 
to revisit whether the different investment styles perform well within UK. Our results 
show that value premium, size premium and even illiquidity have positive and significant 
results while momentum style performs better than contrarian style but the results are 
insignificant.  
Nevertheless, our primary objective is to investigate whether illiquidity meets the second 
criterion. An illiquidity premium does exist and it is only smaller to size premium. The 
top illiquid portfolio is also able to beat the benchmarks of FTSE All Share index and 3 
months LIBOR.  
Similar to Ibbotson et al. (2013), we also decide to conduct further analysis by looking at 
the risk factors of the styles using financial models namely CAPM, Fama-French 3 factor 
model and Carhart 4 factor model. The results show that the long only “illiquid portfolio” 
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is able to generate positive and significant alpha based on all three models. Therefore, we 
consider the illiquidity portfolio as “not easily beaten”, meeting the second criterion of 
Sharpe (1992) benchmark requirement. 
“A viable alternative” is the third criterion of benchmark requirement. In fact, illiquidity 
can even be considered as meeting the third criterion as illiquidity is able to outperform 
the benchmarks and momentum style. However, the illiquidity premium can also be due 
to the other investment styles. To shed light on this, we decide to construct double sorted 
illiquidity portfolios with the other styles. Illiquidity is able to enhance the returns of both 
value and momentum styles. Actually, the enhanced momentum portfolio of “high 
momentum & high illiquid portfolio” moves from the weakest to the best performing, 
after being intersected with illiquidity. Furthermore, the enhanced momentum portfolio 
also outperforms the other portfolios based on risk-adjusted measures of Sharpe ratio, 
Treynor ratio and Information ratio. 
Moreover, using the three financial models, the results show that all enhanced portfolios 
are able to generate positive and significant alpha based on the CAPM but only the “high 
momentum & high illiquid portfolio” is able to generate positive significant monthly 
alpha for all three models. Therefore, further confirming that illiquid have met the third 
benchmark criterion of “a viable alternative”.  
“Low in cost” is the fourth and last benchmark criteria of Sharpe (1992) and our results 
show that 78.45% of illiquid stocks remain in their quartile which is better than value and 
momentum portfolios, while the top “high illiquid portfolio” have around 76.99% of 
stocks staying in their quartile. This is evidence that illiquid portfolios can be managed 
at a low cost and consequently meeting the fourth criterion. Moreover, it also signifies 
that the portfolios can be managed passively and investors can gain higher net returns as 
they can save on the additional transaction costs 92  especially since Carhart (1997) 
mentions that transaction costs have a negative impact on fund’s performance.  
                                                 
92 As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is important to consider costs as Carhart (1997) signifies that investment costs of expense 
ratios, transaction costs and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on funds’ performance. For instance, a study by S&P Dow 
Jones Indices in 2016 shows that about 90 percent of active stock managers failed to beat their index targets over various periods, of 
which fees explain a significant part of the underperformance (Stein, 2017). This is not surprising, as a typical active fund and passive 
fund at Fidelity Investments may charge 70 cents and 5 cents respectively for every $100 invested (Stein, 2017). However, trading 
costs can be mitigated through longer horizons and less trading (Ibbotson et al., 2013). Therefore, the stability of our illiquidity 
portfolios suggests that the negative impact from transaction (trading) costs can be reduced and there is profitability potential of our 
portfolios for investors. 
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Nevertheless, our “high momentum & high illiquid portfolio” is the best strategy for fund 
managers to utilize in the UK, which is different from Ibbotson et al. (2013) whose 
evidence indicate that “high value & high illiquid portfolio” will be better for fund 
managers in the US. 
We also find evidence to suggest that although using financial models (or “covariance 
model”) are common in finance, it is discovered that “characteristics model” (e.g. 
financial ratios) may be the best way to construct illiquidity portfolios as it provides 
consistent results.  
A brief study on January premiums is also conducted since past literature consistently 
indicates the existence of a seasonal effect for all investment styles. Our results show that 
the January effect is not present on the market level and momentum factor but it does 
exist under the other styles, while our double sorted portfolios on the three styles signify 
that the January premium is mainly an illiquidity phenomenon.  
Overall, our results do prove that illiquidity, as represented by Amihud Illiquidity 
measure, meets all four criteria of Sharpe (1992) benchmark requirements. Therefore, we 
fully agree with Ibbotson et al. (2013) that illiquidity can be considered as an alternative 
investment style in equal standing with the other investment styles and it appears to 
reward investors who particularly have long horizons.  
Nevertheless, similar to our study in the previous chapter, one finding that must be treated 
with caution is the strong positive correlation between size and illiquidity. Thus, using 
the longer period of 23 years does not improve results, as the strong relationship between 
size and illiquidity still remains. This comes into contrast with Ibbotson et al. (2013), 
signifying that the favourable performance of illiquidity may actually be due to size. 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) also highlight similar results but Elfakhani (2000) 
believes that the size premium may actually be due to illiquidity.  
Moreover, our results are weaker in comparison to Ibbotson et al. (2013), probably due 
to the different liquidity measure used as well as the different characteristics of UK and 
US markets such as the lower volatility in the UK market relative to the US market 
(Bartram et al., 2012) since the lower level of volatility will definitely affect prices and 
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consequently individual and market liquidity (See Stoll (1978), Vayanos (2004), Hameed 
et al. (2010) and Amiram, Cserna, and Levy (2015))93 
Further studies need to be conducted in different geographical areas but we believe that 
illiquidity still has its merits as an investment management tool and choosing an 
investment style actually depends on investors’ preference. Since the latest crisis is partly 
attributed on the illiquidity of financial markets, it is anticipated that investors will expect 
more compensation for the illiquidity risk of holding stocks longer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Stoll (1978) shows that bid-ask spreads (liquidity) are positively affected by return volatility. Vayanos (2004) finds that during 
volatile times, investors reduce their willingness to hold illiquid assets, illiquidity premia increases followed by market betas of illiquid 
assets. Hameed et al (2010) mention that negative market returns decrease stock liquidity, with the effect being strongest for high 
volatility firms and during times of market funding tightness. Hameed et al (2010) also document that market volatility affect liquidity 
commonality positively. Amiram et al (2015) discover that the positive relationship between volatility and illiquidity is mainly due to 
‘a jump component’ (infrequent, large isolated surprise price changes) while a negative relationship between illiquidity and diffusive 
volatility (smooth and expected small price changes) also exists, where the latter is commonly perceived as “volatility”. Overall, it 
shows that there is a relationship between volatility and liquidity, which will obviously result in different findings for us compared to 
Ibbotson, Chen et al (2013), due to the difference in market volatility between the UK and the US. 
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CHAPTER 6 : MULTIPLE COUNTRIES RESPONSE TO OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND 
ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS  
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the significance of crude oil, there are various studies that investigate its impact 
on financial markets, instruments and the economy. Hamilton (1983) studies its effect on 
the US economy while Sadorsky (1999) studies its relationship with stock markets. 
Hamilton (2011) highlights that out of eleven US recessions, ten US recessions are 
preceded by significant rises in oil price. Thus, it does indicate the importance of crude 
oil to the macro-economy. 
There are also studies that highlight the relationship between illiquidity and the macro-
economy such as Fujimoto (2004) who studies the US market and finds evidence that 
macroeconomic fundamentals appear to be significant determinants of liquidity. However, 
recently, some studies have emerged that show an inverse relationship.  Liquidity appears 
to affect macroeconomic variables. For instance, Næs et al. (2011) mention that market 
liquidity contains useful information for estimating the current and future state of the US 
and Norwegian economy while Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) expand this line of 
research by studying G7 countries. Therefore, similar to oil, liquidity appears to have an 
impact on the economy.  
Interestingly, both oil and liquidity are linked to the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
In relation to oil, Taylor (2009) mentions that oil price increases have prolonged the 
financial crisis while Tverberg (2012) mentions that if the world oil supply continues to 
remain generally flat, a continuing financial crisis can be expected. With regards to 
liquidity, it is more obvious as some researchers even refer to the financial crisis as either 
liquidity crisis or crunch (Iyer et al., 2014). Crotty (2009) highlights that financial 
deregulation, complex financial products, liquidity dry-outs and investors running for 
liquidity and safety as some of the reasoning for the crisis. Cornett et al. (2011) mention 
that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply. 
Nevertheless, Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) indicate that credit lines 
on corporate spending ease the impact of the financial crisis. Generally, both oil and 
liquidity appear to have some connection to the recent financial crisis which require 
further investigation as to their ability to predict business cycles.  
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Furthermore, researchers have also acknowledged the connection of the two variables. 
For instance, Gupta (2008) assesses the relative oil vulnerability of 26 net oil-importing 
countries on the basis of various indicators such as exposure to geopolitical oil market 
concentration risks, as measured by a number of variables including market liquidity (size 
of domestic demand relative to world supply).  
Alper and Torul (2008) show that for a small open economy such as Turkey, the inclusion 
of the global liquidity conditions (FFR and VIX)94 is important when investigating the 
relationship between aggregate economic activity and oil price changes. Ratti and 
Vespignani (2013) research the effect of liquidity (measured by money supply, M295) in 
China and in developed economies (US, Eurozone and Japan) on the real oil price and 
they find evidence that relative to developed economies, the cumulative impact of China's 
real M2 on the real price of crude oil is large and statistically significant, signifying the 
relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil. 
Although Gupta (2008) Alper and Torul (2008) and Ratti and Vespignani (2013) define 
liquidity differently, their research shows the potential of conducting research using 
liquidity and oil variables.  Moreover, since there are findings to link oil price and stock 
markets (Filis et al., 2011), it is expected that researching oil and market liquidity (based 
on stock markets) will provide meaningful results, which would be interesting for the 
readers, both academics and practitioners. 
Moreover, we believe on the significance of researching asymmetric effects96 on oil. 
Initially, research on oil such as Hamilton (1983) tends to focus only on oil price increases. 
Mork (1989) also investigates oil price decreases but his research finds statistically 
significant results only for oil price increases. Nevertheless, Engemann et al. (2014) study 
all 50 US states plus the District of Columbia (DC) and they discover that around 35 
states are affected by positive oil price shocks only97. 
                                                 
94 The Fed Funds Rate (FFR) and the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options (VIX) are used as measures of global liquidity. 
95 M2 is a measure of the money supply that includes all elements of M1 and "near money." M1 includes cash and checking deposits, 
while near money refers to savings deposits, money market securities, mutual funds and other time deposits. Near money assets are 
less liquid than M1 and not as suitable as exchange mediums, but they can be quickly converted into cash or checking deposits (M2, 
n.d.). 
96 Similar to Engemann, Owyang et al. (2014), we define an asymmetric effect when a country responds to either positive or negative 
oil price shocks while a symmetric effect occurs when a country responds to both shocks (positive and negative) or does not respond 
at all. 
97 Oil price shocks are calculated by comparing the current oil price with where it has been over the previous one (1) year or previous 
four (4) quarters as proposed by Hamilton (1996). For instance, positive oil price shocks are calculated as below (Engemann, Owyang 
et al., 2014): 
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ    (6.1) 
Where ݔ௧is crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the crude oil Brent price of the previous four (4) quarters. 
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Similar to oil, we feel that there are potential asymmetric effects as far as illiquidity is 
concerned. In their UK market study, Said and Giouvris (2017) discover that the reaction 
of liquidity after restrictive monetary shifts appears to be less noticeable compared to 
expansive monetary shifts. This signifies potential asymmetric effects of positive and 
negative illiquidity shocks 98  on the economy. Even though research on liquidity 
asymmetries will be interesting and beneficial within the current environment, 
surprisingly, there is actually limited research available. We aim to close this gap. 
One important findings of Engemann et al. (2014)  is that the most energy intensive US 
states appear to respond only to negative oil price shocks. Hence, it appears that the 
characteristics of the states or countries are also important in relation to oil price shocks 
research. However, for some reason, past studies seldom differentiate between oil 
exporting countries and oil importing countries, which is also highlighted by Wang et al. 
(2013). Due to this, we feel that it will be beneficial to investigate the effect of oil price 
shocks on the economies of net oil exporting countries and net oil importing countries. 
We decide to use Engemann et al. (2014) framework, as it is closely related to our 
intended research. However, instead of using US states, we will be using eleven countries 
as part of our data sample, which is categorised as net oil exporting and net oil importing 
countries. Based on our analysis, five countries are categorised as net oil exporters and 
six as net oil importers.  Furthermore, instead of using payroll employment, we decide to 
use Gross Domestic Products (GDP) as a proxy of macroeconomic activity because it is 
readily available for the countries in our sample.   
We also briefly cover national oil price shocks, which is the specific country’s currency 
conversion of USD99 crude oil prices, as Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that the 
significant effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables becomes more 
significant when the shocks are defined in local currencies. 
Overall, categorising the chosen countries into net oil exporting countries and net oil 
importing countries does provide some valuable insights, as net oil exporters (e.g. Brazil) 
and net oil importers (e.g. Germany) appear to benefit from positive oil price shocks and 
negative oil price shocks respectively. However, our results for asymmetric effects is 
                                                 
Please refer to data and variables section for more information. 
98 Hamilton (1996) equation for calculating oil price shocks appears to be simple enough and we feel that it can be applied to measure 
the shocks of other variables including illiquidity shocks.  
99 United States Dollar 
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contradictory to past research such as Engemann et al. (2014), as most countries in our 
sample respond to negative oil price shocks instead of positive oil price shocks. 
Furthermore, nationalising oil price shocks does not appear to provide any obvious 
improvement in results when testing for asymmetric effects while illiquidity shocks seem 
to exhibit clearer results.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the literature 
review while section 6.3 describes the data and variables. In section 6.4, the methodology, 
empirical results and analysis of the research are discussed followed by our conclusion in 
section 6.5.  
 
6.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
6.2.1. OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND ECONOMY 
In relation to oil and macroeconomic research, one of the earliest key studies is conducted 
by Hamilton (1983) who highlights that there is a significant increase in the price of crude 
petroleum prior to seven of the eight post world-war II recessions in the US. Nonetheless, 
although this does not automatically signify that oil price shocks cause the recessions, oil 
price shocks are found to be at least a contributing factor, as evidence indicates that over 
the period between 1948 and 1972, this correlation is statistically significant and non-
spurious. 
Hamilton (1996) reiterates his research on US data and the evidence has actually 
strengthened since Hamilton (1983), as his recent data is consistent with the historical 
correlation between oil price shocks and recessions. This is further confirmed in his more 
recent research also on the US economy (see Hamilton (2003) and Hamilton (2009)). In 
fact, Hamilton (2011) updates the count to ten out of eleven US recessions being preceded 
by significant rises in oil price. With the additional three rises occurring in the fall of 
1990, 1999-2000 period and 2007–2008 period. As also highlighted in Hamilton (1983), 
the only exceptional recession is between 1960 and 1961, as there is no preceding rise in 
oil prices.   
As observed, Hamilton’s studies are more focused on the US economy and hence, it is 
important to explore other countries as well such as Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) who 
study fifteen European countries. Using quarterly data for the period between 1960 and 
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1999, Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) find a relationship between oil price shocks and  
macroeconomic variables such as inflation and industrial production indexes. However, 
they also find differential evidence of the effects of oil price shocks on each of the 
European countries.  
Cunado and De Gracia (2005) conduct similar research on six Asian countries namely 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines between 1975(Q1) 
and 2002(Q2). Their research suggests that oil prices have a significant effect on both 
economic activity and price indexes, especially when oil price shocks are in national 
currencies. Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) also show the expected vulnerability of 
the Iranian economy to oil price fluctuations. Nevertheless, Chang and Wong (2003) 
highlight that the impact of oil price shocks on the Singapore economy is marginal but 
should not be considered negligible even though it is small.  
Research is not limited to the impact of oil on the macro-economy but also on financial 
markets. For instance, Jones and Kaul (1996) highlight that changes in oil prices have a 
detrimental effect on output and real stock returns in the US, Canada, Japan and the UK 
during the post-war period but for both the UK and Japan results are less rational 
compared to US and Canada. Moreover, Sadorsky (1999) finds evidence that oil price 
and oil price volatility both play important roles in affecting real stock returns by studying 
the US market while Cunado and de Gracia (2014) who study twelve oil importing 
European countries suggest the existence of a negative and significant impact of oil price 
changes on most European stock market returns. 
However, by examining the dynamic linkages between crude oil price shocks and stock 
market returns in 22 emerging economies, Maghyereh (2006) finds evidence inconsistent 
with prior research on developed economies, as their findings imply that oil price shocks 
have no significant impact on stock index returns. Furthermore, their results also suggest 
that stock market returns in these economies do not rationally signal shocks in the crude 
oil market. 
Overall, past literature appears to show that crude oil does impact the economy of 
countries as well as financial markets. However, the degree of development of each 
country seems to show that there are some differences on how countries react towards 
crude oil. Even the classification of a country as an oil importer/exporter appears to be 
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important.  For instance Singapore is only marginally impacted (Chang & Wong, 2003) 
while Iran is highly vulnerable to oil price fluctuations (Farzanegan & Markwardt, 2009). 
 
6.2.1.1. ASYMMETRY DUE TO OIL SHOCKS 
Nowadays, research is focusing on the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the 
economy and the financial markets. One of the prominent earlier studies is conducted by 
Mork (1989), as an extension of Hamilton (1983) studies on the US economy. Unlike 
Hamilton (1983), Mork (1989) also looks into oil price decreases. His research highlights 
that positive oil price changes have a significant negative effect on the US macro-
economy measured using GNP, while oil price declines tend to have a small positive but 
statistically insignificant effect, indicating an asymmetric effect.  
Mork et al. (1994) expand their research by covering seven Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries namely US, Canada, Japan, Germany 
(West), France, UK and Norway. Their results indicate that the correlations between oil 
price increases and growth are negative and significant for their sample (with the 
exception of Norway), while oil price decreases are mostly positively correlated with 
growth. Oil price reductions appear to have adverse effects on the business cycle for oil 
exporters. However, the adverse effect from an oil price decrease is only significant for 
the US and Canada which are oil exporters. Mork et al. (1994) highlight that asymmetry 
is not confined to the US, as most countries show evidence of asymmetric effects, with 
the exception of Norway. This is not surprising as the oil producing sector of Norway is 
large relative to the economy as a whole. Their results also confirm that oil-price 
fluctuations are important for the shaping of business cycles of the leading market 
economies. 
Mork (1994) further reaffirms this by surveying oil market events and their relation to 
macroeconomic variables. He concludes that by considering sectoral imbalance, oil price 
increases seem to hurt aggregate activity while price declines do not appear to help. Other 
studies that focus on the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the macro-economy 
are conducted by Lee et al. (1995) and Ferderer (1996). They both study US data while 
also considering oil price variability and volatility respectively. Cuñado and de Gracia 
(2003) also consider asymmetric effects of oil price shocks but on fifteen European 
countries.  
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Recently, more research has been conducted on other regions focusing also on developing 
countries. Cunado and De Gracia (2005) study six Asian countries, finding evidence of 
asymmetric effects in the oil prices–macro economy relationship for some of the Asian 
countries. In relation to the oil price changes–inflation rate relationship, Japan, Thailand, 
South Korea and Malaysia show an asymmetric effect, while for oil price changes–
economic growth rate relationship, only South Korea is impacted. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) study Iran, one of the largest oil producers and a net 
oil exporting country, whose economy depends significantly on oil exports. By 
investigating the dynamic relationship between oil price shocks and major 
macroeconomic variables, Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) highlight the asymmetric 
effects of oil price shocks. Interestingly, one of their findings indicates that both positive 
and negative oil price shocks significantly increase inflation. 
Nevertheless, using US data between 1973 (Q2) and 2007 (Q4), Kilian and Vigfusson 
(2011) show empirically that there is no statistically significant evidence of asymmetry 
in the response functions of real GDP towards unanticipated changes in the real oil price. 
They highlight that both symmetric and asymmetric models correctly compute impulse 
responses of roughly the same magnitude in either positive or negative shocks. 
Using US employment growth as a macroeconomic variable, Engemann et al. (2014) 
show some contradictory results to asymmetric effects. Their study of fifty US states (plus 
DC) discover that although most states are affected by positive shocks only, ten states 
experience symmetric responses, five states respond to both shocks and another five states 
respond to neither shocks. They also find evidence that five states show an asymmetric 
effect of responding only to negative oil price shocks. 
Overall, the literature above shows that there are instances where symmetric responses 
do actually exist. Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) show a symmetric effect in their study of 
the US economy while Engemann et al. (2014) find symmetric effect evidence on some 
of the US states. Furthermore, Mork et al. (1994) highlight that only Norway shows 
evidence of symmetric effects, which is probably due to Norway’s large oil-producing 
sector. Therefore, the classification of a country as oil exporter/importer may have some 
impact on the asymmetric effect results. 
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6.2.1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTRY’S OIL INDUSTRY AND THE 
MACRO ECONOMY.  
Although there appear to be some differences in the relationship between net oil exporting 
countries and net oil importing countries, such studies are still limited. For instance, 
Cunado and De Gracia (2005) find evidence that Malaysia’s oil prices–macro economy 
relationship seems to be less significant compared to five other Asian economies, as 
Malaysia is the only oil-exporting country in their sample. However, Cunado and De 
Gracia (2005) mention that further research is needed to obtain a more reliable conclusion, 
even though their results seem to suggest that there are different responses between oil 
exporters and oil importers.  
Mork et al. (1994) obtain results which show that although the US is less dependent on 
imported oil compared to countries like Germany, France and Japan, US is more 
vulnerable to oil price increases. Nonetheless, Norway, an oil-exporting country, behaves 
differently, as its economy benefits significantly from oil price increases and seems to be 
hurt by price declines but somewhat less significantly. The different behaviour for 
Norway100 suggests that the domestic oil sector is large enough relative to the size of the 
economy, resulting in the country's net oil exporting position to influence the oil price-
GDP correlation substantially (Mork et al., 1994). Furthermore, Engemann et al. (2014) 
highlight that apparently the US states that only respond to negative oil-price shocks are 
generally energy-intensive US states.  
It appears that the characteristics of the countries or states are important in relation to the 
impact of oil price shocks but past studies seldom differentiate between oil exporting 
countries and oil importing countries, which is highlighted by Wang et al. (2013). Even 
though they differentiate between oil exporting and importing countries, their research 
focuses on the relationship between oil price shocks and stock markets, not the macro-
economy. This is clearly a gap in the literature, highlighting the potential of conducting 
research that concentrates on the macro-economy.  
 
                                                 
100 Furthermore, the reason that Norway is affected less when the oil price declines even though it is an oil exporter is because the 
government uses all wealth accumulated in previous years to boost the macro economy of the country when revenue from selling oil 
diminishes. 
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6.2.2. MARKET LIQUIDITY AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
As highlighted earlier, our research looks into the effect of liquidity shocks on the macro-
economy. There are various studies that investigate the relationship between market 
liquidity and the macro-economy of countries. However, the initial common theme is 
how macroeconomic variables affect market liquidity. Chordia et al. (2001) discover that 
market liquidity increases prior to major macroeconomic announcements by studying the 
effects of several explanatory variables (including macroeconomic announcements101) on 
aggregate market spreads, depths and trading activity for US stocks from 1988 to 1998. 
Fujimoto (2004) who also studies the US market obtains similar results as 
macroeconomic fundamentals are significant determinants of liquidity and their effects 
are stronger prior to the mid 1980’s when business cycle dynamics are more volatile.  
There is also similar research conducted on other markets. Söderberg (2008) tests the 
ability of fourteen macroeconomic variables’ such as monthly inflation rate to forecast 
changes in market liquidity in the Scandinavian order-driven stock exchanges102. Said 
and Giouvris (2017) study the UK market by focusing on the impact of monetary 
conditions (measured using interest rates) on market liquidity.  
Nevertheless, recently, more studies have emerged on the reverse relationship that is the 
impact of liquidity on macroeconomic variables. Næs et al. (2011) highlight that market 
liquidity contains useful information for estimating the current and future state of the US 
and Norway economy. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) expand this line of research by 
studying G7 countries and they show that liquidity may contain some information for 
predicting the current and future state of the economies but it is found to be more country 
specific and liquidity-variable dependent.  
Sung and Giouvris (2016) also conduct a similar study on Asia-Pacific countries but they 
segregate their data into developed and developing markets. Sung and Giouvris (2016) 
finds that some of their liquidity variables are able to predict macroeconomic variables 
but are not consistent over the 6 countries in their sample. Additionally, they find no 
causality between macro-variables and global liquidity in developed markets but a one-
                                                 
101 Their study focuses on macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment rate and the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). 
102 Söderberg (2008) studies three Scandinavian order-driven stock exchanges namely Copenhagen (Denmark), Oslo (Norway) and 
Stockholm (Sweden) stock exchanges.  
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way causality from macro-variables to global liquidity in developing markets, signifying 
that the two markets react differently to liquidity variables.  
 
6.2.2.1. ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS AND THE ECONOMY 
So far the literature does confirm that there is a relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and liquidity, indicating that there should also be a relationship between 
business cycles and liquidity. Nevertheless, unlike oil price shocks which have been 
linked to the state of the economy, there is less literature available regarding illiquidity 
shocks. Ellington et al. (2016) highlight that to the best of their knowledge, there is no 
empirical investigation on the effects of liquidity shocks on the real economy, as most 
literature focus on explanatory and forecasting performance (See Næs et al. (2011)). 
However, a few studies have emerged over the years such as Choi and Cook (2006) which 
cover the Japanese market. They discover that liquidity shocks significantly affect 
macroeconomic variables. Bali et al. (2014) find that liquidity shocks are positively 
associated with contemporaneous stock returns in the US.  However, their research covers 
stock market returns and not macroeconomic variables.  
China has been a major contributor to global liquidity over the past twenty years. Kang, 
Ratti, and Vespignani (2016) study the influence of liquidity shocks in China on the US 
economy and their findings confirm that China's liquidity expansion has a spill-over 
effect on the US through the effects of world commodity markets (oil and commodities 
prices) and China’s exchange rate regime.  Kang et al. (2016) show that liquidity shocks 
may not only affect a country’s economy but also have a spill-over effect on other 
countries, signifying the importance of liquidity on the state of a country’s economy.  
Moreover, using US data from 1970 to 2014, Ellington et al. (2016) examine the dynamic 
impact of liquidity shocks of stock and housing markets on real GDP growth. They find 
that GDP is more resilient to stock market liquidity shocks throughout time but as 
disruptions in the property sector start to emerge, GDP becomes highly sensitive to house 
market liquidity shocks. Therefore, their study shows that liquidity shocks based on other 
variables can also impact the economy, further demonstrating the influence of liquidity 
shocks on macroeconomic variables.  
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6.2.2.2. POTENTIAL ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS DUE TO MARKET ILLIQUIDITY 
Unlike oil price shocks, there is not much research available in relation to the asymmetric 
effects of illiquidity shocks on the economy. Thus, we feel that there is potential in 
researching the asymmetric effects of illiquidity shocks.  
Chordia et al. (2001) have conducted some asymmetric effect research but it is in relation 
to bid-ask spreads (liquidity) response to market movements. They find that both quoted 
and effective spreads increase dramatically in down markets, but decrease only 
marginally in up markets.   
Bali et al. (2014) find that liquidity shocks are positively related to stock returns, 
indicating that positive liquidity shocks are linked to higher stock returns while negative 
liquidity shocks are associated with lower stock returns. Although Bali et al. (2014) 
conduct research closer to our intentions by covering positive and negative liquidity 
shocks, unfortunately, their study does not directly explore asymmetry effects. Moreover, 
as highlighted earlier, their research explores stock market returns and not 
macroeconomic variables.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) mention flight-to-quality, whereby when funding 
becomes scarce speculators cut back on the market liquidity provision especially for 
capital intensive assets. This indicates that when market liquidity decreases, the state of 
the economy may potentially worsen due to fewer investment projects. Rajan (2006) 
mentions that in times of ample liquidity supplied by the central banks, investors tend to 
engage in riskier investments to earn higher returns. Thus, during expansive monetary 
condition periods where market liquidity is expected to increase, it is likely that investors 
will increase their investments in riskier projects, potentially increasing economic growth. 
The two events of constrain and ample liquidity potentially show a symmetric effect. 
Nevertheless, there appear to be contradictory results. Ellington et al. (2016) provide 
evidence of asymmetric effect in the response of GDP to house market liquidity shocks, 
as the response is stronger during the great recession than non-recessionary period. 
However, the asymmetric effect involves house market liquidity shocks instead of stock 
market liquidity shocks and the liquidity shock is actually a sudden decline of market 
liquidity only.  
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Jensen and Moorman (2010) study on the US market finds that liquidity price adjusts 
substantially around expansive monetary policy shifts but maintains consistency around 
shifts to a restrictive monetary policy. Similarly, Said and Giouvris (2017) research on 
UK appears to show that market liquidity increases after expansive monetary shifts but it 
is less noticeable during restrictive periods, indicating that investors are less concerned 
with liquidity. Thus, providing more evidence of potential asymmetry effect of liquidity 
in the US and UK.    
 
6.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
6.3.1. DATA 
Our sample consists of 11 countries namely Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, UK and US for the period from January 1997 to 
December 2015. The time period is determined by the availability of financial markets 
and economic data of the respective countries.  
To determine economic growth, we use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the chosen 
countries while oil price shocks are based on the crude oil Brent prices. We decide to use 
crude oil Brent because at the point of our data collection, it is considered as the most 
widely used oil reference (Kurt, 2015). In comparison to other benchmarks such as WTI 
(West Texas Intermediate), around two thirds of global crude contracts use crude oil 
Brent (Kurt, 2015).  
Since we are also covering liquidity of stock markets, we use the main available stock 
indices of our chosen eleven countries. The indices that are chosen are Oslo All Share 
index (Norway), TSX Composite index (Canada), OMXC Index (Denmark), IPC index 
(Mexico), Bovespa index (Brazil), STI Index (Singapore), FTSE All Share index (UK), 
Prime All Share Index (Germany), Nikkei 225 (Japan), SBF120 index (France) and S&P 
500 (US).  
We mainly use daily data to calculate quarterly illiquidity measures. GDP is available 
quarterly. Before the calculation of the illiquidity measures and construction of the 
portfolios, the sample is initially analysed for any unsuitable data to avoid the emergence 
of biased results. All the data use in this paper are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, 
World Bank website and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website.  
 200 
 
 
6.3.2. HAMILTON’S SHOCK EQUATIONS 
Initially, Hamilton (1983) describes oil shocks as the log change in oil prices. However, 
Hamilton (1996) highlights fluctuation issues, as since 1986 most of the oil price 
increases happen immediately after even larger oil price decreases. Thus, Hamilton (1996) 
proposes that it appears more appropriate to compare the current price of oil with where 
it has been over the previous one year (or previous four quarters) rather than the previous 
one quarter alone.  
This is appropriate as it will only cover significant increases or decreases in oil price, 
which can easily be described as an oil shock. In fact, Hamilton (2003) even suggests 
using a three years horizon instead of one year horizon. However, for our research we 
will use one year horizon similar to Engemann et al. (2014), as using three years horizon 
will further reduce our data span. According to Engemann et al. (2014), a positive 
(negative) oil price shock is defined as an increase (decrease) in the current price of oil 
above (below) the maximum (minimum) oil price over the previous four quarters.  
 
Therefore, positive oil price shocks are given by: 
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ    (6.1) 
Where ݔ௧is crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the crude oil 
Brent price of the previous four quarters. 
 
While for negative oil price shock, Engemann et al. (2014) describe it as: 
∆ݔ௧ି ൌ ݉݅݊ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௜௡൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ    (6.2) 
Where ݔ௧is crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the crude oil 
Brent price of the previous four quarters. 
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Our original sample data is between January 1997 and December 2015. Our final data for 
analysis will be from January 1998 to December 2015. Over the 18 years period, table 
6.1 shows that there are a total of 46 oil price shocks whereby 29 are positive oil price 
shocks and 17 are negative oil price shocks.  
 
Table 6.1: Number of oil price shocks after applying Hamilton’s shock equations. 
This table reports the number of oil price shocks from the following equations: 
 
1. Positive oil price shocks  
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ  (6.1) 
 
2. Negative oil price shocks  
∆ݔ௧ି ൌ ݉݅݊ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௜௡൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ  (6.2) 
 
Where ݔ௧is crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the crude oil Brent price of the 
previous four (4) quarter. The original sample data is between January 1997 and December 2015 but after 
applying Hamilton’s shock equations, our final data for analysis is from January 1998 to December 2015, 
consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank 
and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
 Positive shocks Negative shocks Total shocks 
Oil price  29 17 46 
 
 
6.3.3. ILLIQUIDITY MEASURE 
For illiquidity, we have decided to choose the Amihud Illiquidity measure (Amihud, 
2002) as it is a recognisable measure, simple to calculate and has been extensively used 
in past literature. Amihud is calculated for each stock, s, every quarter as follows 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀௦௤ ൌ 	 ଵ௤ ∑
ଵ,଴଴଴,଴଴଴	ൈ	|௥௘௧௨௥௡೟|
௣௥௜௖௘೟ൈ௩௢௟௨௠௘೟௧       (6.3) 
Where t is each trading day. 
 
6.4. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.4.1. OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND BUSINESS CYCLES  
Table 6.2 provides more information on our chosen eleven countries. It shows that five 
countries are net oil exporting countries and the other six are net oil importing countries 
including the US.  This table is constructed using the most recently available data of 2012 
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and it reports “oil exports”, “oil imports” and “net oil exports” of the countries in our 
sample. The table also reports the “annual oil revenue (expenditure) to GDP ratios” of 
the countries, which are calculated using Wang et al. (2013) framework. The “annual 
revenue (expenditure)” of a country’s net oil exports (imports) is calculated using the 
following formula:  
Annual revenue (expenditure) of a country’s net oil exports (imports) 
= Daily oil exports (imports) x number of days in a year x the annual 
average oil price.   
 (6.4) 
Where the annual average oil price of USD112.02 is the average price per barrel for Crude 
oil Brent in the year 2012 obtained from DataStream and the number of days in the year 
2012 is 366 days because it is a leap year. 
The table indicates that Canada is a major net oil exporting country whereas US is the 
main net oil importing country. The “annual oil revenue to GDP ratio” appears to be 
important for Norway while Singapore’s “annual oil expenditure to GDP ratio” is the 
highest in comparison to the other countries. 
Table 6.2: Description of countries in our sample in the year 2012. 
This table reports the oil exports, oil imports and net oil exports of oil exporting and importing countries in 
our sample of 11 countries based on the most recently available data of the year 2012. The table also reports 
the countries annual oil revenue (expenditure) to GDP ratios, which are calculated using the average Brent 
oil price in 2012 of US$112.02 per barrel obtained from DataStream. We calculate the revenue (expenditure) 
of a country’s net oil exports (imports) by the following formula: Daily oil exports (imports) x number of 
days in a year (366 days) x the average Brent oil price (USD112.02). The calculation technique for oil 
revenue to GDP ratio is similar to Wang et al (2013) framework. We have also reported the GDP 
(US$ billion) and GDP per capita (US$) of the countries in our sample. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Countries 
Crude oil Annual oil 
Revenue to 
GDP ratio 
GDP per 
capita 
(US$) 
MSCI Market 
Classification  Exports Imports Net exports (Thousand Barrels per day) 
Norway 1324 28 1296 10.42% 101,563.70 Developed 
Canada 2470 736 1734 3.90% 52,495.30 Developed 
Denmark 137 87 50 0.63% 58,125.40 Developed 
Mexico 1280 10 1270 4.39% 9,720.60 Emerging 
Brazil 526 375 151 0.25% 12,157.30 Emerging 
United Kingdom 710 1222 -512 -0.79% 41,538.30 Developed 
Singapore 0.1 1078 -1077.9 -15.28% 54,451.20 Developed 
France 1.3 1159 -1157.7 -1.77% 40,838.00 Developed 
Germany 3.8 1888 -1884.2 -2.18% 44,065.20 Developed 
Japan 0 3724 -3724 -2.56% 48,629.20 Developed 
United States 399 9812 -9413 -2.39% 51,433.00 Developed 
World (Average)     10,499.50  
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Figure 6.1: Business cycle and the oil price shocks. 
The figure shows time series plots of the oil price shocks for all countries in our sample. The black lines 
are Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable based on oil Brent prices. A positive (negative) oil shock is 
defined as when the current (quarterly) oil price is above (below) the maximum (minimum) oil price over 
the last year (4 previous quarters). Shaded grey are recession periods and a recession period is identified as 
a period for which there is negative GDP growth for at least two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 
to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank 
and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Norway Canada 
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Brazil Singapore 
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Figure 6.1 shows time series plots of the Hamilton type oil price shocks for our chosen 
countries and the recession periods in our sample. We define a recession period as a 
period for which there is negative GDP growth for two consecutive terms. Since 
Engemann et al. (2014) use the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession 
periods for the US, our recession periods are different from them. However, to ensure 
consistency with other countries in our sample, we feel that the method of observing 
negative GDP growth for two consecutive terms is sufficient103.    
As expected, the figure shows that over the years, various countries have different periods 
of recessions. Nevertheless, although the duration period can be different, the recession 
period that all the countries face in our sample is the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Therefore, we will initially investigate the relationship between oil price shocks and 
recessions during this period.  
The figure shows that generally net oil importing countries such as Singapore, UK, 
Germany, Japan, France and US go into recession immediately after enduring a positive 
oil price shock (or oil price increase). This is consistent to past studies such as Hamilton 
(1983), as countries tend to react to an increase in oil price. Our findings are also similar 
to Engemann et al. (2014) study on US states. 
Interestingly, we observe that with the exception of Denmark and Mexico, recession hits 
net oil exporting countries with a delay. In fact, for Norway, Canada and Brazil, recession 
periods only happen after a negative oil price shock, which is expected to be detrimental 
for oil exporting countries.  
Denmark and Mexico, two net oil exporting countries are probably affected earlier due 
to other factors. The economy of Denmark may not be too dependent on oil as among the 
net oil exporting countries, it exports the lowest amount of crude oil and its “annual oil 
revenue to GDP ratio” is the second lowest. Although Mexico is one of the major net oil 
exporters, its close proximity to the US may be the reason for the early recession period. 
Furthermore, US is Mexico’s main trade partner for both exports and imports 
(World_Bank).  
During other recession periods, the patterns are less noticeable for most countries. Canada 
and Brazil seem to confirm that negative oil shocks precede recession periods for net oil 
                                                 
103 Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) also determine recession periods by observing negative GDP growth for two consecutive terms. 
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exporters. This pattern can be observed during the post-2015 recession period. However, 
Mexico appears to be the most unfortunate, as it is affected by both positive and negative 
oil price shocks, which seem to cause the recessions. This is also observed by Engemann 
et al. (2014) for the US state of New Mexico, which is classified as an energy producing 
state and rank among the top eight states in terms of both oil and gas production (Snead, 
2009).  
 
6.4.1.1. OIL PRICE SHOCKS COEFFICIENT 
To further investigate the effect of oil price shocks, we use the model suggested by 
Engemann et al. (2014)  where aggregate growth is determined by lags of itself and past 
innovations to oil prices. However, unlike Engemann et al. (2014) who use payroll 
employment, we use GDP as it is available for all our sample countries. Similarly, we 
model the growth rate of the countries’ GDP,	∆ݕ௜௧, as an AR (4)104. Nevertheless, we 
omitted other variables such as the control for post-Hurricane Katrina because it is 
irrelevant to us.  
∆y୧୲ ൌ α୧ ൅ ∑ β୧୨∆y୧,୲ି୨ସ୨ୀଵ ൅ ∑ γ୧୨∆x୲ି୨ାସ୨ୀଵ ൅ ∑ δ୧୨∆x୲ି୨ିସ୨ୀଵ ൅ ε୧୲   (6.5) 
Where ∆ݕ௧ି௝ is the GDP growth, ∆ݔ௧ି௝ା  is Positive oil price shocks, ∆ݔ௧ି௝ି  is Negative oil 
price shocks. 
 
Our regression in table 6.3 shows that there is a relationship between GDP and oil price 
shocks but compared to Engemann et al. (2014) study on US, our results are less obvious. 
Engemann et al. (2014) results show that economic growth, proxied by payroll 
employment, is negative and statistically significant after a positive oil price shock at 
second, third and fourth quarter but our results show a response only at the fourth quarter. 
Nevertheless, in response to negative oil price shocks, our results are more similar to them 
as we also do not find any responses to negative oil price shocks for the US.  
                                                 
104 The lag length K for the above equation are determine by 5 tests namely Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). If there are 
any conflicts, the lag length with the highest number of significant tests is chosen and if there are still conflicts, the shortest lag length 
is chosen. However, due to the different countries (markets) involved, the tests provide conflicting lag length. Therefore, we decide 
to use four lags because most countries show similar results and it is consistent to Engemann et al. (2014) research.     
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With regards to other countries in our sample, the table appears to show that when there 
is a negative oil price shock, a few countries experience a positive and significant increase 
in GDP after the first quarter. This result is understandable for Japan and Germany 
because both countries are considered as big manufacturers and major oil importers. Thus, 
a reduction in oil prices should improve economic growth for the two countries.  
However, for Norway, Canada and Mexico, it is less straightforward, as table 6.2 shows 
that they are net oil exporting countries and it is expected that they will benefit more from 
an increase in oil prices. The results of positive response towards negative oil price shocks, 
may merely indicate that oil is not a major part of their economic growth105. This is 
obviously contradictory to Mork et al. (1994) who comment that the oil producing sector 
of Norway is large relative to its economy as a whole. Surprisingly, Norway also obtain 
a negative and significant response towards positive oil price shocks, even though our 
earlier results in the previous section find otherwise. 
As expected, Brazil, another net oil exporting country, achieves economic growth when 
there is a positive oil price shock after the first quarter. This is not surprising because as 
a net oil exporter, Brazil will benefit more from an increase in oil price. Denmark also 
shows similar results but it happens only after the third quarter. Denmark also has a 
negative response at the second and fourth quarter signifying that maybe Denmark is just 
not a major net oil exporting country, which is consistent to our results in the previous 
section.  
Overall, table 6.3 shows that categorising the countries into net oil exporting countries 
and net oil importing countries does provide some valuable insights, as net oil exporters 
such as Brazil appears to benefit from positive oil price shocks while net oil importers 
such as Germany benefits from negative oil price shocks. However, there are mixed 
responses as well and some results are not as expected. For instance, Norway, a net oil 
exporter, responds positively towards a decrease in oil price. This could be a result of the 
financial and monetary policy of the Norwegian government106.  Even for the US, the 
response to positive oil price shock comes later in comparison to Engemann et al. (2014) 
but this could be merely due to the difference in time periods and variables used.  
                                                 
105 The Norwegian government is also known to use previously accumulated wealth from oil sales to counter balance reductions in 
oil revenue and a subsequent decline in GDP. Perhaps this is the reason for the positive results obtained here.  
106 The Norwegian government is known to increase spending when there is a decrease in oil price to cancel out any negative effects. 
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Table 6.3: Regression results of oil price shocks.  
This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
∆࢟࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ࢏ ൅෍ࢼ࢏࢐∆࢟࢏,࢚ି࢐
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢽ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢾ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅ ࢿ࢏࢚							ሺ૟. ૞ሻ 
 
Where ∆ݕ௜௧ is the GDP growth at quarter t.  The other variables are positive oil price shocks (	∆ݔ௧ି௝ା  ), negative oil price shocks ( ∆ݔ௧ି௝ି  ) and also the GDP growth ( ∆ݕ௧ି௝ ) at quarterly lags of t-j, for 
which we use up to 4 quarterly lags for our regressions. Based on oil Brent prices, a positive (negative) oil shock is defined as when the current (quarterly) oil price is above (below) the maximum 
(minimum) oil price over the last year (4 previous quarters). The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations.  Newey-West p-value are reported in 
brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag 
selection. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank, IMF and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Variable   ∆࢚࢟ି࢐  ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା   ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି  
Lag   ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝ 
Coefficient α  ࢼ૚ ࢼ૛ ࢼ૜ ࢼ૝  ࢽ૚ ࢽ૛ ࢽ૜ ࢽ૝  ࢾ૚ ࢾ૛ ࢾ૜ ࢾ૝ Norway 0.008  -0.240 -0.266 -0.005 -0.162  -0.008 0.024 -0.039 0.027  0.031 -0.006 0.029 -0.009 
(0.001)  (0.015) (0.027) (0.962) (0.139)  (0.712) (0.341) (0.081) (0.357)  (0.012) (0.852) (0.101) (0.533) 
Canada 0.003  0.455 -0.101 0.091 0.031  0.006 -0.002 0.000 -0.016  0.024 -0.006 -0.001 -0.012 
(0.010)  (0.004) (0.560) (0.523) (0.790)  (0.561) (0.917) (0.964) (0.209)  (0.084) (0.512) (0.955) (0.212) 
Denmark 0.003  0.196 0.167 0.018 -0.038  0.002 -0.039 0.045 -0.033  0.022 0.003 -0.001 0.005 
(0.019)  (0.197) (0.192) (0.871) (0.763)  (0.945) (0.080) (0.039) (0.079)  (0.174) (0.785) (0.935) (0.665) 
Mexico 0.004  0.402 -0.017 0.015 -0.086  0.012 0.002 -0.002 -0.017  0.040 -0.026 -0.010 0.002 
(0.008)  (0.036) (0.904) (0.916) (0.399)  (0.297) (0.920) (0.865) (0.226)  (0.049) (0.102) (0.482) (0.894) 
Brazil 0.006  0.426 -0.240 0.123 -0.206  0.044 -0.047 0.016 -0.003  0.027 -0.006 0.005 0.009 
(0.029)  (0.019) (0.149) (0.180) (0.118)  (0.024) (0.182) (0.438) (0.899)  (0.197) (0.804) (0.810) (0.573) 
Singapore 0.050  0.180 -0.080 0.122 -0.173  0.177 -0.081 -0.138 0.135  0.128 -0.199 0.098 -0.047 
(0.033)  (0.192) (0.608) (0.517) (0.186)  (0.380) (0.776) (0.334) (0.363)  (0.278) (0.146) (0.525) (0.780) 
United Kingdom 0.003  0.600 0.234 -0.260 0.033  0.005 -0.014 -0.010 -0.001  0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.000 
(0.012)  (0.022) (0.097) (0.106) (0.664)  (0.739) (0.280) (0.284) (0.914)  (0.758) (0.568) (0.832) (0.899) 
Germany 0.002  0.389 0.021 0.060 0.003  0.010 -0.002 -0.023 0.002  0.039 -0.033 0.008 -0.012 
(0.080)  (0.000) (0.851) (0.593) (0.968)  (0.409) (0.925) (0.173) (0.837)  (0.081) (0.150) (0.569) (0.350) 
Japan 0.005  0.176 -0.150 -0.215 -0.103  0.009 -0.011 0.000 -0.024  0.057 -0.037 0.037 -0.009 
(0.007)  (0.261) (0.279) (0.047) (0.397)  (0.658) (0.733) (0.989) (0.260)  (0.006) (0.119) (0.120) (0.702) 
France 0.001  0.493 0.267 -0.045 -0.032  0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001  0.011 -0.014 0.000 -0.002 
(0.150)  (0.000) (0.066) (0.719) (0.767)  (0.862) (0.614) (0.700) (0.902)  (0.132) (0.233) (0.935) (0.800) 
United States 0.013  0.201 0.226 0.017 0.045  0.003 -0.012 0.029 -0.093  0.042 -0.055 0.021 -0.024 
(0.024)  (0.190) (0.084) (0.916) (0.707)  (0.964) (0.881) (0.637) (0.029)  (0.393) (0.267) (0.458) (0.519) 
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6.4.1.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
In the previous section, we show that the countries in our sample respond differently 
towards either positive or negative oil price shocks. Therefore, in order to investigate this 
further, we study the asymmetric effects of the countries by exploring the 
spatial/directional asymmetry from two complementary perspectives which is similar to 
Engemann et al. (2014). The two perspectives involve using the “estimated coefficients 
on the oil-price shock variables” and the “impulse responses to oil-price shocks”.  
 
6.4.1.2.1. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY I: OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
COEFFICIENT 
The aggregate directional asymmetries of the countries in table 6.4 are obtained using 
Wald tests. Table 6.4 will allow an investigation of the aggregate directional asymmetries 
in oil price shocks from the perspective of the oil price shocks’ estimated coefficients that 
are highlighted in table 6.3.  
Unlike  Engemann et al. (2014), our results in table 6.4 appear to indicate that negative 
oil price shocks cause more responses than positive oil price shocks. Nevertheless, only 
Denmark and Japan exhibit statistically significant results. Both countries display 
positive responses towards negative oil price shocks, signifying that the two countries 
benefit from it. Due to Japan’s characteristics as an oil importer, this is expected and 
consistent with earlier results. As an oil exporter, the result is surprising for Denmark but 
it can be seen as a confirmation that oil is not a major part of Denmark’s economic growth. 
Table 6.2 does show that Denmark exports the lowest amount of crude oil and its “annual 
oil revenue to GDP ratio” is the second lowest among net oil exporting countries. 
Our results also show that all the countries, with the exception of Japan, failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of directional symmetry meaning that their responses are symmetrical 
to both positive and negative oil price shocks.  
Overall, our findings show that only Japan and Denmark appear to exhibit asymmetric 
effects, which is inconsistent to past studies such as Mork (1994). Furthermore, in 
contrast to Engemann et al. (2014) study, we find no evidence of asymmetric effect for 
the US. Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) who also use GDP like we do, also find no 
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significant evidence of an asymmetric effect. The difference in results could be due to the 
different sample period and variables used.  
 
Table 6.4: Tests of aggregate directional symmetry of oil price shocks. 
The table shows the aggregate directional symmetry of oil price shocks based on the coefficients of table 
6.3 using Wald test. The variables below represent coefficients in relation to positive oil price shocks (	∑ ߛ௝ ) 
and negative oil price shocks ( ∑ߜ௝ ). ∑ߛ௝ ൌ ∑ߜ௝ is the tests for aggregate directional symmetry for the oil 
price shocks. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly 
observations. Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically 
significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is 
calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream, 
Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
H0 ෍ߛ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߜ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߛ௝ ൌ෍ߜ௝ 
 ෍ߛ௝  ෍ߜ௝   
Norway 0.003  0.046  -0.043 (0.927)  (0.118)  (0.436) 
Canada -0.012  0.005  -0.017 (0.546)  (0.691)  (0.508) 
Denmark -0.025  0.028  -0.053 (0.440)  (0.092)  (0.179) 
Mexico -0.004  0.005  -0.010 (0.891)  (0.786)  (0.800) 
Brazil 0.011  0.034  -0.024 (0.703)  (0.517)  (0.694) 
Singapore 0.093  -0.020  0.113 (0.718)  (0.930)  (0.743) 
United Kingdom -0.020  -0.001  -0.020 (0.210)  (0.951)  (0.263) 
Germany -0.013  0.002  -0.015 (0.596)  (0.860)  (0.632) 
Japan -0.026  0.048  -0.074 (0.417)  (0.050)  (0.095) 
France -0.009  -0.005  -0.004 (0.529)  (0.617)  (0.818) 
United States -0.073  -0.016  -0.057 (0.469)  (0.757)  (0.617) 
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6.4.1.2.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY II: IMPULSE RESPONSE 
FUNCTIONS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
As highlighted earlier, we have also conducted impulse response functions on the eleven 
countries, as it may be able to provide a different viewpoint of directional asymmetry, 
following Engemann et al. (2014).  
 
Table 6.5: Summary of spatial/ directional asymmetry of oil price shocks: Impulse response function. 
The table provides a summary of the results of the impulse response function of oil price shocks from figure 
6.2. A country is considered to experience a shock if its response is statistically significant (different from 
zero) for at least one quarter. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 
quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Positive oil shocks 
only 
Negative oil shocks 
only 
Both positive and 
negative oil shocks 
Neither positive nor 
negative oil shocks 
 Canada Brazil Norway 
 Denmark   
 Mexico   
 Singapore   
 United Kingdom   
 Germany   
 Japan   
 France   
 United States   
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Figure 6.2: GDP and oil price shocks impulse response function. 
This figure shows the impulse response function of the GDP to a generalised one standard deviation of 
either positive or negative oil price shocks. The VAR lag length is kept at four. The sample period is from 
January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
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Table 6.5 presents a summary of results of directional asymmetry based on impulse 
response functions. The countries in table 6.5 are segregated according to their response 
to positive and negative oil price shocks. If a country’s response is statistically different 
from zero for at least one quarter, then we consider the country to be responsive to the 
respective shock. Moreover, similar to Engemann et al. (2014) we define an asymmetric 
effect when a country responds to either  positive or negative oil price shocks. A 
symmetric effect occurs when a country responds to either both shocks (negative and 
positive) or does not respond at all.   
Unlike Engemann et al. (2014) who find that most states respond only to positive oil price 
shocks, table 6.5 shows that most countries respond to negative oil price shocks, which 
is consistent to our earlier results. Only Norway, a net oil exporting country shows 
symmetrical response to neither shocks. Brazil, another net oil exporter, is the only 
country that responds to both shocks. Surprisingly, based on impulse response functions, 
none of the countries in our sample respond only to positive oil price shocks. We will 
now investigate this further by looking at the individual countries impulse response 
functions as shown in figure 6.2.  
As expected, figure 6.2 provides more evidence that the countries respond differently to 
either positive or negative oil price shocks. Norway appears to show a bouncy response 
towards both positive and negative oil price shocks but are not significant.  
Denmark and Canada responses are only significant to negative oil price shocks, 
signifying that the GDP of Denmark and Canada grew when there is a negative oil price 
shock. Mexico’s response, another net oil exporter, is also similar to Canada. Mexico 
responds positively towards both oil price shocks but it is only significant to negative oil 
price shock. Since Canada, Denmark and Mexico are net oil exporters, positive responses 
to negative oil price shocks are not expected as it indicates that the net oil exporters are 
benefiting from decreases in oil prices107.    
As highlighted earlier in table 6.5, Brazil is the sole country that responds to both positive 
and negative oil price shocks. Brazil’s response is positive and significant to both shocks 
                                                 
107 The results of positive response towards negative oil price shocks for net oil exporters, may merely indicate that oil is not a major 
part of their economic growth such as in table 6.2, Denmark’s “annual oil revenue to GDP ratio” is actually less than 1%. Another 
reason, may be due to a close trade relationship between a net oil exporter and importer. For instance, Mexico is the main trade partner 
of the US and a negative oil price shock will allow US to trade more with Mexico causing Mexico to have a positive response 
regardless of oil revenue. Moreover, some net oil exporters may have other policies (or tools) to counter any unexpected negative oil 
price shocks. For example, Norway is known to use previously accumulated wealth from oil sales to counter balance reductions in oil 
revenue and a subsequent decline in GDP. 
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before decreasing in the next few quarters. As a net oil exporter, it is expected that GDP 
for Brazil will improve with an increase in oil price, which can be observed in figure 6.2. 
However, Brazil also responds positively to negative oil price shocks, which is 
unexpected.  
In relation to net oil importing countries, it is more consistent as all the countries respond 
significantly towards negative oil price shock. The negative responses are not surprising 
for net oil importers, as it is expected that they will benefit from a decrease in oil price. 
However, as shown in table 6.5, none of the net oil importing countries responds to 
positive oil price shock significantly.  
Regarding asymmetric effects, our results are consistent to past studies. However, in 
contrast to previous literature such as Hamilton (1983), Mork et al. (1994) and Engemann 
et al. (2014), our findings show that most countries respond to negative oil price shocks 
instead of positive oil price shocks 108 . Although Brazil responds to both shocks, 
researchers such as Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) consider the responds 
asymmetrical as it responds to both shocks positively. Nevertheless, according to 
Engemann et al. (2014), it is considered symmetrical and hence along with Norway, 
Brazil exhibit symmetrical effect.  
 
6.4.2. ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS AND BUSINESS CYCLES  
As mentioned in the literature, there is evidence of a two-way relationship between 
illiquidity and macroeconomic variables. Næs et al. (2011) and Galariotis and Giouvris 
(2015) highlight that liquidity may contain some information for estimating the current 
and future state of the economies. Also Choi and Cook (2006) discover that liquidity 
shocks significantly affect macroeconomic variables by studying the Japanese market. 
Hence, it will be interesting to study the relationship between illiquidity shocks and the 
macro-economy as Ellington et al. (2016) highlight that most literature concentrates on 
explanatory performance and none on the effects of liquidity shocks on the real economy.  
                                                 
108 The financial crisis may have cause the market to react differently and also the strength of the oil price shocks may matter more. 
Although there are more positive shocks during our sample period, the maximum shock (strength) in negative oil price shock is 47% 
whereas for positive oil price shock, the maximum shock is 28% only. Furthermore, during this period, there are six occasions where 
negative oil price shock is more than 20% while for positive oil price shocks, it only occurs twice. Also investors may be more 
concerned with negative oil price shocks due to the crisis period. Thus, resulting in macro-economies responding to negative oil price 
shocks instead of positive oil price shocks. 
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Furthermore, there is also evidence of a potential asymmetric effect of liquidity variables, 
as Said and Giouvris (2017) show that market liquidity increases after expansive 
monetary shifts but the relationship is not clear during restrictive periods in the UK. This 
drives us to conduct research on the asymmetric effects of illiquidity variables.     
We believe that Hamilton’s formula of comparing the current value of a variable with the 
previous four values of the same variable is a simple and logical technique for 
determining a variable’s shock. Thus, we feel that it can also be applied to measure the 
shocks of other variables, including illiquidity shocks.  
We calculate positive and negative illiquidity shocks using Hamilton’s shock equations 
(6.1) and (6.2) respectively but by replacing the crude oil Brent price with Amihud 
illiquidity measure values. Based on this, a positive illiquidity shock will indicate an 
increase in market illiquidity (or decline in market liquidity) while a negative illiquidity 
shock signifies a decrease in market illiquidity (or rise in market liquidity).  
Table 6.6 shows that the countries in our sample have a different number of illiquidity 
shocks with Germany having the most illiquidity shocks while Canada and UK jointly 
face the lowest number of illiquidity shocks. Denmark has the highest number of positive 
illiquidity shocks while US endure the highest number of negative illiquidity shocks. In 
relation to the other countries, only Norway and Denmark have more positive illiquidity 
shocks than negative illiquidity shocks, signifying that the two countries suffer more 
decline in market liquidity during the sample period. 
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Table 6.6: Number of illiquidity shocks (Amihud) after applying Hamilton’s shock equations. 
This table reports the number of illiquidity shocks from the following equations: 
 
1. Positive illiquidity shocks  
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ       (6.6) 
 
2. Negative illiquidity shocks  
∆ݔ௧ି ൌ ݉݅݊ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௜௡൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ        (6.7) 
 
Where ݔ௧ is Amihud illiquidity measure values at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ  are the Amihud 
illiquidity measure values of the previous four (4) quarter. The original sample data is between January 
1997 and December 2015 but after applying Hamilton’s shock equations, our final data for analysis is from 
January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Countries Amihud illiquidity measure Positive shocks Negative shocks Total shocks 
Norway 20 16 36 
Canada 6 22 28 
Denmark 21 18 39 
Mexico 14 20 34 
Brazil 10 20 30 
Singapore 15 25 40 
United Kingdom 13 15 28 
Germany 19 24 43 
Japan 8 27 35 
France 11 18 29 
United States 10 32 42 
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Figure 6.3: Business cycle and the illiquidity shocks (Amihud). 
The figure shows time series plots of the illiquidity shocks for all countries in our sample. The black lines 
are Hamilton type illiquidity shock variable based on Amihud illiquidity measure. A positive (negative) 
illiquidity shock is defined as when the current (quarterly) Amihud value is above (below) the maximum 
(minimum) Amihud value over the last year (4 previous quarters). Shaded grey are recession periods and a 
recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP growth for at least two consecutive 
terms. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. 
All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website.  
Norway Canada 
  
Denmark Mexico 
  
Brazil Singapore 
  
United Kingdom Germany 
  
Japan France 
  
United States  
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We will initially focus on the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as there are simultaneous 
recessions in our sample countries allowing for easier comparison. Figure 6.3 shows that 
Norway, Canada, Denmark, Germany and US suffer positive illiquidity shocks prior to a 
recession, signifying that market illiquidity increases before a recession. Out of the five 
countries, three are net oil exporters while the other two are net oil importers. Thus, there 
is no feasible justification based on their categorisation as either net oil exporters or 
importers.  
UK, Mexico and France also show positive illiquidity shocks but they occur at the same 
time with the recession while for Singapore and Japan, the positive illiquidity shocks 
occur one quarter after the beginning of the recession. Such results can imply that 
recessions have actually caused the positive illiquidity shock (or decrease in market 
liquidity) and not vice-versa.  
Brazil shows some unexpected results during the crisis. There is actually a negative 
illiquidity shock prior to the recession, signifying that market liquidity has actually 
increased before the recession. Thus, signifying that market illiquidity may not be an 
important factor for the Brazilian economy109. Nevertheless, among the countries in our 
sample, Brazil has the second lowest GDP per capita and along with Norway have the 
shortest recession period during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Moreover, Brazil is 
one of two countries categorised as an emerging market in table 6.2 by MSCI and as Sung 
and Giouvris (2016) comment developed and developing markets can respond differently 
to liquidity variables.  
Other than the financial crisis period, countries such as Norway, Mexico, Singapore and 
Germany show consistent positive illiquidity shocks around recession periods while the 
UK and the US do not show any other recession periods within our sample periods.  
Similar to Brazil during the crisis, Denmark, Japan and Canada also face both positive 
and negative illiquidity shocks around other recession periods. Nonetheless, Brazil and 
Japan show the most consistent results of negative illiquidity shocks prior to recession 
                                                 
109 Brazil is one of two emerging countries in our sample and hence it may be less integrated to the global financial markets compared 
to the other countries in our sample. However, Sung and Giouvris (2016) highlight that relative to national liquidity, global liquidity 
has extra explanatory power in developing markets. Since we use national liquidity for this chapter, the reaction for Brazil is probably 
less because it is an emerging country. 
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periods. The two countries have the highest number of recession periods, as Brazil and 
Japan endure five and six recessions respectively in our sample110.  
    
6.4.2.1. ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS COEFFICIENTS 
Our regression results in table 6.7 are obtained using the previous equation (6.4) but the 
oil price shocks are replaced by illiquidity shocks. The table shows that there is a clear 
relationship between GDP and illiquidity shocks. In fact, the regression results on 
illiquidity shocks are clearer compared to oil price shocks, as the results are more 
consistent and statistically significant.  
Table 6.7 generally shows that during the first quarter, most countries experience a 
negative and significant decrease in GDP when there is a positive illiquidity shock (or 
increase in market illiquidity), with the US obtaining the highest negative coefficient. 
Only Canada, Germany, France and Singapore do not react to positive illiquidity shocks. 
However, with the exception of Singapore, the other three countries show a similar 
negative coefficient but it is not statistically significant. After the first quarter, Norway, 
Denmark, Brazil, Japan and UK continue to show that positive illiquidity shocks affect 
their economies in a negative way111. 
Mexico and the US show mixed coefficients as higher lags show positive responses to 
positive illiquidity shocks. Only Canada experiences a positive response, instead of a 
negative response, to positive illiquidity shocks over the four lags, signifying that the 
GDP of Canada increases following an increase in market illiquidity. Furthermore, 
Singapore, Germany and France do not show any reaction to positive illiquidity shocks.  
                                                 
110 The 1997 Asian financial crisis may have effected Japan due to its close economic relationship within the Asian region. Although 
later, Brazil is also effected by the Asian financial crisis (Frontline, n.d.). Nevertheless, Japan has been known to be in perpetual 
recession while the low GDP per capita for Brazil and being categorised as an emerging market may be the reason why Brazil is less 
integrated with foreign markets. Therefore, these may have increased the number of recessions for the two countries, resulting in the 
unique results. However, further investigations provide more consistent results as Japan is found to be negatively affected by positive 
illiquidity shocks while Brazil is not affected by either shocks, which is better explained in sub-chapter 6.4.2.2.2. Spatial/ Directional 
Asymmetry II: Impulse Response Functions of Illiquidity Shocks. 
111  The results are anticipated because market illiquidity is expected to coincide with poor economy. Past research such as 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlights that when liquidity becomes scarce, speculators cut back on the provision for assets, 
potentially affecting the economy due to fewer projects. Moreover, Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) mention that there is a negative 
relationship between illiquidity and GDP, signifying that as market illiquidity increases, the economy will shrink. Thus, if market 
illiquidity decreases, the economy is expected to improve. Central banks use interest rates as a monetary policy instrument. By keeping 
interest rates low, banks will encourage economic growth. Said and Giouvris (2017) mention that low interest rates appear to increase 
market liquidity. 
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Reactions to negative illiquidity shocks are less convincing as there are fewer statistically 
significant coefficients. Among the statistically significant coefficients, only Mexico 
shows a positive response at first and third lags after a negative illiquidity shock, as it is 
expected that the economy will grow with an increase in market liquidity. Canada, 
Singapore and Germany unexpectedly experience negative responses at different quarters. 
By looking at the first quarter, nine countries exhibit negative instead of positive 
responses to negative illiquidity shocks but it is generally not statistically significant.  
Overall, it appears that investors are more concerned when there is less liquidity available, 
which is consistent to past research.  
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Table 6.7: Regression results of illiquidity shocks. 
This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
∆࢟࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ࢏ ൅෍ࢼ࢏࢐∆࢟࢏,࢚ି࢐
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢽ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢾ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅ ࢿ࢏࢚							ሺ૟. ૡሻ 
 
Where ∆ݕ௜௧ is the GDP growth at quarter t.  The other variables are positive illiquidity shocks (	∆ݔ௧ି௝ା  ), negative illiquidity shocks ( ∆ݔ௧ି௝ି  ) and also the GDP growth ( ∆ݕ௧ି௝ ) at quarterly lags of t-j, for 
which we use up to 4 quarterly lags for our regressions. Based on Amihud illiquidity measure, a positive (negative) illiquidity shock is defined as when the current (quarterly) Amihud value is above 
(below) the maximum (minimum) Amihud value over the last year (4 previous quarters). The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. Newey-West 
p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the 
Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Variable   ∆࢚࢟ି࢐  ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା   ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି  
Lag   ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝ 
Coefficient α  ࢼ૚ ࢼ૛ ࢼ૜ ࢼ૝  ࢽ૚ ࢽ૛ ࢽ૜ ࢽ૝  ࢾ૚ ࢾ૛ ࢾ૜ ࢾ૝ Norway 0.012   -0.450 -0.402 -0.195 -0.228   -0.028 -0.003 -0.012 -0.004   -0.002 -0.013 0.006 -0.005 
(0.000)   (0.003) (0.011) (0.084) (0.034)   (0.001) (0.557) (0.040) (0.607)   (0.796) (0.277) (0.354) (0.588) 
Canada 0.001   0.586 -0.250 0.172 0.009   -0.013 0.009 0.011 0.009   -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
(0.767)   (0.000) (0.144) (0.289) (0.950)   (0.184) (0.101) (0.012) (0.378)   (0.416) (0.346) (0.061) (0.346) 
Denmark 0.003   0.032 0.163 0.054 -0.017   -0.012 -0.011 0.002 -0.001   -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.160)   (0.762) (0.301) (0.536) (0.903)   (0.001) (0.028) (0.738) (0.922)   (0.509) (0.925) (0.841) (0.906) 
Mexico 0.005   0.520 -0.076 0.028 -0.054   -0.023 0.001 0.015 -0.009   0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 
(0.003)   (0.002) (0.614) (0.862) (0.588)   (0.007) (0.755) (0.000) (0.348)   (0.049) (0.930) (0.008) (0.583) 
Brazil 0.005   0.468 -0.166 0.074 -0.155   -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.008   0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 
(0.138)   (0.004) (0.355) (0.489) (0.268)   (0.073) (0.908) (0.920) (0.057)   (0.553) (0.685) (0.511) (0.356) 
Singapore 0.043   0.104 -0.192 0.093 -0.199   0.017 -0.053 0.030 -0.045   -0.162 -0.021 -0.074 -0.014 
(0.048)   (0.337) (0.236) (0.664) (0.123)   (0.835) (0.718) (0.779) (0.666)   (0.017) (0.691) (0.109) (0.845) 
United Kingdom 0.003   0.552 0.171 -0.198 0.040   -0.015 -0.007 -0.009 0.005   -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 
(0.005)   (0.001) (0.258) (0.124) (0.670)   (0.046) (0.071) (0.089) (0.563)   (0.698) (0.349) (0.318) (0.964) 
Germany 0.001   0.387 -0.014 0.046 -0.126   -0.005 -0.007 0.004 0.004   -0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.015 
(0.483)   (0.085) (0.878) (0.681) (0.289)   (0.489) (0.194) (0.509) (0.428)   (0.204) (0.499) (0.252) (0.047) 
Japan 0.005   0.106 -0.173 -0.329 -0.112   -0.039 0.004 -0.034 -0.007   -0.007 0.002 0.009 -0.004 
(0.007)   (0.481) (0.141) (0.010) (0.297)   (0.000) (0.632) (0.005) (0.505)   (0.399) (0.821) (0.386) (0.631) 
France 0.001   0.522 0.158 -0.016 -0.003   -0.005 -0.003 0.011 0.001   -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.655)   (0.001) (0.344) (0.895) (0.977)   (0.340) (0.429) (0.191) (0.813)   (0.303) (0.808) (0.275) (0.732) 
United States 0.009   0.079 0.237 0.161 0.065   -0.075 0.011 0.024 0.047   -0.037 -0.003 -0.015 0.055 
(0.474)   (0.560) (0.099) (0.463) (0.578)   (0.001) (0.620) (0.391) (0.058)   (0.311) (0.914) (0.631) (0.203) 
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6.4.2.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
Similar to oil price shocks, in order to scrutinise illiquidity shocks further, we study the 
asymmetry effects of the countries by exploring the spatial/directional asymmetry using 
two complementary perspectives namely the “estimated coefficients on the illiquidity 
shock variables” and the “impulse responses to illiquidity shocks”.  
 
6.4.2.2.1. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY I: ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS 
COEFFICIENT 
To obtain the aggregate directional asymmetry tests of the illiquidity shocks coefficients, 
we use Wald tests. This section will allow an investigation of directional asymmetries in 
illiquidity shocks from the perspective of the shocks’ estimated coefficients reported 
earlier in table 6.7. Table 6.8 shows that when there is a positive illiquidity shock, only 
Norway, UK and Japan show a negative and statistically significant response, which is 
consistent to the previous section. Most of the other countries also have a negative 
response but it is not statistically significant. US is a bit of a surprise because it provides 
the highest statistically significant negative response in table 6.7 for the first lag but then 
again the fourth lag is positive and significant.  
In relation to negative illiquidity shocks, the results are less convincing. Table 6.8 shows 
that there are statistically significant results but the responses are negative, signifying that 
as market liquidity increases, GDP actually decreases. Countries that show such a 
significant negative response are Canada, Singapore and Germany. Moreover, the rest of 
the countries also show negative responses but results are not statistically significant with 
the exception of Mexico, UK and US. Although the latter three countries show positive 
responses, results are not statistically significant.  
The last column shows that other than Japan, all the countries in our sample failed to 
reject the null hypothesis of directional symmetry signifying that all the other countries 
are symmetrical to their response to positive and negative illiquidity shocks. This is 
unexpected as past literature shows that investors react differently to either an increase or 
decrease in market liquidity.  
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Table 6.8: Tests of aggregate directional symmetry of illiquidity shocks. 
The table shows the aggregate directional symmetry of illiquidity shocks based on the coefficients of table 
6.7 using Wald test. The variables below represent coefficients in relation to positive illiquidity shocks 
(	∑ ߛ௝ ) and negative illiquidity shocks ( ∑ߜ௝ ). ∑ߛ௝ ൌ ∑ߜ௝ is the tests for aggregate directional symmetry 
for the illiquidity shocks. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 
quarterly observations. Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote 
statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-
value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream, 
Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
H0 ෍ߛ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߜ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߛ௝ ൌ෍ߜ௝ 
 ෍ߛ௝  ෍ߜ௝   
Norway -0.047   -0.014   -0.034 (0.003)   (0.311)   (0.113) 
Canada 0.016   -0.013   0.029 (0.268)   (0.037)   (0.100) 
Denmark -0.021   -0.008   -0.013 (0.145)   (0.544)   (0.556) 
Mexico -0.015   0.006   -0.021 (0.224)   (0.168)   (0.179) 
Brazil -0.013   -0.008   -0.005 (0.102)   (0.444)   (0.723) 
Singapore -0.051   -0.271   0.221 (0.817)   (0.057)   (0.358) 
United Kingdom -0.026   0.005   -0.031 (0.075)   (0.539)   (0.105) 
Germany -0.003   -0.025   0.022 (0.784)   (0.056)   (0.213) 
Japan -0.076   -0.001   -0.075 (0.001)   (0.958)   (0.006) 
France 0.004   -0.005   0.010 (0.684)   (0.418)   (0.534) 
United States 0.006   0.000   0.006 (0.935)   (0.999)    0.9638 
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6.4.2.2.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY II: IMPULSE RESPONSE 
FUNCTIONS OF ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS 
To provide a different viewpoint of the directional asymmetry, as before, we have also 
conducted impulse response function on the eleven countries.  
 
Table 6.9: Summary of spatial/ directional asymmetry of illiquidity shocks: Impulse response 
function.  
The table provides a summary of the results of the impulse response function of the illiquidity shocks from 
figure 6.4. A country is considered to experience a shock if its response is statistically significant (different 
from zero) for at least one quarter. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting 
of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Positive shocks only Negative shocks only Both positive and negative shocks 
Neither positive nor 
negative shocks 
Norway  Mexico Brazil 
Canada  Singapore Germany 
Denmark    
United Kingdom    
Japan    
France    
United States    
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Figure 6.4: GDP and illiquidity shocks Impulse Response Function. 
This figure shows the impulse response function of the GDP to a generalised one standard deviation of 
either positive or negative illiquidity shocks. The VAR lag length is kept at four. The sample period is from 
January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
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Table 6.9 shows the summary of the impulse response functions to positive and negative 
illiquidity shocks, whereby we consider the country to be responsive to an illiquidity 
shock if the country’s response is statistically different from zero for at least one quarter.  
Even though table 6.8 shows that only Japan rejects the null hypothesis of directional 
symmetry, table 6.9 indicates that seven of the countries in the sample are experiencing 
directional asymmetry by responding to positive illiquidity shocks only. Mexico and 
Singapore are the only two countries that respond to both positive and negative illiquidity 
shocks while Brazil and Germany respond to neither shock. Since our previous section 
shows inconsistent results to negative illiquidity shocks, it is not a surprise that table 6.9 
shows similar results that none of the countries respond only to negative shocks. To 
investigate this further, we will now look at the individual countries’ impulse response 
functions as shown in figure 6.4.  
Figure 6.4 shows that Norway and Japan experience bouncy responses to both positive 
and negative illiquidity shocks but only responses to positive illiquidity shocks are 
statistically significant. As expected, the two countries’ response to positive illiquidity 
shock started off negatively indicating that an increase in market illiquidity has caused 
the GDP of Norway and Japan to fall.  
Canada show less bouncy graphs but similar to Norway and Japan, Canada also responds 
negatively to positive illiquidity shocks only. Such graphs can also be observed for 
Denmark and UK whereby GDP responds negatively to positive illiquidity shocks during 
the second quarter followed by a GDP increase in the following quarter. US and France 
also respond to positive illiquidity shocks only but the graph is slightly different as it is 
negative in the first quarter before gradually increasing in the next quarters.  
Although Mexico experiences a similar negative response to a positive illiquidity shock, 
Mexico also experiences a statistically significant positive response to a negative 
illiquidity shock. This indicates that the GDP of Mexico is increasing when there is a 
negative illiquidity shock (or an increase in market liquidity). Therefore, Mexico appears 
to exhibit a genuine symmetrical effect as positive and negative illiquidity shocks causes 
the GDP of Mexico to move in the opposite direction respectively.  
Singapore is the other country that responds to both positive and negative illiquidity 
shocks. As expected, Singapore responds negatively to positive illiquidity shocks and it 
occurs immediately during the first quarter which is similar to the US. However, unlike 
 228 
 
Mexico, Singapore’s response to negative illiquidity shocks is also negative signifying 
that when market liquidity increases, the GDP of Singapore decreases instead. Although 
the reaction of Singapore to negative illiquidity shocks is surprising, this is actually 
consistent to our findings in table 6.8 as Singapore has a statistically significant negative 
aggregate coefficient. Therefore, although Singapore responds to both shocks, it does not 
have a genuine symmetrical effect similar to Mexico, as it responds to both shocks 
negatively. However, based on Engemann et al. (2014), it is considered as symmetrical.  
Brazil and Germany show no statistically significant responses to both positive and 
negative illiquidity shocks. Nevertheless, the pattern of the graphs for Brazil follow 
closely those of Mexico as there are negative and positive responses to positive and 
negative illiquidity shocks respectively, which is interesting as both Mexico and Brazil 
have the lowest GDP per capita and they are the only countries categorised as emerging 
markets in our sample. Germany shows a pattern of negative responses to negative 
illiquidity shocks that is more in line with the other countries in our sample. Since there 
are no statistically significant results for the two countries, the two countries exhibit 
symmetrical effect. The results could mean that illiquidity shocks do not actually impact 
the GDP of Brazil and Germany.  
Overall, according to Engemann et al. (2014) description, four countries exhibit 
symmetrical effect to illiquidity shocks namely Mexico, Singapore, Brazil and Germany.  
 
6.4.3. NATIONAL OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND BUSINESS CYCLES  
Since Cunado and De Gracia (2005) study of six Asian countries suggests that the 
significant effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables becomes more 
significant when the shocks are defined in local (or national) currencies, we decide to 
briefly investigate this. 
As we are aware, the crude oil Brent price is in USD. In order to convert the price to 
national crude oil Brent price, we simply multiply the specific country’s foreign exchange 
rate against USD with the crude oil Brent price (e.g. For the UK = GBP/USD x crude oil 
Brent price). 
Table 6.10 shows the number of oil price shocks of the countries over the 18 years period 
after converting the oil price shocks to national oil price shocks. Obviously, US is not 
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affected as it is already in USD but the other countries are affected in different ways, 
shown in table 6.11.  
Table 6.11 shows that the total number of oil shocks for Denmark has reduced by more 
than 10% while the total shocks for Canada have increased by 8.7%. However, in terms 
of positive oil price shocks, Brazil is the most affected as its positive oil price shocks 
increase by more than 24% while its negative oil price shocks are reduced by almost 30% 
after currency conversion. Considering this, Brazil is in fact more affected in comparison 
to Denmark.  
Table 6.11 also shows that Singapore, UK and Japan appear to exhibit significant 
movement of both positive and negative shocks after currency conversation. Moreover, 
the table also shows that the number of negative oil price shocks for Norway, Mexico, 
Germany and France are not affected by it. Other than that, France and Germany which 
use the Euro (EUR) understandably have the same number of shocks. 
As a result of currency conversion, figure 6.5 doesn’t actually show any substantial 
changes that would change our earlier viewpoints as shown in figure 6.1. Other than oil 
price shocks becoming more or less pronounced, the relationship between oil price shocks 
and business cycles (or recessions) appears to be the same. 
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Table 6.10: Number of national oil price shocks after applying Hamilton’s shock equations. 
This table reports the number of national oil price shocks from the following equations: 
 
1. Positive national oil price shocks  
∆ݔ௧ା ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௔௫൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ       (6.9) 
 
2. Negative national oil price shocks  
∆ݔ௧ି ൌ ݉݅݊ ൜0, 100	 ൈ ݈݊ ௫೟௠௜௡൫௫೟షభ,௫೟షమ,௫೟షయ,௫೟షర൯ൠ       (6.10) 
 
Where ݔ௧is national crude oil Brent price at quarter t and ݔ௧ିଵ, ݔ௧ିଶ,ݔ௧ିଷ,ݔ௧ିସ are the national crude oil 
Brent price of the previous four (4) quarter. Since the crude oil Brent price is in USD, the national crude 
oil Brent price is obtained by multiplying the specific country’s foreign exchange rate with the crude oil 
Brent price (e.g. for the UK = GBP/USD x Oil price). The original sample data is between January 1997 
and December 2015 but after applying Hamilton’s shock equations, our final data for analysis is from 
January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Countries National oil price Positive shocks Negative shocks Total shocks 
Norway 28 17 45 
Canada 30 20 50 
Denmark 25 16 41 
Mexico 31 17 48 
Brazil 36 12 48 
Singapore 27 21 48 
United Kingdom 25 21 46 
Germany 26 17 43 
Japan 33 14 47 
France 26 17 43 
United States 29 17 46 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.11: Percentage change in number of national oil price shocks compared to oil price shocks. 
This table reports the percentage change in the number of national oil price shocks (table 6.10) in 
comparison to the number of oil price shocks (table 6.1). Since the crude oil Brent price is in USD, the 
national crude oil Brent price is obtained by multiplying the specific country’s foreign exchange rate with 
the crude oil Brent price (e.g. for the UK = GBP/USD x Oil price). The sample is from January 1998 to 
December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, 
Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Countries Percentage change Positive shocks Negative shocks Total shocks 
Norway -3.4% 0.0% -2.2% 
Canada 3.4% 17.6% 8.7% 
Denmark -13.8% -5.9% -10.9% 
Mexico 6.9% 0.0% 4.3% 
Brazil 24.1% -29.4% 4.3% 
Singapore -6.9% 23.5% 4.3% 
United Kingdom -13.8% 23.5% 0.0% 
Germany -10.3% 0.0% -6.5% 
Japan 13.8% -17.6% 2.2% 
France -10.3% 0.0% -6.5% 
United States 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Figure 6.5: Business cycle and the national oil price shocks. 
The figure shows time series plots of the national oil price shocks for all countries in our sample. The black 
lines are Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable based on national crude oil Brent prices, obtained by 
multiplying the specific country’s foreign exchange rate with the crude oil Brent price (e.g. for the UK = 
GBP/USD x Oil price). A positive (negative) oil shock is defined as when the current (quarterly) oil price 
is above (below) the maximum (minimum) oil price over the last year (4 previous quarters). Shaded grey 
are recession periods and a recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP growth 
for at least two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. All data 
are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
website. 
Norway Canada 
 
Denmark Mexico 
  
Brazil Singapore 
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Japan France 
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6.4.3.1. NATIONAL OIL PRICE SHOCKS COEFFICIENT 
Although figure 6.5 in the previous section seems to show minimum changes, we also 
conduct more regressions as shown in table 6.12 to investigate the issue further. In 
comparison to table 6.3, table 6.12 shows some significant changes in the relationship 
between GDP and oil price shocks after converting to national currencies.  
Norway now shows a significant positive response instead of a negative response to 
positive national oil price shocks, which is expected for net oil exporting countries. 
Denmark still shows both positive and negative responses to positive national oil price 
shocks but relative to table 6.3, the negative response at lag four is now not significant. 
Brazil appears to be affected the most by the currency conversion. Its response to positive 
national oil price shocks is now negative especially at lag 2, which is not expected for a 
net oil exporter. The UK also now responds negatively to positive national oil price 
shocks at the third lag and as a net oil importer, it is expected that the UK will be adversely 
affected by the positive shock.  
Nevertheless, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Germany, Japan and France response to 
positive oil shocks are not affected by converting to local currencies, even though some 
countries such as Germany and Japan show substantial changes in the number of shocks, 
as shown in table 6.11. The changes in responses for Denmark, UK and Brazil are 
consistent to table 6.11, as the three countries have endured the most changes in the 
number of positive shocks due to the conversion. However, although the number of 
positive oil shocks for Norway does not change much, it does result in significant 
responses. 
In relation to negative oil price shocks, the original results in table 6.3 for Canada and 
Mexico appear to be affected by currency conversion, as now the two countries do not 
significantly and positively respond to negative shocks. Japan now shows a positive 
response to a negative oil price shock at the third lag but it also shows a negative response 
at the second lag. Moreover, Singapore exhibits negative responses to negative oil shocks 
which are also not expected for a net oil importer, while Germany is found not to be 
positively affected by the negative oil price shock anymore.  
Table 6.11 highlights that due to currency conversion, there are changes to the number of 
negative oil shocks for Canada, Singapore and Japan, while there are no changes for 
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Norway and France. Mexico and Germany do not display any changes to the number of 
oil shocks but as highlighted earlier their response to negative oil price shocks have 
changed, which is surprising. This indicates that the timing as well as the strength of the 
shocks and not the number of shocks may have caused the changes of the two countries 
response to negative oil price shocks. 
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Table 6.12: Regression results of national oil price shocks.  
This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
∆࢟࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ࢏ ൅෍ࢼ࢏࢐∆࢟࢏,࢚ି࢐
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢽ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅෍ࢾ࢏࢐∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି
૝
࢐ୀ૚
൅ ࢿ࢏࢚							ሺ૟. ૚૚ሻ 
 
Where ∆ݕ௜௧ is the GDP growth at quarter t.  The other variables are positive national oil price shocks (	∆ݔ௧ି௝ା  ), negative national oil price shocks ( ∆ݔ௧ି௝ି  ) and also the GDP growth ( ∆ݕ௧ି௝ ) at quarterly 
lags of t-j, for which we use up to 4 quarterly lags for our regressions. National crude oil Brent price = Country’s FX rate X crude oil Brent price. Based on national crude oil Brent prices, a positive 
(negative) oil shock is defined as when the current (quarterly) oil price is above (below) the maximum (minimum) oil price over the last year (4 previous quarters). The sample period is from January 1998 
to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The 
bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website. 
Variable   ∆࢚࢟ି࢐  ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ା   ∆࢚࢞ି࢐ି  
Lag   ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝  ࢐ ൌ ૚ ࢐ ൌ ૛ ࢐ ൌ ૜ ࢐ ൌ ૝ 
Coefficient α  ࢼ૚ ࢼ૛ ࢼ૜ ࢼ૝  ࢽ૚ ࢽ૛ ࢽ૜ ࢽ૝  ࢾ૚ ࢾ૛ ࢾ૜ ࢾ૝ Norway 0.008   -0.204 -0.246 -0.001 -0.202   -0.033 0.047 -0.028 0.013   0.051 -0.020 0.039 -0.021 
(0.001)   (0.023) (0.033) (0.990) (0.055)   (0.277) (0.068) (0.168) (0.567)   (0.000) (0.451) (0.116) (0.272) 
Canada 0.003   0.518 -0.140 0.103 0.015   0.013 -0.001 -0.012 -0.010   0.021 -0.007 -0.004 -0.010 
(0.031)   (0.002) (0.391) (0.494) (0.901)   (0.243) (0.940) (0.381) (0.340)   (0.263) (0.634) (0.756) (0.485) 
Denmark 0.002   0.233 0.126 0.061 -0.085   0.030 -0.049 0.050 -0.024   0.017 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 
(0.296)   (0.119) (0.426) (0.516) (0.473)   (0.161) (0.017) (0.045) (0.201)   (0.304) (0.958) (0.620) (0.840) 
Mexico 0.005   0.435 -0.067 -0.010 -0.111   0.012 0.002 -0.003 -0.015   0.047 -0.023 -0.014 0.014 
(0.004)   (0.023) (0.648) (0.941) (0.284)   (0.311) (0.896) (0.860) (0.243)   (0.104) (0.279) (0.428) (0.494) 
Brazil 0.007   0.457 -0.245 0.154 -0.262   0.034 -0.060 0.027 0.000   0.046 -0.010 0.010 0.022 
(0.016)   (0.009) (0.160) (0.160) (0.054)   (0.061) (0.058) (0.174) (0.982)   (0.178) (0.776) (0.798) (0.437) 
Singapore 0.048   0.182 -0.077 0.141 -0.178   0.167 -0.104 -0.065 0.110   0.128 -0.250 0.121 -0.057 
(0.042)   (0.182) (0.635) (0.467) (0.153)   (0.406) (0.722) (0.670) (0.432)   (0.315) (0.078) (0.481) (0.756) 
United Kingdom 0.002   0.619 0.221 -0.237 0.012   0.004 -0.011 -0.015 0.006   -0.002 0.003 -0.006 0.001 
(0.024)   (0.016) (0.115) (0.101) (0.868)   (0.817) (0.456) (0.044) (0.553)   (0.834) (0.729) (0.555) (0.842) 
Germany 0.001   0.391 0.012 0.100 -0.027   0.010 0.004 -0.020 0.012   0.035 -0.034 0.002 -0.015 
(0.421)   (0.001) (0.920) (0.348) (0.698)   (0.482) (0.832) (0.275) (0.288)   (0.160) (0.154) (0.891) (0.258) 
Japan 0.004   0.210 -0.190 -0.218 -0.088   0.015 -0.007 -0.014 -0.009   0.054 -0.035 0.037 -0.016 
(0.019)   (0.177) (0.105) (0.033) (0.415)   (0.327) (0.849) (0.465) (0.564)   (0.000) (0.036) (0.010) (0.220) 
France 0.000   0.490 0.269 -0.010 -0.065   0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.005   0.004 -0.015 -0.007 -0.001 
(0.638)   (0.001) (0.039) (0.932) (0.549)   (0.464) (0.931) (0.935) (0.594)   (0.640) (0.240) (0.178) (0.936) 
United States 0.013   0.201 0.226 0.017 0.045   0.003 -0.012 0.029 -0.093   0.042 -0.055 0.021 -0.024 
(0.024)   (0.190) (0.084) (0.916) (0.707)   (0.964) (0.881) (0.637) (0.029)   (0.393) (0.267) (0.458) (0.519) 
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6.4.3.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY OF NATIONAL OIL PRICE 
SHOCKS 
We will also investigate the effect of currency conversion on the asymmetry effects of 
the countries by exploring the spatial/directional asymmetry from two complementary 
perspectives. As before, this will be conducted by looking at “estimated coefficients on 
the national oil price shock variables” and the “impulse responses to national oil price 
shocks”.  
 
6.4.3.2.1. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY I: NATIONAL OIL PRICE 
SHOCKS COEFFICIENT 
This section will allow an investigation of directional asymmetries in national oil price 
shocks from the perspective of the shocks’ estimated coefficients reported earlier in table 
6.12. Table 6.13 shows that the currency conversion has caused none of the countries to 
have significant responses to either positive or negative national oil price shocks. 
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Table 6.13: Tests of aggregate directional symmetry of national oil price shocks. 
The table shows the aggregate directional symmetry of national oil price shocks based on the coefficients 
of table 6.12 using Wald test. The variables below represent coefficients in relation to positive oil price 
shocks (	∑ ߛ௝  ) and negative oil price shocks ( ∑ߜ௝  ). ∑ߛ௝ ൌ ∑ߜ௝  is the tests for aggregate directional 
symmetry for the national oil price shocks. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, 
consisting of 72 quarterly observations. Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures 
denote statistically significance coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-
West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank, IMF and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
H0 ෍ߛ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߜ௝ ൌ 0  ෍ߛ௝ ൌ෍ߜ௝ 
 ෍ߛ௝  ෍ߜ௝   
Norway 0.000   0.048   -0.049 (0.992)   (0.206)   (0.446) 
Canada -0.010   0.000   -0.010 (0.680)   (0.993)   (0.753) 
Denmark 0.007   0.012   -0.005 (0.764)   (0.598)   (0.873) 
Mexico -0.004   0.023   -0.027 (0.906)   (0.447)   (0.584) 
Brazil 0.001   0.067   -0.066 (0.960)   (0.417)   (0.446) 
Singapore 0.108   -0.058   0.166 (0.645)   (0.815)   (0.618) 
United Kingdom -0.016   -0.003   -0.013 (0.232)   (0.734)   (0.470) 
Germany 0.006   -0.012   0.018 (0.740)   (0.504)   (0.547) 
Japan -0.014   0.040   -0.055 (0.692)   (0.101)   (0.186) 
France 0.001   -0.018   0.020 (0.916)   (0.148)   (0.261) 
United States -0.073   -0.016   -0.057 (0.469)   (0.757)   (0.617) 
  
 
6.4.3.2.2. SPATIAL/ DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY II: IMPULSE RESPONSE 
FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
We have also conducted impulse response functions on the eleven countries, in order to 
provide a different perspective of the directional asymmetry. Table 6.14 shows that two 
countries are affected by currency conversion namely Brazil and UK.  
As shown in table 6.11, Brazil has the most changes in the number of positive oil price 
shocks and this may have caused Brazil’s response to positive oil price shocks to become 
insignificant. Nevertheless, Brazil’s response to negative oil price shocks is not affected 
even though Brazil has the most changes in the number of negative oil price shocks. On 
the other hand, UK’s response to negative oil price shocks has become insignificant. In 
order to further analyse the effect of currency conversion, we will also check the impulse 
response functions of the individual countries. 
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Figure 6.6 shows that there are some changes to the responses but the pattern appears to 
be similar. For example, although not significant Brazil and Mexico exhibit negative 
response to positive oil price shocks at the first quarter, which is not the case in figure 
6.2. This is contrary to our understanding because as a net oil exporter, Brazil is expected 
to exhibit positive response to positive oil price shocks. This can also be seen for 
Germany, which now exhibits a positive response to a positive oil price shock also at the 
first quarter, which again is contrary to our findings, as Germany is a net oil importer. In 
relation to negative oil price shocks, only Norway shows changes relative to figure 6.2. 
Nonetheless, none of the responses are considered to be significant, indicating that the 
changes do not really matter. 
 
Table 6.14: Summary of spatial/ directional asymmetry of national oil price shocks: Impulse response 
function. 
The table provides a summary of the results of the impulse response function of the national oil price shocks 
from figure 6.6. A country is considered to experience a shock if its response is statistically significant 
(different from zero) for at least one quarter. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, 
consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank 
and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Positive oil shocks 
only 
Negative oil shocks 
only 
Both positive and 
negative oil shocks 
Neither positive nor 
negative oil shocks 
 Canada  Norway 
 Denmark  United Kingdom 
 Mexico   
 Brazil   
 Singapore   
 Germany   
 Japan   
 France   
 United States   
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Figure 6.6: GDP and national oil price shocks impulse response function. 
This figure shows the impulse response function of the GDP to a generalised one standard deviation of 
either positive or negative national oil price shocks. Since the crude oil Brent price is in USD, the national 
crude oil Brent price is obtained by multiplying the specific country’s foreign exchange rate with the crude 
oil Brent price (e.g. for the UK = GBP/USD x Oil price). The VAR lag length is kept at four. The sample 
period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are 
obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
website. 
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6.5. CONCLUSION 
This study looks at the impact of oil price shocks on eleven countries, consisting of five 
net oil exporting countries and six net oil importing countries. Our research starts off with 
the investigation of the relationship between oil price shocks and our sample countries.  
During the financial crisis, our research initially shows that generally net oil importing 
countries such as Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan, France and US appear to go into 
recession immediately after a positive oil price shock, which is consistent to past studies 
such as Hamilton (1983). Whilst for net oil exporting countries such as Norway, Canada 
and Brazil, the recession only happens after a negative oil price shock.  
Further investigation appears to indicate that Brazil, a net oil exporter, benefits from 
positive oil price shocks while net oil importers such as Germany benefits from negative 
oil price shocks. Nevertheless, there are mixed responses as well, such as for the US, the 
response to positive oil price shocks is delayed in comparison to Engemann et al. (2014) 
but this may merely be due to the differences in time periods and variables use.  
Our first asymmetry effect exercise shows that all countries with the exception of Japan 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of directional symmetry. This means that all other 
countries exhibit a symmetrical response to both positive and negative oil price shocks. 
However, using impulse response functions, two countries exhibit symmetrical effect 
while most countries show significant asymmetry effects. However, most countries 
respond to negative oil price shocks instead of positive oil price shocks. This makes 
drawing a conclusion difficult regarding the effect of oil price shocks on macro-
economies.  
We also investigate the relationship between illiquidity shocks and the macro-economy 
of our sample countries. During the financial crisis period, some countries such as 
Norway, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the US endure positive illiquidity shocks prior 
to a recession period signifying that a market illiquidity increase (or market liquidity 
decrease) is followed by a recession. Further investigation by regression models reveals 
a clear relationship between illiquidity shocks and GDP in relation to positive illiquidity 
shocks. Moreover, the results on illiquidity shocks seem to be much clearer in comparison 
to oil price shocks.  
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Similar to oil price, the first asymmetry effect test is less convincing but when using 
impulse response functions results are more consistent. Results indicate that seven of our 
sample countries experience directional asymmetry by responding to positive illiquidity 
shocks only, while four countries show symmetrical effect. However, Mexico seems to 
exhibit a genuine symmetrical effect as positive and negative illiquidity shocks cause the 
GDP of Mexico to move in the opposite direction respectively. 
We also study national oil price shocks briefly as Cunado and De Gracia (2005) show 
that the significant effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables becomes more 
significant when the shocks are defined in national currencies. Unfortunately, our results 
are mixed, as earlier tests appear to show improvement in the results but later tests show 
results that contradict past literature.   
In conclusion, we obtain contradictory results regarding the effect of oil price shocks on 
national economies. Although national oil price shocks show mixed results, our initial 
tests show some encouraging results due to currency conversion, signifying potential for 
future research. In addition illiquidity shocks appear to provide much clearer results 
(asymmetry is present) even though the Hamilton (1996) equation is actually meant for 
oil price shocks. Overall our study shows that illiquidity shocks112 appear to be at least 
an equally important determinant of the state of the economy compared to oil price shocks 
which are thought to be one of the most important factors for a number of years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 Market capitalisation may be an important variable for liquidity because by comparing the market capitalization of a specific 
country’s stock market relative to another, stock markets with high market capitalisation is expected to be more liquid as it is more 
globally integrated. Another criterion that we should consider is foreign investor as Sung and Giouvris (2016) signifies its importance 
particularly for developing countries. Sung and Giouvris (2016) highlight that foreign direct investment is increasingly sought by 
developing countries and it could increase liquidity as well as macroeconomic indicators in the host country. In our research, we have 
not considered market capitalization because one of the variables of our illiquidity measure namely Amihud illiquidity measure is 
market value (or capitalization). Even though we have also not included foreign investors, we feel that including market value and 
foreign investors may be good for our future research. 
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CHAPTER 7 : OIL, BALTIC DRY INDEX, MARKET LIQUIDITY AND BUSINESS 
CYCLES: EVIDENCE FROM NET OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES AND NET OIL 
IMPORTING COUNTRIES  
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008, liquidity research has gained importance, 
as Crotty (2009) highlights that the crisis happened when investors run for liquidity and 
safety. Brunnermeier (2009) mentions that the crisis has led to the most severe financial 
crisis since the great depression and threatens to have large repercussions on the real 
economy, indicating the significance of market liquidity on the economy.  
Nevertheless, along with liquidity we believe that the price of oil is an important part of 
macroeconomic activity. Basher and Sadorsky (2006) highlight that countries’ demand 
for oil increases significantly due to urbanization and modernization, indicating that oil 
is considered the lifeblood of modern economies. Furthermore, similar to illiquidity, oil 
is also linked to the financial crisis as Taylor (2009) mentions that oil price increases have 
prolonged the crisis. Tverberg (2012) also suggests that if world oil supply should remain 
the same (low), then there is the possibility of a continuing financial crisis similar to the 
2008-2009 recession. Although both liquidity (Crotty, 2009) and oil prices (Tverberg, 
2012) are related to present/past crises and economic growth, there is no research 
available that investigates the combined effect of the two variables.  
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) find evidence that market liquidity may contain some 
information for predicting the current and future state of the economy. We believe that 
oil price may be more important for conducting a similar estimation. Thus, we decide to 
conduct research on the effect of both oil and market liquidity on economic growth using 
their framework.  
Since we are conducting research on oil, we also include national foreign exchange rate 
(NFX) as part of our variables because oil is usually priced in United States Dollar (USD). 
Furthermore, Cunado and Gracia (2005) highlight that the effect of oil on economic 
activity becomes more significant when oil is defined in local currencies. We also include 
Baltic Dry index (BD), as it is commonly used as an indicator of economic activity 
reflecting on the global demand for raw materials (Bakshi et al., 2011). BD has also been 
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linked to oil as Tett (2016) mentions that the behaviour of Baltic Dry index (BD) is almost 
as dramatic as oil prices when viewing the global economy. 
Although there are various studies on oil available, Wang et al. (2013) highlight that past 
studies seldom differentiate between oil exporting countries and oil importing countries. 
Wang et al. (2013) have conducted such research but their study is not between oil and 
macroeconomic activity. We undertake original research by covering ten countries 
grouped into five net oil exporting countries (Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico and 
Brazil) and five net oil importing countries (Singapore, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, 
Japan and France). Our grouping is based on the latest data available on US Energy 
Information Administration and DataStream. 
Overall, this paper contributes to the current literature of macroeconomics forecasting. 
Næs et al. (2011) mention that a larger cross-section of stock markets should be 
investigated to test the predictive power of liquidity on the state of the economy. We 
expand this line of research by focusing on ten countries, of which four are new countries 
in comparison to Næs et al. (2011) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015). Even though some 
of the countries are similar, we provide original results by including extra predictive 
variables such as oil (OB), Baltic Dry index (BD) and national foreign exchange (NFX), 
in addition to the illiquidity variables113 which have not been used before. Moreover, by 
segregating our sample into net oil exporters and net oil importers, we will be able to 
investigate which predictive variables affect macroeconomic activity114 of the two groups 
of countries. Finally, we also split our net oil exporting countries into developed and 
emerging countries in order to further enhance our study.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the literature 
review while section 7.3 describes the data and variables. In section 7.4, the methodology, 
empirical results and analysis are discussed followed by our conclusion in section 7.5. 
 
                                                 
113 The paper uses the Amihud illiquidity measure to construct two illiquidity variables namely national illiquidity (NAM) and global 
illiquidity (GAM). National illiquidity (NAM) relates to the illiquidity of the companies of a specific country while global illiquidity 
(GAM) excludes the companies of the specific country and hence consisting of international companies only. Further details of the 
illiquidity variables can be found in the Data and variables section. 
114 The paper uses Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a proxy for macroeconomic activity.  
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7.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
7.2.1. OIL PRICES AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
One of the earliest key studies on oil and macroeconomic variables is conducted by 
Hamilton (1983) who finds that there is a significant increase in the price of crude 
petroleum prior to seven of the eight post world war II recessions in the US. Nonetheless, 
although this does not automatically signify that oil shocks cause the recessions, oil 
shocks can be seen at least as a contributing factor. Hamilton (2011) in fact updates the 
count to ten out of eleven US recessions being preceded by significant rises in oil price. 
Mork (1989) investigates both increases and decreases in oil price and finds that positive 
oil price changes have a negative and significant relationship with changes in the US 
macro-economic activity while oil price decreases tend to have a positive impact on 
macro-economic activity, but it is small, and not statistically significant. 
Mork et al. (1994) expand their research by covering seven Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)115 countries and their results indicate that with 
the exception of Norway, oil price increases are significant and negatively correlated 
with macroeconomic indicators (GDP) of the other countries. Surprisingly, Mork et al. 
(1994) also find that oil price decreases are significant and positively correlated to 
macroeconomic activity for the US and Canada116, suggesting that an oil price reduction 
may also have adverse effects on the business cycle regardless of the degree to which the 
country depends on oil.  Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) study fifteen European countries 
and find evidence of oil price shocks affecting macroeconomic variables such as inflation 
and industrial production indexes. Furthermore, Cunado and De Gracia (2005) undertake 
similar research on six Asian countries and highlight that oil prices have a significant 
effect on both economic activity and price indexes. Nevertheless, they show that the 
effects of oil price shocks on each of the European countries can be different.  
All studies above concentrate on the relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic 
activity. There is also research on the impact of oil on financial markets. For instance, 
Jones and Kaul (1996) highlight that changes in oil prices have a detrimental effect on 
output and real stock returns in the US, Canada, Japan and the UK post-war. Sadorsky 
                                                 
115 Mark, Olsen et al. (1994) OECD sample is consisting of US, Canada, Japan, Germany (West), France, UK and Norway 
116 Mork, Olsen et al. (1994) highlight that Canada switches from a position of net oil importer to net oil exporter over time while we 
classify Canada as a net oil exporter based on the latest available data (2012) that we obtained from US EIA website.   
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(1999) finds evidence that oil price and oil price volatility both play important roles in 
affecting real stock returns by studying the US market. 
Using Toda and Yamamoto (1995) version of Granger causality tests on the Indian market, 
Ghosh and Kanjilal (2016) reveal that there exists a unidirectional Granger causality 
running from oil price to exchange rate in phase I while in phase II, causality runs from 
oil price to stock market as well as stock market to exchange rate. In phase III117, the 
causality runs from crude oil price to stock market with no feedback effect, indicating 
that global oil price is exogenously determined.  
There is also a comparable unidirectional effect when looking at the relationship between 
energy consumption and GDP. Lee (2005) finds evidence that long-run and short-run 
causalities run from energy consumption to GDP, but not vice versa using their sample 
of eighteen developing countries. Wolde-Rufael (2004) finds a similar unidirectional 
causality in Shanghai, China from 1952 to 1999. Moreover, Narayan and Smyth (2008) 
highlight that energy consumption Granger causes real GDP positively in the long run for 
the G7 countries. They also mention that the results are consistent with the energy 
dependent hypothesis, suggesting that energy consumption is a major factor influencing 
economic growth for energy dependent countries. 
Nevertheless, we believe that there may also be an inverse relationship between energy 
and economic growth whereby economic growth can influence oil price. The logic behind 
this is as follows.  As economies improve, it is expected that the energy consumption of 
those economies will also increase resulting in an increasing demand for oil causing the 
oil price to also increase. For instance, Kraft and Kraft (1978) find evidence in the US 
that causality is unidirectional, running only from GNP to energy118 for the post-war 
period between 1947 and 1974. Al-Iriani (2006) also finds unidirectional causality 
running from GDP to energy consumption by studying six Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)119  countries. Interestingly, since Al-Iriani (2006) result is unidirectional, any 
changes to energy consumption (e.g. energy consumption policies) will not have negative 
effects on their economic growth. Similarly, Mehrara (2007) also shows unidirectional 
                                                 
117 Ghosh and Kanjilal (2016) use data from January 2, 2003 to July 29, 2011, which are chosen based on the fact that oil price starts 
rising once again from 2003 onwards after the oil price crises in 1973 and 1979/1980. In order to get a better understanding, the entire 
data span is further divided into three sub-phases of prior (phase I) and post (phase III) to the most volatile phase (phase II) that spans 
from July 2, 2007 to Dec 29, 2008. 
118 Energy is represented by Gross energy inputs which include the total of inputs into the economy of primary fuels plus the generation 
of hydro and nuclear power converted to equivalent energy inputs (BTU’s). The primary fuels include both domestic and imports of 
coal, natural gas and petroleum (Kraft & Kraft, 1978) 
119 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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strong causality from economic growth to energy consumption for eleven oil exporting 
countries.  
However, there are also studies that find a bidirectional causality such as Oh and Lee 
(2004). They find a long run bidirectional relationship between energy and GDP by 
studying Korea for the 1970–1999 period. However, Oh and Lee (2004) also find 
evidence of short run unidirectional causality running from energy to GDP. Soytas and 
Sari (2003) obtain mixed results. They find bidirectional causality in Argentina, while for 
Italy and Korea, the causality runs from GDP to energy consumption and inversely for 
Turkey, France, Germany and Japan.  
There are also studies that find contradictory results of no causality between economic 
growth and energy consumption such as Eden and Hwang (1984) research on US, using 
data between 1947 and 1979. A more important point is highlighted by Al-Iriani (2006) 
who mention in their research of GCC countries that energy consumption is based on 
aggregate data, so oil consumption may only be a portion of other more relevant energy 
variables120 . Wolde-Rufael (2004) actually dis-aggregated the energy series, finding 
evidence to suggest that there is no Granger causality running in any direction between 
oil consumption and real GDP but there is only a unidirectional Granger causality running 
from coal, electricity and total energy consumption to real GDP. This indicates that other 
energy variables have a stronger effect on economic growth and hence energy 
consumption may not be appropriately captured by oil.  
Basher et al. (2012) investigate the dynamic relationship between oil prices, exchange 
rates and emerging market stock prices and show that positive shocks to oil prices tend 
to depress emerging market stock prices. However, a positive oil production shock lowers 
oil prices while a positive shock to real economic activity increases oil prices. They also 
show that increases in oil prices are due to increases in emerging market stock prices. 
Clements and Fry (2008) highlight that commodity exporting countries through their 
exchange rate can have an impact on commodity prices. This situation can arise if a 
country is a large producer of a commodity or if a group of commodity exporting 
countries have the combined market power to influence the world prices of commodities. 
This can relate to oil as oil can be classified as part of commodities. In fact, Clements and 
                                                 
120Energy consumption for the World Bank (Global Consumption Database) consists of Electricity, Gas and other fuels. 
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Fry (2008) give examples of Saudi Arabia which has the ability to influence oil price 
while Australia is a price maker for wool. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is part of OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), a group of oil exporting countries, 
which should have the combined market power to influence oil prices. In fact, Kaufmann 
et al. (2004) find evidence that OPEC121 Granger cause real oil prices but there is no 
inverse relationship (causality), implying that OPEC is able to influence real oil price.  
Sheppard et al. (2016) report that due to poor performance of oil companies and big oil 
producing countries going into recession, OPEC led by Saudi Arabia decides to cut oil 
production to help the oil market recover. This is consistent with the findings of Fan and 
Xu (2011) who highlight that one of three main drivers122 affecting oil prices are the 
supply–demand relationship of oil market. However, it should be pointed out that the 
main drivers of oil price changes are distinct during different structural periods. 
Overall, past literature shows that there is a relationship between oil and economic growth. 
Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that oil affects economic activity while it is less 
obvious in the other direction. Kaufmann et al. (2004) and Sheppard et al. (2016) shows 
that OPEC can influence real oil prices to benefit their economies if required. Thus, the 
literature appears to suggest the possibility of bidirectional relationship between oil and 
economic growth. 
 
7.2.1.1. NET OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES VERSUS NET OIL IMPORTING 
COUNTRIES  
We believe that the degree to which oil is important to a specific country’s economy may 
result in the specific country to react differently to oil price movements. For instance, a 
country that is less dependent on oil is expected to react less to any movement in oil prices.  
Earlier research tends to focus on the US economy, an oil importer, and the results show 
that there is a significant increase in the price of crude petroleum prior to recession 
periods (Hamilton, 1983). However, an oil exporter is expected to benefit from an oil 
                                                 
121 The variables of OPEC: include capacity utilization, OPEC production quotas, the degree to which OPEC exceeds these production 
quotas, and crude oil stocks in OECD nations. 
122 The other two main drivers of oil price are relevant “market fundamentals” and “episodic events”. “Market fundamental” includes 
the US dollar exchange rate, stock market, gold market and oil futures. “Episodic events” include market wars and terrorist attacks. 
Fan & Xu (2011) mention two episodic events namely the US terrorist attack (11th September 2001) and invasion of Iraq (20th March 
2003).  
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price increase, as shown by Saudi Arabia’s willingness to cut oil production in order to 
improve revenue and their economy (Sheppard et al., 2016). Wang et al. (2013) mention 
that the influence of oil price shocks on the national economies of oil-exporting countries 
can be different from those of oil-importing countries, as oil price increases may bring 
positive effects on the national economies of oil-exporting countries. 
Mork et al. (1994) obtain results which show that Norway, an oil-exporting country, 
behaves differently from the other countries in their sample, as Norway’s economy 
benefits significantly from oil price increases. Moreover, Mork et al. (1994) highlight that 
Norway seems to be hurt by oil price declines but less significantly. Mork et al. (1994)  
mention that if the domestic oil sector is large enough relative to the size of the economy, 
a country's net oil exporting position appears to influence the oil-price-GDP correlation 
substantially. Nevertheless, UK 123 , another oil-exporting country in their research, 
exhibits similar results to oil-importing countries such as US, Germany, France, and 
Japan. 
Cunado and De Gracia (2005) find that Malaysia’s oil price–economy relationship seems 
to be less significant compared to other five Asian economies, as Malaysia is the only oil-
exporting country in their sample. Cunado and De Gracia (2005) stress that more research 
is required to obtain a more reliable conclusion but their results seem to suggest that there 
are different responses between oil exporters and oil importers.  
Moreover, Wang et al. (2013) highlight the different reaction between oil-exporting 
countries and oil-importing countries, as positive aggregate and precautionary demand 
oil shocks are shown to result in a higher degree of co-movement among the stock 
markets in oil-exporting countries but not among stock markets in oil-importing countries. 
Engemann et al. (2014) highlight that apparently the most energy-intensive US states are 
the states that only respond to negative oil-price shocks.  
Overall, it seems that the classification of whether a country is an oil exporter or importer 
is important when undertaking research on oil. However, past studies seldom differentiate 
between oil exporting countries and oil importing countries, which is also highlighted by 
Wang et al. (2013). Although they differentiate between oil importing/exporting countries, 
their focus is on the relationship between oil price shocks and stock markets instead of 
                                                 
123 In this paper, we classify UK as a net oil importer based on the latest available data as of 2012 that we obtained from US EIA 
website.   
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macroeconomic activity. This indicates the importance of investigating the effect of oil 
prices on economic activity differentiating between oil importing and exporting countries.  
 
7.2.2. LIQUIDITY AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
Chordia et al. (2001) study the effect of several explanatory variables on aggregate market 
spreads, depths and trading activity for US stocks from 1988 to 1998 and confirm that 
short-term interest rates significantly affect market liquidity as well as trading activity. 
Fujimoto (2004) who also studies the US market presents similar findings as 
macroeconomic fundamentals appear to be significant determinants of liquidity and their 
effects are stronger prior to the mid 1980’s when business cycle dynamics are more 
volatile. Furthermore, Said and Giouvris (2017) study the UK market and find evidence 
that expansive monetary conditions (measured using interest rates) increase market 
liquidity. Generally, past literature finds evidence that macroeconomic variables affect 
market liquidity. Söderberg (2008) finds evidence that some of the fourteen 
macroeconomic variables in his sample are able to forecast market liquidity of the 
Scandinavian stock exchanges including Copenhagen (Denmark), Oslo (Norway) and 
Stockholm (Sweden). 
Recently, more studies have emerged on the inverse relationship that is the impact of 
liquidity on macroeconomic variables. Chordia et al. (2001) indicate that market liquidity 
increases prior to major macroeconomic announcements but it concentrates mostly on 
speculative trading activity and competition among informed traders 124  (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 1988). Næs et al. (2011) mentions that at least since WWII, market liquidity 
contains useful information for estimating the current and future state of the US and 
Norway economy. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) expand this line of research by studying 
G7 countries. Even though results are mixed, Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) also find 
evidence that liquidity variables are generally negatively related to GDP, signifying that 
economic growth increases following a reduction in market illiquidity (or increase in 
                                                 
124 Chordia, Roll et al. (2001) study focuses on macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment 
rate and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) but only finds significant results for GDP and the unemployment rate. Although Chordia, 
Roll et al. (2001) appear to highlight that market liquidity impact macroeconomics, their study is actually in relation to speculative 
trading activity by uninformed trading causing depth measure to increase. However, it decreases back to normal level, as the 
announcement dates approaches, signifying that there is an increase in the number of informed traders. Furthermore, during periods 
when liquidity trading is concentrated, competition among informed traders can bring additional liquidity (Admati & Pfleiderer 1988). 
Please refer to Chordia, Roll et al (2001) and Admati & Pfleiderer (1988) for more information.   
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market liquidity). Sung and Giouvris (2016) also conduct a similar study but on four 
developed and two emerging Asia-Pacific countries and they find that some of their 
liquidity variables are able to predict macroeconomic variables but are not consistent over 
the six countries. Moreover, Sung and Giouvris (2016) find that relative to national 
liquidity, global liquidity has extra explanatory power in developing markets. 
So far the literature appears to show that there is a potential two-way relationship between 
illiquidity and macroeconomic variables, as Fujimoto (2004) mentions that 
macroeconomic fundamentals seem to be significant determinants of liquidity while Næs 
et al. (2011) highlight the inverse relationship. Pereira and Zhang (2010) do find a 
bidirectional relationship but their study involves stock market and liquidity while 
Chordia et al. (2001) find indirectly that there is a potential two-way relationship between 
macroeconomic variables and liquidity.  
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) have found evidence that there is a two-way causality 
between macroeconomic indicators and liquidity variables for the six countries in their 
sample but it is more consistent for global liquidity.  
When considering both developed and developing markets, Sung and Giouvris (2016) 
also find that there is a two-way causality between macroeconomic variables and national 
liquidity but not for global liquidity. Moreover, they find no causality between 
macroeconomic variables and global liquidity in developed markets but mainly a one-
way causality from macroeconomic variables to global liquidity in developing markets, 
signifying that the two markets react differently to liquidity variables. Dey (2005) finds 
that turnover is significant for emerging market portfolios only, while it is insignificant 
for developed market portfolios, indicating that due to the high liquidity of developed 
markets, liquidity is not a concern for investors. Thus, providing further evidence that the 
two markets respond differently. This is interesting as our sample consists of two (2) 
countries that are categorised as emerging markets while the others are developed markets. 
Overall, the literature shows that there is potentially a two-way causality between 
liquidity and macroeconomic variables but the causality depends on the liquidity measure 
used. For instance Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) find a two-way causality for global 
liquidity whereas Sung and Giouvris (2016) obtain similar results for national liquidity.   
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7.2.3. BALTIC DRY INDEX AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
The Baltic Dry Index (BD) is a shipping and trade proxy created by the Baltic Exchange 
and it reflects the rates that freight carriers charge to haul solid raw materials such as iron 
ore, coal, cement, and grain (Rothfeder, 2016). Lin and Sim (2013) highlight that BD has 
become one of the most important indicators of the cost of shipping and an important 
barometer of the volume of worldwide trade and manufacturing activity. Essentially, BD 
captures trade activity. A decrease in BD usually means that shipping prices and 
commodities sales are dropping (Rothfeder, 2016). 
Although the predictive ability of BD has recently waned, BD still shows some potential. 
In the past, a dip in the BD foretold IndyMac’s bankruptcy which is one of the first major 
bank failures during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Rothfeder, 2016). Bakshi et al. 
(2011) find evidence of positive association between a BD increase and growth on 
stock/commodity returns as well as in global economic activity by studying the industrial 
production of 20 countries. Furthermore, using daily data spanning from 1985 to 2012, 
Apergis and Payne (2013) show the predictive capacity of the BD for both financial assets 
and industrial production, whereby the relationship is found to be positive. Thus, 
revealing the role of the BD in predicting the future course of the real economy.  
Another reason that we consider Baltic Dry Index (BD) as part of our research is due to 
its apparently close relationship with oil. Tett (2016) mentions that recently, the 
behaviour of the BD is almost as dramatic as oil prices due to the current sluggish trade 
environment. Kilian (2009) introduces a new measure of monthly global real economic 
activity based on dry cargo bulk freight rate data that is used to disentangle demand and 
supply shocks in the global crude oil market. Although the dry cargo bulk freight rate is 
not actually BD, its concept is the same as the dry cargos consist of grain, oilseeds, coal, 
iron ore, fertilizer, and scrap metal. A similar technique is also applied by Wang et al. 
(2013) in order to estimate the scale of global economic activity as a proxy for global oil 
demand. 
There also appears to be an inverse relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
Baltic Dry Index (BD). Klovland (2002) shows that cycles in economic activity are major 
determinants of the short-run behaviour of shipping freight rates in the years between 
1850 and World-War I. Moreover, since Apergis and Payne (2013) indicate that there is 
a relationship between commodities and BD, a change in demand for commodities should 
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have an effect on BD as well. For example, due to economic growth, an increase demand 
for commodities will eventually affect BD. Bloch et al. (2012) mention that China's 
demand for coal is surging because of China’s strong economic growth. Hence, there is 
potentially a two-way relationship between BD and economic growth. In fact, Bloch et 
al. (2012) find that there is a bidirectional causality between coal consumption and GDP 
using demand-side analysis. Thus, since coal is part of BD, it should be expected that 
economic growth may also affect BD.   
On a separate note, Lin and Sim (2013) investigate 48 Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
designated by the United Nations using BD as an instrument for trade and they find that 
a 1% expansion in trade raises GDP per capita by approximately 0.5% on average, 
emphasizing the importance of trade towards the economic development of LDCs or low 
income countries. Since we have two emerging countries in our sample, it may be 
interesting to investigate whether developed and emerging countries will react differently 
to the predictive variables including BD. However, Mexico and Brazil are not part of Lin 
and Sim (2013) LDCs. 
Overall, BD appears to have some relationship with economic growth as highlighted by 
Bakshi et al. (2011) since it has the ability to predict economic growth. Bloch et al. (2012) 
find evidence of a potential two-way causality. Moreover, BD’s close relationship with 
oil is one of the main reasons that we decide to include BD in our research since BD is 
used as a proxy for global oil demand (Wang et al., 2013). 
 
7.2.4. FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE MACRO-ECONOMY 
We have included national foreign exchange (NFX) rate as part of our predictive 
variables because oil is usually priced in United States Dollars (USD). Moreover, there 
appears to be a relationship between oil and NFX as Basher et al. (2012) mention that 
lower USD coincides with higher oil prices and vice versa. Moreover, Basher et al. (2012) 
highlight that positive oil shocks tend to depress USD in the short run, which is consistent 
with Krugman (1980) research that exchange rate movements are determined primarily 
by current account movements. Therefore, for a net oil importer like the US, rising oil 
prices lead to a current account deterioration causing exchange rates to fall.  
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The mechanism behind the relationship between NFX and the economy of countries 
appears simple. It is expected that as NFX rate change, the prices of goods and services 
will affect exports and imports. This is a simple policy that is commonly reported in the 
mainstream media. For instance in 2015, China’s central bank has purposely devalued 
the Yuan relative to the USD because a cheaper Yuan will make Chinese exports less 
expensive, potentially boosting overseas sales (exports) that have been among the main 
drivers of economic growth for China’s remarkable rise over the past 30 years (Inman, 
2015).  
There are studies on the impact of NFX on exports. Cashin et al. (2004) investigate 58 
commodity exporting countries between 1980 and 2002. They find evidence of a long-
run relationship between national real exchange rate and real commodity prices for about 
one-third of the commodity exporting countries. They do not actually show the effect of 
NFX on the economy but they show that NFX is an important aspect of trade (exports 
and imports). Since oil is also considered to be a commodity, it is expected that the impact 
will be similar. Moreover, oil appears to have some relationship with the economy. For 
example Hamilton (2011) highlights that ten out of eleven US recessions have been 
preceded by significant rises in oil price. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) study on the relationship between the Iranian 
economy and oil, highlights the “Dutch Disease” syndrome. For instance, due to 
significant real effective NFX rate appreciation, the price of imports reduces while the 
price of exports increases, resulting in an inflationary effect which can affect the economy 
of Iran. Therefore, it will be expected that the NFX rate has at least an indirect effect on 
the economic growth or decline of the countries.  
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it is common for studies of oil to be connected to NFX. 
In addition to Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) 
highlight that changes in oil price influence NFX markets and inflation, giving rise to 
indirect effects on real activity while Cunado and De Gracia (2005) research on six Asian 
countries mention that the significant effect of oil price shocks on both economic activity 
and price indexes becomes more significant when the shocks are defined in local 
currencies. Nandha and Hammoudeh (2007) examine the relationship between beta risk 
and realized stock index return in the presence of oil and exchange rate sensitivities for 
fifteen countries in the Asia-Pacific region and they highlight that no country shows 
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sensitivity to oil price when measured in USD but find that the Philippines and South 
Korea are oil-sensitive when oil is expressed in local currencies.  
The impact of NFX rate is not just limited to exports and imports, as it can also relate to 
financial markets. Dumas and Solnik (1995) investigate whether NFX rate risks are priced 
in international asset markets and their findings support the existence of NFX risk-premia 
for equities and currencies by covering the world's four largest equity markets namely 
Germany, UK, Japan and US. Nandha and Hammoudeh (2007) also find evidence that 8 
out of 15 countries show a significant relationship between the changes in the exchange 
rate and domestic stock index returns. 
However, Park and Ratti (2008) indicate that using real world oil price (USD) to measure 
real oil price shocks provides more cases of statistically significant impact on real stock 
returns in comparison to using national real oil price. Hussin, Muhammad, Abu, and 
Razak (2012) highlight that oil price is valid for the purpose of predicting changes in 
Islamic share prices in Malaysia but NFX rate is not. Moreover, Jorion (1991) presents 
evidence that the relationship between stock returns and the value of the dollar differs 
systematically across industries but their findings do not suggest that NFX risk is priced 
in the US stock market, contradicting firms decision to hedge. 
Interestingly, Lizardo and Mollick (2010) study on the relationship between oil and NFX 
rate shows that increases in real oil prices lead to a significant depreciation of the USD 
against net oil exporter currencies such as Canada, Mexico, and Russia while the opposite 
can be seen for the NFX rate of oil importers such as Japan. Thus, signifying that the 
NFX of oil exporters and importers react differently to oil price movements. 
Finally, we feel that economic growth can also affect NFX rate, as Inman (2015) 
highlights that the main reason that China devalue the Yuan is due to its flagging economy. 
This is also reported by Ryan and Farrer (2015) indicating that the state of the economy 
of a country can also impact NFX rate.  
Overall, the literature shows a potential connection between NFX rate and economic 
growth as well as the possibility of a two-way relationship between the two variables. 
Cunado and De Gracia (2005) highlight that the impact of oil price shocks on economic 
activity becomes more significant when shocks are defined in national currencies but Park 
and Ratti (2008) find contradictory evidence when investigating stock returns. 
Nevertheless, Lizardo and Mollick (2010) different observations for oil exporters and 
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importers motivate us to include NFX rate in our study as we are exploring net oil 
exporters and importers. 
   
7.3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
7.3.1. DATA 
We have chosen ten (10) countries for our data sample expanding from January 1998 to 
December 2015. Using the most recent data obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website, we have equally segregated our countries into five (5) net 
oil exporting countries and five (5) net oil importing countries. The net oil exporting 
countries are Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico and Brazil while the net oil importing 
countries are Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan and France. The countries and periods are 
selected based on the availability of financial markets and economic data of the respective 
countries. Unfortunately, due to limited data availability, we are unable to include any 
members of the OPEC. Please refer to Table 7.1 for more information. 
 
7.3.2. MACROECONOMIC, MARKET AND ILLIQUIDITY DATA 
We use the main available stock indices of our chosen ten (10) countries to calculate 
market data such as our illiquidity measure. The indices that we chose are Oslo All Share 
index (Norway), TSX Composite index (Canada), OMXC Index (Denmark), IPC index 
(Mexico), Bovespa index (Brazil), STI Index (Singapore), FTSE All Share index (UK), 
Prime All Share Index (Germany), Nikkei 225 (Japan) and SBF120 index (France).  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used to determine economic growth. For financial 
variables (FV) and as control variables, we use the risk free rate (RF), standard deviation 
or market volatility (SD), excess market returns (XS) and Dividend yield (DY). Risk free 
rate (RF) is the quarterly risk free rate of the respective countries125 while Standard 
deviation or market volatility (SD) is the standard deviation of daily average returns for 
                                                 
125 The risk free rates that we have chosen for our ten (10) countries are 3 months Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) 
(Norway), 28 days Mexican Federal Treasury Certificate (CETE) Rate (Mexico), 3 months Canada Treasury Bills (Canada), Brazil 
Money Market Rate (Brazil), 3 months Denmark Interbank Offered Rate (Denmark), 3 months Singapore Interbank Offer Rate 
(SIBOR) (Singapore), 3 months UK Treasury Bills (United Kingdom), 3 months Frankfurt Interbank Offer Rate (FIBOR)* (Germany), 
3 months Japan interbank bank rate (Japan) and 3 months Paris Interbank Offer Rate (PIBOR)* (France). *FIBOR and PIBOR are 
eventually merged into Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). 
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all stocks over each quarter. Dividend yield (DY) is calculated as the cross sectional 
quarterly average for all stocks of the respective countries. Excess market returns (XS) is 
the cross sectional average returns for all stocks of the respective countries in excess of 
the risk free rate of the respective countries also over each quarter. Unfortunately, due to 
the limited number of stocks available for certain countries, certain financial variables 
that are used by Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) are not available for us such as size 
premium (SMB) and value premium (HML).  
Our five (5) predictive variables are national foreign exchange (NFX), national illiquidity 
(NAM), global illiquidity (GAM), crude oil Brent (OB) and Baltic Dry Index (BD). 
National foreign exchange (NFX) is the specific country’s currency foreign exchange126 
relative to USD and hence an increase in value will signify that USD has strengthened 
while the respective country’s currency has weakened. For instance, for UK (GBP), an 
increase in the GBP/USD value means that GBP has weakened while USD has 
strengthened. The opposite scenario will be observed if the NFX value reduces. We 
include NFX because the crude oil Brent (OB) is normally priced in USD and Cunado 
and De Gracia (2005) study of six (6) Asian countries suggests that the significant effect 
of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables becomes more significant when oil prices 
are defined in local currencies. 
In comparison to the other variables, choosing the right illiquidity measure is not as 
straightforward because as highlighted by Goyenko et al. (2009), different illiquidity 
measures capture different aspects of liquidity. There are various measures available such 
as Bid-Ask spread (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) and High-Low Spread (Corwin & 
Schultz, 2012). However, since Amihud et al. (2005) mention that there is hardly a single 
liquidity measure that can capture all aspects of estimating the effect of liquidity on asset 
prices, we have decided to choose the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002). We 
have chosen the Amihud illiquidity measure because it is a recognisable measure which 
has been extensively used in the past literature and it is simple to calculate. More 
importantly, since we are investigating ten countries, it is essential as we have the inputs 
for the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud) for all the countries in our sample.  
                                                 
126 The NFX consists of Norway (Norwegian Krone - NOK), Canada (Canadian Dollar - CAD), Denmark (Danish Krone - DKK), 
Mexico (Mexican Peso - MXN), Brazil (Brazilian Real - BRL), Singapore (Singapore Dollar - SGD), UK (UK Pound Sterling - GBP), 
Germany (Euro - EUR), Japan (Japanese Yen - JPY) and France (Euro - EUR). 
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Our Amihud illiquidity measure is calculated for each stock, s, in all countries for every 
quarter as follows: 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀௦௤ ൌ 	 ଵ௤ ∑
ଵ,଴଴଴,଴଴଴	ൈ	|௥௘௧௨௥௡೟|
௣௥௜௖௘೟ൈ௩௢௟௨௠௘೟௧       (7.1) 
Where t is each trading day. 
 
We believe that using one illiquidity measure is sufficient because we will be considering 
two aspects of illiquidity namely national and global illiquidity for all the countries in our 
sample. National illiquidity (NAM) is simply the cross sectional average of Amihud 
illiquidity measure for all stocks of the respective countries in our sample. Global 
illiquidity (GAM) is created using the equally weighted average of the Amihud illiquidity 
measure across all stocks for the nine (9) countries, with the exception of the stocks 
belonging to a specific country nominated for the analysis which is similar to Brockman, 
Chung, and Pérignon (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) technique. For instance, 
the global illiquidity (GAM) for UK is the equally weighted average of all sample stocks 
of the nine (9) countries, with the exception of stocks that are part of the UK FTSE All 
Share index. 
Oil is based on the crude oil Brent prices (OB) and we chose to use it because at the point 
of our data collection, crude oil Brent (OB) is considered as the most widely used oil 
reference (Kurt, 2015). In comparison to other benchmarks such as the WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate), around two thirds of global crude contracts use crude oil Brent (Kurt, 2015).  
Lastly, Baltic Dry index (BD) is an index that tracks the cost of shipping commodities, 
such as coal, iron ore, steel, cement, and grain, around the world (Apergis & Payne, 2013). 
Thus, it can be an indicator of global demand for raw materials as well as a predictor of 
growth in global economic activity (Bakshi et al., 2011). Moreover, BD appears to be 
closely related to oil. Tett (2016) remarks that the behaviour of the BD is almost as 
dramatic as oil prices when viewing the global economy. 
We mainly use daily data to calculate our quarterly variables except for GDP which is 
already in quarterly. Before the calculation of the illiquidity measures and construction 
of the portfolios, the sample is initially scrutinised for any unsuitable data to avoid biased 
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results. All the data used in this paper are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World 
Bank website and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website.  
 
7.3.3. DETAILS OF COUNTRIES AND VARIABLES 
Table 7.1 provides more information of our chosen ten (10) countries, which is 
constructed using the most recently available data of the year 2012, obtained from US 
EIA website. The table reports the “oil exports” and “oil imports” of the countries in our 
sample as well as the “net oil exports (imports)”, which is merely the difference of oil 
exports and imports. Using the net oil exports, the ten (10) countries are then segregated 
into five (5) net oil exporting countries and net oil importing countries respectively. The 
net oil exporters are Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico and Brazil while net oil 
importers consist of Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan and France. The table also reports 
the “annual oil revenue (expenditure) to GDP ratios” of the countries, which are 
calculated using Wang et al. (2013) framework. The “annual revenue (expenditure)” of 
a country’s net oil exports (imports) is calculated using the following formula:  
Annual revenue (expenditure) of a country’s net oil exports (imports) 
= Daily oil exports (imports) x number of days in a year x the annual 
average oil price.   
 (7.2) 
Where the annual average oil price of USD112.02 is the average price per barrel for Crude 
oil Brent in the year 2012 obtained from DataStream and the number of days in the year 
2012 is 366 days because it is a leap year. 
 
Since we are investigating Baltic Dry index, we have also included information for “liner 
shipping connectivity index” because it captures how well countries are connected to 
global shipping networks and it is computed by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). Other information that we include in the table are the 
countries’ “exports, imports and net exports for goods and services (as a percentage of 
GDP)” as well as “GDP per capita” and “MSCI market classification”. With the 
exception of MSCI market classification, all the information is obtained from the World 
Bank website and it is more updated in comparison to our oil information, as we manage 
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to obtain information as of 2015. The MSCI market classification categorises the 
countries in our sample as either developed or emerging markets/ countries as of 2016 
and it is obtained directly from MSCI website. 
Table 7.1 shows that Canada is a major net oil exporting country whereas Germany is the 
main net oil importer. The “annual oil revenue to GDP ratio” appears to be the highest 
for Norway while Singapore’s “annual oil expenditure to GDP ratio” is the highest in 
comparison to the other countries. The table also shows that only Mexico and Brazil are 
classified as emerging markets/ countries by MSCI while Singapore is the highest net 
exporter of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Interestingly, the liner shipping 
connectivity index for the five (5) net oil importing countries is higher in comparison to 
the five (5) net oil exporters with Singapore having the highest index value.  
In table 7.2, panel A shows descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum) of the GDP for the ten (10) countries while panel B exhibits 
descriptive statistics for crude oil Brent (OB) and Baltic dry index (BD). In Panel C of 
table 7.2, we present descriptive statistics of the national foreign exchange (NFX) rate of 
the ten (10) countries relative to the USD. The last two (2) panels (panel D and Panel E 
respectively) exhibit descriptive statistics of the two (2) liquidity measures namely 
national (NAM) and global illiquidity (GAM).  
 260 
 
Table 7.1: Details of the ten (10) countries in our sample. 
This table reports the exports, imports and net exports of crude oil as well as goods and services of the ten (10) countries in our sample. The data is based on the most recently available data whereby the 
data for crude oil is from the year 2012 while the other data are from the year 2015 and 2016. The ten (10) countries are segregated into net oil exporting countries and net oil importing countries according 
to the countries latest net oil exports data. The table also reports the countries annual oil revenue (expenditure) to GDP ratios, which are calculated using the average crude oil Brent price in 2012 of 
USD112.02 per barrel. We calculate the revenue (expenditure) of a country’s net oil exports (imports) by the following formula:  
 
Annual revenue (expenditure) of a country’s net oil exports (imports) = Daily oil exports (imports) x number of days in a year (366 days) x the average crude oil Brent price (USD112.02)  (7.2) 
 
The calculation technique for oil revenue to GDP ratio is similar to Wang et al (2013) framework. We have also reported the Liner shipping connectivity index, GDP per capita (USD) and MSCI Market 
classification of the countries in our sample. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank, MSCI and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Countries 
2012  2015  2016 
Crude oil Brent Annual oil 
revenue 
(expenditure) 
to GDP ratio 
(%) 
    Liner 
shipping 
connectivity 
index 
GDP per 
capita 
(USD) 
 
MSCI Market 
Classification 
(Thousand Barrels per day)  Goods and services (% of GDP)  
Exports Imports Net exports (imports)  Exports Imports Net Exports  
Net oil exporters             
Norway 1324 28 1296 10.42%  37.4% 32.0% 5.4% 4.8 74,481.8  Developed 
Canada 2470 736 1734 3.90%  31.6% 34.0% -2.4% 42.9 43,315.7  Developed 
Denmark 137 87 50 0.63%  55.2% 47.8% 7.4% 52.3 53,014.6  Developed 
Mexico 1280 10 1270 4.39%  35.4% 37.5% -2.1% 43.0 9,005.0  Emerging 
Brazil 526 375 151 0.25%  12.9% 14.1% -1.2% 41.0 8,677.8  Emerging 
             
Net oil importers             
Singapore 0.1 1078 -1077.9 -15.28%  176.5% 149.6% 26.9% 117.1 52,888.7  Developed 
United Kingdom 710 1222 -512 -0.79%  27.6% 29.2% -1.6% 95.2 43,929.7  Developed 
Germany 3.8 1888 -1884.2 -2.18%  46.8% 39.2% 7.6% 97.8 41,178.5  Developed 
Japan 0 3724 -3724 -2.56%  17.6% 18.0% -0.4% 68.8 34,523.7  Developed 
France 1.3 1159 -1157.7 -1.77%  30.0% 31.4% -1.4% 77.1 36,352.5  Developed 
World (Average)      29.5% 28.7% 0.8% 96.7 10,098.2   
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Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics of the chosen variables of the ten (10) countries in our sample. 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum) of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) for the ten (10) countries while panel B exhibit the descriptive 
statistics for crude oil Brent and Baltic dry index. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics of the national foreign exchange (NFX) rate of the countries in our sample relative to United States Dollars (USD). 
Panel D and panel E shows the descriptive statistics of national and global illiquidity (Amihud) measures for the relevant quarters respectively. Panel F and panel G show the descriptive statistics of the 
market value (millions) of the countries’ chosen indices in their respective currencies and in USD respectively. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly 
observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
  Panel A: Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  Panel B: Oil and Baltic Dry 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France  Oil Baltic Dry 
 Mean 0.417% 0.579% 0.258% 0.587% 0.598% 1.341% 0.489% 0.322% 0.151% 0.363%  60.753 2442.264 
 Median 0.300% 0.625% 0.300% 0.655% 0.895% 1.363% 0.600% 0.400% 0.300% 0.400%  57.685 1541.500 
 Std. Dev. 1.106% 0.637% 0.887% 0.912% 1.264% 2.226% 0.643% 0.851% 1.099% 0.499%  34.825 2098.322 
 Maximum 3.500% 1.550% 2.900% 2.140% 2.490% 9.250% 1.800% 2.100% 2.700% 1.300%  122.060 10228.000 
 Minimum -2.500% -2.280% -2.400% -3.850% -3.970% -3.375% -2.300% -4.500% -4.100% -1.700%  11.480 617.000 
 
Panel C: National foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD) 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France 
 Mean 6.852 1.241 6.285 11.488 2.206 1.528 0.610 0.844 107.559 0.844 
 Median 6.566 1.207 5.944 11.004 2.093 1.545 0.622 0.798 109.218 0.798 
 Std. Dev. 1.113 0.206 0.996 1.836 0.585 0.198 0.056 0.134 15.087 0.134 
 Maximum 9.258 1.594 8.580 16.762 3.848 1.834 0.704 1.151 139.879 1.151 
 Minimum 5.084 0.968 4.775 8.422 1.127 1.223 0.489 0.640 77.331 0.640 
 
Panel D: National illiquidity (Amihud) 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France 
 Mean 769.285 250.049 1172.796 82.614 293.854 27.057 2.531 3135.614 0.021 20.579 
 Median 659.688 170.281 809.699 61.600 245.384 6.787 2.190 2930.160 0.012 14.030 
 Std. Dev. 479.259 231.279 935.942 88.548 292.291 39.599 1.244 1810.116 0.017 15.991 
 Maximum 1882.618 858.993 3568.500 339.392 1341.593 194.620 6.073 8500.649 0.069 66.339 
 Minimum 123.574 3.317 163.083 0.152 0.390 0.696 0.764 88.869 0.004 1.749 
 
Panel E: Global illiquidity (Amihud) 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France 
 Mean 498.570 550.494 458.219 567.237 546.113 572.793 575.246 261.937 575.497 573.441 
 Median 477.785 517.163 429.353 550.467 512.172 561.465 566.422 253.547 566.588 564.668 
 Std. Dev. 228.986 257.903 219.861 257.269 260.301 257.563 258.915 115.769 258.992 258.537 
 Maximum 1048.510 1207.902 1158.321 1216.468 1177.493 1231.602 1236.298 504.251 1236.703 1230.518 
 Minimum 118.793 89.373 122.953 140.753 124.352 141.902 143.932 80.292 144.098 137.470 
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Panel F: Market value (millions) in the respective national currencies 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France 
 NOK CAD DKK MXN BRL SGD GBP EUR JPY EUR 
 Mean 11,096.240 5,412.093 10,247.557 83,151.336 18,647.683 10,854.897 3,060.525 3,975.110 1,114,927.875 11,446.907 
 Median 1,283.815 1,401.250 689.615 32,427.300 7,272.040 6,491.160 405.985 285.375 508,874.805 4,541.700 
 Std. Dev. 41,707.368 10,845.973 36,658.792 133,740.967 32,315.015 11,734.605 10,656.610 11,631.946 1,995,805.407 18,549.008 
 Maximum 594,579.470 115,924.790 786,397.570 992,079.050 301,720.990 68,402.790 182,388.730 248,650.900 36,880,843.080 163,556.850 
 Minimum 3.200 0.040 0.870 149.940 15.740 3.310 0.960 0.310 12,064.360 21.760 
 
Panel G: Market value (millions) in USD 
 Norway Canada Denmark Mexico Brazil Singapore UK Germany Japan France 
 USD USD USD USD USD USD USD USD USD USD 
 Mean 1,753.672 4,743.675 1,720.015 6,684.349 8,971.786 7,624.667 5,057.328 4,867.006 10,456.410 14,169.776 
 Median 193.982 1,191.664 112.451 2,858.528 3,484.788 4,435.872 674.505 348.738 4,749.940 5,502.411 
 Std. Dev. 6,812.642 9,802.044 6,176.118 10,510.816 16,207.038 8,537.873 17,665.177 14,092.001 18,281.989 23,254.931 
 Maximum 116,958.937 106,092.550 116,798.596 80,083.811 165,281.560 50,922.592 279,202.036 245,145.322 344,766.485 213,992.328 
 Minimum 0.453 0.036 0.130 15.780 6.230 1.813 1.502 0.272 103.514 23.558 
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7.4. METHODOLOGY, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
7.4.1. PREDICTIVE VARIABLES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 
Figure 7.1 to 7.5, exhibits time series of the five (5) predictive variables in our research 
in relation to recession periods. Our five (5) predictive variables consist of national 
illiquidity (NAM), global illiquidity (GAM), national foreign exchange (NFX), oil (OB) 
and Baltic Dry index (BD). We define a period as a recession period when there is 
negative GDP growth for at least two consecutive quarters.  
The figures reveal that the countries in our sample have different recession periods. 
However, it is observed that all the countries have been affected by the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 but the recession duration can be different. Thus, we will initially investigate 
the relationship between our predictive variables and the recent crisis period in order to 
ensure consistency.  
Figure 7.1 shows that during the crisis period, national illiquidity (NAM) is able to predict 
the recession for three (3) net oil exporters namely Norway, Canada and Denmark, as 
NAM increases before the recession whereas among net oil importers, only Germany 
shows such a relationship. The other countries show less clear evidence, as NAM 
decreases prior to the recession. Interestingly, for net oil exporters, the two (2) countries 
for which NAM does not show predictive ability during the crisis are the only emerging 
countries in our sample namely Brazil and Mexico. Nevertheless, if we consider other 
recession periods, then some of the countries do show expected results such as Brazil and 
France. The NAM of the two (2) countries does increase before the other recession 
periods, signifying predictive ability.   
Figure 7.2 results are more consistent, as global illiquidity (GAM) increases prior to the 
recession period for all the countries, indicating the predictive ability of GAM during the 
crisis. Although there are contradictory results during other recession periods, most GAM 
results continue to show an enhanced predictive ability.  
With reference to oil (OB), figure 7.3 shows that all five (5) net oil importing countries 
go into recession immediately after an increase in oil price (OB) during the financial crisis, 
which is consistent with past studies such as Hamilton (1983), as countries tend to react 
to an increase in oil price. Fascinatingly, it is observed that with the exception of Denmark, 
there is a delay with which net oil exporting countries enter recession, as oil price (OB) 
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actually decreases prior to the recession period. This is actually expected for net oil 
exporters as a decrease in oil price is considered detrimental for such countries and is 
consistent to Mork et al. (1994) who finds that Norway, a net oil exporter, reacts 
differently to the oil importing countries in their sample. Among net oil exporters, 
Denmark is the only net oil exporter that reacts differently to oil (OB) during the crisis. 
Table 7.1 shows that Denmark exports the smallest amount of crude oil and have the 
second lowest “annual oil revenue to GDP ratio”, indicating that probably the economy 
of Denmark may not be too dependent on oil.  
Coincidentally, during the crisis, figure 7.4 also shows that there is an increase in the 
Baltic Dry index (BD) prior to a recession period for net oil importers, while for net oil 
exporters the BD exhibits an increase only in the case of Norway prior to recessions. The 
results are contradictory to past studies such as Bakshi et al. (2011) who highlight that 
increases in the Baltic Dry index growth rate could predict increases in economic growth, 
concurring with strengthening commodity prices and rising stock markets. Rothfeder 
(2016) reports that BD somehow predicts IndyMac’s bankruptcy during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008.  
Nevertheless, Baltic Dry Index (BD) is also an indicator for global demand of raw 
materials and is related to commodities (Bakshi et al., 2011) and hence similar to oil, an 
increase in BD may benefit exporters of raw materials more, relative to importers. 
Moreover, Wang et al. (2013) has used BD as a proxy for global oil demand, signifying 
that BD may actually be a good indicator of oil prices. Net oil exporters (except for 
Norway) endure a recession after a decrease of BD. We observe a delayed recession since 
the BD drops two quarters prior to a recession.  
Figure 7.5 is less consistent as Norway, Canada, Brazil and UK endure an increase in 
National foreign exchange (NFX) prior to recession periods while Mexico, Denmark, 
Singapore, Germany, Japan and France endure a recession period after a decrease in NFX.  
Overall, in comparison to national illiquidity (NAM), global illiquidity (GAM) shows 
more consistent results as during the financial crisis, GAM is able to predict recessions 
for the majority of countries. With reference to oil (OB), all five (5) net oil importing 
countries go into recession immediately after an increase in oil price during the financial 
crisis while it is observed that oil price actually decreases prior to recessions for net oil 
exporters (with the exception of Denmark), which is expected. The Baltic Dry index (BD) 
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shows that there is also an increase in the index prior to a recession for net oil importers, 
while it decreases for net oil exporters (with the exception of Norway) prior to recessions, 
indicating that it may actually be a good proxy for oil. Moreover, it appears to show that 
oil may have a stronger effect on economic growth relative to BD. Further analysis is 
required to investigate this issue. 
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Figure 7.1: Business cycle and National illiquidity based on Amihud illiquidity measure. 
The figure shows time series plots of the national illiquidity based on Amihud illiquidity measure (NAM) 
for all the countries in our sample, which are represented by the black lines. Shaded grey are recession 
periods and a recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP growth for at least 
two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained 
from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
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Figure 7.2: Business cycle and Global illiquidity based on Amihud illiquidity measure. 
The figure shows time series plots of the global illiquidity based on Amihud illiquidity measure (GAM) for 
all the countries in our sample, which are represented by the black lines. Global illiquidity is constructed 
as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by 
combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. Shaded grey are recession periods and a 
recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP growth for at least two consecutive 
terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, 
Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
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Figure 7.3: Business cycle and crude oil Brent price. 
The figure shows time series plots of the crude oil Brent price, which are represented by the black lines. 
Shaded grey are recession periods and a recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative 
GDP growth for at least two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly 
observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website. 
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Figure 7.4: Business cycle and Baltic Dry Index. 
The figure shows time series plots of the Baltic Dry index, which are represented by the black lines. Shaded 
grey are recession periods and a recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP 
growth for at least two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. 
All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website. 
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Figure 7.5: Business cycle and national foreign exchange. 
The figure shows time series plots of the national foreign exchange (NFX) relative to United States Dollars 
(USD) for all the countries in our sample, which are represented by the black lines. Shaded grey are 
recession periods and a recession period is identified as a period for which there is negative GDP growth 
for at least two consecutive terms. Sample range Q1 1998 to Q4 2015, 72 quarterly observations. All data 
are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
website. 
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7.4.2. CORRELATIONS 
Correlations in table 7.3 use only raw data before any differencing and orthogonalization. 
The correlation analysis in table 7.3 shows the relationship of the different variables with 
each other and it is undertaken for all countries in our sample. Panel A to panel E show 
the correlation results for net oil exporters. The correlation results for net oil importers 
are presented in panel F to panel J. We will initially look at the relationship between 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and financial variables (FV), followed by the 
relationship between GDP and the predictive variables inclusive of national foreign 
exchange (NFX), national illiquidity (NAM), global illiquidity (GAM), crude oil Brent 
(OB) and Baltic Dry index (BD). We will then investigate the relationship between the 
financial variables and the predictive variables followed by a brief study of the 
correlations among the predictive variables.   
Similar to Galariotis and Giouvris (2015), it appears that standard deviation (or market 
volatility) (SD) is negative and significantly correlated to GDP for most countries, with 
the exception of Norway and Canada. The significant results indicate that as standard 
deviation increase, GDP actually reduces. Dividend yield (DY) also shows consistent 
results as most countries except for Norway and Denmark show negative correlation to 
GDP. Six (6) countries have excess market returns (XS) that are positively correlated to 
GDP, signifying that as excess market returns increase GDP also improves. The risk-free 
rate (RF) shows less consistent results, as only two (2) countries are found to be 
negatively correlated to GDP while Canada shows a positive relationship. The negative 
correlation between the risk-free rate and GDP is expected since as the interest rate falls, 
investment increases and this results in an increase in GDP.  
Correlations between GDP and the predictive variables show that out of the five (5) 
predictive variables, illiquidity variables appear to be more strongly correlated to GDP, 
as more countries display significant correlations. Between national (NAM) and global 
illiquidity (GAM), the latter seems to be more important as six (6) countries exhibit 
significant correlations to GDP while for national illiquidity (NAM) only four (4) 
countries show correlations. Moreover, Denmark, UK and Germany are found to be 
negatively correlated to both illiquidity variables. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) also 
find such a relationship for the UK. As expected, the two (2) illiquidity variables 
consistently show negative correlations to GDP, indicating that GDP increases with a 
decrease in illiquidity (or increase in market liquidity).  
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Correlations are less noticeable for the other three predictive variables. For instance, only 
the GDP of Brazil shows a positive correlation to Baltic Dry index (BD), signifying that 
as BD increases, the GDP of Brazil also improves. In relation to Crude oil Brent (OB), 
only the GDP of UK and France show significant correlations to oil. Nevertheless, as net 
oil importers, the negative correlation for the two countries is justifiable, as it is expected 
that the GDP of net oil importers will deteriorate due to an increase in oil price. For 
national foreign exchange (NFX), only Brazil and France show significant correlations 
to GDP but the signs are opposite, as Brazil exhibit negative correlation while France 
positive correlation.  
Correlations between financial variables and the predictive variables show that the risk 
free rate (RF), standard deviation (SD) and dividend yield (DY) are correlated with at 
least four (4) countries for all the predictive variables. Standard deviation is found to be 
positively correlated to national illiquidity (NAM) for all ten (10) countries while DY 
positively correlates to global illiquidity (GAM) for nine (9) countries with the exception 
of Singapore. DY also correlates with NAM for eight countries and hence DY appears to 
have the closest relationship with both illiquidity variables. RF, SD and DY appear to 
show a strong relationship with national foreign exchange (NFX), as all three (3) financial 
variables are significantly correlated for eight (8) countries. In relation to oil, both RF 
and SD are significantly correlated to crude oil Brent (OB) in nine countries with the 
exception of Japan and UK respectively, which are both net oil importing countries. For 
DY, the correlation with OB can only be observed in seven (7) countries except for 
Norway, UK and Singapore. The financial variables relationship with Baltic Dry Index 
(BD) is weaker. Both DY and RF correlate with BD in five (5) countries while SD shows 
a relationship in four countries. Nevertheless, the weakest correlation is shown by excess 
market returns (XS) as it is not significantly correlated with NFX, OB and BD. XS is only 
correlated to the illiquidity variables in only three (3) countries for NAM and one (1) 
country for GAM namely France.  
Among the predictive variables, national foreign exchange (NFX) is significantly 
correlated with crude oil Brent (OB) for all countries and the relationship appears to be 
negative with the exception of Mexico. The negative relationship signifies that there may 
be a benefit for the economies of net oil exporters as an increase in oil prices will be 
boosted by the strengthening of their NFX. Mexico may not benefit from the positive 
relationship, as an increase in oil price will be offset by the weakening of Mexico’s 
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NFX127 relative to USD. Similarly, the negative relationship may not be beneficial for net 
oil importing countries, as oil price decreases, their NFX weakens relative to USD and 
there will be no opportunity to purchase oil at cheaper price. Oil (OB) is also found to be 
positively correlated to Baltic Dry index (BD) and in a way this somehow justifies some 
researchers’ usage of the BD to estimate oil demand such as Wang et al. (2013) but bear 
in mind that the correlation is just over 0.2. Global illiquidity (GAM) is also found to be 
significantly correlated to BD for all countries but the correlation is negative. 
Surprisingly, national illiquidity (NAM) and GAM, which are used to measure illiquidity, 
are found to be positively correlated in only six (6) countries except for Canada, Mexico, 
Brazil and Japan128.  
Overall, financial variables have stronger correlations to GDP in comparison to predictive 
variables. Standard deviation (SD) appears to relate to GDP of most countries. Among 
the predictive variables, global illiquidity (GAM) is found to have the strongest 
relationship with countries’ GDP, while Baltic Dry Index (BD) and crude oil Brent (OB) 
are found to be less correlated to GDP. Only the GDP of UK and France show significant 
correlations to OB and the negative correlation for the two (2) countries is expected, as 
the GDP of net oil importers will deteriorate due to an increase in oil price. For BD, only 
the GDP of Brazil shows positive correlation which is as expected. Financial variables 
and predictive variables appears to show some significant correlation to each other but 
excess market returns (XS) shows the weakest correlation, as it is not correlated with 
national foreign exchange (NFX), OB and BD. Oil (OB) is found to be positively 
correlated to BD and this somehow justifies some researchers’ usage of the BD to 
estimate oil demand. 
                                                 
127 As highlighted earlier, an increase in NFX means USD strengthens while the specific country’s currency weakens. In this case, 
Mexican Peso will weaken with the strengthening of USD.   
128 The national illiquidity (NAM) of Brazil and Mexico are probably not correlated to their respective global illiquidity (GAM) 
because the two countries are categorised as emerging countries by MSCI in table 7.1 and their financial markets may not be globally 
integrated. Although Canada and Japan are developed countries, the financial markets of the two countries may be more interrelated 
with certain countries such as the US and China which are not part of our sample. These may have resulted in the countries’ national 
illiquidity (NAM) to not be correlated to their respective global illiquidity (GAM). Ultimately, our global illiquidity (GAM) variables 
are constructed using only countries available in our sample and by omitting countries such as the US, China, South Korea, India and 
Russia may have resulted in the variable to be less global.   
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Table 7.3: Correlations of the chosen variables for all ten (10) countries. 
The table shows correlation coefficients between all variables use in our analysis. The associated p-values are reported in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. GDP is the macroeconomic 
variable and the respective country quarterly real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. RF is the quarterly risk free rate of the respective countries. SD is the standard deviation/ market volatility and 
DY is the dividend yield, which are calculated as the cross sectional average for all stocks of the respective countries in our sample. XS is excess market returns, which is the cross sectional average returns 
for all stocks in excess of the RF of the respective countries. NFX is the national foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our illiquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in 
front of each illiquidity variable refers to national illiquidity based on Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity based on Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is constructed as in 
Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil Brent price while BD 
is the Baltic Dry index. Correlations presented below are for raw data. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Panel A: Norway GDP_NOR RF_NOR SD_NOR XS_NOR DY_NOR NFX_NOR NAM_NOR GAM_NOR OB BD 
GDP_NOR  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_NOR  -0.0407 1.0000         
  (0.7345) -----         
SD_NOR  -0.1384 0.2947 1.0000        
  (0.2462) (0.0120) -----        
XS_NOR  0.2179 -0.3779 -0.3111 1.0000       
  (0.0660) (0.0011) (0.0078) -----       
DY_NOR  -0.0852 0.0742 0.7360 -0.2590 1.0000      
  (0.4766) (0.5357) (0.0000) (0.0280) -----      
NFX_NOR  0.0101 0.5208 0.2080 -0.0914 0.1020 1.0000     
  (0.9331) (0.0000) (0.0795) (0.4450) (0.3937) -----     
NAM_NOR  -0.2283 -0.0607 0.4822 -0.2896 0.4061 0.0126 1.0000    
  (0.0537) (0.6126) (0.0000) (0.0136) (0.0004) (0.9164) -----    
GAM_NOR  -0.1917 0.1723 0.6295 -0.0524 0.4536 0.1065 0.5625 1.0000   
  (0.1067) (0.1478) (0.0000) (0.6623) (0.0001) (0.3731) (0.0000) -----   
OB  -0.0484 -0.5226 -0.2048 -0.0562 -0.0180 -0.8101 0.1936 -0.0965 1.0000  
  (0.6866) (0.0000) (0.0844) (0.6394) (0.8807) (0.0000) (0.1032) (0.4201) -----  
BD  0.0311 0.0667 -0.2804 0.0605 -0.2216 -0.4660 -0.5510 -0.2261 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.7951) (0.5777) (0.0171) (0.6136) (0.0614) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0561) (0.0680) ----- 
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Panel B: Canada GDP_CAN RF_CAN SD_CAN XS_CAN DY_CAN NFX_CAN NAM_CAN GAM_CAN OB BD 
GDP_CAN  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_CAN  0.2927 1.0000         
  (0.0126) -----         
SD_CAN  -0.0948 0.4652 1.0000        
  (0.4285) (0.0000) -----        
XS_CAN  0.1354 -0.0449 -0.1797 1.0000       
  (0.2569) (0.7082) (0.1309) -----       
DY_CAN  -0.6532 -0.4663 0.0113 -0.0787 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9248) (0.5113) -----      
NFX_CAN  0.1717 0.5956 0.6634 0.1001 -0.4433 1.0000     
  (0.1493) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4028) (0.0001) -----     
NAM_CAN  0.1553 0.7138 0.7995 -0.0028 -0.3488 0.7716 1.0000    
  (0.1928) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9812) (0.0027) (0.0000) -----    
GAM_CAN  -0.3249 -0.3946 0.1571 0.0688 0.3492 0.1035 0.0024 1.0000   
  (0.0054) (0.0006) (0.1877) (0.5655) (0.0026) (0.3870) (0.9844) -----   
OB  -0.1348 -0.6126 -0.6211 -0.1637 0.3234 -0.9211 -0.7522 0.0178 1.0000  
  (0.2590) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1695) (0.0056) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8822) -----  
BD  -0.0250 0.1388 -0.2155 -0.0158 0.3254 -0.3556 -0.1844 -0.2866 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.8347) (0.2450) (0.0691) (0.8955) (0.0053) (0.0022) (0.1209) (0.0146) (0.0680) ----- 
 
Panel C: Denmark GDP_DEN RF_DEN SD_DEN XS_DEN DY_DEN NFX_DEN NAM_DEN GAM_DEN OB BD 
GDP_DEN  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_DEN  -0.0408 1.0000         
  (0.7338) -----         
SD_DEN  -0.4696 -0.0345 1.0000        
  (0.0000) (0.7735) -----        
XS_DEN  0.1714 -0.3498 -0.3675 1.0000       
  (0.1501) (0.0026) (0.0015) -----       
DY_DEN  -0.0815 0.4136 0.0007 -0.0354 1.0000      
  (0.4961) (0.0003) (0.9957) (0.7680) -----      
NFX_DEN  0.1520 0.3920 -0.2040 0.0162 0.4442 1.0000     
  (0.2023) (0.0007) (0.0857) (0.8929) (0.0001) -----     
NAM_DEN  -0.2838 -0.4952 0.6591 -0.1807 -0.3344 -0.2872 1.0000    
  (0.0157) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1288) (0.0041) (0.0144) -----    
GAM_DEN  -0.3007 0.1414 0.2847 -0.1953 0.4188 0.3377 0.2425 1.0000   
  (0.0103) (0.2361) (0.0154) (0.1001) (0.0003) (0.0037) (0.0402) -----   
OB  -0.1627 -0.4957 0.3399 -0.0842 -0.4746 -0.7426 0.5527 -0.2935 1.0000  
  (0.1721) (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.4819) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0123) -----  
BD  0.0094 0.3553 -0.1796 -0.0618 -0.0904 -0.4673 -0.3593 -0.2027 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.9379) (0.0022) (0.1311) (0.6060) (0.4500) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0877) (0.0680) ----- 
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Panel D: Mexico GDP_MEX RF_MEX SD_MEX XS_MEX DY_MEX NFX_MEX NAM_MEX GAM_MEX OB BD 
GDP_MEX  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_MEX  -0.0309 1.0000         
  (0.7967) -----         
SD_MEX  -0.3202 0.6481 1.0000        
  (0.0061) (0.0000) -----        
XS_MEX  0.1547 -0.2847 -0.3996 1.0000       
  (0.1946) (0.0154) (0.0005) -----       
DY_MEX  -0.3752 0.4866 0.3935 -0.0573 1.0000      
  (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.6326) -----      
NFX_MEX  -0.0614 -0.6409 -0.3208 0.1803 -0.3145 1.0000     
  (0.6086) (0.0000) (0.0060) (0.1297) (0.0071) -----     
NAM_MEX  -0.1215 0.3278 0.2288 -0.0538 0.3863 -0.5757 1.0000    
  (0.3093) (0.0049) (0.0532) (0.6536) (0.0008) (0.0000) -----    
GAM_MEX  -0.3876 -0.2163 0.0633 0.0305 0.3309 0.1220 0.1781 1.0000   
  (0.0008) (0.0680) (0.5973) (0.7995) (0.0045) (0.3075) (0.1344) -----   
OB  0.1154 -0.6273 -0.4285 0.0940 -0.4167 0.5468 -0.6438 -0.0276 1.0000  
  (0.3342) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.4321) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8177) -----  
BD  0.1167 -0.1396 -0.1989 0.1054 -0.0558 -0.1462 -0.0431 -0.3024 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.3288) (0.2422) (0.0939) (0.3780) (0.6417) (0.2205) (0.7193) (0.0098) (0.0680) ----- 
 
Panel E: Brazil GDP_BRA RF_BRA SD_BRA XS_BRA DY_BRA NFX_BRA NAM_BRA GAM_BRA OB BD 
GDP_BRA  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_BRA  -0.2435 1.0000         
  (0.0393) -----         
SD_BRA  -0.2874 0.4819 1.0000        
  (0.0144) (0.0000) -----        
XS_BRA  0.2062 0.1006 -0.3056 1.0000       
  (0.0822) (0.4006) (0.0090) -----       
DY_BRA  -0.3674 0.7321 0.4239 0.0747 1.0000      
  (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.5329) -----      
NFX_BRA  -0.2184 0.0324 -0.2244 0.0679 0.3602 1.0000     
  (0.0653) (0.7868) (0.0580) (0.5708) (0.0019) -----     
NAM_BRA  0.1510 0.6634 0.2295 0.3305 0.5137 0.1176 1.0000    
  (0.2056) (0.0000) (0.0524) (0.0046) (0.0000) (0.3251) -----    
GAM_BRA  -0.1463 -0.1217 -0.0747 -0.0303 0.2355 0.2775 -0.1008 1.0000   
  (0.2202) (0.3086) (0.5330) (0.8007) (0.0464) (0.0183) (0.3995) -----   
OB  0.1246 -0.7847 -0.4069 -0.1116 -0.6572 -0.2285 -0.6583 0.0247 1.0000  
  (0.2972) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.3506) (0.0000) (0.0535) (0.0000) (0.8368) -----  
BD  0.4405 -0.1828 -0.0139 0.0659 -0.4006 -0.0916 0.1057 -0.3123 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.1244) (0.9080) (0.5824) (0.0005) (0.4443) (0.3771) (0.0076) (0.0680) ----- 
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Panel F: Singapore GDP_SIN RF_SIN SD_SIN XS_SIN DY_SIN NFX_SIN NAM_SIN GAM_SIN OB BD 
GDP_SIN  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_SIN  -0.1441 1.0000         
  (0.2271) -----         
SD_SIN  -0.2042 0.6062 1.0000        
  (0.0854) (0.0000) -----        
XS_SIN  0.2836 -0.0698 0.0776 1.0000       
  (0.0158) (0.5603) (0.5171) -----       
DY_SIN  -0.3161 0.1182 0.3437 -0.0891 1.0000      
  (0.0068) (0.3227) (0.0031) (0.4568) -----      
NFX_SIN  0.0322 0.4854 0.5891 0.1118 -0.2230 1.0000     
  (0.7880) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3499) (0.0597) -----     
NAM_SIN  -0.1825 0.1297 0.3112 -0.0801 -0.1887 0.6999 1.0000    
  (0.1249) (0.2774) (0.0078) (0.5037) (0.1124) (0.0000) -----    
GAM_SIN  -0.1667 -0.5770 0.0241 -0.0125 0.1275 0.0430 0.3542 1.0000   
  (0.1615) (0.0000) (0.8405) (0.9168) (0.2859) (0.7198) (0.0023) -----   
OB  -0.0027 -0.4825 -0.6441 -0.1534 0.0406 -0.9018 -0.5909 -0.0407 1.0000  
  (0.9823) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1984) (0.7348) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7345) -----  
BD  0.0964 0.1014 -0.0650 -0.0418 -0.2188 0.0039 -0.1902 -0.3007 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.4207) (0.3969) (0.5876) (0.7273) (0.0648) (0.9739) (0.1095) (0.0103) (0.0680) ----- 
 
Panel G: UK GDP_UK RF_UK SD_UK XS_UK DY_UK NFX_UK NAM_UK GAM_UK OB BD 
GDP_UK  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_UK  0.1702 1.0000         
  (0.1528) -----         
SD_UK  -0.6366 -0.0023 1.0000        
  (0.0000) (0.9845) -----        
XS_UK  0.2038 -0.2003 -0.3479 1.0000       
  (0.0860) (0.0916) (0.0028) -----       
DY_UK  -0.6374 -0.0999 0.8611 -0.1071 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.4040) (0.0000) (0.3704) -----      
NFX_UK  -0.0080 -0.3669 0.1863 0.0558 0.3559 1.0000     
  (0.9467) (0.0015) (0.1172) (0.6418) (0.0022) -----     
NAM_UK  -0.4964 -0.0899 0.8093 -0.2715 0.7738 0.2518 1.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.4526) (0.0000) (0.0210) (0.0000) (0.0328) -----    
GAM_UK  -0.2591 -0.3516 0.4343 -0.0028 0.6382 0.5580 0.6237 1.0000   
  (0.0280) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.9815) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) -----   
OB  -0.2585 -0.6490 -0.0424 -0.0373 -0.1524 -0.2168 -0.0444 -0.0495 1.0000  
  (0.0284) (0.0000) (0.7236) (0.7559) (0.2011) (0.0674) (0.7110) (0.6799) -----  
BD  -0.1606 0.3322 0.0462 -0.1287 -0.1263 -0.7778 0.0063 -0.3020 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.1778) (0.0044) (0.7001) (0.2813) (0.2905) (0.0000) (0.9582) (0.0099) (0.0680) ----- 
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Panel H: Germany GDP_GER RF_GER SD_GER XS_GER DY_GER NFX_GER NAM_GER GAM_GER OB BD 
GDP_GER  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_GER  -0.0656 1.0000         
  (0.5843) -----         
SD_GER  -0.2988 0.5179 1.0000        
  (0.0108) (0.0000) -----        
XS_GER  0.1853 -0.3286 -0.2047 1.0000       
  (0.1191) (0.0048) (0.0845) -----       
DY_GER  -0.6891 -0.2052 0.3188 -0.1633 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.0838) (0.0063) (0.1705) -----      
NFX_GER  -0.0103 0.4087 0.4604 -0.1331 -0.2179 1.0000     
  (0.9318) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.2651) (0.0659) -----     
NAM_GER  -0.4378 0.0514 0.4703 -0.1578 0.5303 0.1901 1.0000    
  (0.0001) (0.6682) (0.0000) (0.1855) (0.0000) (0.1097) -----    
GAM_GER  -0.3312 -0.3213 0.2603 -0.1196 0.4925 0.1232 0.4989 1.0000   
  (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0272) (0.3169) (0.0000) (0.3026) (0.0000) -----   
OB  0.0814 -0.4723 -0.5036 -0.0481 0.2495 -0.7444 -0.1543 0.1307 1.0000  
  (0.4969) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6884) (0.0345) (0.0000) (0.1955) (0.2740) -----  
BD  0.0626 0.4041 -0.1430 -0.0600 -0.1335 -0.4671 -0.0852 -0.5422 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.6017) (0.0004) (0.2309) (0.6166) (0.2637) (0.0000) (0.4768) (0.0000) (0.0680) ----- 
 
Panel I: Japan GDP_JAP RF_JAP SD_JAP XS_JAP DY_JAP NFX_JAP NAM_JAP GAM_JAP OB BD 
GDP_JAP  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_JAP  -0.2882 1.0000         
  (0.0141) -----         
SD_JAP  -0.3559 0.3929 1.0000        
  (0.0022) (0.0006) -----        
XS_JAP  0.2092 -0.3053 -0.2611 1.0000       
  (0.0777) (0.0091) (0.0267) -----       
DY_JAP  -0.3041 0.2359 0.1173 -0.1377 1.0000      
  (0.0094) (0.0461) (0.3264) (0.2486) -----      
NFX_JAP  -0.0203 0.0529 0.1410 0.0200 -0.6886 1.0000     
  (0.8653) (0.6591) (0.2375) (0.8674) (0.0000) -----     
NAM_JAP  -0.1370 0.0685 0.5411 -0.0376 -0.3452 0.4329 1.0000    
  (0.2512) (0.5677) (0.0000) (0.7537) (0.0030) (0.0001) -----    
GAM_JAP  -0.0763 -0.2265 0.2662 -0.0820 0.3894 -0.3094 0.1316 1.0000   
  (0.5240) (0.0557) (0.0238) (0.4934) (0.0007) (0.0082) (0.2706) -----   
OB  0.0099 0.1352 -0.3455 -0.0689 0.6219 -0.7210 -0.7261 -0.0495 1.0000  
  (0.9344) (0.2576) (0.0030) (0.5653) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6799) -----  
BD  0.0929 0.5434 -0.1380 -0.1426 -0.1420 0.0140 -0.3783 -0.3019 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.4376) (0.0000) (0.2478) (0.2320) (0.2340) (0.9071) (0.0011) (0.0100) (0.0680) ----- 
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Panel J: France GDP_FRA RF_FRA SD_FRA XS_FRA DY_FRA NFX_FRA NAM_FRA GAM_FRA OB BD 
GDP_FRA  1.0000          
  -----          
RF_FRA  0.0994 1.0000         
  (0.4059) -----         
SD_FRA  -0.2889 0.4547 1.0000        
  (0.0138) (0.0001) -----        
XS_FRA  0.2418 -0.2543 -0.3822 1.0000       
  (0.0407) (0.0311) (0.0009) -----       
DY_FRA  -0.7111 -0.2604 0.4804 -0.2140 1.0000      
  (0.0000) (0.0271) (0.0000) (0.0710) -----      
NFX_FRA  0.2803 0.4090 0.3734 -0.0217 -0.1638 1.0000     
  (0.0171) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.8565) (0.1693) -----     
NAM_FRA  0.1498 0.5085 0.5388 -0.0081 0.0798 0.6086 1.0000    
  (0.2093) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9464) (0.5050) (0.0000) -----    
GAM_FRA  -0.4532 -0.1119 0.5046 -0.1994 0.8024 0.1845 0.2821 1.0000   
  (0.0001) (0.3493) (0.0000) (0.0931) (0.0000) (0.1208) (0.0163) -----   
OB  -0.3360 -0.4728 -0.3684 -0.0973 0.2393 -0.7444 -0.7176 -0.0451 1.0000  
  (0.0039) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.4159) (0.0429) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7066) -----  
BD  -0.0400 0.4036 -0.2041 -0.1291 -0.2311 -0.4671 -0.2573 -0.3008 0.2163 1.0000 
  (0.7390) (0.0004) (0.0856) (0.2798) (0.0508) (0.0000) (0.0291) (0.0102) (0.0680) ----- 
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7.4.3. IN SAMPLE PREDICTION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
7.4.3.1. STATIONARITY AND ORTHOGONALISATION 
The last section on correlations shows that there are relationships between GDP and our 
predictive variables but since we plan to conduct regression analysis to forecast economic 
growth, the data may not be stationary, as the correlation analysis is performed using raw 
data. Thus, similar to Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) we initially test the data for 
stationarity before conducting any further analysis, as non-stationary data will result in 
potentially unreliable and biased outcomes. We conduct six (6) stationarity tests namely 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, GLS detrended Dickey-Fuller (DFGLS) test, 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test, Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test, Elliot, 
Rothenberg, and Stock Point Optimal (ERS) test and the Ng and Perron (NP) test on all 
the variables and if the variable examined satisfies at least four (4) of the stationarity tests, 
we consider the variable as stationary. The variables have been differenced to become 
stationary if the variable is deemed non-stationary. The variables that have been 
differenced, have a D in brackets at the back of the name of the variable in the tables.  
The correlation analysis also shows that most independent variables are correlated to each 
other, signifying the possibility of biased results due to multicollinearity. Thus, in order 
to avoid multicollinearity, we have also orthogonalized129 all the relevant variables using 
the same technique utilised by Galariotis and Giouvris (2015). 
 
7.4.3.2. PREDICTING ECONOMIC GROWTH USING INDIVIDUAL PREDICTIVE 
VARIABLES 
We estimate the following model to assess the predictive ability of our independent 
variables: 
௧ܻାଵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ′ܨ ௧ܸ ൅ ߛ′ܺ௧ ൅	ߝ௧ାଵ   (7.3) 
where Yt+1 is the realised growth of our macroeconomic variable, GDP, one quarter ahead 
(t+1); FVt are the control variables at contemporaneous quarter t and contains the 
                                                 
129 Similar to Galariotis & Giouvris (2015), we orthogonalize all explanatory variables. For example, in order to orthogonalise the 
explanatory variable X1, X2 and X3, we run the following regressions: X1=c+X2+X3+residualsX1 and X2=c+X3+residualsX2. Then, 
we use residualsX1, residualsX2 and X3. In this way, the variables should not be correlated to each other and there should not be any 
multi-collinearity. 
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following financial variables (FV): the risk free rate (RF), standard deviation or market 
volatility (SD), excess market returns (XS), dividend yield (DY), at least one lag of the 
dependent variable (GDP) and more lags of the GDP if autocorrelation remains in the 
residuals. Xt contains the following predictive variables: National foreign exchange 
(NFX), National illiquidity (NAM), Global illiquidity (GAM), Crude oil Brent (OB) and 
Baltic Dry index (BD). ߚᇱand ߛ′ are the vector of coefficient estimates for the financial 
variables (or control variables) and predictive variables respectively and ε is the error 
term.  
In table 7.4, we run six different regression models in order to identify the contribution 
of our predictive variables to economic growth. The first regression model includes one 
lag of the dependent variable and financial variables only. The following five regression 
models use the same variables as the first regression model but we add one predictive 
variable at a time. This is repeated for all countries. As highlighted earlier, if there is a D 
in brackets at the back of the name of the variable then it means that the variable has been 
differenced. Moreover, all variables are orthogonalised and the coefficients reported are 
standardised to allow comparison. 
Table 7.4 shows that only France requires an additional lag of the dependent variable 
(GDP), as initially there is an autocorrelation in the residuals. We have reported both 
regressions in panel J and K respectively.  
Although our correlation analysis indicates that standard deviation (SD) and dividend 
yield (DY) have the closest relationship with GDP, our first regression model which 
includes only financial variables appears to show that excess market returns (XS) is the 
most relevant coefficient as it is positive and significant for six (6) countries namely 
Norway, Denmark, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore and France. SD and DY are only 
significant for three countries (Norway, Singapore and UK) and one country respectively 
(Mexico). Similarly, risk free rate (RF) is positively significant to GDP in only one 
country namely Norway. 
We will now investigate the effect of our predictive variables, adding one at a time. By 
adding national foreign exchange (NFX), only Brazil shows a significant result, 
indicating that NFX has the ability to predict the GDP of Brazil. The negative NFX sign 
signifies that USD weakens and Brazilian Real (BRL) has actually strengthened. Table 
7.1 shows that Brazil’s “net exports of goods and services (% of GDP)” is negative, 
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indicating that Brazil may be able to import goods and services at a cheaper price and 
hence somehow improve its GDP. Moreover, Brazil may benefit from a stronger NFX 
through its oil exports particularly since Brazil is a net oil exporter.  
By comparison, we would expect NFX to be significant for Singapore as it has the highest 
“annual oil expenditure to GDP ratio (%)” and Singapore’s “exports and imports of 
goods and services (% of GDP)” is more than 100% of its GDP, signifying that Singapore 
is less self-sufficient and trades more with other countries. However, the result is 
insignificant for Singapore. 
Unlike Galariotis and Giouvris (2015), our findings indicate that global illiquidity (GAM) 
is less important in comparison to national illiquidity (NAM), as only two (2) countries’ 
GDP are predicted by GAM while four (4) countries’ economic growth can be predicted 
by NAM. Canada shows the only unexpected positive relationship for NAM while only 
Germany is affected by both illiquidity variables.   
Interestingly, Crude oil Brent (OB) appears to be the most significant variable as the 
economic growth of nine (9) countries is positively predicted by it. Only UK, a net oil 
importer is not affected by OB. All the countries that are affected exhibit a positive 
coefficient, signifying that as oil price increases, the GDP of those countries also 
increases. Moreover, Mexico displays the highest positive coefficient, which is not 
surprising, as Mexico is a net oil exporter. The positive coefficient for net oil exporters is 
expected, as the higher oil price means higher revenue for those countries, which 
translates to higher GDP. However, for net oil importers we expect the opposite results 
whereby an oil price decrease, will increase GDP of those countries as they will be able 
to import oil cheaper for the development of their economy. Table 7.4 provides 
contradictory results for oil (OB) but Mork et al. (1994) do find evidence that US and 
Canada are positively related to a decrease in oil price even though the two (2) countries 
are oil importer and potential130 oil exporter respectively. However, we will investigate 
this further in the next section when we include all variables. 
Baltic Dry index (BD) is found to be significant for three (3) countries namely Canada, 
UK and France. The negative coefficients indicate that as BD increases, the economy of 
the three (3) countries shrinks. We notice that the three (3) countries’ “net exports of 
                                                 
130 Mork, Olsen et al. (1994) highlight that Canada switches from a position of net oil importer to net oil exporter over time while we 
classify Canada as a net oil exporter based on the latest available data (2012) that we obtain from US EIA website.   
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goods and services (% of GDP)” is negative and therefore one way to explain this is that 
as the BD increases (which indicates an increase in demand for raw materials as well as 
the price for those materials) this results in more expensive imports which leads to the 
GDP of those three countries to shrink.  
The last panel L shows the summary of each country’s adjusted R2 after the addition of 
the individual predictive variables (one at a time) to our initial regression model which 
consists of the dependent variable (one lag or two lags) and financial variables only. 
National foreign exchange (NFX) provides extra explanatory power over the financial 
variables for three (3) countries only and as expected in the case of Brazil, the effect of 
NFX is the strongest. In relation to illiquidity, national illiquidity (NAM) provides greater 
explanatory power for four (4) countries over financial variables compared to global 
illiquidity (GAM) which provides greater explanatory power for three (3) countries only. 
Surprisingly, GAM and not NAM provides extra explanatory power in the case of 
Germany even though both illiquidity variables are significant.  
As expected, oil (OB) exhibits the greatest explanatory power over financial variables, as 
there is improvement in nine (9) countries with the exception of UK. In the case of Japan, 
the addition of oil brings the highest improvement in explanatory power over financial 
variables. This may be due to Japan being a net importing country with the second highest 
“Annual oil expenditure to GDP ratio” after Singapore. Moreover, Japan is the only 
country that does not export any oil. Similar to NFX, the inclusion of Baltic Dry index 
(BD) provides extra explanatory power for only three (3) countries. The highest 
improvement is observed in the case of the UK, which is consistent to our earlier 
regression findings.  
To summarize, excess market returns (XS) is the best predictor among financial variables 
as it is positively significant for six (6) countries, while among predictive variables, oil 
(OB) appears to be the best predictor as it is significant in nine (9) countries. Between 
illiquidity variables, national illiquidity (NAM) is found to be superior in comparison to 
global illiquidity (GAM). Similar to illiquidity, the Baltic Dry Index (BD) is found to be 
negatively related to economic growth, which is contradictory to Bakshi et al. (2011). 
NFX is the least important predictive variable, as we obtain a significant result only for 
Brazil.  
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Table 7.4: In sample prediction of economic growth using additional individual predictive variables for all ten (10) countries. 
The table shows the results from predictive regression where we regress next quarter economic growth in macroeconomic variable (GDPt+1) using different additional individual predictive variables.  The 
regression model estimated is:  
 
௧ܻାଵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ′ܨ ௧ܸ ൅ ߛ′ܺ௧ ൅	ߝ௧ାଵ   (7.3)  
where Yt+1 is real GDP growth (GDPt+1). We include one lag of the dependent variable (and we include more lags if there is autocorrelation in the residuals) and financial variables (FVt) of RF (Risk free); 
SD (Standard deviation); XS (Excess market returns); DY (Dividend yield) as control variables. Predictive variables (Xt) are consisting of NFX (National foreign exchange), NAM (National illiquidity-
Amihud), GAM (Global illiquidity-Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry index). NFX is the national foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our 
illiquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in front of each illiquidity variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is 
constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby Global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil 
Brent price while BD is the Baltic Dry index. The coefficients reported are standardised. Adj. R2 presents Adjusted R2 of the dependent variable (GDP) + financial variables (FV) + X (relevant additional 
predictive variable). Please note that panel L summarizes all results obtained from previous panels (countries) and are based on the methodology of Brockman et al (2009), Galariotis & Giouvris (2015) 
and Sung & Giouvris (2016). Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-
West p-value is calculated using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. The number in the last two columns are the probability values of the Ljung-Box test (Q Stat) and Breusch-Godfrey test (LM 
Test), for testing autocorrelation in the residuals. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation and a probability value above 0.05 indicates that there is no autocorrelation. Where there is 
autocorrelation, the regression is repeated and the final results are presented where the residuals are free from autocorrelation. Both the old and new Ljung-Box test (Q Stat) and Breusch-Godfrey test (LM 
Test) probability values are presented and the additional lagged variable is presented for as many lags as were necessary. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 
quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Panel A: Norway           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0051 -0.2535 0.2311 -0.1355 0.2399 -0.0038  0.1364 0.8170 0.6087 
 (0.0000) (0.0044) (0.0402) (0.1265) (0.0738) (0.9787)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0052 -0.2663 0.2278 -0.1353 0.2423 -0.0036 -0.1317 0.1415 0.6880 0.3815 
 (0.0001) (0.0157) (0.0332) (0.1249) (0.0751) (0.9788) (0.3373)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM 0.0053 -0.2833 0.2230 -0.1354 0.2448 -0.0043 -0.1586 0.1494 0.7600 0.5067 
 (0.0001) (0.0086) (0.0402) (0.1614) (0.0651) (0.9776) (0.1199)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0052 -0.2576 0.2303 -0.1351 0.2412 -0.0031 -0.0168 0.1230 0.8260 0.6258 
 (0.0000) (0.0038) (0.0299) (0.1450) (0.0822) (0.9825) (0.8515)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0051 -0.2514 0.2312 -0.1361 0.2387 -0.0049 0.1356 0.1428 0.9840 0.9645 
 (0.0002) (0.0240) (0.0199) (0.1614) (0.0774) (0.9673) (0.0408)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0054 -0.2531 0.2314 -0.1353 0.2402 -0.0034 -0.0220 0.1232 0.8300 0.6333 
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Panel B: Canada           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY (D) X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0022 0.6044 -0.0947 0.0542 0.1608 -0.1155  0.3102 0.6280 0.4036 
 (0.0760) (0.0001) (0.2628) (0.6433) (0.1510) (0.4877)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0022 0.6048 -0.0948 0.0542 0.1608 -0.1156 0.0096 0.2993 0.6160 0.3872 
 (0.0819) (0.0001) (0.2756) (0.6448) (0.1567) (0.4853) (0.9004)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0021 0.6337 -0.1032 0.0546 0.1602 -0.1211 0.1502 0.3231 0.7960 0.6476 
 (0.0920) (0.0000) (0.1726) (0.6239) (0.1350) (0.4960) (0.0181)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0024 0.5761 -0.0864 0.0535 0.1609 -0.1106 -0.0801 0.3055 0.6070 0.3568 
 (0.0559) (0.0002) (0.3052) (0.6362) (0.1454) (0.5404) (0.3817)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0032 0.4330 -0.0447 0.0525 0.1666 -0.0810 0.4754 0.5185 0.7020 0.5983 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5386) (0.5852) (0.1034) (0.0929) (0.0000)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0029 0.6024 -0.0940 0.0539 0.1603 -0.1157 -0.0846 0.3070 0.7340 0.5572 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.2703) (0.0000) (0.0628) (0.0011)    
 
Panel C: Denmark           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0024 0.0701 0.1431 -0.2604 0.2997 0.0504  0.1377 0.8120 0.5718 
 (0.0326) (0.6167) (0.1145) (0.0200) (0.0391) (0.7196)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0024 0.0634 0.1437 -0.2625 0.2997 0.0513 0.0710 0.1295 0.8910 0.7486 
 (0.0411) (0.6684) (0.1039) (0.0179) (0.0498) (0.7045) (0.5748)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0024 0.0811 0.1420 -0.2571 0.2999 0.0486 -0.0981 0.1345 0.8740 0.6878 
 (0.0511) (0.5606) (0.0434) (0.0261) (0.0751) (0.6640) (0.3900)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0026 -0.0066 0.1485 -0.2857 0.3021 0.0583 -0.2519 0.1879 0.9800 0.9558 
 (0.0319) (0.9643) (0.0253) (0.0052) (0.0716) (0.5825) (0.0068)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0026 -0.0271 0.1512 -0.2910 0.3003 0.0632 0.2603 0.1892 0.6760 0.3324 
 (0.0101) (0.8205) (0.0791) (0.0033) (0.0219) (0.6499) (0.0019)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0036 0.0723 0.1426 -0.2601 0.3003 0.0494 -0.1183 0.1394 0.6820 0.3386 
 (0.0077) (0.6164) (0.0287) (0.0148) (0.0675) (0.6583) (0.1394)    
 
Panel D: Mexico           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0034 0.4185 0.1083 0.0579 0.2978 -0.1548  0.2994 0.9250 0.8659 
 (0.0339) (0.0049) (0.2023) (0.6174) (0.0003) (0.0185)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0034 0.4222 0.1084 0.0583 0.2975 -0.1539 -0.1335 0.3077 0.8810 0.7889 
 (0.0506) (0.0110) (0.3079) (0.6428) (0.0022) (0.0637) (0.1627)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0034 0.4167 0.1083 0.0577 0.2980 -0.1552 -0.0443 0.2904 0.8960 0.8150 
 (0.0260) (0.0023) (0.1669) (0.6058) (0.0005) (0.0173) (0.6882)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0036 0.3806 0.1077 0.0525 0.3018 -0.1646 -0.0993 0.2976 0.9950 0.9901 
 (0.0139) (0.0030) (0.1297) (0.5962) (0.0005) (0.0136) (0.1667)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0045 0.2262 0.1046 0.0378 0.3172 -0.1959 0.5002 0.5247 0.8080 0.7355 
 (0.0000) (0.0022) (0.1555) (0.6167) (0.0000) (0.0087) (0.0032)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0040 0.4265 0.1085 0.0583 0.2971 -0.1536 -0.0641 0.2927 0.7970 0.6458 
 (0.0049) (0.0009) (0.1094) (0.5644) (0.0003) (0.0181) (0.2314)    
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Panel E: Brazil           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0039 0.3501 -0.1723 -0.0232 0.2434 0.0240  0.1885 0.9470 0.8912 
 (0.0203) (0.0059) (0.1316) (0.8309) (0.0589) (0.7935)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0039 0.3372 -0.1735 -0.0209 0.2453 0.0201 -0.1953 0.2172 0.6920 0.4386 
 (0.0105) (0.0072) (0.1601) (0.8308) (0.0472) (0.8135) (0.0115)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0039 0.3507 -0.1721 -0.0232 0.2434 0.0241 0.0634 0.1800 0.9540 0.8986 
 (0.0306) (0.0111) (0.2275) (0.8194) (0.0522) (0.7836) (0.3708)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0038 0.3563 -0.1708 -0.0219 0.2430 0.0245 0.1132 0.1896 0.9690 0.9378 
 (0.0195) (0.0059) (0.1801) (0.8198) (0.0522) (0.7779) (0.3161)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0046 0.2415 -0.1894 -0.0222 0.2554 0.0015 0.2490 0.2316 0.7530 0.5556 
 (0.0580) (0.1006) (0.2921) (0.8381) (0.0430) (0.9883) (0.0002)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0025 0.2931 -0.1810 -0.0220 0.2499 0.0118 0.1228 0.1889 0.8130 0.6098 
 (0.3010) (0.0291) (0.2469) (0.8153) (0.0648) (0.8968) (0.2774)    
 
Panel F: Singapore           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD (D) XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0130 0.0955 0.1346 -0.2399 0.3113 0.0302  0.1272 0.8060 0.5499 
 (0.0001) (0.3999) (0.1422) (0.0514) (0.0195) (0.7356)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0130 0.0961 0.1346 -0.2399 0.3112 0.0303 0.0157 0.1136 0.8280 0.5902 
 (0.0002) (0.3971) (0.1376) (0.0494) (0.0211) (0.7358) (0.8871)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0130 0.0945 0.1346 -0.2398 0.3115 0.0300 -0.0061 0.1134 0.7970 0.5303 
 (0.0002) (0.4109) (0.1494) (0.0542) (0.0180) (0.7388) (0.9245)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0128 0.1051 0.1335 -0.2403 0.3092 0.0318 0.0474 0.1157 0.7800 0.4963 
 (0.0000) (0.2860) (0.0906) (0.0484) (0.0232) (0.6953) (0.5321)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (OB) 0.0138 0.0321 0.1357 -0.2333 0.3252 0.0166 0.2156 0.1603 0.9140 0.8017 
 (0.0000) (0.7597) (0.1031) (0.0206) (0.0258) (0.8180) (0.0001)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0131 0.0962 0.1346 -0.2400 0.3112 0.0303 -0.0069 0.1134 0.7980 0.5321 
 (0.0001) (0.3542) (0.1152) (0.0533) (0.0219) (0.7183) (0.9459)    
 
Panel G: UK           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0015 0.6893 0.0104 -0.1587 0.0110 0.0682  0.4330 0.7210 0.5995 
 (0.2699) (0.0003) (0.9143) (0.0014) (0.8764) (0.4233)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0016 0.6688 0.0098 -0.1584 0.0116 0.0617 -0.0879 0.4320 0.7750 0.6749 
 (0.2295) (0.0003) (0.9192) (0.0015) (0.8583) (0.5068) (0.3293)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM 0.0017 0.6496 0.0094 -0.1582 0.0121 0.0556 -0.1283 0.4404 0.8520 0.7732 
 (0.1945) (0.0003) (0.9112) (0.0031) (0.8724) (0.5667) (0.0990)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0015 0.6849 0.0105 -0.1588 0.0112 0.0668 -0.0132 0.4241 0.7450 0.6187 
 (0.2958) (0.0011) (0.8970) (0.0002) (0.8645) (0.5348) (0.8339)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0015 0.6875 0.0104 -0.1587 0.0110 0.0676 0.0037 0.4240 0.7210 0.5998 
 (0.3528) (0.0044) (0.9060) (0.0002) (0.8693) (0.5149) (0.9750)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0039 0.6416 0.0120 -0.1601 0.0131 0.0530 -0.2738 0.5038 0.3310 0.1594 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8858) (0.0035) (0.8340) (0.4660) (0.0421)    
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Panel H: Germany           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0018 0.4719 -0.1809 -0.0849 0.0686 0.0367  0.1527 0.7170 0.4098 
 (0.1851) (0.0081) (0.3791) (0.5251) (0.4285) (0.7489)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0018 0.4722 -0.1810 -0.0849 0.0686 0.0369 -0.0127 0.1394 0.7140 0.4023 
 (0.1890) (0.0088) (0.3840) (0.5290) (0.4311) (0.7506) (0.9009)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM 0.0020 0.4079 -0.1644 -0.0868 0.0710 0.0079 -0.1150 0.1505 0.8050 0.5122 
 (0.0302) (0.0108) (0.4449) (0.4959) (0.4109) (0.9367) (0.0980)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM (D) 0.0019 0.4488 -0.1734 -0.0864 0.0698 0.0287 -0.2672 0.2170 0.8220 0.6534 
 (0.1531) (0.0076) (0.4090) (0.5217) (0.4451) (0.8001) (0.0007)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0024 0.2480 -0.1276 -0.0891 0.0759 -0.0711 0.4886 0.3614 0.7000 0.4805 
 (0.0159) (0.0726) (0.2406) (0.3715) (0.3931) (0.5172) (0.0077)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0022 0.4769 -0.1817 -0.0850 0.0685 0.0396 -0.0482 0.1417 0.5940 0.2265 
 (0.1333) (0.0239) (0.3455) (0.5069) (0.4657) (0.7335) (0.5764)    
 
Panel I: Japan           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY (D) X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0017 0.1068 0.1517 -0.2113 -0.0039 -0.1164  0.0473 0.7980 0.4034 
 (0.0948) (0.3019) (0.1835) (0.1328) (0.9790) (0.2570)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0017 0.1035 0.1520 -0.2117 -0.0043 -0.1180 0.0410 0.0340 0.7220 0.2400 
 (0.1492) (0.3797) (0.1978) (0.1272) (0.9748) (0.3109) (0.6331)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0017 0.0926 0.1528 -0.2148 -0.0035 -0.1222 -0.1121 0.0457 0.7960 0.4289 
 (0.0829) (0.3578) (0.1717) (0.1241) (0.9811) (0.2384) (0.4345)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0017 0.1096 0.1515 -0.2104 -0.0043 -0.1154 0.0208 0.0326 0.8030 0.4140 
 (0.1017) (0.2361) (0.1794) (0.1400) (0.9776) (0.2064) (0.7928)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0019 0.0131 0.1602 -0.2299 -0.0061 -0.1572 0.3575 0.1647 0.7510 0.4874 
 (0.0123) (0.8999) (0.0897) (0.0582) (0.9637) (0.0779) (0.0048)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0029 0.1160 0.1506 -0.2104 -0.0027 -0.1119 -0.0980 0.0426 0.9870 0.9578 
 (0.0335) (0.2451) (0.2027) (0.1049) (0.9861) (0.2256) (0.2356)    
 
Panel J: France           
 Cons GDP RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0012 0.6375 -0.1943 -0.0634 0.1874 -0.0847  0.4436 0.1230 0.0249 
 (0.1035) (0.0001) (0.2092) (0.5332) (0.0410) (0.3783)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0012 0.6375 -0.1943 -0.0634 0.1874 -0.0847 0.0097 0.4349 0.1220 0.0247 
 (0.1075) (0.0001) (0.2122) (0.5369) (0.0431) (0.3844) (0.9115)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0013 0.6263 -0.1917 -0.0627 0.1874 -0.0906 -0.1702 0.4664 0.1120 0.0252 
 (0.0877) (0.0001) (0.2388) (0.5228) (0.0295) (0.3317) (0.0126)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0014 0.5961 -0.1844 -0.0617 0.1884 -0.1036 -0.0653 0.4381 0.1900 0.0294 
 (0.1261) (0.0037) (0.2829) (0.5738) (0.0513) (0.3176) (0.4805)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0017 0.5040 -0.1630 -0.0565 0.1885 -0.1503 0.2396 0.4838 0.3140 0.1311 
 (0.0026) (0.0002) (0.2014) (0.5491) (0.0532) (0.1714) (0.0073)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0022 0.6314 -0.1927 -0.0636 0.1883 -0.0857 -0.1540 0.4607 0.0260 0.0014 
 (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.1747) (0.4795) (0.0362) (0.4096) (0.0268)    
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Panel K: France (Two lags for GDP)          
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY X Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
GDPt+1 = FV  0.0009 0.5287 0.2140 -0.2426 -0.0858 0.2007 -0.0536  0.4611 0.5690 0.1205 
 (0.3362) (0.0006) (0.1050) (0.1224) (0.3713) (0.0229) (0.5903)     
GDPt+1 = FV+FX (D) 0.0009 0.5288 0.2140 -0.2426 -0.0858 0.2007 -0.0536 0.0098 0.4526 0.5700 0.1195 
 (0.3400) (0.0007) (0.1079) (0.1269) (0.3765) (0.0248) (0.5948) (0.9021)    
GDPt+1 = FV+NAM (D) 0.0009 0.5131 0.2220 -0.2417 -0.0859 0.2011 -0.0586 -0.1755 0.4866 0.5190 0.1082 
 (0.3127) (0.0010) (0.0769) (0.1344) (0.3510) (0.0153) (0.5397) (0.0215)    
GDPt+1 = FV+GAM 0.0008 0.5323 0.2181 -0.2449 -0.0865 0.2008 -0.0504 0.0089 0.4525 0.5610 0.1048 
 (0.3706) (0.0041) (0.0234) (0.1765) (0.3833) (0.0615) (0.6467) (0.9373)    
GDPt+1 = FV+OB (D) 0.0013 0.4079 0.1987 -0.2090 -0.0776 0.2007 -0.1190 0.2307 0.4985 0.8300 0.6109 
 (0.0550) (0.0005) (0.0479) (0.1168) (0.3593) (0.0256) (0.2542) (0.0133)    
GDPt+1 = FV+BD 0.0018 0.5156 0.2272 -0.2439 -0.0875 0.2024 -0.0528 -0.1636 0.4821 0.1920 0.0010 
 (0.0040) (0.0008) (0.0154) (0.0983) (0.2563) (0.0443) (0.6277) (0.0039)    
 
Panel L: Summary of each countries Adj. R2 after adding the individual control variables  
 Adj. R2  % Change of Adj. R2 relative to FV only 
  FV only FV + FX FV + NAM FV + GAM FV + OB FV + BD  FV + FX FV + NAM FV + GAM FV + OB FV + BD 
Norway 0.136 0.142 0.149 0.123 0.143 0.123  3.76% 9.49% -9.83% 4.70% -9.66% 
Canada 0.310 0.299 0.323 0.305 0.519 0.307  -3.50% 4.17% -1.51% 67.18% -1.00% 
Denmark 0.138 0.130 0.134 0.188 0.189 0.139  -5.96% -2.37% 36.43% 37.35% 1.19% 
Mexico 0.299 0.308 0.290 0.298 0.525 0.293  2.80% -3.00% -0.60% 75.29% -2.23% 
Brazil 0.189 0.217 0.180 0.190 0.232 0.189  15.25% -17.13% 5.32% 22.16% -18.46% 
Singapore 0.127 0.114 0.113 0.116 0.160 0.113  -10.68% -10.86% -9.03% 26.02% -10.85% 
UK 0.433 0.432 0.440 0.424 0.424 0.504  -0.22% 1.73% -2.04% -2.08% 16.37% 
Germany 0.153 0.139 0.150 0.217 0.361 0.142  -8.69% -1.42% 42.11% 136.73% -7.15% 
Japan 0.047 0.034 0.046 0.033 0.165 0.043  -28.12% -3.21% -31.01% 248.58% -9.90% 
France (One lag) 0.444 0.435 0.466 0.438 0.484 0.461  -1.97% 5.14% -1.24% 9.05% 3.86% 
France (Two lags) 0.461 0.453 0.487 0.452 0.498 0.482   -1.86% 5.52% -1.87% 8.09% 4.55% 
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7.4.3.3. PREDICTING ECONOMIC GROWTH USING ALL VARIABLES 
Instead of adding one predictive variable at a time, we will now use a regression model131 
which incorporates all variables and is shown in table 7.5.  
Table 7.5 shows that in addition to Norway, the GDP of Denmark is also now positively 
related to risk free rate (RF). Even standard deviation (SD) have two (2) additional 
countries showing significant negative coefficients namely Norway and Germany. There 
no changes for excess market returns (XS) as the same six (6) countries exhibit positive 
coefficients while for dividend yield (DY), Japan also displays a negative and significant 
coefficient.  
In relation to the predictive variables, national foreign exchange (NFX) remains negative 
and significant only for Brazil, confirming that Brazil benefits from their cheaper imports. 
However, this appears to be in contrast to table 7.1, as its trade data for oil as well as 
goods services is one of the lowest as a percentage of GDP. Nevertheless, as highlighted 
earlier, Brazil have the lowest “annual oil revenue to GDP ratio (%)” and negative “net 
exports of goods and services (% of GDP)” signifying that NFX may have positively 
affect Brazil’s economic growth through cheaper “imports of goods and services (% of 
GDP)” and exports of expensive oil (OB).  
The results of illiquidity variables change slightly, as national illiquidity (NAM) of 
Norway as well as global illiquidity (GAM) of Canada and Mexico are now found to be 
negatively significant to GDP. NAM has more significant results compared to GAM but 
NAM of Canada remains positively related to its GDP which is unexpected. If we exclude 
Canada, the GDP of four (4) countries is correctly predicted by NAM and GAM 
respectively. Thus, similar to Galariotis and Giouvris (2015), this shows that market 
illiquidity does contain some information for estimating the current and future state of 
the economy of certain countries in our sample. 
The GDP of the nine (9) countries (except UK) are still predicted by oil (OB) even after 
including all predictive variables. This indicates that the effect of oil (OB) on the 
economy of the nine (9) countries is quite significant as the additional variables do not 
change the relationship. The results also confirm that the GDP of all nine (9) countries 
                                                 
131 The regression model estimate is similar to the previous equation (7.3) but is conducted by including all the predictive variables. 
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are positively predicted by oil (OB) which is not expected for net oil importers132. 
However, Mork et al. (1994) do find evidence that countries with different characteristics 
namely US and Canada133, can have similar reaction to oil (OB).  
Baltic dry index (BD) still predicts the GDP of three (3) countries even after including all 
variables. However, the composition of the three (3) countries actually changes, as 
Brazil’s GDP is now significantly affected by BD while the GDP of Canada is not 
affected by the BD. However, out of the three countries, Brazil obtains a positive 
coefficient which is more consistent to past research such as Bakshi et al. (2011). They 
show the ability of the BD to predict the future course of the economy of Brazil. Since 
national foreign exchange (NFX) and BD for Brazil remains significant, the results show 
that the two variables combined can predict the economic growth of Brazil and trade is 
apparently important for the GDP of Brazil. 
Panel B presents a summary of explanatory power for all countries in the sample by 
looking at the adjusted R2 of the combined predictive variables over financial variables. 
After including all predictive variables into the regression, surprisingly results for two (2) 
countries namely Singapore and Norway do not show improvement. Singapore may have 
different characteristics in comparison to the other countries. Table 7.1 shows that it has 
the highest Annual oil expenditure to GDP ratio and it is the only country with 
exports/imports of goods and services (% of GDP) that exceeds 100%. Thus, Singapore 
may require different financial and predictive variables.  
Norway has the highest “Annual oil revenue to GDP ratio” and the lowest “liner 
shipping connectivity index” but unlike Singapore, Norway is affected the most when all 
the variables are included, as two (2) variables namely standard deviation (SD) and NAM 
become significant. Predictive variables for Germany show the greatest explanatory 
power over financial variables, as the adjusted R2 increases by more than 200%.  
Overall, the results show that when including all variables, oil (OB) is able to predict 
economic growth for most countries in our sample while excess market returns (XS) is 
the best predictor among financial variables (FV). Results are less consistent for national 
                                                 
132 For net oil importers, we expect negative coefficient whereby an oil price decrease, will increase the GDP of those countries as 
they will be able to import oil cheaper for the development of the countries’ economy. However, the positive coefficient for net oil 
exporters is expected, as the higher oil price means higher revenue for those countries, which translates to higher GDP. For instance, 
Sheppard, Raval et al. 2016 reports of Saudi Arabia’s willingness to cut oil production in order to improve revenue and their economy, 
signifies that oil exporters are expected to benefit from an oil price increase. 
133 Mork, Olsen et al. (1994) highlight that Canada switches from a position of net oil importer to net oil exporter over time while we 
classify Canada as a net oil exporter based on the latest available data (2012) that we obtain from US EIA website.   
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and global illiquidity as there are changes in the number of countries affected. National 
illiquidity (NAM) is significant for five (5) countries’ GDP and global illiquidity (GAM) 
is significant for four (4) countries’ GDP. However, NAM has a positive effect in the 
case of Canada’s GDP which is not consistent to past research such as Galariotis and 
Giouvris (2015). Whilst Baltic Dry index (BD) has a positive effect on Brazil’s GDP after 
the inclusion of all variables. With regards to explanatory power, Germany shows the 
highest improvement while Norway and Singapore are the only two (2) countries that do 
not show any improvement over financial variables after including all predictive variables. 
Finally, results for individual countries show that oil (OB) has greater explanatory power 
in comparison to other predictive variables such as BD and the illiquidity variables.  
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Table 7.5: In sample prediction of macroeconomic variable with all variables for the ten (10) countries. 
The table shows the results from predictive regression where we regress next quarter economic growth in macroeconomic variable (GDPt+1) using all the variables.  Thus, the regression model estimated 
is similar to before but is inclusive of all variables as below:  
 
௧ܻାଵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ′ܨ ௧ܸ ൅ ߛ′ܺ௧ ൅	ߝ௧ାଵ   (7.4)  
where Yt+1 is real GDP growth (GDPt+1). We include one lag of the dependent variable (and we include more lags if there is autocorrelation in the residuals) and financial variables (FVt) of RF (Risk free); 
SD (Standard deviation); XS (Excess market returns); DY (Dividend yield) as control variables. Predictive variables (Xt) are consisting of NFX (National foreign exchange), NAM (National illiquidity-
Amihud), GAM (Global illiquidity-Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry index). NFX is the national foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our 
illiquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in front of each illiquidity variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is 
constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil 
Brent price while BD is the Baltic Dry index. The coefficients reported are standardised. Adj. R2 presents Adjusted R2 of the dependent variable (GDP) + financial variables (FV) + ALL (All predictive 
variables). Please note that panel B summarizes all results obtained from panel A and are based on the methodology of Brockman et al (2009), Galariotis & Giouvris (2015) and Sung & Giouvris (2016). 
Newey-West p-value are reported in brackets whereby bold figures denote statistically significant coefficient at least at 10% level. The bandwidth parameter for the Newey-West p-value is calculated 
using the Newey-West automatic lag selection. The number in the last two columns are the probability values of the Ljung-Box test (Q Stat) and Breusch-Godfrey test (LM Test), for testing autocorrelation 
in the residuals. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation and a probability value above 0.05 indicates that there is no autocorrelation. Where there is autocorrelation, the regression is repeated 
and the final results are presented where the residuals are free from autocorrelation. Both the old and new Ljung-Box test (Q Stat) and Breusch-Godfrey test (LM Test) probability values are presented 
and the additional lagged variable is presented for as many lags as are necessary. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained 
from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
 
Panel A: All Countries              
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) NAM GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Norway 0.0056 -0.3003  0.2186 -0.1351 0.2480 -0.0041 -0.1350 -0.1617 -0.0229 0.1355 -0.0192 0.1353 0.8100 0.6033 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0578) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9309) (0.1945) (0.0004) (0.6542) (0.0000) (0.5298)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY (D) NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Canada 0.0040 0.4032  -0.0360 0.0514 0.1660 -0.0766 0.0018 0.1107 -0.1316 0.4837 -0.0877 0.5284 0.4450 0.2755 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.6010) (0.5214) (0.1142) (0.2322) (0.9769) (0.0295) (0.0808) (0.0001) (0.1007)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Denmark 0.0041 -0.1203  0.1575 -0.3222 0.3037 0.0721 0.0851 -0.0802 -0.2825 0.2885 -0.1176 0.2506 0.7740 0.5207 
 (0.0050) (0.3313)  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.4549) (0.4733) (0.3495) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.1893)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Mexico 0.0053 0.1553  0.1033 0.0275 0.3246 -0.2144 -0.1266 -0.0537 -0.1761 0.5241 -0.0327 0.5472 0.9730 0.9603 
 (0.0001) (0.0581)  (0.1999) (0.7081) (0.0000) (0.0061) (0.1019) (0.5160) (0.0160) (0.0003) (0.6460)    
                
 293 
 
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Brazil 0.0024 0.1158  -0.2076 -0.0160 0.2703 -0.0274 -0.2150 0.0613 0.1087 0.3024 0.2044 0.2837 0.7920 0.5996 
 (0.2633) (0.4896)  (0.1972) (0.8273) (0.0265) (0.7763) (0.0045) (0.3742) (0.3058) (0.0003) (0.0227)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD (D) XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Singapore 0.0137 0.0379  0.1349 -0.2335 0.3238 0.0176 0.0139 -0.0144 0.0366 0.2143 -0.0004 0.1054 0.8850 0.7269 
 (0.0003) (0.7360)  (0.1041) (0.0208) (0.0258) (0.8393) (0.9015) (0.8502) (0.6434) (0.0005) (0.9976)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) NAM GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
UK 0.0048 0.4875  0.0091 -0.1590 0.0179 0.0041 -0.1248 -0.1723 -0.0742 0.0890 -0.2975 0.5148 0.6880 0.4591 
 (0.0000) (0.0040)  (0.9178) (0.0063) (0.7373) (0.9660) (0.1125) (0.0021) (0.2976) (0.3297) (0.0071)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) NAM 
GAM 
(D) OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Germany 0.0033 0.0547  -0.0763 -0.0955 0.0832 -0.1562 -0.0063 -0.2559 -0.2915 0.5495 -0.0197 0.4662 0.4970 0.2350 
 (0.0014) (0.5321)  (0.6265) (0.2822) (0.3219) (0.1431) (0.9276) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.7869)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY (D) NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
Japan 0.0030 0.0033  0.1608 -0.2328 -0.0051 -0.1608 0.0476 -0.1203 0.0110 0.3590 -0.0880 0.1369 0.8550 0.6744 
 (0.0433) (0.9644)  (0.1013) (0.0388) (0.9694) (0.0409) (0.5745) (0.2565) (0.8790) (0.0003) (0.2854)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
France 0.0033 0.3319  -0.1222 -0.0492 0.1921 -0.2293 0.0083 -0.1831 -0.1840 0.3060 -0.1629 0.5390 0.3090 0.0683 
 (0.0000) (0.0352)  (0.3784) (0.4897) (0.0255) (0.0722) (0.9108) (0.0229) (0.0295) (0.0047) (0.0515)    
                
 Cons GDP GDP-1 RF (D) SD XS DY NFX (D) 
NAM 
(D) GAM OB (D) BD Adj. R2 Q Stat LM Test 
France 0.0028 0.3051 0.1621 -0.1719 -0.0687 0.2011 -0.1798 0.0087 -0.1846 -0.1197 0.2787 -0.1674 0.5443 0.4470 0.0827 
 (0.0000) (0.0251) (0.0893) (0.2815) (0.2765) (0.0356) (0.1979) (0.9037) (0.0248) (0.2238) (0.0069) (0.0261)    
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Panel B: Summary of each countries Adj. R2    
 Adj. R2   % Change of Adj. R2 relative to FV only 
 FV only FV + ALL  FV + ALL 
Norway 0.136 0.1353  -0.84% 
Canada 0.310 0.5284  70.38% 
Denmark 0.138 0.2506  81.93% 
Mexico 0.299 0.5472  82.81% 
Brazil 0.189 0.2837  50.50% 
Singapore 0.127 0.1054  -17.15% 
UK 0.433 0.5148  18.89% 
Germany 0.153 0.4662  205.39% 
Japan 0.047 0.1369  189.58% 
France (One lag) 0.444 0.5390  21.51% 
France (Two lags) 0.461 0.5443  18.03% 
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7.4.3.4. SUMMARY OF THE AVERAGE ADJUSTED R2 
Table 7.6 presents the grand average of adjusted R2. The first line shows the results when 
all countries are included. National foreign exchange (NFX) does not show any extra 
explanatory power over financial variables (FV). Global illiquidity (GAM) has extra 
explanatory power over national illiquidity (NAM) and Baltic Dry index (BD), but BD 
has more explanatory power in comparison to NAM. Nevertheless, the extra explanatory 
power of the three (3) variables dwarves by the extra explanatory power of oil (OB), 
signifying the importance of oil (OB) for predicting economic growth.  
So far our study, shows the importance of oil (OB) for the countries in our sample. In 
order to research this further, we have categorised the ten (10) countries into net oil 
exporters and net oil importers. To recap, net oil exporters are: Norway, Canada, 
Denmark, Mexico and Brazil while net oil importers are: Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan 
and France.  
The adjusted R2 for net oil exporters (line 2) shows that NFX now has extra explanatory 
power over financial variables but BD does not have extra explanatory power. In terms 
of illiquidity variables, GAM remains superior in comparison to NAM. Nonetheless, oil 
(OB) outperforms all other predictive variables. For net oil importers (line 3), results are 
similar whereby oil (OB) provides superior explanatory power.  By comparing the three 
groups, it appears that oil (OB) is more important for net oil exporters as the explanatory 
power is higher in comparison to the other two groups, consistent with Wang et al. (2013). 
Baltic Dry index (BD) is found to be more important for net oil importers probably since 
the countries are more focused on trading goods and services rather than oil (OB). 
Furthermore, net oil importers are on the top 5 “liner shipping connectivity index”, which 
captures how well countries are connected to global shipping networks. 
With reference to illiquidity, global illiquidity (GAM) seems to be more important for net 
oil exporters while for net oil importers, national illiquidity (NAM) appears to be more 
important. National foreign exchange (NFX) also provides greater explanatory power for 
net oil exporters relative to net oil importers, signifying that NFX may be important for 
them for trading oil. Being an emerging country may play a role as well. Brazil is the only 
country that displays significant results for NFX. Therefore, we are going to investigate 
this later by comparing developed and emerging countries.  
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Overall, our results confirm the importance of the chosen predictive variables. Both 
illiquidity variables are able to provide greater explanatory power in comparison to 
financial variables but global illiquidity (GAM) variable is apparently superior. Baltic 
Dry index (BD) also provides some explanatory power while national foreign exchange 
(NFX) is the only variable that does not provide any benefits when all countries are 
included. However, it can be unanimously said that oil (OB) is the most important 
predictive variable, as it provides the greatest explanatory power especially for net oil 
exporters while BD appears to be more important for net oil importers.  
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Table 7.6: Summary of the average adjusted R2 of the ten (10) countries as a group (All countries, net oil exporters and net oil importers). 
The table shows the summary average adjusted R2 results from the predictive regression of table 7.4 and table 7.5. FV only (financial variables) includes RF (Risk free); SD (Standard deviation); XS 
(Excess market returns); DY (Dividend yield) as well as one lag of the dependent variable (and we include more lags if there is autocorrelation in the residuals). The predictive variables are NFX (National 
foreign exchange), NAM (National illiquidity-Amihud), GAM (Global illiquidity-Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry index), whereas ALL involves regression using all the variables. 
Thus, the Adj. R2 presents Adjusted R2 of the dependent variable (GDP) + financial variables (FV) + X (relevant additional variables) or ALL (All variables). Please note that summarising by taking the 
average adjusted R2 is based on the methodology of Brockman et al (2009), Galariotis & Giouvris (2015) and Sung & Giouvris (2016). All countries include all ten (10) countries in our sample. Net oil 
exporters are Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico and Brazil while net oil importers are Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan and France. For France, we use Adj. R2 of the regression with two lags of GDP, 
as it results in no autocorrelation in the residuals. NFX is the national foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our illiquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in front of each 
liquidity variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis 
and Giouvris (2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil Brent price while BD is the Baltic Dry index. The sample 
period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
website. 
Summary of each countries Adj. R2 
 Average Adj. R2  % Change of Adj. R2 relative to FV only 
 FV only FV + FX FV + NAM FV + GAM FV + OB FV + BD FV + ALL  FV + FX FV + NAM FV + GAM FV + OB FV + BD FV + ALL 
X→GDP (All countries) 0.229 0.227 0.231 0.235 0.322 0.233 0.351  -1.154% 0.897% 2.271% 40.219% 1.808% 53.167% 
X→GDP (Net oil exporters) 0.214 0.219 0.215 0.221 0.321 0.210 0.349  2.164% 0.481% 2.927% 49.874% -1.956% 62.776% 
X→GDP (Net oil importers) 0.244 0.234 0.247 0.248 0.322 0.257 0.353  -4.068% 1.263% 1.694% 31.743% 5.112% 44.731% 
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7.4.4. CAUSALITY 
So far our research has focused on the relationship and the effect of predictive variables 
on GDP. However, there is a possibility of an inverse relationship that is GDP may cause 
the predictive variables or even a two-way relationship. For instance, in relation to 
illiquidity, Fujimoto (2004) who studies the US market finds evidence that 
macroeconomic fundamentals are significant determinants of liquidity while for oil (OB), 
Sheppard et al. (2016) report that due to big oil producing countries going into recession, 
OPEC led by Saudi Arabia decides to cut oil production to help the oil market recover, 
signifying that there is a possibility for oil prices (OB) to be affected by GDP. With 
respect to national foreign exchange (NFX), Inman (2015) highlights that the main reason 
that China devalues its currency is due to its weakening economy while for Baltic Dry 
index (BD), Bloch et al. (2012) mentions that due to China’s strong economic growth, 
China's demand for coal is surging and since coal is part of BD, it is expected that 
economic growth may also affect BD.  
Furthermore, there is also evidence of a two-way or bidirectional relationship between 
the chosen predictive variables and macroeconomics. Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) find 
a two-way causality between global liquidity and macroeconomic variables in their study 
of G7 countries while Bloch et al. (2012) find a bidirectional causality between coal 
consumption and GDP, as coal is one of the raw materials captured by BD. 
 
7.4.4.1. CAUSALITY RESULTS FOR ALL COUNTRIES, NET OIL EXPORTERS 
AND NET OIL IMPORTERS 
In table 7.7, we use Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) methodology to investigate the 
possibility of an inverse or a two-way relationship between our predictive variables and 
GDP. Similarly, we use two causality tests namely the ‘standard pairwise Granger 
causality panel data test’ and the ‘Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel data test’. However, 
unlike them, we have two further panels of countries namely net oil exporters (panel B) 
and net oil importers (panel C), in addition to the panel data involving all countries (Panel 
A). We report the F-test and probability/p-value (in parenthesis) for the standard pairwise 
Granger causality panel data test and the W-stat, Z bar and probability/p-value (in 
parenthesis) for the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel data test. The null hypotheses for 
the standard pairwise Granger causality panel data test is that our predictive variables 
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do not Granger cause GDP and GDP does not Granger cause our respective predictive 
variables. For the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel data test, the null hypothesis is that 
our predictive variables do not homogeneously cause GDP and then we test the null 
hypothesis that GDP does not homogeneously cause our predictive variables. 
Panel A in table 7.7 reports causality results between our predictive variables and 
macroeconomic variable for all ten (10) countries in our sample. The panel shows that 
there are no interactions between national foreign exchange (NFX) and the 
macroeconomic variable (GDP) while both illiquidity variables appear to cause GDP 
based on D-H panel data test for national illiquidity (NAM) and standard Granger 
causality panel data test for global illiquidity (GAM). However, GDP also Granger causes 
GAM signifying a two-way causality for GAM, which is close to the findings of 
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015).  
A two-way relationship can also be observed for Baltic Dry index (table 7.7, panel A, 
lines 9-10) according to both standard Granger and D-H tests which is close to the 
bidirectional evidence that Bloch et al. (2012) find between coal consumption and GDP. 
Oil (OB) also shows a two-way causality but not for both tests. Oil (OB) homogenously 
causes GDP (D-H test) while GDP granger causes oil (standard granger test).  
Next we will investigate causality results for net oil exporting countries in panel B of 
table 7.7. Panel B shows that GDP Granger causes NFX but there are no interactions 
between national illiquidity (NAM) and GDP as previously observed when using all 
countries. Moreover, for net oil exporters, GDP does not homogenously cause global 
illiquidity (GAM) based on D-H test but the two-way relationship between GAM and 
GDP remains according to the standard Granger test. In comparison to all countries, oil 
(OB) and Baltic dry index (BD) relationship with GDP remains the same, as there is still 
a two-way causality. 
Panel C in table 7.7 shows causality tests for net oil importing countries which consist of 
Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan and France. Similar to net oil exporters, GDP of net oil 
importers also cause NFX according to D-H test. Surprisingly, there is no interaction 
between national illiquidity (NAM) and GDP for net oil importers. Global illiquidity 
(GAM) still appears to have a two-way relationship with GDP but it is slightly weaker 
compared to all countries and net oil exporters. Furthermore, there is no more a two-way 
 300 
 
causality for both oil (OB) and Baltic Dry index (BD). GDP still Granger cause oil (OB) 
while BD Granger causes GDP (both tests) but not the other way round.  
Overall, GDP is found to cause national foreign exchange (NFX) when our countries are 
segregated into net oil exporters and importers, signifying that GDP may be the reason 
that countries try to manipulate their currencies as reported by Inman (2015) for China. 
With regards to illiquidity, we obtain similar findings to Galariotis and Giouvris (2015), 
as there is a two-way relationship between global illiquidity (GAM) and our 
macroeconomic variable (GDP). 
The Baltic Dry index (BD) and oil (OB) show a two-way relationship but it appears to be 
stronger for the former. Evidence for the BD is similar to Bloch et al. (2012) research 
which involves coal consumption as coal is part of the Baltic Dry index (BD). As 
expected oil (OB) does impact GDP as also highlighted by Mork et al. (1994). There is 
also inverse causality, signifying that a group of countries can affect oil prices as 
suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2004) in relation to OPEC countries but interestingly, our 
data does not include any OPEC countries. In relation to net oil exporters and importers, 
oil (OB) is apparently more important for net oil exporters as the two-way causality 
remains while for net oil importers, we observe a one-way causality from GDP to oil 
(OB). Wang et al. (2013) do find different reactions between oil-exporting and oil-
importing countries, as positive aggregate and precautionary demand oil shocks are 
shown to result in a higher degree of co-movement among the stock markets in oil-
exporting countries. 
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Table 7.7: Granger Causality Tests (Panel Data of all countries, net oil exporters and net oil 
importers). 
The table shows Panel Granger causality tests between quarterly macroeconomic variable (GDP) and all relevant 
variables. The predictive variables are consisting of NFX (National foreign exchange), NAM (National illiquidity-
Amihud), GAM (Global illiquidity-Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry index).  NFX is the national 
foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our illiquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ 
in front of each illiquidity variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global 
illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris 
(2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB 
is crude oil Brent price while BD is the Baltic Dry index. All variables are orthogonalised. Besides the standard pairwise 
Granger causality panel data test, we also use the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel data test. We first test the null 
hypothesis that our variables do not Granger cause the macroeconomic variable in question and then we test the null 
hypothesis that our macroeconomic variable does not Granger cause the respective variables in question. The null for 
the D-H test is that that our variables do not homogeneously cause the macroeconomic variable in question and then 
we test the null hypothesis that our macroeconomic variable does not homogeneously cause the particular variables in 
question. We do this for all macroeconomic and predictive variables. We report the F-test and p-value (in parenthesis) 
for the standard panel Granger causality test and the W-stat, Z bar and probability (in parenthesis) for the D-H test. We 
use 2 and 4 lags for our tests. If in bold, figures denote statistically significant results at least at 10% level. Panels A, 
B and C present results for all countries, net oil exporters and net oil importers respectively. The sample period is from 
January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, 
Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Panel A: All countries 
    Standard pairwise Granger Causality Tests  Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 
  Std (2 lags) Std (4 lags)  D-H (2 lags) D-H (4 lags) 
Line 1 H0: NFX does not →GDP 
0.139 0.496  1.961 3.160 
(0.871) (0.739)  -0.154 -1.007 
   (0.878) (0.314) 
Line 2 H0: GDP does not → NFX 
0.511 0.724  1.006 4.346 
(0.600) (0.576)  -1.570 0.208 
   (0.116) (0.835) 
Line 3 H0: NAM does not →GDP 
1.017 0.788  0.664 3.259 
(0.362) (0.533)  -2.077 -0.905 
   (0.038) (0.366) 
Line 4 H0: GDP does not → NAM 
0.543 1.115  2.148 4.146 
(0.581) (0.348)  0.124 0.003 
   (0.901) (0.998) 
Line 5 H0: GAM does not →GDP 
7.822 4.977  2.877 4.147 
(0.000) (0.001)  1.205 0.005 
   (0.228) (0.996) 
Line 6 H0: GDP does not → GAM 
4.851 5.912  2.298 5.915 
(0.008) (0.000)  0.346 1.815 
   (0.730) (0.070) 
Line 7 H0: OB does not →GDP 
0.097 0.798  1.348 2.304 
(0.907) (0.527)  -1.062 -1.883 
   (0.288) (0.060) 
Line 8 H0: GDP does not → OB 
4.622 4.335  2.174 4.551 
(0.010) (0.002)  0.163 0.418 
   (0.871) (0.676) 
Line 9 H0: BD does not →GDP 
26.420 19.185  16.756 22.729 
(0.000) (0.000)  21.813 19.065 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Line 10 H0: GDP does not → BD 
1.401 4.152  0.981 6.593 
(0.247) (0.003)  -1.608 2.516 
   (0.108) (0.012) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Net oil exporting countries 
    Standard pairwise Granger Causality Tests  Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 
  Std (2 lags) Std (4 lags)  D-H (2 lags) D-H (4 lags) 
Line 1 H0: NFX does not →GDP 
1.255 1.017  1.672 2.862 
(0.286) (0.399)  -0.411 -0.928 
     (0.681) (0.354) 
Line 2 H0: GDP does not → NFX 
3.196 3.442  1.698 5.644 
(0.042) (0.009)  -0.385 1.087 
     (0.701) (0.277) 
 302 
 
Line 3 H0: NAM does not →GDP 
0.416 0.462  0.709 1.940 
(0.660) (0.764)  -1.422 -1.595 
     (0.155) (0.111) 
Line 4 H0: GDP does not → NAM 
0.149 0.385  2.450 3.985 
(0.862) (0.819)  0.404 -0.114 
     (0.686) (0.909) 
Line 5 H0: GAM does not →GDP 
4.364 2.632  2.642 4.375 
(0.014) (0.034)  0.605 0.168 
     (0.545) (0.866) 
Line 6 H0: GDP does not → GAM 
3.849 4.924  2.630 7.295 
(0.022) (0.001)  0.593 2.283 
     (0.553) (0.022) 
Line 7 H0: OB does not →GDP 
0.249 0.265  0.773 1.561 
(0.780) (0.900)  -1.355 -1.869 
     (0.175) (0.062) 
Line 8 H0: GDP does not → OB 
3.502 2.475  2.382 4.588 
(0.031) (0.044)  0.332 0.322 
     (0.740) (0.747) 
Line 9 H0: BD does not →GDP 
10.200 9.349  12.183 15.306 
(0.000) (0.000)  10.623 8.098 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Line 10 H0: GDP does not → BD 
0.384 3.233  0.897 7.172 
(0.682) (0.013)  -1.225 2.199 
     (0.221) (0.028) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Net oil importing countries 
    Standard pairwise Granger Causality Tests  Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 
  Std (2 lags) Std (4 lags)  D-H (2 lags) D-H (4 lags) 
Line 1 H0: NFX does not →GDP 
0.056 0.301  2.249 3.458 
(0.946) (0.878)  0.194 -0.496 
     (0.846) (0.620) 
Line 2 H0: GDP does not → NFX 
0.333 0.666  0.314 3.049 
(0.717) (0.616)  -1.836 -0.792 
     (0.066) (0.428) 
Line 3 H0: NAM does not →GDP 
0.803 0.877  0.619 4.578 
(0.449) (0.478)  -1.516 0.315 
     (0.130) (0.753) 
Line 4 H0: GDP does not → NAM 
0.396 0.955  1.846 4.306 
(0.673) (0.432)  -0.229 0.118 
     (0.819) (0.906) 
Line 5 H0: GAM does not →GDP 
3.919 2.503  3.112 3.919 
(0.021) (0.042)  1.098 -0.162 
     (0.272) (0.871) 
Line 6 H0: GDP does not → GAM 
1.719 2.040  1.965 4.535 
(0.181) (0.089)  -0.104 0.284 
     (0.917) (0.777) 
Line 7 H0: OB does not →GDP 
0.120 0.788  1.924 3.047 
(0.887) (0.533)  -0.147 -0.793 
     (0.883) (0.428) 
Line 8 H0: GDP does not → OB 
1.789 2.385  1.967 4.515 
(0.169) (0.051)  -0.102 0.269 
     (0.919) (0.788) 
Line 9 H0: BD does not →GDP 
16.472 11.120  21.330 30.152 
(0.000) (0.000)  20.225 18.865 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Line 10 H0: GDP does not → BD 
1.427 1.604  1.064 6.014 
(0.241) (0.173)  -1.049 1.359 
     (0.294) (0.174) 
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7.4.5. NET OIL EXPORTERS: DEVELOPED VERSUS EMERGING COUNTRIES 
Sung and Giouvris (2016) finds that causality between macroeconomic variables and 
liquidity are different for developed and developing markets. Since our data consists of 
two (2) countries that are categorised as emerging markets/ countries by MSCI, we decide 
to investigate this briefly by further regrouping our net oil exporting countries into 
developed and emerging countries. Therefore, developed countries are consisting of 
Norway, Canada and Denmark while Mexico and Brazil will form part of emerging 
countries.  
 
7.4.5.1. SUMMARY OF THE AVERAGE ADJUSTED R2 FOR NET OIL EXPORTERS: 
DEVELOPED VS EMERGING COUNTRIES 
As before, table 7.8 presents a summary of the grand average of adjusted R2 of the 
relevant variables. According to table 7.8, national foreign exchange (NFX) has extra 
explanatory power over financial variables for emerging countries, which could probably 
be due to Brazil, as Brazil is the only country that shows significant results in the earlier 
sections. Both illiquidity variables provide extra explanatory power for developed 
countries which is probably due to the more established financial markets of developed 
countries. Nevertheless, global illiquidity (GAM) remains superior compared to national 
illiquidity (NAM) for developed countries. As expected, oil (OB) is more important for 
emerging countries, as oil (OB) provides superior explanatory power over financial 
variables, potentially due to emerging countries over-reliance on oil. Surprisingly, the 
Baltic dry index (BD) does not provide any extra explanatory power over financial 
variables for both developed and emerging markets. However, then again in table 7.1, our 
net oil exporting countries are in the bottom five “liner shipping connectivity index” of 
our sample. 
Overall, table 7.8 shows that oil (OB) appears to be more significant for emerging 
countries while illiquidity variables provide superior explanatory power for developed 
countries.  
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Table 7.8: Summary of the average adjusted R2 of the five (5) net oil exporting countries as a group of developed and emerging countries (Net oil exporters-Developed countries and Net oil 
exporters-Emerging countries). 
The table shows the summary average adjusted R2 results from the predictive regression of table 7.4 and table 7.5. FV only (financial variables) includes RF (Risk free); SD (Standard deviation); XS 
(Excess market returns); DY (Dividend yield) as well as one lag of the dependent variable (and we include more lags if there is autocorrelation in the residuals). The predictive variables are consisting of 
NFX (National foreign exchange), NAM (National Amihud), GAM (Global Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry), whereas ALL involves regression using all the variables. Thus, the Adj. 
R2 presents Adjusted R2 of the dependent variable (GDP) + financial variables (FV) + X (relevant additional variables) or ALL (All variables). Please note that summarising by taking the average adjusted 
R2 is based on the methodology of Brockman et al (2009), Galariotis & Giouvris (2015) and Sung & Giouvris (2016). Net oil exporters - Developed countries are Norway, Canada, and Denmark while 
Net oil exporters – Emerging countries are Mexico and Brazil. NFX is the national foreign exchange relative to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our liquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in 
front of each illiquidity variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). Global illiquidity is constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) 
and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby global illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil Brent price while BD is the Baltic Dry index. 
The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website. 
Summary of developed versus emerging countries Adj. R2 
 Average Adj. R2  % Change of Adj. R2 relative to FV only 
 FV only 
FV + 
FX 
FV + 
NAM 
FV + 
GAM 
FV + 
OB 
FV + 
BD 
FV + 
ALL  
FV + 
FX 
FV + 
NAM 
FV + 
GAM 
FV + 
OB 
FV + 
BD 
FV + 
ALL 
X→GDP (Net oil exporters – Developed 
countries) 0.195 0.190 0.202 0.205 0.284 0.190 0.305  -2.383% 3.870% 5.488% 45.561% -2.507% 56.474% 
X→GDP (Net oil exporters – Emerging countries) 0.244 0.262 0.235 0.244 0.378 0.241 0.415  7.610% -3.578% -0.140% 55.041% -1.296% 70.325% 
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7.4.5.2. CAUSALITY RESULTS FOR NET OIL EXPORTERS: DEVELOPED VS 
EMERGING COUNTRIES 
We have also conducted casualty tests on net oil exporters (developed countries) and net 
oil exporters (emerging countries) to investigate if there is a two-way causality between 
GDP and the chosen predictive variables for the two group of countries (or markets).  
Panel A in table 7.9 reports causality results between GDP and our predictive variables 
for net oil exporters (developed countries). The panel shows that national foreign 
exchange (NFX) Granger cause GDP but there is no interaction between national 
illiquidity (NAM) and GDP. Global illiquidity (GAM) Granger causes GDP and 
surprisingly there is two-way relationship between Baltic Dry index (BD) and GDP 
although in our last section BD apparently does not provide any extra explanatory power. 
More surprisingly there is no interaction between oil (OB) and GDP, probably due to 
insufficient amount of data after segregation of net oil exporting countries to developed 
and emerging countries. 
Panel B of table 7.9 shows causalities for emerging countries among net oil exporters. 
Unlike developed countries, emerging countries do not show any interaction between 
GDP and NFX, which is unexpected as our earlier results appear to show that Brazil may 
be the reason that there is a relationship between GDP and NFX. However, GDP appears 
to cause both national illiquidity (NAM) and global illiquidity (GAM). There is also no 
two-way causality between GDP and Baltic Dry index (BD) but BD does cause GDP. 
Similar to developed countries, there are no interactions found between GDP and oil (OB) 
also for emerging countries, again probably due to insufficient data. 
Overall, there is only two-way causality between Baltic Dry (BD) and GDP for developed 
countries. There is no causality between national illiquidity (NAM) and GDP for 
developed countries while for emerging countries there is a one-way causality from GDP 
to NAM. This is contradictory to Sung and Giouvris (2016) who finds that there is a two-
way causality between macroeconomic variables and national liquidity. Nevertheless, our 
contradictory evidence is probably due to the high liquidity of developed markets. Dey 
(2005) highlights that liquidity is not a concern for investors, resulting in insignificant 
results for developed markets. Both markets (group of countries) obtain significant results 
for global illiquidity (GAM) but for developed countries, GAM caused GDP while the 
opposite is observed for emerging countries, which is similar to Sung and Giouvris (2016) 
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However, Sung and Giouvris (2016) find no causality for developed markets. 
Surprisingly, one-way causality for national foreign exchange (NFX) is found only in 
developed countries and not emerging countries. More surprisingly, there is no causality 
between oil (BD) and GDP for both developed and emerging countries, probably due to 
insufficient amount of data after segregation of net oil exporting countries to developed 
and emerging countries. 
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Table 7.9: Granger Causality Tests (Panel Data of Net oil exporters–Developed countries and Net oil 
exporters–Emerging countries). 
The table shows Panel Granger causality tests between quarterly macroeconomic variable (GDP) and all relevant 
variables. The predictive variables are NFX (National foreign exchange), NAM (National illiquidity-Amihud), GAM 
(Global illiquidity-Amihud), OB (Crude oil Brent) and BD (Baltic Dry).  NFX is the national foreign exchange relative 
to United States Dollars (USD). Amihud (AM) is our liquidity measure and the prefix ‘N’ in front of each illiquidity 
variable refers to national illiquidity-Amihud (NAM) while the prefix ‘G’ refers to global illiquidity-Amihud (GAM). 
Global illiquidity is constructed as in Brockman et al. (2009) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) whereby global 
illiquidity is created by combining all countries except the country nominated for the test. OB is crude oil Brent price 
while BD is the Baltic Dry index. All variables are orthogonalised. Besides the standard pairwise Granger causality 
panel data test, we also use the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) panel data test. We first test the null hypothesis that our 
variables do not Granger cause the macroeconomic variable in question and then we test the null hypothesis that our 
macroeconomic variable does not Granger cause the respective variables in question. The null for the D-H test is that 
that our variables do not homogeneously cause the macroeconomic variable in question and then we test the null 
hypothesis that our macroeconomic variable does not homogeneously cause the particular variables in question. We do 
this for all macroeconomic and liquidity variables. We report the F-test and p-value (in parenthesis) for the standard 
panel Granger causality test and the W-stat, Z bar and probability (in parenthesis) for the D-H test. We use 2 and 4 lags 
for our tests. If in bold, figures denote statistically significant results at least at 10% level. Panels A and B present 
results for Net oil exporters (Developed countries) and Net oil exporters (Emerging countries) respectively. The sample 
period is from January 1998 to December 2015, consisting of 72 quarterly observations. All data are obtained from 
DataStream, Bloomberg, World Bank and US Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. 
Panel A: Net oil exporters (Developed countries) 
    Standard pairwise Granger Causality Tests  Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 
  Std (2 lags) Std (4 lags)  D-H (2 lags) D-H (4 lags) 
Line 1 H0: NFX does not →GDP 
0.665 0.902  2.042 3.367 
(0.515) (0.464)  -0.018 -0.435 
   (0.986) (0.664) 
Line 2 H0: GDP does not → NFX 
2.483 2.303  1.513 4.599 
(0.086) (0.060)  -0.448 0.256 
   (0.654) (0.798) 
Line 3 H0: NAM does not →GDP 
0.106 0.205  0.474 2.084 
(0.900) (0.935)  -1.292 -1.155 
   (0.196) (0.248) 
Line 4 H0: GDP does not → NAM 
0.964 0.499  0.856 3.046 
(0.383) (0.736)  -0.981 -0.615 
   (0.326) (0.538) 
Line 5 H0: GAM does not →GDP 
2.717 1.510  1.641 3.221 
(0.069) (0.201)  -0.344 -0.517 
   (0.731) (0.605) 
Line 6 H0: GDP does not → GAM 
0.559 1.216  0.891 4.588 
(0.573) (0.305)  -0.954 0.250 
   (0.340) (0.803) 
Line 7 H0: OB does not →GDP 
0.257 0.174  0.792 1.873 
(0.773) (0.952)  -1.033 -1.273 
   (0.301) (0.203) 
Line 8 H0: GDP does not → OB 
1.625 1.457  2.438 4.520 
(0.200) (0.217)  0.303 0.212 
   (0.762) (0.833) 
Line 9 H0: BD does not →GDP 
9.047 6.964  13.155 15.399 
(0.000) (0.000)  9.019 6.324 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Line 10 H0: GDP does not → BD 
0.475 2.513  1.348 8.634 
(0.622) (0.043)  -0.582 2.524 
   (0.561) (0.012) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Net oil exporters (Emerging countries) 
    Standard pairwise Granger Causality Tests  Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) 
  Std (2 lags) Std (4 lags)  D-H (2 lags) D-H (4 lags) 
Line 1 H0: NFX does not →GDP 
0.610 0.324  1.117 2.104 
(0.545) (0.862)  -0.628 -0.934 
     (0.530) (0.350) 
Line 2 H0: GDP does not → NFX 
1.031 1.715  1.975 7.211 
(0.360) (0.151)  -0.059 1.405 
     (0.953) (0.160) 
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Line 3 H0: NAM does not →GDP 
0.558 0.549  1.061 1.725 
(0.574) (0.700)  -0.665 -1.107 
     (0.506) (0.268) 
Line 4 H0: GDP does not → NAM 
3.018 1.632  4.841 5.394 
(0.052) (0.170)  1.841 0.573 
     (0.066) (0.567) 
Line 5 H0: GAM does not →GDP 
2.078 1.391  4.143 6.107 
(0.129) (0.241)  1.378 0.899 
     (0.168) (0.369) 
Line 6 H0: GDP does not → GAM 
4.185 4.856  5.239 11.356 
(0.017) (0.001)  2.106 3.304 
     (0.035) (0.001) 
Line 7 H0: OB does not →GDP 
0.657 0.468  0.743 1.093 
(0.520) (0.759)  -0.877 -1.397 
     (0.381) (0.163) 
Line 8 H0: GDP does not → OB 
2.019 1.261  2.297 4.689 
(0.137) (0.289)  0.154 0.250 
     (0.877) (0.803) 
Line 9 H0: BD does not →GDP 
8.113 6.663  10.725 15.167 
(0.001) (0.000)  5.751 5.058 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Line 10 H0: GDP does not → BD 
0.037 1.863  0.221 4.981 
(0.964) (0.121)  -1.223 0.386 
     (0.221) (0.700) 
 
 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
This study looks into the relationship between macroeconomic growth (captured by GDP) 
and predictive variables namely national foreign exchange (NFX), national illiquidity 
(NAM), global illiquidity (GAM), oil (OB) and Baltic Dry index (BD). By investigating 
net oil exporting countries (Norway, Canada, Denmark, Mexico and Brazil) and net oil 
importing countries (Singapore, UK, Germany, Japan and France), our paper offers 
original results on the two groups of countries which have not been commonly segregated 
in the past as highlighted by Wang et al. (2013).  
This paper shows that excess market returns (XS) is the most relevant financial variable, 
while among predictive variables, oil (OB) appears to be the most significant as the GDP 
of nine (9) countries is predicted by it. The coefficient obtained is positive. Between 
illiquidity variables, national illiquidity (NAM) is found to be superior in comparison to 
global illiquidity (GAM) but both variables mainly show a negative relationship with 
GDP, except for Canada’s GDP which is found to be positively related with national 
illiquidity (NAM). National foreign exchange (NFX) is the least important predictive 
variable, as it is significant only in the case of Brazil. Baltic Dry index (BD) is found to 
be negatively related to economic growth, which is contradictory to past research. 
Nevertheless, when including all variables, Brazil obtains a positive coefficient revealing 
 309 
 
the ability of the Baltic Dry index (BD) to predict the future course of the economy, 
consistent to past research such as Bakshi et al. (2011). Since NFX and BD remain 
significant in the case of Brazil, the results show that the two variables combine can 
predict the state of the economy of Brazil. Both illiquidity variables provide greater 
explanatory power in comparison to financial variables but global illiquidity (GAM) is 
apparently superior. BD also provides some explanatory power while NFX does not 
provide any benefits when all countries are included. However, it is found that overall oil 
(OB) is the most important predictive variable, as it provides the greatest explanatory 
power. Our results show that oil (OB) has higher explanatory power for net oil exporters 
while the BD seems to be more important for net oil importing countries. Moreover, NFX 
is also found to provide some explanatory power for the group of net oil exporters only.   
With regards to causality, we obtain almost similar findings to Galariotis and Giouvris 
(2015), as there is two way causality between global illiquidity (GAM) and GDP. Unlike 
Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) who find evidence of a two way causality, our results 
show one way causality from national illiquidity (NAM) to GDP. However, it should be 
pointed out that Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) research involves G7 countries for 
different periods and hence it may not be directly comparable to our study.    
GDP is found to cause NFX when the countries are segregated into net oil exporters and 
importers. Baltic Dry index (BD) and oil (OB) shows a two-way causality but it appears 
to be stronger for the former. Evidence for the BD is similar to Bloch et al. (2012) study 
which involves coal consumption, as coal is part of BD. As expected, oil (OB) does 
impact GDP as mentioned by Mork et al. (1994) and there is also an inverse causality, 
signifying that a group of countries can affect the price of oil (OB) as suggested by 
Kaufmann et al. (2004) although none of our countries are part of OPEC. In relation to 
net oil exporters and importers, oil (OB) is apparently more important for net oil exporters 
as the two-way causality remains, while for net oil importers, only causality from GDP 
to oil (OB) can be observed. GDP is found to cause NFX when the countries are 
segregated into net oil exporters and importers, signifying that macroeconomic inactivity 
(captured by GDP) may be the reason that countries try to manipulate their currencies as 
reported by Inman (2015) for China. 
By further segregating net oil exporting countries into developed (Norway, Canada and 
Denmark) and emerging markets/ countries (Mexico and Brazil), our results show that 
NFX has extra explanatory power over financial variables for emerging countries while 
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both illiquidity variables provide extra explanatory powers for developed countries only. 
Nevertheless, global illiquidity (GAM) remains superior compared to national illiquidity 
(NAM) for developed countries. Oil (OB) appears to be more important for emerging 
countries, potentially due to emerging countries over-reliance on oil while Baltic dry 
index (BD) does not provide any extra explanatory power for both developed and 
emerging countries. We find a two-way causality between BD and GDP for developed 
countries. There is one way causality from GDP to NAM for emerging countries, which 
is contradictory to Sung and Giouvris (2016) who find that there is a two way causality 
between macroeconomic variables and national liquidity for emerging markets. We 
obtain significant results for GAM for both markets. However, for developed countries, 
GAM causes GDP while the opposite is observed for emerging countries. The findings 
on emerging countries is similar to Sung and Giouvris (2016) but they find no causality 
for developed markets. Surprisingly, a one-way causality for NFX is found only for 
developed countries and not for emerging countries. More surprisingly, there is no 
causality between oil (BD) and GDP for both developed and emerging countries of net 
oil exporters which may probably due to insufficient amount of data after segregation of 
the net oil exporting countries. 
Overall, in relation to illiquidity variables, we find similar results but also some 
contradictory results to Galariotis and Giouvris (2015) and Sung and Giouvris (2016), 
probably due to different data and periods used. Nevertheless, we believe that further 
research is necessary in order to include OPEC countries especially when studying oil. 
One other issue that has arisen is the classification of the chosen countries based on the 
latest available data of 2012. For instance Mork et al. (1994) classify UK as an oil 
exporting country while we consider it as a net oil importing country. Moreover, Mork et 
al. (1994) highlight that the UK and Norway switch from a position of net importer to net 
exporter of oil in the 1970s while Canada also has moved back and forth between net 
exporter and net importer over time. Therefore, for future studies the classification of 
countries should probably be based on the average or total oil exports or imports over the 
sample periods. 
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CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSION 
 
At the start of this PhD thesis, we acknowledge that the financial crisis of 2007/ 2008 is 
an important event for the global financial markets and liquidity appears to be one of the 
reasons for the crisis, as some researchers even refer to the crisis as a liquidity crisis. Past 
liquidity research also provides evidence of the influence that liquidity has on asset 
pricing, signifying the importance of liquidity for firms, investors, regulators and 
financial markets. Hence, due to the financial crisis and financial sector developments, 
the study of liquidity has become more prominent. Even though the number of studies on 
liquidity have increased over the years, some questions remain unanswered as past 
research tends to focus on the US market. Therefore, we believe that further studies 
should be done on liquidity.  
Chapter one provides an introduction as well as the aims of our PhD research while the 
second chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to our research. We have conducted 
five empirical studies. The third chapter is the first empirical chapter, which investigates 
the relationship between illiquidity and monetary conditions in the UK. Chapter four and 
five research the ability of illiquidity as an investment style in the UK. However, chapter 
four focuses on the financial crisis while chapter five employs a longer data period and 
conducts additional analysis such as the January effect. Chapter six and seven are the last 
two empirical chapters and both chapters investigate illiquidity and the energy markets 
by studying net oil exporters and importers. Chapter six investigates the asymmetric 
effect of oil price and illiquidity shocks on economic growth while chapter seven studies 
the relationship between economic growth and five predictive variables such as oil, 
national illiquidity, global illiquidity and the Baltic Dry index.  
Our findings in chapter three show that in general, illiquid portfolios generate higher 
returns relative to liquid portfolios and changes to monetary conditions seem to have more 
effect on illiquid stocks relative to liquid stocks, signifying the sensitivity of the illiquid 
stocks. This chapter also shows that market liquidity increases after expansive shifts, but 
with some interruptions due to major events such as the financial crisis. However, it is 
less noticeable during restrictive periods, suggesting that investors are less concerned 
with liquidity, at least in the UK.  
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Chapter four investigates the potential of illiquidity as an investment style in the UK  
during the financial crisis, using Ibbotson et al. (2013) framework and Sharpe (1992) 
benchmark criteria of 1) “identifiable before the fact”, 2) “not easily beaten”, 3) “a 
viable alternative”, and 4) “low in cost”. Our results show that pre-crisis, illiquidity is 
able to meet the four criteria of Sharpe (1992) benchmark requirements or at least show 
its profitability as an investment style. Thus, we agree with Ibbotson et al. (2013) that 
illiquidity can be considered as an alternative investment style in equal standing with the 
other styles. However, as expected, the portfolios performance post-crisis is almost 
consistently worse relative to pre-crisis. Interestingly, although illiquidity is not as 
successful after the crisis, it does provide steady profits as it is able to perform better than 
the benchmarks. Furthermore, it is more stable, signifying profit opportunity potential.  
Chapter five is similar to our study in the previous chapter but using a longer period of 
23 years and the results shows that illiquidity still meets all four criteria of Sharpe (1992). 
However, using the longer period does not improve results, as the strong relationship 
between size and illiquidity still remains, signifying that the favourable performance of 
illiquidity may actually be due to size. The chapter also finds evidence to suggest that 
with regards to “covariance model” (e.g. financial models), “characteristics model” (e.g. 
financial ratios) may be the best technique to construct illiquidity portfolios as it provides 
consistent results. Finally, the January effect seems to be present on the investment styles 
(except for momentum), while our double sorted portfolios signify that the January effect 
of value and size investment styles appear to be an illiquidity phenomenon.  
Chapter six investigates the impact of oil price shocks and illiquidity shocks on eleven 
(11) countries, consisting of five (5) net oil exporting countries (Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Mexico and Norway) and six (6) net oil importing countries (France, Germany, Japan, 
Singapore, UK and US). During the financial crisis, our research initially shows that 
generally net oil importing countries appear to go into recession immediately after a 
positive oil price shock, while the recession for net oil exporting countries only happen 
after a negative oil price shock. However, our results for asymmetric effect are 
contradictory to past research such as Engemann et al. (2014) who concentrate on the US 
states, as most countries in our sample respond to negative oil price shocks instead of 
positive oil price shocks. Our findings also show two countries exhibiting symmetrical 
effect. Furthermore, we “nationalise” the oil price shocks but it does not seem to provide 
any obvious improvement in results when testing for asymmetric effect. 
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We also investigate illiquidity shocks in chapter six and our evidence expectedly show 
that countries such as Norway, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the US endure positive 
illiquidity shocks prior to a recession period. Further investigation by regression models 
reveal a clear relationship between illiquidity shocks and GDP in relation to positive 
illiquidity shocks. Although most countries experience directional asymmetry in relation 
to illiquidity shocks, four countries show symmetrical effect, with Mexico displaying a 
genuine symmetrical effect as positive and negative illiquidity shocks cause the GDP of 
Mexico to move in the opposite direction respectively. Moreover, the results on illiquidity 
shocks seem to be much clearer in comparison to oil price shocks.  
Chapter seven is the final empirical chapter and it looks into the relationship between 
macroeconomic growth (captured by GDP) and five (5) predictive variables. We split our 
sample into net oil exporting countries and net oil importing countries. This chapter 
provides original results by including extra predictive variables such as oil (OB), Baltic 
Dry index (BD) and national foreign exchange (NFX), in addition to the illiquidity 
variables134 which have not been used before.  Our findings show that excess market 
returns (XS) is the most relevant financial variable, while among predictive variables, oil 
(OB) appears to be the most significant as the GDP of nine (9) countries is positively 
predicted by it. Between illiquidity variables, national illiquidity (NAM) is found to be 
superior in comparison to global illiquidity (GAM). NFX is the least important predictive 
variable while BD is found to be negatively related to economic growth, which is 
contradictory to past research. Chapter seven also shows that oil (OB) has higher 
explanatory power for net oil exporters while the BD seems to be more important for net 
oil importing countries.  
With regards to causality, chapter seven finds that there is two way causality between 
global illiquidity (GAM) and GDP but unlike Galariotis and Giouvris (2015), our results 
show only one way causality from national illiquidity (NAM) to GDP. Baltic Dry index 
(BD) and oil (OB) shows a two-way causality but it appears to be stronger for the former. 
Oil (OB) is apparently more important for net oil exporters as the two-way causality 
remains while for net oil importers, only causality from GDP to oil (OB) can be observed. 
By further segregating net oil exporting countries into developed (Norway, Canada and 
                                                 
134 The paper uses the Amihud illiquidity measure to construct two illiquidity variables namely national illiquidity (NAM) and global 
illiquidity (GAM). National illiquidity (NAM) relates to the illiquidity of the companies of a specific country while global illiquidity 
(GAM) excludes the companies of the specific country and hence consisting of international companies only. Further details of the 
illiquidity variables can be found in the Data and variables section of chapter seven. 
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Denmark) and emerging markets/ countries (Mexico and Brazil), our results show that 
oil (OB) appears to be more important for emerging countries, potentially due to 
emerging countries over-reliance on oil while BD does not provide any extra explanatory 
power for both developed and emerging countries. Surprisingly, there is no causality 
between oil (BD) and GDP for both developed and emerging countries of net oil exporters 
which may probably due to insufficient amount of data after segregation of the countries. 
As a summary, the PhD thesis main findings are as follows:  
 Firstly, the evidence generally shows that illiquid portfolios are found to supersede 
liquid stocks returns but different illiquidity measures capture different aspects of 
liquidity, thus there can be some divergence on the results obtained.  
 Secondly, we find that market liquidity and the “illiquid minus liquid stocks (IML) 
portfolio” are affected by changes in monetary conditions. However, market 
liquidity and the IML portfolio have different reaction towards BOE base rate and 
LIBOR. It shows that investors who are concerned with market illiquidity and the 
IML portfolio should focus on LIBOR and BOE decisions respectively. 
Nevertheless, it can be deducted that when there is an intersection between the two 
monetary conditions, the reaction is stronger. 
 Thirdly, our results show that illiquidity is able to meet the four criteria of Sharpe 
(1992) benchmark requirements or at least show its profitability, signifying its 
potential as an investment style. However, illiquidity is found to be strongly 
correlated to size for the UK market.  
 Fourthly, most countries generally experience directional asymmetry in relation to 
both oil price shocks and illiquidity shocks but there are also countries that show 
symmetrical effect.   
 Fifthly, illiquidity shocks appear to be at least an equally important determinant of 
the state of the economy compared to oil price shocks which is thought to be one 
of the most important factors for a number of years.  
 Sixthly, among the five (5) predictive variables, oil (OB) appears to be the most 
significant as it is able to predict the GDP of 9 out of 10 countries, while excess 
market returns (XS) is the most relevant among the four (4) financial variables. 
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Even though illiquidity is less able to predict economic growth compared to oil, 
illiquidity still provides some explanatory power. 
 Lastly, categorising the chosen countries into net oil exporting countries and net oil 
importing countries does provide some valuable insights, as net oil exporters (e.g. 
Brazil) and net oil importers (e.g. Germany) appear to benefit from positive oil price 
shocks and negative oil price shocks respectively. Furthermore, oil (OB) has higher 
explanatory power for net oil exporters while the Baltic Dry index (BD) seems to 
be more important for net oil importing countries. 
There are also limitations to our research. For instance, our study on the relationship 
between illiquidity and monetary conditions obtain weaker evidence in comparison to 
Jensen and Moorman (2010), as our results are generally not always significant 135 
particularly for restrictive conditions136. Furthermore, although our results appear to 
confirm illiquidity as a profitable style, there is a strong relationship between size and 
illiquidity which is in contrast with Ibbotson et al. (2013). Nevertheless, we believe that 
the different results in comparison to past researchers may simply be due to different 
periods and liquidity measures used. Another reason may be the different characteristics 
of UK and US markets such as the lower volatility in the UK market relative to the US 
market (Bartram et al., 2012), since the lower level of volatility will definitely affect asset 
prices and liquidity. Stoll (1978) does show that liquidity is positively affected by return 
volatility. 
With regards to chapter three, four and five, we believe that further studies need to be 
conducted by including more countries and over longer periods. Although we include 
more countries for chapter six and seven, we feel that including OPEC countries is 
important especially when studying oil. One other issue that has arisen is the classification 
of the chosen countries based on the latest available data of 2012. For instance Mork et 
al. (1994) classify UK as an oil exporting country while we consider it as net oil importing 
                                                 
135 We have also conducted a stock migration investigation using Amihud as a measure of liquidity but using quartiles instead of 
quintiles between January 1991 and December 2014. Basically, our investigation looks into stock migration from each quartile in year 
(t) (sorting year) to other quartiles in year (t+1) (performance year). The quartiles are only rebalanced annually meaning that stocks 
are held for at least one year. Our overall results show (not presented here to keep the number of tables as low as possible) that over 
the period, on average 78.45% of stocks remain in the same quartiles. This could be one of the reasons why our results are not always 
significant. 
136 Table 3.2 shows that there are more expansive periods compared to restrictive periods, which may be another reason for results 
that are not significant during restrictive periods.  
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country. Therefore, for future studies the classification of countries should probably be 
based on the average or total oil exports or imports over the sample periods.  
The findings of the thesis also provide some implications for regulators, policymakers 
and investors as follows.  
Our first empirical chapter shows that the IML portfolio returns increase following 
expansive monetary shifts, signifying profit opportunity for investors during expansive 
periods. As also shown in our first empirical chapter, regulators or policymakers such as 
central banks can use liquidity to stabilise the financial markets. It also shows that 
investors and regulators who are concerned with IML portfolio and market liquidity 
should focus on BOE decisions and LIBOR respectively. However, it can be concluded 
that when there is an intersection between the two monetary conditions, the reaction is 
stronger. Although market liquidity is less affected by the BOE base rate compared to 
LIBOR, the correlation between the two interest rates indicate that the decision by the 
BOE as regulator still plays a significant role in controlling the liquidity of financial 
markets.  
Nevertheless, major events such as the financial crisis can still adversely influence market 
liquidity while monetary policies appear to be less effective during restrictive periods 
because investors are less concerned with liquidity. Therefore, during such events or 
periods, regulators and policymakers should probably use other financial tools to control 
market liquidity.  
Our second empirical chapter signifies that pre-crisis, investors can use illiquidity as an 
alternative investment style in equal standing to the other styles, as it meets the four 
criteria of Sharpe (1992) benchmark requirements. Even though illiquidity is not as 
successful post-crisis, illiquidity is more stable and it is able to perform better than the 
benchmarks. Thus, signifying profit opportunities for investors with lower transaction 
costs.  
Using a longer data sample, the third empirical chapter shows that investors can still use 
illiquidity as an investment style and investors should focus on “characteristics model” 
instead of “covariance model” when constructing investment portfolios. The January 
effect evidence for the investment styles indicates further profit potentials for investors 
in the month of January.  
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However, investors should keep in mind that there is a strong relationship between size 
and illiquidity as shown in our second and third empirical chapters. Nevertheless, we feel 
that illiquidity still has its merits as an investment management tool and choosing an 
investment style actually depends on the investors’ preference. 
With regards to the asymmetric effect study in our fourth empirical chapter, most 
countries in our sample respond to negative oil price shocks instead of positive oil price 
shocks, which is contradictory to past research. Therefore, policymakers such as 
government officials should anticipate that negative oil price shocks can also influence 
macro-economies. Moreover, policymakers should also consider illiquidity shocks, as our 
results on illiquidity shocks appear to be much clearer in comparison to oil price shocks.  
Nevertheless, when five predictive variables including oil and illiquidity are investigated, 
our fifth empirical chapter highlights that policymakers, particularly policymakers of net 
oil exporters as well as emerging countries, should include oil when predicting economic 
growth. Moreover, policymakers should also acknowledge the importance of other 
variables such as excess market returns (XS) and for net oil importers, Baltic Dry index 
(BD). 
In conclusion, the thesis shows that regulators (e.g. central banks) can use liquidity to 
stabilise the market while investors can use it as an investment style. Although liquidity 
is less able to predict economic growth compared to oil, liquidity still provides some 
explanatory power for researchers such as policymakers. Therefore, the PhD thesis shows 
the continued importance of liquidity for finance theory as well as for both academics 
and practitioners. 
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